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A bstract
This dissertation explores the impact of legal and institutional factors on the 
development of securities and banking markets in transition economies, and on flows 
of foreign direct investment into the same.
Chapter 1 introduces the main questions the dissertation seeks to address and 
identifies the topic of each chapter.
Chapter 2 presents the methodology, and focuses on the 1999 EBRD Legal Indi­
cator Survey, which provided the data on securities and banking laws, and contract 
enforcement. It presents background information on the use of surveys in economics, 
and the economic rationale for attaching weights to the survey questions.
Chapter 3 studies the impact of securities laws on several measures of securities 
market development, and finds that stricter regulation of financial disclosure and 
market intermediaries raise stock market capitalisation and turnover. The enforce­
ment of disclosure and regulation of intermediaries drives this result.
Chapter 4 studies the impact of banking law and its perceived enforcement upon 
banking development. It establishes that legal indices on information disclosure by 
banks, such as use of external auditors, and consolidated supervisory examinations 
of banks, raise private credit, and foreign bank entry. Fewer legal restrictions on 
foreign ownership of domestic banks are also associated with a more developed 
banking industry.
Chapter 5 examines the relevance of the contract enforcement environment for 
flows of foreign direct investment, and establishes that foreign investors are attracted 
to locations, with a transparent legislative process and dissemination of new laws, 
and which protect htigants’ rights of appeal and judicial review of government de­
cisions. FDI is higher in countries with higher confidence in the courts to resolve 
disputes with the government, but not so in countries with higher confidence in the 
courts to resolve disputes with private parties.
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Finally, Chapter 6 summarises the main results, and offers policy imphcations 
and guidehnes for future research.
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Introduction
Transition economies from Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
have undergone dramatic changes over the last ten years. At the beginning of the 
1990s new markets began to be established where few or none had existed before. 
Some of the most far-reaching reforms have happened on the real side of the economy, 
namely privatization and restructuring of formerly state-owned enterprises. The 
main challenge of the transition period was to create foundations for new enterprises 
and to restructure old inefficient state-owned enterprises.
Financial market reforms began almost immediately at the start of the transition 
period, but have been rather slow, and proceeded in most of the transition countries 
with a lot of delays and hesitation. Many financial reforms were politically unpopular 
and left for implementation at a later stage. Financial crises, bank failures and 
fraudulent saving schemes occurred almost everywhere in this region. A key element 
of the transition was to create functioning capital markets, which involved both the 
creation of a two-tier banking system, and the establishment of a stock market. 
Thus, for example, during the transition process two-tier banking systems replaced 
the mono-bank system of the socialist years, and stock exchanges have re-emerged or 
were created in most of the 26 transition economies from Central and Eastern Europe
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and the former Soviet Union (the exceptions with no stock market today are Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan).
The banking sector plays an important role in the transition period. While stock 
markets were largely non-existent at the beginning of transition, banks as known in 
market economies, were relatively developed in some of the early reforming transi­
tion countries, such as Hungary. The mono-bank was usually broken up into new 
commercial banks in the early years of transition. Banks became crucial in extending 
loans to ’de novo’ enterprises. However, the experience of several transition countries 
suggests that the banking sector was a major source of non-performing loans to old 
state-owned enterprises and that these loans have prevented the expansion of bank 
credit to the new, small and politically less connected enterprises. The accumulation 
of bad loans became instrumental in triggering the banking crises, which plagued 
a number of transition economies in the second half of the 1990s, and resulted in 
tightening of credit, thereby stunting the growth of new firms.
Simultaneously with the economic package of reforms, legal reforms started at 
the beginning of the transition period. Typically, the classical centrally-planned 
economy operated in the virtual absence of economic legality. However, we cannot 
think of a market economy without laws and courts, functioning in such a manner 
as to reduce the uncertainty of economic outcomes. Institutional reform is difficult 
and takes time to accomplish. Changing the rules, which govern the economic 
relationships between firms and individuals and between the government and the 
private sector, is likely to generate serious obstacles and resistance. Furthermore, 
the establishment of legal norms and rules, which protect investors, and fostering 
a culture of their proper enforcement takes time. During this period of time the 
investment process in the real sector as well as in the financial sector is hampered 
by great uncertainty. So long as there are no stable laws or their enforcement is 
inadequate, potential domestic or foreign investors regard such investments as very
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risky. Thus, both domestic and foreign investment have been very low in almost 
all transition economies. A stable legal framework plays also an important role in 
securing financial stability. For example, Wagner (1998) reports that the existence 
of a rigid banking law and strict bankruptcy laws and proceedings, adopted after the 
unification in Germany, have generally prevented the uncontrolled credit expansion, 
which characterizes the other transition countries.
The purpose of the present dissertation is to examine the institutional and legal 
determinants of securities market development and banking development in transi­
tion economies. I divide my analysis into three distinct areas, namely: securities 
law and regulation and stock market development; banking law and regulation and 
banking industry development; and enforceability of commercial contracts and in- 
fiows of foreign direct investment (FDI). I introduce briefiy each topic in the next 
paragraphs.
The majority of crises in transition economies have been financial in their origin 
and nature - failing banks, pyramid deposit schemes, collapsing investment funds, 
speculative currency attacks, etc. They span from lack of investor protection to 
cases of sheer fraudulence. Economists and legal scholars alike have long maintained 
that law is essential for sound finance. Consequently, legal reform has occupied an 
integral part of political transition in Eastern Europe and governments across the 
region have been delegated the laborious task of enacting new legal rules, supportive 
of a market economy.
An established theoretical view is that the availability of external finance (both 
equity and debt) to a country’s private sector tends to be positively correlated with 
the quality of legal investor protection.^ Fairly large-sample cross-country studies 
in institutional economics, linking legal origin and legal protections of outside in­
vestors to financial and economic development have spurred a plethora of empirical
^See for example La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, (1997).
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and theoretical work over the past few years, e.g. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 
2000), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Djankov et al. (2002, 2003a, 2003b), Beck et 
al. (2000, 2003a, 2003b), Levine and Zervos (1998), among others. These recent 
studies in the area of institutional economics (recently dubbed ’’The New Com­
parative Economics”) are exploring through what channels countries’ legal origins 
matter for financial market development; whether institutional development has an 
independent impact upon economic growth, or affects it through its infiuence on the 
financial system; whether countries’ geographical and disease endowments at the 
time of colonization have an impact on their current economic and institutional de­
velopment; how government regulation affects financial market performance; which 
types of capitalist institutions -  those which protect private contracting and enforce­
ment between private firms or individuals, or those which ensure protection against 
the government and powerful elites. It is a rich research agenda, and one which is 
evolving fast.
In view of this research, which typically covers relatively large cross-sections or 
panels of data, the sample of countries studied in the current dissertation is limited 
to only about 20 transition economies. This limits seriously the degrees of freedom, 
with which we operate and make econometric inferences. Nevertheless, as we argue 
in Chapter 2 and further, the existing methodological concerns do not invalidate our 
approach, and we take measures to ensure the robustness of our results.
The main purpose of Chapter 2 is to present the methodology of the 1999 EBRD 
Legal Indicator Survey (LIS) -  a survey of legal practitioners carried out in 1999 to 
assess progress in financial and commercial legislation and the enforcement of this 
legislation. Its purpose is to justify the methodology adopted and to present the 
rationale for the content of the LIS questionnaire and the scoring and aggregation 
of the questions in the survey. I will make the argument that surveys in general 
-  particularly self-administered written questionnaires without a formal interview.
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such as the LIS -  must be well-designed in order to generate good-quality data. I will 
explain the economic rationale behind the aggregation of legal indices on securities 
and banking laws, utilised in later chapters. Furthermore, Chapter 2 presents an 
account of the extensive cleaning procedures, which I undertook in ensuring internal 
consistency, and lack of data coding errors. I will justify the steps undertaken to 
change some question weights -  in order to make them correspond better to current 
economic thinking, and to make question scores easily comparable. Chapter 2 also 
provides a brief summary of current literature on survey design and implementation, 
and presents some methodological issues of particular concern, such as conflicting 
respondents’ answers, or equal question weights. Our main purpose would be to 
lay out the main tool of gathering our legal data, and to present an account of 
its strengths and drawbacks. We will also argue that there is no unique way of 
aggregating the legal survey data -  our main criterion for weighting the data -  in 
contrast to prior uses of the same data -  would be existing economic theoretical and 
empirical work, and some internationally-accepted standards on flnancial laws (such 
as those of the Basle Core Principles of Bank Supervision (1997)).
After the discussion of the methodology in Chapter 2, I present the core the­
matic chapters of the dissertation. Chapter 3’s main aim is to investigate whether 
securities laws and their enforcement -  as perceived by the lawyers respondents to  
the LIS -  affected stock market development in 1999 and thereafter. In order to 
answer the above question, I shall test whether these laws, governing securities mar­
kets, and in operation in 1999, and in particular the quality of their enforcement, 
have any signiflcant bearing upon the volumes of equity flnance and stock market 
turnover in around 20 transition economies. I use a cross-section of relevant aggre­
gate economic data and indices of securities laws’ perceived extent and perceived 
enforcement based on the survey. The main novelty fromj>rior versions of t l ^ work 
is that I utilise disaggregated indices -  such as indices of disclosure requirements, or
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indices of regulation of securities market intermediaries -  and place less emphasis 
on the concepts of legal extensiveness and legal effectiveness, even though I still 
maintain this categorical distinction between LIS questions.
An important objective of Chapter 3 is to test newly-available empirical evidence 
by La Porta et al. (2003) that securities laws matter for stock market development, 
and that disclosure rules and liability rules, which support private enforcement mech­
anisms, rather than powerful public regulation of securities markets (i.e. the public 
enforcement view), are associated with higher market capitalisation, turnover and 
other indicators of liquidity, depth and efficiency. The La Porta et al. (2003) data 
sample do not cover the transition economies, so it is worthwhile to expand their 
sample to these countries. Furthermore, the LIS and the analysis in the dissertation 
goes into more detail in some of the aspects of securities laws that they consider. The 
latter feature also enables us to compare securities regulation and legislation -  albeit 
as perceived by the LIS respondents -  in two of the advanced transition economies 
-  Poland and the Czech Republic in the mid- to late-1990s, and to compare our 
findings with other studies of the same, e.g. Glaeser et al. (2001).
Some transition economists, e.g. Berglof and Bolton (2002), have argued that 
banking markets may be more important for the transition economies than securities 
markets. Chapter 4 studies the impact of banking law and its enforcement -  again 
as perceived by the responses to the Banking section of the LIS questionnaire -  
upon the share of credit to the private sector in GDP, the liquid liabilities of the 
domestic bank and non-bank financial intermediaries and the penetration of foreign 
banks. The main idea behind this chapter is to assess different theories of financial 
regulation and recent evidence that powerful supervision of banks, e.g. Barth et al. 
(2004), is associated with worse rather than better banking industry performance. 
The motivation for this chapter is also to try explaining the low volumes of bank 
finance, and obstacles to finance perceived by firms across transition economies, e.g.
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Pistor et al. (2000), Pries et al. (2002).
As in Chapter 3, I rely on disaggregated indices of banking law and its enforce­
ment, and test for their effect upon bank development, measured in a variety of 
ways. Suitable control variables are employed in the regression estimations, con­
trolling for degree of competition in the domestic banking sector, for availability of 
information on borrowers, and for macroeconomic stability.
In both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, which share a common theme, I conduct 
a series of robustness checks aimed at overcoming estimation problems, typical of 
cross-country regression analysis -  such as endogeneity, multi-collinearity and omit­
ted variable bias. One set of these checks involve running instrumental variables (IV) 
regressions, which correct for endogenous legal and financial development variables.
Transition economists have pointed out that foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
been a substitute for bank or capital market-raised finance by firms in transition. 
Indeed, estimates reveal that FDI flows have accounted for about half of gross fixed 
capital formation in several advanced transition economies, which have been able 
to attract a large share of total FDI inflows to the region. Therefore, firms in 
transition, which are finance-constrained, can rely on foreign partners and owners 
to inject funds and restructure.
Foreign direct investment is considered an important factor in the process of 
economic transition. It is argued that the transitional economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union can benefit directly from FDI inflows 
in terms of higher employment and capital stock, and indirectly, as a result of 
technology transfer, introduction of new management and labour skills, and better 
marketing and distribution. FDI is also regarded as being complementary to local 
industry by creating backward linkages to local suppliers, and in this way leading to 
benefits to other local firms, such as those in the upstream industry. This in itself can 
spread to the local downstream firms, which due to the entry of a multinational firm
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would initially be exposed to stronger competition. As a result of the possibility 
of FDI acting both as a substitute for the local downstream industry and as a 
complement to the local upstream industry, and depending on the magnitude of 
these effects, it can be shown that FDI can lead to growth of local industry^.
The past several years -  after the first decade of transition -  have produced sev­
eral papers which evaluate the impact of FDI in transition economies. The evidence 
is not very conclusive -  while most studies, e.g. Resmini (2000), Konings (2001), 
Djankov and Hoekman (2000), Yudaeva et al. (2003), find that foreign-owned firms 
are more productive efficient than their domestic counterparts, the results generally 
point to either no effects, or negative spillover effects on other domestic firms -  
both within the same industry, and outside. Nevertheless, most studies concur that 
benefits can be generated if labour skills improve.
Despite the numerous benefits of FDI, some transition economies seem to have 
attracted much less FDI than others. What are the reasons for this? Which are the 
key determinants of FDI in the region? Does the legal and regulatory environment 
exert any infiuence on the decision of foreign investors to enter these markets? These 
are the main questions, which Chapter 5 aims to address. My initial hypothesis is 
that both commercial law enforcement and the contract enforceability environment 
will affect the willingness of foreign entrepreneurs to invest in these markets. This 
is in line with previous case studies and investor surveys, in which property rights 
protection and legal factors are cited among the main obstacles to high FDI inflows 
in transition, as well as with more recent econometric work, performed on transition 
countries, e.g. Bevan et al. (2001), and other samples of countries, e.g. Globerman 
and Shapiro (2002).
Unlike the analysis of Chapters 3 and 4, which employ the legal data from the Fi­
nancial Markets section of the LIS, Chapter 5 utilises data from the so-called General
^For a theoretical model of the effects of FDI on local firms in the same industry see Markusen 
and Venables (1999).
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Commercial Law Effectiveness section of the survey^. I again employ disaggregated 
measures of the contract enforcement environment -  such as confidence in the work 
of the courts; legal drafting and dissemination of new laws on commercial activity; 
regulation of judicial process, and notably presence of litigants’ rights of appeal and 
judicial review of government decisions; and perceptions about court performance 
in terms of speed, fairness and cost. Importantly, the survey also gathered estimates 
of the duration of a standard debt collection case in a first-instance trial court, and 
duration of execution of a first-instance judgment.
Apart from enabling us to see which institutional features affect FDI flows -  
something which the related literature is still attempting to determine -  the study 
also relates to recent contributions to the institutional economics literature, which 
aims to understand whether private contracting institutions, guaranteeing the rights 
of private parties in disputes with other private parties; or property rights institu­
tions, guaranteeing the rights of private parties versus the government, matter most 
for economic and financial development, e.g. Acemoglu and Johnson (2003). My 
study presents evidence that foreign investors are primarily concerned with property 
rights institutions -  i.e. with guarantees that the courts will uphold their contrac­
tual and property interests in disputes with the government. Good property rights 
institutions reduce the risk of expropriation.
Notably, the dissertation makes several contributions: the original paper, which 
eventually split into Chapters 3 and 4, on Law and Finance in Transition Economies 
was one of the first attempts to estimate the impact of financiaHegal and regulatory 
factors over the volume of private sector credit, and the size and volume of stock 
market activity, for transition countries, using the La Porta et al. (1997) method­
ology. As mentioned above. Chapter 3 expands the La Porta et al. (2003) sample
^Although originally classified as a section with only effectiveness-related questions, a careful 
analysis of the questions in this section reveals that some do have elements close to extent of the 
law rather than its enforcement.
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to transition economies, and goes deeper into further detail in some aspects of se­
curities law. Chapter 4 provides a robustness check for some of the data gathered 
by Barth et al. (2001) -  they built a comprehensive data on bank regulation and 
supervision across over 100 countries, and used these data in Barth et al. (2004). 
Chapter 4 is a critique of their work, showing that measurement of some of the 
supervisory variables is highly uncertain, and finding that -  at least in transition 
economies -  some of their results on the detriment of powerful regulators may not 
necessarily hold. Finally, Chapter 5 investigates whether the contract enforcement 
environment, as measured by disaggregated indices of law dissemination, confidence 
in the courts and rights of appeal, among others, plays a significant role in explain­
ing cumulative fiows of FDI over 1999-2002 alongside standard variables used in the 
related literature. Thus, it provides valuable empirical support for the largely anec­
dotal evidence, e.g. Lankes and Venables (1996), Thornton and Mikheeva (1996), 
and more recent econometric evidence on the role of legal institutions for FDI in 
transition, e.g. Garibaldi et al. (2001), Bevan and Estrin (2000) and Bevan et al. 
(2001).
Some of the research on which the dissertation is based has been published. The 
author’s work on the EBRD Legal Indicator Survey has led to contributions to the 
Annex on Legal Reform in the 1998 and 1999 EBRD Transition Reports, and to a 
presentation of the financial law dataset in an article (joint with Anita Ramasastry) 
in Law in Transition (1999). Further work on the commercial law section of the 
Legal Indicator Survey has led to papers on corporate governance and insolvency in 
transition, also published in Law in Transition (1999 and 2000). The work in the 
dissertation also fits well into the author’s subsequent research at the World Bank 
on judicial efficiency around the world, one of the background studies for the 2002 
World Bank World Development Report, as well as work on contract enforcement 
and co-authorship of the chapter of ’’Enforcing Contracts” in the World Bank report
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on Doing Business in 2004: Understanding Regulation. Recent work by the author 
has also led to a World Bank publication on ’’Building Market Institutions in South 
Eastern Europe”, World Bank (2004).
Chapter 2 
M ethodology of the Legal 
Indicator Survey
2,1 Introduction
The new institutional economics literature uses two main methodological approaches 
to examine the economic effect of law and legal enforcement across countries. First, 
it is possible to review the laws on the books and to codify existent legal norms 
and derive corresponding measures of what laws on the books represent. For exam­
ple, in La Porta et al. (1997) shareholder and creditor rights are measured in this 
manner, first by identifying several key variables, (which taken together give a fairly 
good measure of the degree of protection of shareholder and creditor rights), and 
then by matching these variables with provisions in the law. They then construct 
corresponding legal indices, noting 1 if a certain provision is in the law, and 0 if 
such provision is omitted from the law. The approach is simple, straightforward, 
easy to use and to understand, and methodologically sound, since it builds on exis­
tent economic theory about the underlying economic variables, such as shareholder 
and creditor rights in this example. The same approach is also used in Pistor et
12
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al. (2000) when measuring the protection of shareholders and creditors in the tran­
sition economies. In this instance, the authors utilize the La Porta et al. (1997) 
methodology by using the same methodology for shareholder and creditor rights in 
the transition economies, but add on to the two indices some additional variables, 
which are matched with corresponding legal provisions. An extensive review of the 
laws in the transition countries is made, and for each country each variable, from 
which the indices of shareholder and creditor rights are constructed, is coded as 1 
or 0, depending on whether or not there exists a legal provision which supports it.
Second, it is also possible to use various surveys to measure perceptions of prac­
tising lawyers, judges, and businessmen at large, about how good the laws and legal 
enforcement in a given jurisdiction are. The latter survey approach is not limited to 
examining legal conditions and enforcement only, but is also widely used to measure 
various aspects of the business environment such as enterprise performance, corrup­
tion, bribery, unofficial payments, competition, etc. Indeed, various surveys utilizing 
perception-based data have been in use for some time in the economic literature, 
e.g. the corruption indicators of Transparency International or the World Competi­
tiveness Report are both based on surveys of business community professionals, and 
therefore reflect subjective individual opinions.
In addition, survey-based measures of legal enforcement are used both in the 
study by La Porta et al. (1997) and by Pistor et al. (2000). Since the focus and 
thrust of the Pistor et al. article is precisely on the priority of legal enforcement 
over law on the books, it is important to stress that methodologically the authors 
use a sum of three separate survey-based proxies of how good legal enforcement of 
shareholder and creditor rights may be (their variable is called Legal Effectiveness, 
but should not be confused with the legal effectiveness measures in this dissertation), 
where the surveys are not run by the authors, but obtained from three external 
sources.
Chapter 2. Methodology of the Legal Indicator Survey 14
Recently there has been a new wave of studies based on institutional survey 
indices. For example, Djankov et al. (2003a) entirely rely on survey-based measures 
of contract enforcement across 109 countries worldwide. The survey questionnaire, 
in this case, was designed to follow the exact procedures which would be followed 
by creditors to collect a bounced check, and to evict a non-paying tenant, through 
the courts. The survey was conducted with the cooperation of Lex Mundi and Lex 
Africa law firms, and one law firm in each of the 109 countries was chosen to prepare 
the survey answers. Two lawyers in each law firms worked on the survey, and the 
answers were verified by one of the partners. The main variables, whose function 
is to measure the efficiency of contract enforcement, are the number of procedures 
mandated by law through which the parties to the case and the judge must go; 
the expected duration of the case in a first-instance court, and the expected legal 
costs of procedure. Again, lawyers give opinions on each of these variables, and 
their answers axe used in constructing each of these indicators. Regardless of the 
strict factual and procedural assumptions on which the assumed case is built, the 
Lex Mundi survey also contains an element of lawyers’ opinions. Yet, the data are 
shown to be consistent with other measures of judicial efficiency, and recent updates 
of the survey relating to a larger debt claim provide additional consistency checks.
Another survey instrument, which has gained popularity among researchers work­
ing on transition economies, is the Business Environment and Enterprise Perfor­
mance Survey (BEEPS); this was conducted for the first time in the summer of 
1999, and re-run for a second time in the summer of 2002, among the transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS countries. This is a survey 
of enterprise managers, rather than lawyers, though the principles of the survey are 
the same. Again, the answers reflect individual opinions about various aspects of 
the investment climate, among them how fair and incorrupt court enforcement of 
contracts is, as well as how well the enterprise performs. The derived indicators are
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necessarily proxies of the underlying economic variable being measured.
Finally, surveys of legal practitioners have recently been utilised in large cross­
country studies, aimed at generating comparative data on registration procedures 
(following the methodology of Djankov et al. (2002), contract enforcement (following 
the methodology of Djankov et al. (2003)), bankruptcy proceedings (in co-operation 
with the American Bar Association), labour regulations (following the methodology 
of Botero et al. (2004)), and secured credit transactions (following La Porta et al. 
(1997)). These are the Doing Business data (World Bank (2004)). Typically, a 
standard detailed questionnaire is sent to one law firm in over 130 countries, and 
lawyers are asked to fill it in. The data is then coded and post-coding interactions 
with the survey respondent are usually undertaken to explain unclear answers and 
confirm interpretations. These data have gained popularity, and are being utilised 
increasingly in cross-country studies related to financial market development and 
the role of institutions, among others, e.g. Acemoglu and Johnson (2003), Beck et 
al. (2003b), Qian and Strahan (2004).
This chapter will provide a description of the methodology used to evaluate 
the quality and enforcement of investor protection laws in our sample of transi­
tion economies. Our main legal variables, which would be used in the analysis in 
subsequent chapters, are derived from the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) Legal Indicator Survey (LIS), run by the General Counsel 
Office of the EBRD since 1997; therefore we will pay due attention to the use of 
survey-based legal indicators, their attractions and limitations.
The chapter is organized as follows. We discuss the use of surveys in measuring 
economic outcomes at some length in section 2.2. Section 2.3 compares the legal 
indicators in the Transition Report 1999 and those reported and used in this thesis. 
Special attention is paid to the two set of weights used for aggregating the legal 
variables in the Transition Report and in the thesis. Consistency checks, and pro­
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cedures to clean the data are also outlined in this section. Section 2.4 presents the 
theoretical background behind the construction and content of our legal variables on 
securities laws and banking laws. Section 2.5 examines alternative ways to weight 
and aggregate the data, and their effect upon our results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The U se of Surveys in M easuring Economic 
and Legal Outcomes - the Legal Indicator Sur­
vey
It is often said that designing a good survey questionnaire is an art^. Yet, the sci­
ence of survey methodology and cognitive psychology sheds a lot of light on the 
survey process. What constitutes a good survey? What should social scientists do 
to construct better questionnaires? How do respondents arrive at the answers in the 
survey process? What cognitive processes determine the choice of a particular an­
swer, and how does this affect the answers to subsequent or earlier survey questions? 
How do expert survey responses differ from general, non-expert responses?
All these questions are discussed extensively in ’’Thinking About Answers” by 
Sudman, Bradburn and Schwarz (1996). The book summarizes existing research 
on the interactions between cognitive psychology and survey questionnaire design. 
The authors start out from the premise that a survey is a social encounter, a spe­
cial type of conversation between interviewer and interviewee, and governed by the 
same social norms which govern relations between strangers. Furthermore, a survey 
questionnaire is delivered to respondents through language, and the ways in which 
people comprehend speech or written material affect their answers. For instance, 
question wording affects, among other things, the meaning of the question. What is
^See Recanatini, Wallsten and Xu (2000) for a comprehensive review of different firm-level 
surveys, and the main problems with the design of survey questionnaires.
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more, related research indicates that the most important part of the survey process 
is the wording of each question. In this regard, question wording and how it affects 
comprehension, and whether or not the inferred meaning of the question differs from 
the meaning actually intended by the survey author, would be crucial in survey de­
sign. Small changes in wording could alter the meaning fundamentally, whereas 
extensive wording changes could change the meaning slightly. An early experiment 
from the 1940s is quoted by the authors, whereby matched samples of respondents 
were asked one of two questions: "Do you think the United States should allow 
public speeches against democracy?” or "Do you think the United States should 
forbid public speeches against democracy?" When the question referred to "allow­
ing", 21% of respondents were in favor of free speech. However, when the question 
was about "forbidding", 39% of respondents supported free speech. The authors 
point out that a theory of survey response effects would be able to explain these 
differences. Finally, it is necessary to understand that respondents’ answers to sur­
vey questionnaires are the result of complex cognitive processes, such as memory 
retrieval and information processing; therefore survey methods are inherently linked 
to cognitive psychology.
To begin with, from a cognitive perspective, answering a survey question requires 
the respondent to accomplish several distinct tasks. These include interpreting the 
question, retrieving information, forming an opinion, formatting a response, and 
editing this response. These are the main psychological stages of the process, which 
begins when a question is asked and ends with the respondent’s answer to that 
question.
The main issue in question comprehension is to ensure that the respondent’s 
understanding and interpretation of the question matches the content which the 
researcher had in mind. This involves understanding both the literal meaning of the 
question and the pragmatic meaning, i.e. to infer the questioner’s intention in ask­
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ing the question. It is argued that since lexical ambiguities are present in language, 
both spoken and written, and there exist idiosyncratic differences in word meanings 
across regions or cultures, it is often unclear what a particular word or term means 
to survey respondents. For example, it was found that respondents had in mind 
nine different meanings about the term ’’energy crisis”. Similarly, respondents also 
differed in their interpretation of the term ’’big government” . These differences in 
meaning are exacerbated when comparative surveys, such as the Legal Indicator 
Survey in our case, are conducted across countries. Therefore, in designing cross­
country surveys researchers must be careful to avoid ambiguous terms, and try to 
word questions in the same way across languages. However, to the extent that the 
LIS is a survey of experts, and the questions are highly specific and require sys­
tematic knowledge of local laws, the problems inherent in generic surveys, such as 
various opinion polls, political surveys, etc., are less acute. Furthermore, all the LIS 
respondent lawyers had a good working knowledge of English, and the survey was 
administered in English in most countries. Since a lot of the legal jargon and termi­
nology is highly specific and the lawyers we surveyed were identified mainly through 
the EBRD’s local contacts, and constitute leading law firms which work with many 
international clients, survey question comprehension and interpretation are not con­
sidered a serious issue. It must be noted that the survey was administered in the 
Russian language across the CIS countries, and the translation was made in-house, 
using professional EBRD translators, proficient in legal and economic terminology.
It has been demonstrated, however, that question comprehension can depend 
on the response alternatives provided by the survey designers. For example, rating 
scales have been found to affect the inferred meaning of the question. Using two 
different rating scales for the same question could yield different responses. To 
illustrate this point, in an experiment, German adults were asked ” How successful 
would you say you have been in life?” The question was accompanied by an 11-
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point rating scale, ranging from "not at all successful” to "extremely successful". 
However, in one case the numeric values of the rating scale ranged from 0 ("not at all 
successful") to 10 ("extremely successful"), whereas in the other case the same scale 
had numeric values from -5 ("not at all successful") to 4-5 ("extremely successful"). 
Almost three times more respondents (34% vs. 13%) endorsed a value between 0 and 
5 on the 0 to 10 scale compared to the formally equivalent values between -5 and 
0 on the -5 to 4-5 scale. Therefore, respondents appear to have inferred differential 
interpretations of "not at all successful" from the scale. Subsequent experiments 
confirmed that when this answer choice was assigned the value of 0 on the scale, 
it was interpreted as lack of success. When the same answer choice was combined 
with a numeric scale value of -5 and the scale offered 0 as the midpoint, the same 
term was interpreted by respondents as presence of failure.
In a similar experiment, respondents have been asked to provide behavioral fre­
quency reports on a rating scale ranging from "rarely" to "frequently". In one case 
the numeric scale used assigned to the verbal label "rarely" the value of 0, whereas 
in the other case: the same scale assigned to the label "rarely" the value of 1. It was 
found that respondents assigned higher frequency ratings when "rarely" was coded 
as 0 rather than 1, since the value of 0 made them interpret "rarely" as "never", 
thereby requiring the assignment of higher values for a given behavioral frequency.
These features of survey questionnaires indicate that respondents use response 
alternatives in interpreting the meaning of survey questions. The dependence of 
answers on the numeric scale given for responses is one example how this can happen. 
Therefore, this poses particular problems in survey design and is considered one of 
the main limitations of survey methods.
How important is this limitation for our survey? First, the majority of questions 
in the LIS have a format of responses of Yes, No, Unclear. Rating scales were 
introduced in the 1999 version of the survey with regards to effectiveness-related
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questions. They all share a common 5-point rating scale of 1 to 5, in increments 
of 1, and provide frequency reports. Thus, the rating scale assigns the value of 1 
to "Never”, and the value of 5 to "Almost always". We have not conducted any 
robustness checks to see whether assigning different numeric values to the same 
scale, for instance giving "never" the value of 0, would change the answers to these 
questions -  such robustness tests may be desirable, but were not feasible since the 
data was generated in one round and no pilot questionnaire was implemented (the 
questionnaire was largely a repeat of the 1998 and 1997 ones). If a change in 
numerical scale values were found to affect answers, distribution of the answer points 
could be affected. Thus, if respondents interpret a value of 1 to actually mean 
"rarely" (the next verbal label on the scale) rather than "never", this could lead 
to the respondent’s assignment of lower values to a given behavioral frequency. So, 
the effectiveness scores might be underestimated. Unfortunately, we have no way of 
judging this at this point.
Another problem of survey methods is the so-called context effect. One contex­
tual bias arises from the ordering of questions in a survey. This is known in the 
survey methodology literature as question order effects. People attempt to provide 
answers consistent with the answers already given in the survey. Prior questions 
may bring certain memories or attitudes, which then influence later answers. In 
one study, respondents were asked two questions: "How satisfied are you with the 
current U.S. health care system?" and "How satisfied are you with your health in­
surance plan?". The answers to the latter turned out to be independent of the order 
in which these questions were asked. However, the answer to the former exhibited 
strong order effects. When the question about the U.S. health care system was 
asked first, 39.6% of respondents reported being somewhat or very satisfied with 
it; when the question about individual health plans was asked first, only 26.4% of 
respondents reported being somewhat or very satisfied with the U.S. health care
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system. Apparently, having just reported on their own health plans, with which 
most respondents were satisfied, respondents then went on to interpret the question 
about the quality of the U.S. health care system, as meaning: ’’Aside from your 
own health insurance, how satisfied are you with the U.S. health care system in 
general?”, which led to lower reported levels of satisfaction.
Order effects, resulting from the sequencing of questions, are not only limited 
to order effects of preceding questions. In self-administered questionnaires such as 
written surveys sent by mail, without an interviewer, the respondent might skip 
through questions and answer later questions before actually answering earlier ones. 
Thus, order effects of this type could also occur, if the answers to later questions 
then affects the interpretation of the earlier question. In any case, from a theoretical 
point of view, question order is merely a technical aspect of the survey questionnaire 
and not a relevant psychological variable. We will get back to the context effects and 
how they are generated in the cognitive processes involved in answering a survey.
Let us now go back to the five stages of a respondent’s processing of information 
in a survey situation. We have so far focused on comprehension. The next stage of 
the process is a respondent’s recalling or computing a judgment. Once they have 
determined what the survey researcher is actually asking, respondents have to decide 
whether or not they have the answer stored in their memory, and would either need 
to recall this answer (i.e. recalling a judgment), or would have to come up with 
a judgment on the spot (i.e. computing a judgment). Usually, respondents would 
have to compute a judgment. In attitudinal questions even if an opinion has been 
formed earlier and is retrieved from memory, the existing opinion might not exactly 
match the particular aspect sought in the survey question. In behavioral questions 
respondents are unlikely to have an answer stored in memory. At the very least, 
they would have to determine whether relevant behavioral instances fit the period 
specified, etc. Thus, most survey answers record judgments generated on the spot in
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the specific context of the survey. Normally, this context dependency of respondent’s 
answers is explained by the fact that humans are ’’cognitive misers”, in other words 
when asked to form a judgment, individuals do not normally retrieve all potentially 
relevant information from memory, but rather truncate the search process as soon as 
sufficient information has come to mind to form a judgment. In addition, searching 
memory takes time, and given the time constraints of many survey processes, such 
search truncation usually happens early on. In order to induce respondents to search 
their memory extensively, they must be induced to do so by certain stimuli, e.g. if 
the answers have important personal consequences.
Information plays a crucial role in the process of computing a judgment. Infor­
mation, which is readily accessible, such as information used to answer a preceding 
question, would likely come to mind when a related question is being asked. One 
needs to distinguish between ’’temporarily accessible” information, and ’’chronically 
accessible” information. The former refers to information, which has been brought 
to the respondent’s attention by virtue of the same information being used to an­
swer a preceding question. The latter refers to information, which comes to the 
respondent’s attention by virtue of the frequency of its use in general, outside the 
survey process. For example, a respondent who is concerned about unemployment, 
might often think about this issue, and would resort to ’’chronically accessible” 
information when asked a question on this issue. Or, as in the Legal Indicator 
Survey, a respondent lawyer, by virtue of his everyday work, would know and think 
about the particular legal questions being asked, thus likely resorting to ’’chronically 
accessible” information when forming a judgment in the survey process. In other 
words, ’’temporary accessibility” is mainly determined by questionnaire design, while 
’’chronic accessibility” is mainly determined by respondents’ characteristics. Finally, 
a given piece of information is proportionately more accessible in memory if it is 
part of a larger knowledge structure, e.g. an encompassing knowledge of the overall
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legal system and a law degree might make information about bankruptcy laws more 
accessible.
Once a judgment has been formed by a survey respondent, the next stage of the 
process is concerned with how this judgment would be formatted to give a particular 
response. Survey designers do not usually allow the respondent to answer questions 
in their own words. Rather, they provide a template of response alternatives, from 
which the respondent must choose. In so doing, the answers are necessarily affected 
by the response alternatives provided. However, the impact of response alternatives 
is not only limited to the formatting stage, but also to the other stages of the 
survey-answering process. For example, in categorical scales which offer a number of 
discrete opinions, it has been demonstrated that when respondents cannot identify 
the response which reflects their judgment, they are unlikely to report it, even 
if a generic category of ’’Other” is provided by the survey designers. Or in the 
case of questions with rating scales, the range of the scale might affect question 
comprehension as well as respondents’ judgmental strategy. When rating scales are 
used, respondents usually use the most extreme stimuli to anchor the end points of 
the rating scale. In addition, if the number of stimuli to be rated is large enough, 
respondents use all categories of the rating scale about equally often.
The final stage of the survey-answering process is the editing of the response. 
Respondents might want to edit their response to the survey question before com­
municating it for reasons of social desirability or self-presentation. This effect, how­
ever, is shown to be more pronounced in face-to-face interviews, and less so in 
self-administered surveys. Since the Legal Indicator Survey is of the second type, 
the problem of providing an answer which makes the respondent look good or is 
’’politically correct” is less of an issue.
The methodology employed in the Legal Indicator Survey is based on hypotheses 
derived in economic theory. To avoid generality, it focuses on narrow topics - national
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laws and regulations on banking and stock markets, laws related to bankruptcy, 
corporate governance and secured transactions, as well as perceptions about the 
general enforceability of contracts and the performance of the courts. It is factual, 
as questions elicit responses on the laws in force and how a procedure is done in 
practice, not how the respondent would evaluate its effectiveness. The questionnaire 
asks about highly specific aspects of the respective laws, regulations and procedures 
under detailed assumptions, to ensure that the facts and meaning are comparable 
across countries and that the respondents envision the same process as they complete 
the surveys.
By targeting lawyers who are experts in the particular area, the Legal Indicator 
Survey ensures that only those with detailed professional knowledge and experience 
provide the data. The methodology also allows for repeat interactions during the re­
search process, to eliminate possible misinterpretations in questions^. Furthermore, 
the survey builds on local knowledge - without exception, indicators are based on 
answers by local respondents in the transition countries, who practise law in the ju­
risdictions we study and are familiar with changes in the law as well as with judicial 
and administrative procedures to make use of these laws.
^Although desirable, such interactions usually occurred once a year -  the same law firms were 
usually asked to complete the LIS.
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2.3 How do the legal data in the thesis differ from  
the legal data in the EBRD Transition Re­
ports?
2.3.1 Subjective Legal Expert Opinions
The Legal Indicator Survey data were initially used for the EBRD country rankings 
on commercial law extensiveness and effectiveness and financial law extensiveness 
and effectiveness as published in the 1999 Transition Report. The country rankings 
use a scale from 1 (lowest) to 4* (highest), increasing in increments of 1, but also 
using add-on pluses or minuses. The underlying raw survey data used to derive 
these scores are the same data used in this thesis. Two important qualifications are 
in order, however. First, the official EBRD scoring reflects the survey outcomes, 
but also takes into account expert opinions, notably EBRD in-house lawyers, who 
have usually been consulted and asked to review the country scores before these are 
released for publication. To the knowledge of the thesis author, such consultations 
have happened on several occasions and have led to revisions in the 1 to 4* scores 
given to particular countries. In contrast, the data presented and used in the thesis 
do not include any external judgments, and therefore reflect only and exclusively 
the opinion of the survey respondents.
2.3.2 M issing Answers
Second, extensive consistency checks were performed on the data for the purposes of 
the author’s research and work on the thesis. In the process, a number of errors were 
discovered, at a much later stage than the time of publication of the 1999 Transition 
Report (November 1999). Although these were limited, we are presenting a list of all 
recorded omissions, which lead to discrepancies in the scores given in the Transition
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Report, and the scores in the thesis. One example of this kind is Georgia, which 
was represented in the 1999 survey by three law firms. One of them, however, did 
not provide answers to the Banking part of the questionnaire. Nevertheless, the 
official Georgia rankings did count these missing answers in as 0 scores, and after 
averaging over 3 rather than 2 respondent answers, produced a downward bias in the 
Georgian banking and overall financial scores. Subsequently, this error was revealed 
and corrected, thereby raising Georgia’s banking and overall financial scores.
A recent review of the LIS data has also revealed that in many instances through­
out the answer entries for various countries missing questions or sub-question an­
swers were not treated as missing observations but rather counted as zero scores. 
This used to generate a downward bias in the country scores across the sample and 
across all sections of the survey. This bias was particularly pronounced in countries 
with few survey entries -  such as Armenia, Belarus, Georgia. A correct treatment 
would be to exclude these missing answers, where they are truly missing rather than 
non-applicable, and this has been performed for all the data used in the thesis. The 
correction for missing question answers therefore produced a generally upward shift 
in the country scores.
2.3.3 Differences in Question W eights
Third, the scores published in the 1999 Transition Report are based on different 
question weights. In an attempt to eliminate problems and peer review queries 
regarding arbitrary weights, we have treated each survey question equally, assigning 
a weight of 1 to each. This again result in differences in scores as given in the 
thesis and previously published. We will address the issue of weighting at great 
length when we explain the economic concepts behind the survey variables. Here we 
present the set of weights used for the scores which appear in the Transition Report 
1999 on one hand, and the set of weights used for the scores in the thesis on the
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other, and illustrate how each set affects country scores on a given indicator.
The distinction between extensiveness and effectiveness questions and sub-questions 
is maintained for most questions, i.e. questions and sub-questions categorized as 
extensiveness-related for the scores in the Transition Report, are normally also cate­
gorized as extensiveness-related for the scores used in this thesis.^ Again, given their 
central plane in the thesis, the concepts of legal extensiveness and effectiveness, as 
employed in this thesis, are reviewed briefly in a later section.
Using weights of 1 for all survey questions has enabled us to cross-check the 
entire database for other errors in coding the answers. We also tabulated individual 
question scores for the purposes of the thesis -  something which was not done in 
Transition Report 1999.
2.3.4 Coding Errors and Logical/Internal Inconsistencies
Finally, the thesis data were additionally cleaned for some typical survey inconsis­
tencies. We must stress, however, that such incidences were very few and had minor 
effects on the legal variables in most cases. Nevertheless, we will provide examples 
of when and how such survey answer inconsistencies have arisen, and the procedures 
used to eliminate these inconsistencies. A section will be devoted to this end. Cod­
ing errors, such as missing values coded as zero values were identified in the last 
cleaning procedure, and the data were corrected for them as well.
Summing up, there are four major reasons why the legal variables, as shown and 
used in this thesis, deviate from the same variables as given in the 1999 Transition 
Report and associated EBRD publications, such as Law in Transition. First, the 
legal data published by the EBRD incorporates in-house opinions and judgments, 
which augment the survey raw scores to arrive at the legal scores on a numeric 
scale from 1 to 4*. We do not allow for outside subjective judgments to play a
^Where changes occur, we highlight them and explain the rationale for them.
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role. Second, discrepancies may be due to certain consistency errors in aggregating 
the data, which have been corrected in the scores reported in this thesis. Third, 
the EBRD published data were based on a different set of question weights. For 
a variety of reasons, to be taken up and analysed later, we have chosen to employ 
equal weights. The issue, however, is still open for discussion, and robustness checks 
can be performed actually employing both, or even a third, sets of weights. Finally, 
logical inconsistencies in the survey process and in the data coding, which were 
not corrected in the EBRD Transition Report scores, have been eliminated in a 
systematic cleaning operation by the thesis author.
A thorough discussion of the differences in the LIS legal data used in the thesis 
and in official EBRD publications in Appendices 2.A to 2.D^. The appendices go 
through a very detailed explanation about observed differences, particularly focusing 
on changes in weights. We present Table 2.1, showing the 1 to 4* overall financial le­
gal extensiveness scores reported in the 1999 Transition Report, the underlying raw 
country scores for these 1 to 4* scores (before further judgmental manipulations), 
and the country scores used in the thesis. The countries are ranked by their Tran­
sition Report index score. Detailed explanations are offered in the appendices in 
accounting for all the differences. Table 2.2 then shows the number of law firms per 
country, which provided answers to the three different sections of the Legal Indicator 
Survey used in the thesis (Banking Law, Securities Law and Legal Enforcement). 
Furthermore, we also map the time line of the extensive work, performed to check
'^ We must stress, however, that the numbers given in these appendices have been further changed 
due to changes in definitions, variable re-classifications, and subsequent discovery of missing values 
coded initially as zeros. These events have led to further changes. Since in this thesis, we employ 
more disaggregated indices, based on individual questions, in a sense some of the calculations in 
Appendices 2.A to 2.D are somewhat old at this stage. They do illustrate an important point 
about the changes in scores used in the previous version of the thesis and published EBRD legal 
indicators based on the LIS.
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and clean the data, used in this thesis (Table 2.3).
2.4 Theoretical Background for Legal Variables 
and Question W eights
Having outlined the main sources of differences between the scores shown in the 
thesis and the published scores in some EBRD publications, and provided a detailed 
explanation for these differences in terms of weight changes in the appendices, let 
us now turn to the essential question of what the survey is measuring and how the 
legal variables reflect current theoretical and empirical knowledge about bank and 
stock market regulations, and contract enforcement, which are the sections whose 
data is utilised in later chapters^. Since the Legal Indicator Survey captures lawyers’ 
opinions on each of these aspects of laws and regulations and their application, we 
will consider each of them in succession. Our main objective in this section is to 
explain the theoretical economic thinking about each of these institutions, say stock 
market laws and regulations, and based on this thinking, to justify the particular 
questions asked in the survey, the weights awarded to their answers, and the use 
of legal extensiveness and eflFectiveness as separate proxies for the quality of legal 
protection. We begin with a look into securities market regulation.
2.4.1 Securities Markets Laws and Regulations
There is a growing body of theoretical and empirical research, which seeks to answer 
the question whether or not securities laws matter for stock market development. 
One view, the older one, is that securities law does not matter. Following Coase
®We have also reviewed and cleaned systematically the Bankruptcy and Company Law sections 
of the LIS, as well as a substantial proportion of the Pledge Law section, but do not employ those 
data in the thesis.
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Table 2.1: Differences in Scores: Extensiveness of Banking Laws, 1999
Country TR99 (1-4*) TR99 (1-100) Thesis (1-100)
Estonia 4 64.52 64.61
Hungary 4 64.57 67.95
Moldova 4 71.29 73.69
Poland 4 60.04 63.13
Slovak Republic 4 60.46 62.89
Czech Republic 3+ 59.39 62.23
Slovenia 3+ 62.07 59.31
Albania 3 53.51 58.92
Armenia 3 57.34 56.67
Bulgaria 3 62.80 65.98
Croatia 3 54.75 56.68
FYR Macedonia 3 53.47 57.94
Kazakhstan 3 59.58 63.02
Latvia 3 56.99 58.44
Romania 3 57.80 61.68
Russian Federation 3 50.66 51.26
Kyrgyzstan 3- 54.60 59.69
Lithuania 3- 52.80 54.47
Azerbaijan 2 52.85 55.81
Belarus 2 39.56 39.25
Ukraine 2 48.14 48.29
Uzbekistan 2 57.56 59.17
Georgia 1 30.59 48.96
Source: EBRD Transition Reports, EBRD Legal Indicator Survey raw data 
and author’s compilations.
Chapter 2. Methodology of the Legal Indicator Survey 31
Table 2.2: Number of Surveyed Law Firms Per Country, 1999 Legal Indicator Survey
Country Banking Law Securities Law Contract Enforcement
Albania 4 4 4
Armenia 1 1 2
Azerbaijan 3 3 3
Belarus 1 1 1
Bulgaria 16 16 16
Croatia 9 9 9
Czech Republic 13 13 14
Estonia 7 7 7
FYR Macedonia 3 3 3
Georgia 2 3 1
Hungary 13 13 13
Kazakhstan 5 5 5
Kyrgyzstan 3 3 3
Latvia 4 4 4
Lithuania 3 3 3
Moldova 4 4 3
Poland 7 7 7
Romania 6 6 6
Russian Federation 20 20 21
Slovak Republic 9 9 10
Slovenia 3 3 3
Ukraine 8 8 8
Uzbekistan 4 4 4
Source: EBRD Legal Indicator Survey; 1999
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Table 2.3: Timeline of EBRD and author’s work on the Legal Indicator Survey 
Year EBRD Author
1997 Commercial law survey conducted 
and results reported in TR97
June, Commercial law survey re-run with Involved in collecting and coding
July and An- minor changes (new questions), data, modifying coding template
gust, 1998 A new survey instrument devel- for Commercial Law Survey, and
oped and launched: Financial Law building a coding template file for
Survey. Financial Law Survey (using Visual
Basic programming).
September Results from both surveys appear Team work on preparing country
1998 in TR98. scores for the TR.
April 1999 Results from Financial Law Survey Joint work on article.
appear in LiT.
May 1999 First version of paper on Law
and Finance in Transition pre­
sented at Budapest workshop, us­
ing 1998 banking and stock market 
law data.
June, July Commercial and Financial Law Work on re-design of survey ques-
1999 Surveys combined in joint Legal In- tions, and coding templates,
dicator Survey and administered to
respondents. Modifications intro­
duced in response alternatives for 
effectiveness questions: a 1 to 5 fre­
quency rating scale adopted. Oth­
erwise, same questions as in 1998 
surveys.
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October 1999 Results on company law 
(corporate governance) pub- 
hshed in LiT.
Work on LiT article.
November Law and Finance paper revised to use
1999 1999 financial law data alongside 1998 
data, and appears as a FMG working 
paper
February, Article on insolvency laws in Joint work on LiT 2000 article.
March 2000 LiT.
April 2000 Law and Finance paper submitted to 
journal.
March, May, Law and Finance paper presented at
June 2000 international conferences
June, July Preliminary work on Legal Prehminary coding of available data.
2000 Indicator Survey 2000. A and development of a new coding tem­
new section on Concessions 
Law added to LIS.
plate on Concessions Law.
February Revision of Law and Finance paper.
2001 and presentation at World Bank work­
shop. Suggested to use equal weights 
of questions.
October, Revision of both Commercial and Fi­
Novem­ nancial law data; Systematic consis­
ber, Decem­ tency checks performed and a cleaning
ber 2001 operation complete.
January 2003 Entire legal dataset based on 1999 Le­
February gal Indicator Survey shown in thesis.
2004 Cleaning completed.
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(1960) and Stigler (1964), the government’s optimal policy is to do nothing regarding 
securities markets. When securities are issued, informational asymmetries arising 
between the issuers (or sellers) and investors (buyers) will be resolved through rep­
utational mechanisms or general contract law norms, without the need for specific 
laws on securities markets. For example, under this view, when companies issue 
shares, they have every reason to provide truthful and accurate information about 
the company in order to extract a higher price for their shares. The incentives to 
do so are grounded in general contract and tort law as well as the concern for one’s 
future reputation. Similarly, investors have every reason to find out more about 
the company, whose shares they intend to purchase. Their incentive is to invest in 
information-gathering so as to avoid being cheated by disreputable firms. To the 
extent that such incentives exist for both buyers and sellers of securities, the argu­
ment goes that securities law is unnecessary (since parties can contract around it) 
or may even be harmful in so far as it raises transactions costs.
The second view is that securities law matters, e.g. Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer 
(2001), Black (2001). On this view reputational concerns, contract and tort law are 
not enough to preclude opportunistic behaviour by securities issuers. The payoffs 
from cheating are very high, as are also enforcement costs of private investors who 
have been cheated. To reduce such costs and opportunistic behaviour, the govern­
ment can introduce a securities law, specifying how securities transactions should 
be conducted. Recent work has been very supportive of this latter view, e.g. La 
Porta et al. (2003).
Starting out from a theoretical perspective, let us assume a company tries to sell 
shares on the stock market for the first time, i.e. initiates an initial public offering 
(IPO). The company is trying to raise cash to finance its growing business operations. 
Previously, it used only internal funds and bank loans. Since the company is not 
known to investors at large, potential investors are required to invest some effort
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in learning more about the company and its prospects. A problem of asymmetric 
information arises. The company knows more about the present value of its business 
than outside investors do. It might be tempted not to reveal some aspects of its 
business if it anticipates that they would turn investors away. It may be tempted to 
provide more favorable information in order to boost the price the investors would 
pay for its shares. How is this problem of asymmetric information going to be 
resolved? In the Coasian view, private contracting would ensure that the efficient 
outcome is achieved, assuming zero transaction/information costs. In the public 
enforcement view, private contracting would be insufficient, and the government 
needs to step in and institute a public securities agency and a securities law.
Aside from asymmetric information, a second problem which arises in this exam­
ple is the fact that once shares have been sold to outside investors, is moral hazard. 
The company’s insiders, such as managers and controlling shareholders, have an in­
centive to cheat outside investors out of some or all of the value of their investment. 
This could happen through self-dealing (transactions between a company and its in­
siders, or with another firm that the insiders control). It is possible that the insiders 
also engage in insider trading, or even commit outright theft. Since investors know 
ex-ante that such incentives exist, they may be less willing to buy a company’s shares 
if they suspect that the insiders will cheat. How could this problem be mitigated? 
Again, in the private enforcement view, reputational concerns and general contract 
law will be sufficient to elicit honest behavior by insiders. In the public enforcement 
view, a specialized law which establishes procedural and disclosure requirements 
aimed at controlling self-dealing is needed.
What are the legal and institutional features which help resolve the informa­
tion asymmetry between the company selling its shares and outside investors? On 
grounds of efficiency, the lowest cost provider of information about a security should 
collect and present this information, and be held accountable if this information is
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wrong or misleading. Grossman and Hart (1980) present a theoretical model where 
the lowest-cost providers are the securities issuers, distributors and accountants. 
Therefore, an efficient system would provide these market players with incentives to 
collect and present truthful information to outside investors, and would hold them 
liable if they fail to do so. The relevant provisions of securities law which make this 
possible are disclosure requirements and liability rules. Both make it cheaper for 
investors to recover damages when information is wrong or omitted.
Black (2001) looks at this question in detail and identifies the following legal 
norms and institutions which counter the informational asymmetry on the one hand, 
and self-dealing by company insiders on the other: existence of effective regulators, 
courts and prosecutors; sufficient financial disclosure; reputational intermediaries 
operating in the securities market; well defined and requisite company and insider 
liability; securities market transparency; local culture and other relevant institu­
tions. Appendix 2.E summarizes in a table what these laws and institutions entail.
We observe a lot of similarities in the laws and institutions aimed at controlling 
asymmetric information and self-dealing. However, some of the institutions outlined 
above are specifically targeting only one of the two problems facing securities issuers 
and investors. We will return to these pre-conditions in the next sub-section when 
we discuss how the Legal Indicator Survey in its Securities Law section provides 
information on some of these institutions.
In a recent paper La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer (2003) examine securi­
ties laws in 49 countries worldwide and establish that private enforcement through 
disclosure and liability rules is associated with more developed securities markets, 
whereas public enforcement is mostly not. The authors look at private and public 
enforcement separately. They argue that disclosure requirements and liability rules 
are two crucial features of private enforcement. The authors conduct a survey of 
one law firm per country, and collect data on various aspects of securities laws. The
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data are summarized in several key index measures of the variables of interest. For 
example, six proxies of the strength of disclosure requirements are constructed®. An 
index of disclosure requirements is the average of the six proxies. In addition to 
these specific disclosure requirements, it is common to have a requirement, whereby 
the prospectus needs to include all material information necessary to assess the 
value of the securities being offered. However, when bad news hit the company after 
it has issued securities, the question becomes whether this information was known 
or knowable to the issuer, distributor and/or accountant, and whether it is easy 
for investors to recover damages if information in the prospectus was misleading or 
omitted. La Porta et al. (2003) distinguish four different liability regimes^.
In La Porta et al. (2003)’s analysis the sub-indices of disclosure and burden 
of proof are combined to give an index of private enforcement, and it is found 
that precisely this index is significantly associated with better securities market 
performance.
^These are whether a prospectus is delivered to investors in advance, before the securities issue; 
whether the company must disclose insiders’ compensation, ownership by large shareholders, inside
ownership, contracts outside the normal course of business and transactions with related parties.
^One possibihty would be for the plaintiff to demonstrate that the issuer, distributor or accoun­
tant was negligent in leaving information out of the prospectus. In addition, under this regime 
the investor has to prove that he relied on the information given in the prospectus in their deci­
sion to invest (rehance) and that his losses are due to the information provided in the prospectus 
(causahty). Under the second hability regime, plaintiffs need to prove gross negligence on the part 
of the issuer, distributor and /or accountant. Therefore, this regime is harder for plaintiffs than 
the first one. Under the third liability regime, plaintiffs must prove reliance and causality, but 
not neghgence. Therefore, the burden of proof is lighter in this case. Finally, the fourth scenario 
calls for plaintiffs to merely prove that the information provided in the prospectus was misleading, 
without proving reliance on the prospectus to invest or causality between information provided 
and incurred losses. In the latter case the burden of proof shifts from plaintiff to defendant: the 
defendant must prove that he exercised due difigence in preparing the prospectus.
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2.4.1.1 Disclosure Requirements and the Legal Indicator Survey
Let us now turn to the Securities Markets section of the Legal Indicator Survey. 
What information does the survey elicit from respondents, given the first problem of 
securities issuance, i.e. the problem of asymmetric information between issuers and 
investors? As we have seen above, disclosure of financial information, which enables 
potential investors to judge the health of the company and its future prospects is 
essential. One of the first things the survey section on Securities Markets asks about 
is disclosure and transparency. For example, six of the 29 questions in this section 
are concerned with how good and effective disclosure requirements are.
Thus, an extensiveness question Q5 asks whether publicly traded companies must 
provide timely and accurate financial results and other information to the public, and 
a related question, Q6, asks how often such information is in fact provided, thereby 
measuring the perceived effectiveness of the disclosure rule. Note that in this case 
the question refers to a situation after such securities have been issued. Two aspects 
of such information provision are sought: both that the information is factually cor­
rect and complete, i.e. there is no misleading or omitted information, and second, 
that it is provided to investors and the general public at large in a timely fashion, 
i.e. once every quarter, etc. As discussed earlier, one of the core pre-conditions 
for countering the information asymmetry involves good accounting and auditing 
rules designed to provide information useful to investors. Q7 attempts to measure 
exactly that. It asks the lawyers to tell us whether publicly-traded firms must use 
international accounting standards when preparing their financial statements. Use 
of international accounting standards is thought to be desirable, especially since the 
transition economies had no proper accounting standards to begin with. The next 
question, Q8, is about the transparency of securities transactions. It asks about the 
existence of a properly functioning clearance and settlement system for both shares
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and bonds, assigning equal weights to both®. When such a system is in operation 
trades can be recorded and those records made available to investors. Black (2001) 
lists similar market transparency rules such as recording the time, quantity and 
price of trades as one of the core institutions to control asymmetric information. 
He comments that large investors often try to hide their transactions to reduce the 
price impact of their trades. Large stock exchanges, however, sometimes have the 
power to require that all trades be reported to them. More generally, however, 
the government needs to mandate prompt reporting of transactions and their entry 
into a single, consolidated source. Finally, Q8 and Q9 of the Securities Markets 
section deal with disclosure requirements prior to securities issue. One half of the 
question weight is assigned to an affirmative answer to the question whether filing 
of information with the Securities regulator before issuance is required by the law, 
and whether the information provided exceeds or falls short of that given in the 
issuing company’s annual report. These parts arguably refer to the extensiveness of 
the law. Another half of the question weight of 1 is awarded to a mandatory filing 
of both a prospectus and financial statements, with the prospectus given a three 
times higher weight than financial statements, and both considered complements. 
The importance of the prospectus is discussed by both Black (2001) and La Porta 
et al. (2003). Financial statements can obviously augment the financial informa­
tion provided in the prospectus. La Porta et al. (2003) stress the importance of 
delivery of the prospectus to investors, and Q9 focuses on delivery of the informa­
tion (prospectus, financial statements and other) to the securities market regulator 
prior to issuance. That part of the question asking about the form of information 
disclosure was previously considered an effectiveness question. We choose to treat 
it as an extensiveness question since it relates to the provisions of the law regarding
®Here we maintain the internal question weights originally assigned by the EBRD Legal Transi­
tion Team to the survey answers. In most cases the original internal weights have been maintained 
in generating the legal indices used in the paper.
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delivery of prospectus and financial statements rather than their enforcement. And 
finally, an effectiveness question, QIC, asks how often the regulator does in practice 
approve of the information disclosed before a securities issue.
While, the survey omits disclosure requirements regarding director compensa­
tion, ownership by large shareholders, insider ownership, etc. as coded by La Porta 
et al. (2003), it does focus on some of the crucial aspects of information disclosure 
aimed at mitigating asymmetric information between securities issuers and investors.
We average the six LIS questions on disclosure requirements to get a sub-index 
of Disclosure Rules (DISCL), and look at it in its aggregate as well as broken down 
into its extensiveness (DISCL_EXT) and effectiveness (DISCL_EFF) components.
2.4.1.2 Effective Supervision and Regulation of the Securities Market 
and the Legal Indicator Survey
As pointed out by Black (2001) and La Porta et al. (2003), it is essential to have 
honest, well-funded securities regulators, who have the expertise and budget to 
handle complex securities disclosure cases. Funding of securities regulators is often 
a big problem, particularly in developing countries. Very often the salaries are too 
low to retain qualified staff. La Porta et al. (2003) look at securities regulators as the 
main government agency or official authority charged with supervising the securities 
market, and thereby acting as the public enforcer of securities rules. Under the 
public enforcement view, even with a securities law, private enforcement incentives 
are not strong enough to elicit honest behavior from issuers, and therefore a public 
enforcer, e.g. a Securities Commission, is needed to make sure that the securities 
law is complied with. La Porta et al. (2003) argue that public enforcement could 
be beneficial when the enforcer is politically independent and focused on securities 
markets only; when it can introduce regulations of market participants; when it is 
well suited to elicit information from market participants, and finally when it has
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the authority to impose sanctions on market participants. Each of these four aspects 
of public enforcement through a securities market regulator is carefully coded using 
their available data.
The securities markets section of the Legal Indicator Survey contains several 
questions which refer to the Securities Regulator. For example, the first 4 ques­
tions of this section, Q1 to Q4 are combined under the rubric of Supervision and 
Regulation. Of these, Q2 and Q3 are the most interesting. Q2 asks whether a gov­
ernment agency or an independent body exists and is in charge of securities markets 
regulation. An affirmative answer, regardless of the degree of independence of the 
Regulator, gets the full weight score of 1. Obviously, it makes a great difference 
if the regulator’s staff members are appointed unilaterally by the government, or 
not; and how they can be dismissed -  following due process, or unilaterally by the 
Executive branch of government. The survey does not allow us to fine-tune the 
degree of independence, but rather assumes that respondents know what an inde­
pendent Regulator means. Q3 refers to the investigative powers of the Regulator 
— it asks respondents whether the Regulator has the mandate to conduct on-site 
examinations of securities issuers, presumably to investigate information provided 
with the offering documents. Whenever inaccurate information is provided by the 
issuers, accountants or underwriters, the question arises why such information was 
provided? Did the issuer, accountant or distributor have that information? Could 
they have had it? At what cost? Did the issuer hide relevant information from the 
accountant (auditor) and /or distributor? Finding the answers to all these questions 
is costly, and this is where the Regulator steps in. The Regulator can be empowered 
to command documents from issuers, accountants or distributors, and to subpoena 
witnesses. La Porta et al. (2003) summarize such powers into a sub-index of In­
vestigative Powers of the Regulator. Clearly, the first part of Q3 is also trying to 
gauge the investigative powers of the Regulator, and like Q2, is an extensiveness
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question. The second half of Q3 asks whether the Regulator, if endowed with in­
vestigative powers, can use them in both the regulation of share issues and bond 
issues, i.e. the focus is on comprehensive regulation of the securities market as well 
as on focused regulatory powers. La Porta et al (2003) also stress the importance 
of a focused Regulator. They argue that an effective securities regulator needs to 
stay focused on securities market only rather than on both banking and stock mar­
kets. While Q3 does not rule out banking regulation, an affirmative answer to both 
regulation of share and bond issues does imply a Regulator with comprehensive 
powers of investigation. The information gathered in Q29 of the Capital Markets 
section of the LIS is also linked to the attributes of the Regulator. This question 
asks whether trained and knowledgable staff work in the agency charged with regu­
lation of securities markets (the first half of the question asks the same about bank 
regulation). An affirmative answer to this question, is awarded 0.5 weight, and the 
question is contributing to the total effectiveness score. Presumably, the better staff 
the Regulator has, the more effective its work, and the enforcement or effectiveness 
of securities regulation would be. We consider this question, as part of the Reg­
ulator’s attributes, which define its independence, focus and investigative powers. 
Finally, Q l and Q4, previously included under the rubric of Supervision and Reg­
ulation, are considered less important and will be omitted from the analysis^. Ql 
asks whether securities laws or regulations have been enacted or amended over the 
preceding 8 years, i.e. since 1991. An affirmative answer gains a score of 1 and 
counts toward legal extensiveness. Q4 asks whether securities can be sold through 
other mechanisms than a stock exchange. It used to be an effectiveness question 
on a 5-point rating scale, which awards higher scores, if such trade happens regu­
larly. Presumably, expanding the opportunities for trade is considered beneficial for
^Such omissions, done at a later stage than the cleaning of the data, are another source of 
differences between previously published legal scores and indices based on the LIS, and those used 
in this dissertation.
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market participants. However, it is not very obvious how beneficial over-the-counter 
trade could be in most transition countries, where securities markets are not very 
well developed. Therefore, we choose to treat these questions with caution, and to 
exclude them from the Regulator Attributes and Powers of Investigation sub-index, 
which then becomes an average of Q2, Q3, and Q29b.
2.4.1.3 Enforcement Powers of the Securities Regulator and the Legal 
Indicator Survey
A separate rubric of the Securities Markets section of the survey is devoted to the 
enforcement powers of the Regulator. Q ll for example asks whether the Regulator 
has enforcement powers. Clearly, the question assumes that the lawyers understand 
what such enforcement powers are. The second part of the question in fact helps 
to outline these enforcement powers. Respondents are asked whether the Regulator 
is empowered to revoke an issuer’s listing, and to impose civil fines or penalties 
in cases of non-compliance with securities rules. The existence of civil liability of 
issuers scores higher than authority to delist. Both are non-criminal sanctions for 
violations of securities law. Affirmative answers to all parts of Q ll gain a score of 
1, and count towards extensiveness (previously this was considered an effectiveness 
question, which we consider inappropriate since the question refers to law content 
rather than enforcement). Q12 asks whether the Regulator has engaged in oversight 
or enforcement action over the preceding 5 years, to see how much enforcement 
has occurred in practice. An affirmative answer scores 1 point, and also counts 
toward effectiveness. Similarly, La Porta et al. (2003) also review the powers of 
the Regulator to impose civil sanctions on securities market participants. These 
sanctions include orders on public firms’ directors to amend non-compliance with 
disclosure requirements, to institute changes recommended by outside reviewers and 
to compensate investors for their losses. They track whether or not such sanctions
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may be imposed on issuers, accountants and distributors alike, and average the 
scores into a sub-index of ’’Orders”. While their analysis is more detailed and 
focuses on various market players, the information gathered by Q ll and Q12 of the 
Legal Indicator Survey captures the same notion.
Questions Q13, Q14 and Q15 are all concerned with insider trading. They try 
to gauge the enforcement powers of the Securities Regulator. The Regulator is also 
one of the essential institutions to control self-dealing by insiders. Insider dealing 
or trading is defined as trade between company insiders and less informed investors, 
in which the insiders use information about the company not known to the other 
investors. As discussed earlier, e.g. Black (2001), one of the ways to control insider 
trading is to have securities or other laws which prohibit insider trading, and to 
ensure that such laws are enforced. All three survey question are designed to assess 
this in the transition economies. An affirmative answer to Q13 is awarded with 
a score of 1. Q14 asks through what kind of a normative act insider trading is 
prohibited, and assesses whether there is a comprehensive ban through law -  both 
private and criminal -  as well as through administrative rules and stock exchange 
rules. The rationale is that, if there is a law, a securities law or other, which 
bans insider dealing, then suits on insider dealing can be filed before the courts. 
Any administrative rules, issued by the government, also need to help eliminate 
insider trading and support the law. Stock exchange rules and charters should also 
complement the law and discourage insider trading. Finally, criminal liabihty and 
sanctions could also be sought in cases of insider trading. La Porta et al. (2003) 
list and code criminal sanctions against violators of securities laws alongside civil 
sanctions. The prevailing view in today’s thinking about securities laws is that they 
should impose criminal liability on issuers, accountants and distributors for certain 
violations of the law. By asking whether a criminal law bans insider trading, the 
Legal Indicator Survey assumes that such criminal liability may be sought in cases
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of insider trading. Both Q13 and Q14 count toward Capital Market extensiveness.
Finally, Q15 asks how often the Regulator uses his enforcement powers to pe­
nalise cases of insider dealing or fraud. Thus, this question seeks to assess how 
well insider trading rules and laws are enforced. Enforcement makes violators learn 
that they cannot violate these rules with impunity. Some of the literature also links 
enforced insider trading rules with better stock market performance. For example, 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) report that many countries have laws prohibiting 
insider trading, but only in few of them these laws are enforced. Enforced insider 
trading laws are found to have a significant negative effect on the cost of equity, 
whereas unenforced insider trading rules do not affect the cost of equity. Hence, all 
indications are that Q15 is particularly important. It is an effectiveness question 
and is rated on the 1 to 5 scale, with higher frequencies awarded higher scores.
2.4.1.4 Regulation of Securities Market Intermediaries and the Legal 
Indicator Survey
A separate section of the Legal Indicator Survey, comprising 12 questions, is con­
cerned with securities market intermediaries (also known as reputational interme­
diaries), investment and pension funds, and some other features of the securities 
market. The importance of market intermediaries such as accountants, auditors, 
investment bankers serving as underwriters and distributors of securities, is un­
derscored by Black (2001) and others as one of the core institutions to solve the 
information asymmetry between securities issuers and investors. A sophisticated 
accounting and investment banking profession with securities laws defining liability 
for each if they endorse misleading or wrong information, is a core institution to 
counter asymmetric information. Furthermore, Black (2001) lists mandatory licens­
ing of reputational intermediaries, as well as their being subject to self-regulation, 
as extremely useful in facilitating good financial disclosure. He also considers the
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presence of investment funds as a positive feature of the securities market, enhancing 
good disclosure and providing investable funds. In this regard, the information which 
the LIS attempts to collect falls very much under the realm of these arguments. For 
example, Q17 asks whether securities laws regulate the conduct of securities market 
intermediaries such as brokers and dealers; whether intermediaries are subject to 
mandatory licensing before they begin operation, and whether licensing is based on 
certain minimum standards and professional qualifications. An affirmative answer 
to the third sub-question is thought twice as important as an affirmative answer to 
the first two parts. This is in line with Black’s points about the preeminence of a 
sophisticated and competent accounting, investment banking and securities lawyer 
professions as a core institution. The terms brokers and dealers, as used by the 
LIS, subsume accountants, auditors, investment bankers, lawyers and others who 
are engaged as intermediaries in the sale of securities between the issuers on one end 
and the investors on the other. Q18 asks whether any intermediaries have had their 
licenses revoked by the Regulator or by any other self-regulatory organization. This 
is an effectiveness question, measured on a 1 to 5 rating scale, aimed at evaluating to 
what extent the enforcement powers of the Regulator or other self-regulatory orga­
nizations work in practice. While Q17 counts toward Capital Market extensiveness, 
Q18 contributes toward effectiveness. Q19 asks whether securities market interme­
diaries are subject to mandatory self-regulation. As discussed above, self-regulation 
can serve as a useful complement to the core institutions ensuring honest behavior 
by the intermediaries in endorsing a company’s financial disclosure. It is an effective­
ness question, which scores highest points when self-regulation over intermediaries 
exists.
Four questions (Q20 to Q24) refer to the existence of collective investment 
schemes, defined as investment funds (mutual funds) or funded pension schemes. 
Their existence, and the existence of private schemes is regarded as beneficial for the
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securities market. Both pension and investment funds provide market liquidity and 
require good financial disclosure. Therefore, they can be a useful institution to have 
in order to counter information asymmetries in the securities market. Furthermore, 
Q21 asks whether separate rules and regulations govern the licensing of investment 
and pension funds. This would impose checks on them and make it mandatory 
that they themselves disclose information material to investor’s decisions. Q23 asks 
precisely that -  whether issuers of securities by investment or pension funds must 
disclose financial information to investors. Q22 then gauges whether the informa­
tion provided by investment and pension funds to investors is accurate, i.e. whether 
financial disclosure by them is good and well enforced. Questions Q20 and Q21 are 
extensiveness questions, whereas Q22 and Q23 were previously considered effective­
ness questions. However, while Q22 gauges enforcement of disclosure rules regarding 
investment funds and pension funds, it is not so obvious whether Q23 does that too. 
It just refers to the securities or other law or rule which describes what type of 
information should be disclosed by investment and pension funds. Therefore, we 
choose to treat it an extensiveness question instead.
Three questions in the Securities Markets section of the Legal Indicator Sur­
vey relate to investor compensation in the event of losses incurred as a result of a 
failure of a market intermediary. La Porta et al. (2003) stress the importance of 
civil liability and the ability of the Regulator to make issuers or other intermedi­
aries compensate investors for their losses following non-compliance by the issuer 
or the intermediary with mandatory disclosure requirements. Q24 for instance asks 
whether provisions in the securities law are in place whereby investors get compen­
sated for their losses after failure (we assume insolvency) of a market intermediary. 
The question should be interpreted more broadly to include also compensation for 
investor losses after failure to ensure good disclosure by the issuer. Q25 then asks 
whether such failures have happened in the preceding three years (1996 to 1999),
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and Q26 asks whether in these cases investors did receive compensation. All three 
questions were previously considered effectiveness questions. Since Q25 is concerned 
more with an outcome rather than a legal rule, we remove it from the legal indices 
used in the following analysis. An affirmative answer to Q24 is awarded 1 point, 
and Q26 is measured on the usual 1 to 5 rating scale about the frequency of investor 
compensation.
Finally, Q27 asks about the existence of a shareholder depository. The existence 
of a law governing this, and its operation in practice are given equal weights, and 
contribute to capital market extensiveness and effectiveness respectively. The ra­
tionale here is that the existence of a shareholder depository is useful in bringing 
about market transparency about shareholdings and trades. Thus, it is thought to 
be an institution enhancing good disclosure and facilitating the resolution of asym­
metric information. One last question under the rubric of Regulation of Securities 
Market Intermediaries -  Q16 -  asks whether a functioning stock exchange exists in 
the respondent’s country. The information provided as an answer to this question 
can serve two purposes. First, it captures the existence of a stock exchange as a rep­
utational intermediary in its own right. Indeed, Black (2001) lists stock exchanges 
with their listing rules and ability to enforce them as one of the main reputational 
securities market intermediaries. Both exchanges and investors understand that 
false disclosure by a member will affect the reputation of all listed members. Rep­
utational concerns make the stock exchange enforce its listing standards. So, the 
survey included this as an effectiveness question, scoring 1 point for an affirmative 
answer. However, a second interpretation is also possible. It can be argued that 
this question does not measure how well the law is enforced, but rather measures 
an outcome of how good the law or its enforcement are. Therefore, we remove this 
question’s answer scores from the legal indices used in Chapter 3.^^
^®This is an additional source of difference between previously published legal scores, and the 
ones used in the thesis.
Chapter 2. Methodology of the Legal Indicator Survey 49
2.4.2 Effective Courts and the Legal Indicator Survey
Finally, a question counted in the Securities Markets section of the Legal Indicator 
Survey, but actually meant to capture effectiveness and enforcement for both banks 
and stock markets, asks whether courts are authorized to review enforcement deci­
sions or other corrective actions, presumably by the Regulator, for banks and other 
securities firms. Therefore the question refers to financial regulation in general, and 
not to securities market decisions only. Court involvement is given points, following 
the logic that good courts can complement and provide a check against the Secu­
rities Regulator’s decisions. Black (2001) stresses the importance of effective court 
enforcement in cases of wrong disclosure. It is questionable, however, how benefi­
cial court review of decisions would be in the transition countries, where courts are 
generally known to be corrupt, slow and expensive. Given these uncertainties, as 
well as the fact that the question does not relate to securities regulation per se, we 
exclude it from the indices of Capital Market effectiveness in the analysis to follow.
2.4.3 Bank Regulation and Supervision
An entire section of the Legal Indicator Survey is devoted to the regulation and 
supervision of banks in the transition countries. We will proceed with reviewing the 
questions and main themes of this part of the survey, providing information about 
the economic foundations of question weights as we go along.
There exists a voluminous body of literature dealing with the rationale for bank 
regulation and supervision, e.g. Goodhart (1998). Public regulation of economic 
activity is justified by market failures due to three main sources: 1) the presence 
of market power, 2) the presence of externalities, and 3) asymmetric information 
between buyers and sellers. As discussed by Preixas and Rochet (1998), these three 
main reasons for public regulation imply a need for prudential regulation of indi­
vidual banks. However, they argue that there are specificities about banks and the
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banking system, which call for a close look at banking regulation. One of the often- 
cited justifications of bank regulation is the need to provide a safety net for banks in 
order to protect depositors from the risk of failure of their bank. How are bank fail­
ures different from the failures of non-financial firms? One reason why bank failures 
are so costly is due to the fact that bank debt is held by many, usually small, dis­
persed agents (mostly households), who are not in a position to monitor the bank’s 
activities, whereas only the wealthy, or informed intermediaries, hold claims (debt 
or equity) in non-financial firms. Therefore, an asymmetric information problem 
arises -  the bank’s insiders and managers know much more about the bank’s activi­
ties than the bank’s creditors (depositors, stockholders and other banks). It is true 
that large firms are also financed through securities issues to many dispersed share­
holders. However, bank debt and firm equity differ in the fact that the latter is not 
used as a means of payment (while bank debt is), which means that the free-rider 
problem associated with bank monitoring is more pressing than in the case of firm 
equity, and the fact that the debt-to-assets ratio is much higher in financial interme­
diaries than in non-financial companies. Therefore, free-rider problems associated 
with the monitoring of widely-held firms are thought to be much more serious and 
pronounced in banks and other financial companies, than in non-financial ones.
What types of supervisory and regulatory practices work best? Is there a uni­
versal set of bank regulatory rules and regulations? Since banking regulation and 
supervision is usually codified in banking laws and regulations, the question has 
implications for the relevant laws and regulations pertaining to bank regulation and 
supervision. Are there universally acceptable rules about what bank supervision 
and regulation should or should not do?
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) build a new database of information on regu­
lation and supervision of banks in 107 countries worldwide. The data are based on 
surveys conducted among bank supervisory and regulatory authorities, and cover
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a broad area of issues, such as entry requirements for banks, bank ownership re­
strictions, bank capital requirements, activity restrictions, external auditing re­
quirements, deposit insurance characteristics, loan classification and provisioning 
requirements, accounting and disclosure requirements, and the independence of the 
supervisory authority. Using these data, Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) examine 
the impact of specific bank regulations and the development and fragility of the 
banking sector. What they find is that regulations aimed at eliciting accurate in­
formation disclosure from banks, thereby empowering private sector monitoring of 
banks, as well as regulations which create incentives for private agents to monitor 
banks, work best in promoting bank performance and stability. On the other hand, 
regulations which restrict bank activities are negatively associated with bank per­
formance and stability. Bank capital regulations are not found to be closely linked 
to bank performance or activity. Moreover, measures of official supervisory power, 
resources, independence, loan classification stringency, provisioning stringency, etc. 
are found not to be robustly linked to bank performance or bank stability.
Since the Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) database covers most of the transition 
economies and most of their survey data are as of 1999, In chapter 4 we proceed 
with a comparison, where possible, of the various aspects of bank regulation and 
supervision captured by their data and the LIS survey. In the next sections of this 
chapter we review the economic rationale behind the LIS Banking Laws questions 
and their weights. As we go along, we will be proposing a different way of aggregating 
the LIS data than used so far. It is important to stress that there is no unique way 
of aggregating and quantifying the LIS data on bank regulation, as also mentioned 
above in the section on securities regulation.
Chapter 2. Methodology of the Legal Indicator Survey 52
2.4.3.1 Supervisory Independence
There are competing theories about the scope and need for government regulation 
of the economy. Going back to Pigou (1938), monopoly power, externalities and 
asymmetric information in markets create the need for powerful government regu­
lation. This is the so-called ’’helping hand” view of government regulation. Applied 
to banking industry, this view emphasizes the importance of powerful and inde­
pendent bank regulators and supervisors. The arguments for this are that private 
agents such as depositors do not have the ability or incentive to monitor and super­
vise banks, and will be tempted to free-ride on others to perform such supervision 
and monitoring. In the end, there will be too little supervision, which undermines 
bank stability and performance. Second, since there exist problems of asymmet­
ric information, banks would be prone to contagious and socially costly bank runs. 
If we assume a benevolent government, interested in preventing such bank runs, 
bank supervision can serve a socially efficient purpose in preventing and limiting 
the effects of such bank runs. Finally, most countries have instituted deposit in­
surance schemes, protecting depositors up to a given amount in the event of bank 
failures, and this reduces private agents’ incentives to monitor banks, while at the 
same time creates incentives for bank managers to undertake more risky operations. 
From this perspective, it is argued that strong official supervision can prevent banks 
from engaging in such high-risk-taking activities, and thus prevent bank failures and 
improve bank performance.
There is also an opposite school of thought, which raises doubts about the ben­
efits of powerful government regulation, e.g. Glaeser and Shleifer (2003), Djankov, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) and (2003a). The proponents of this 
school, referred to as ’’the grabbing-hand view of public regulation”, argue that 
powerful public regulators usually implement regulations that favor political con­
stituencies rather than ameliorate market failures. Applied to the banking sector.
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this theory posits that bank supervisors may actually exert negative rather than 
positive influence over bank performance and stability. For example, in countries 
with powerful regulators governments may try to use this power to favor certain po­
litical constituencies, extract bribes, or attract campaign donations. In this manner, 
powerful regulators would not be exclusively focused on overcoming market failures 
and maintaining bank stability, but rather will expend efforts in achieving their own 
narrow objectives. From this perspective, it is expected that powerful supervision 
and regulation of banks would be associated with higher corruption, but with no 
improvements in bank performance or stability.
The assessment of these two views is largely an empirical question. Barth et al. 
(2001) collect data on several aspects of supervisory and regulatory power. These 
are the number of bank supervisors, the average tenure of bank supervisors, the 
official legal power of the supervisory agency, and the independence of the supervi­
sory agency. The variable which allows a comparison with the LIS is independence 
of the supervisory authority. It has two components: political independence, i.e. 
the degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from the government, 
and independence from banks, i.e. the degree to which the supervisory authority is 
independent from lawsuits from banks and other parties. The index of political inde­
pendence is measured on a 1 to 3 scale, with 1 standing for low independence, 2 - for 
medium independence, and 3 - for high independence. The degree of independence 
is determined by survey answers to the following three questions:
1) To whom are the supervisory bodies responsible or accountable?
2) How is the head of the supervisory authority (and other directors) appointed?
3) How is the head of the supervisory authority (and other directors) removed?
The degree of independence from lawsuits by banks or others is measured on a
0-1 scale, with 1 being awarded if bank supervisors are not legally liable for their 
actions, and 0 otherwise.
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The overall index of supervisory independence is then the sum of these two sub­
indices, and varies from 1 to 4, with higher values signifying greater independence.
The first question of the LIS Banking Regulation and Supervision section -  Ql 
-  is most closely related to the independence of the supervisory authority. It asks 
whether banks and other financial institutions are regulated and supervised, and 
determines whether the regulator is the Minister of Finance (no political indepen­
dence), a separate body that has at least some political independence, or a separate 
body with no political independence. Presence of regulation and supervision is 
awarded 0.25, no independence and no separate body regulating gets 0 points, a 
separate regulatory authority with no political independence gets 0.25 points, and 
a separate authority with at least some political independence scores 0.75 points. 
Overall, the value ranges from 0 (if banks are not supervised) to 1 (if banks are 
supervised and the regulator is a separate body with some political independence). 
In between we have a score of 0.25 if banks are regulated, but the regulator is the 
Minister of Finance, and 0.50 if banks are regulated by a separate body, but the lat­
ter lacks political independence. While carefully checking each individual response 
to Ql, we have corrected two prior coding errors^^.
2.4.3 2 Ease of Foreign Bank Entry
Part of the LIS is concerned with the banking laws and regulations governing the 
ownership of domestic banks by foreign banks and the entry of foreign banks into
^^One of the 13 answers for the Czech Republic showed that a regulator exists, but had no answer 
to the question ’’Are financial institutions regulated and supervised?”, scoring 0 points on it. We 
have assumed that the correct answer is ”Yes”, since the next sub-question has been answered. 
This raises the total average score for the Czech Republic on Ql firom 0.69 to 0.71. A similar 
mistake occurs in one of the 7 answers for Poland. The answer indicates that a regulator, which 
is a separate body with at least some political independence exists, but does not have an answer 
to the first sub-question on whether financial institutions are regulated and supervised. Again, we 
correct the answer to be ”Yes”, and this raises the score for this entry from 0.75 to 1.
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the domestic market. A series of related questions elicit information whether foreign 
ownership in financial institutions (banks) is permitted in the respondent’s jurisdic­
tion, whether certain limits on the share of a domestic bank owned by a foreign bank 
are in place, and whether foreign banks are subject to a special licensing regime be­
fore they can make an investment in a local bank. A fourth question asks whether 
the licensing requirements for the subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks differ 
from those for domestic banks. Before we engage in analyzing the collected data 
from these questions, let us briefly outline the importance of regulatory restrictions 
on foreign ownership of banks and entry of foreign banks into a country’s banking 
market. In broad terms, foreign ownership and entry restrictions, alongside restric­
tions on domestic banks’ permissible activities, constitute regulations of competition 
in the banking sector.
Recent empirical evidence suggests that foreign bank entry can bring about sub­
stantial benefits to the host country in terms of increased banking sector competi­
tion and the quality of banking disclosure and supervision. Clarke, Cull, Martinez 
Peria and Sanchez (2001) review the literature on foreign bank entry and discuss 
the benefits and risks of foreign bank entry. One of the findings of the literature 
is that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic banks in developing coun­
tries, while in developed countries, such as the United States for example, foreign 
banks are less efficient than domestic ones, perhaps due to linguistic or cultural 
differences. Cross-country empirical studies point to several factors, which affect 
the decision of banks to enter a foreign country. These are the degree of bilateral 
trade and economic integration between the home and host countries, the market 
opportunities available in the host country, and the entry restrictions and other reg­
ulations in the host country, which banks are subjected to. Some evidence (Miller 
and Parkhe (1998)) suggests that higher FDI flows to a host country are associated 
with more foreign bank entry, but the result does not generally hold for develop­
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ing countries. It is conjectured that in developing and transition countries foreign 
banks face relatively less domestic competition. Therefore, developing countries of­
fer very good profit opportunities in the provision of banking and financial services. 
In this regard, foreign bank entry might precede and even help bring about entry of 
non-financial firms (non-financial FDI). Profit opportunities and market conditions 
in the host country are paramount. For instance, Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2001) analyse foreign bank entry in 80 countries during 1988-1995, and 
establish that foreign bank entry is significantly associated with a reduction in the 
profitability, non-interest income and overhead costs of domestic banks. This result 
is interpreted to mean that foreign entry is associated with greater efficiency in the 
domestic banking system. High profits mean less competition, ceteris paribus^ while 
high overhead costs are indicative of less efficient management or organizational 
structures. An interesting finding is that it is the share of foreign banks in the total 
number of banks in the host country rather than the share of foreign bank assets 
in total bank assets in the host country, which is empirically found to affect the 
competitive environment in the banking market.
A cross-country study by Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) examines cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry, using data on approximately 2500 
banks in 29 OECD countries. They establish that cross-border mergers and acqui­
sitions are less frequent in the banking sector compared to the rest of the economy, 
and that in part this difference is due to regulatory restrictions in the banking sec­
tor. More stringent regulatory restrictions in the banking industry of a country 
reduce both the competitiveness of its domestic banks, and hinder foreign bank 
entry. Estimated probit regressions indicate that the decision to of a bank to ac­
quire equity in a foreign bank is positively and significantly associated with both 
the bank’s efficiency as proxied by profitability, and the home country banking mar­
ket’s efficiency, again proxied by the country-level return on assets (profitability).
Chapter 2, Methodology of the Legal Indicator Survey 57
Furthermore, the probability to internationalize is also positively and significantly 
associated with the bank’s share of non-interest income. Non-interest income at the 
aggregate country level however is found to reduce the probability to go abroad. 
In addition, bank size is also found to have a positive and significant impact on 
the bank’s decision to enter a foreign market. Among the country-specific variables 
affecting significantly this decision are foreign trade openness as measured by the 
share of exports in GDP; the size of the home country banking sector, measured by 
the ratio of total domestic credit to GDP and stock market capitalization as percent 
of GDP. The latter has a negative impact on the probability to go abroad; the for­
mer two -  a positive one. Furthermore, regulatory restrictions in the home country’s 
banking market and restrictions on outward banking FDI significantly reduce the 
probability of home country banks to acquire shareholdings in foreign banks. The 
study includes three Central European transition economies, which are members 
of OECD - the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Unfortunately, the authors 
exclude their observations from the estimation of the preferred equation (including 
regulatory restrictions among the regressors) due to lack of data on regulatory re­
strictions in these countries. Overall, the study has pertinence to the current chapter 
in the fact that banking regulatory restrictions in general and the restrictions with 
respect to ownership of foreign banks are found among the main factors behind 
banks’ decision to go abroad. Second, contrary to previous thinking that foreign 
banks mainly cater to their country’s multinationals in the host country, the papers 
reviewed above point to issues of efficiency and profitability driving banks abroad in 
search of better profit opportunities. The studies also confirm the previous finding 
in the literature that in developing and transition economies foreign banks are more 
efficient than local banks, thus helping to enhance competition and driving local 
banks to undertake restructuring in search of new niches and market opportunities.
As a further example of the foreign banking literature, case study evidence from
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Hungary presented by Bonin and Abel (2000) lends support to the view that in 
the developing and transition economies foreign banks are attracted mainly by mar­
ket opportunities rather than ’’follow the customer” policies. In Hungary, which in 
1999 had close to 60% of banking assets held by foreign banks and was among the 
first transition economies to rapidly open its banking market to foreign penetration, 
foreign banks have entered the retail banking market rather then staying involved 
in wholescde operations and industrial lending, which is typical of foreign banks in 
general. Foreign banks are involved in deposit taking and consumer lending in Hun­
gary, and Bonin and Abel (2000) also present evidence that foreign entry has forced 
incumbent domestic banks such as OTP -  the largest Hungarian commercial bank -  
to look for new market niches and improve its services. Thus, OTP has managed to 
restructure successfully and, being under the pressure of foreign competition, now 
provides improved retail banking services and holds a large share of the bank cards 
issued in Hungary (about 40% in 1999).
One of the main findings of the recent literature on internationalization of bank­
ing is that host-country regulations, which limit banking market competition and 
protect inefficient local banks, are a deterrent to foreign entry. As mentioned above, 
Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) find that foreign entry is lower in countries with heavier 
regulatory restrictions on banking activity. Furthermore, Barth, et al. (2004) find 
evidence across 107 countries that heavier restrictions on domestic or foreign bank 
entry are associated with higher net interest margins and overhead costs, and that 
limitations on foreign bank entry and ownership increase significantly the likelihood 
of a banking crisis. Therefore, restrictions and limitations on foreign bank entry and 
ownership worsen bank performance and banking system stability.
Going back to the LIS, we assign weights to the questions related to the regulation 
of foreign bank ownership on the assumption that foreign ownership is beneficial 
and carries minimum risks. Thus, the question whether or not foreign ownership
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of banks (and financial institutions) is permitted -  Q17 -  gets a score of 1 for a 
positive answer, and 0 for a negative one. A question on the percentage of control 
shares of a bank that can be owned by foreigners (Q18) awards the maximum 1 
point to a lack of any such restrictions, i.e. when a bank may be 100% foreign- 
owned. Fractions of a point (0.75 and 0.5) are awarded when greater than 50% but 
below 100% is permitted, and when the limit is between 26% and 50% respectively. 
Fractions of a point are deducted when the permitted share is less than 10% (-0.5 
score) and between 10% and 25% (-0.25 score). Finally, 1 point is awarded when 
the banking laws do not impose a need for a foreign entity to obtain a special 
license before acquiring shareholdings in a local bank (financial institutions) -  this 
is question Q19. Also, one point is also given when the licensing requirements for 
foreign banks do not differ from those for domestic banks (Q20). We average the 
scores of these four questions to get a sub-index of the ease of foreign bank ownership 
(FORJEASE_P).
One caution is in order here: when reviewing each country’s entry for these LIS 
questions we discovered a number of missing answers. For instance, a respondent 
would answer that foreign ownership is permitted, and would specify what the lim­
its for it are, if any, but would fail to provide an answer to the question whether 
a special license is necessary. Alternatively, a respondent would indicate that for­
eign ownership in financial institutions is allowed, but would not reveal what its 
maximum permissible share of a domestic bank’s control capital is. By the nature 
of the summation of the answers until now, these "no answers” have been treated 
as zero values, thereby producing a downward bias in the final average scores. We 
have decided that a correct treatment would be to treat these "no answer" cases 
as truly missing values, and have adjusted the country scores for the particular 
question affected accordingly, generally raising scores for Q19 and Q20 across most 
of the sample countries. An alternative way to address this problem would be to
Chapter 2. Methodology of the Legal Indicator Survey 60
treat these as ’’Unclear” values, and deduct a fraction of a point (0.17) whenever 
they occur, particularly because both Q19 and Q20 do not allow for the ” Unclear” 
category in their answer menus.
2.4.3.3 Private Monitoring of Banks
The central finding of the Barth et al. (2004) studies as well as subsequent studies 
utilizing their cross-country database on bank supervision, e.g. Beck, Demirguc- 
Kunt and Levine (2003c), is that when bank supervision focuses on eliciting accurate 
information disclosure it eases private agents’ monitoring of banks and is associated 
with better financial market outcomes. For example, firms perceive significantly 
lower obstacles in raising external finance in countries with stronger and easier pri­
vate monitoring of banks. In contrast, official bank supervisory power, i.e. the 
powers afforded to the supervisory agency to conduct supervision, are found to af­
fect firms’ financing obstacles positively and significantly. Furthermore, more official 
supervisory power is associated with more corruption and a higher role of connec­
tions and nepotism in financial intermediation. Supervisory independence, however, 
is found to mitigate some of the negative effects of official supervisory power. The 
authors contend that these findings support the so-called ’’private empowerment 
view”, i.e. the notion that supervision of banks should address the information and 
enforcement costs of private agents’ monitoring of banks by enhancing their ability 
and incentives to overcome information problems and exert corporate control over 
banks. It also seeks in so doing to limit the power of bank supervisors so that they 
are less susceptible to capture by political or private interests. Yet, the supervisory 
agency must have sufficient powers in order to be able to force accurate information 
disclosure. How to achieve the right balance is the crucial issue.
Barth et al. (2004) construct an index of Private Monitoring of Banks. This in­
dex is a composite of nine dummy variables, which measure 1) whether banks must
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be audited; 2) whether the bank auditor is an internationally certified and licensed 
auditor; 3) whether 100% of the top 10 domestic banks are rated by an interna­
tional rating agency; 4) whether or not an excessively generous deposit insurance is 
in place, which distorts private agents incentives to monitor banks; 5) whether banks 
must publish consolidated statements; 6) whether banks must disclose oflF-balance 
sheet items to the public; 7) whether banks must disclose internal risk management 
procedures to the public; 8) whether bank managers and directors are legally liable 
for disclosing misleading or erroneous financial information; and 9) whether subor­
dinated debt is allowable as bank capital. It is straightforward to see how these 
components affect the abilities of the public to better monitor banks. For exam­
ple, having the bank audited would provide an independent check on the financial 
information, which the bank releases to the public. Requirements that the auditor 
be certified and licensed internationally is a further step in making sure that the 
outside evaluation of the bank’s financial condition is accurate and up to standard. 
The higher the share of domestic banks which are rated by foreign rating firms, 
the better the public’s awareness of the overall condition of the country’s banking 
industry. Absence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme and lack of depositor 
compensation the last time a bank failed are awarded 1 point on the assumption 
that generous deposit insurance and guarantees that deposits are protected would 
lead to less private monitoring and more risk-taking by banks, i.e. will exacerbate 
the free-riding and moral hazard problems which deposit insurance creates. Fur­
ther, when banks are obligated to release accounting information on a consolidated 
basis (i.e. parent bank and subsidiaries, including non-bank financial affiliates or 
subsidiaries) reduces the scope for banks to hide problems by shifting losses around, 
and therefore enables better private sector monitoring. Private monitoring is also 
made easier by making banks disclose off-balance sheet accounting information, and 
by requiring banks to also release risk-management procedures to the public. Mak­
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ing it possible to prosecute and bring to court bank managers, who have released 
wrong or misleading information, also reinforces the abilities of the private sector 
to monitor, but, more importantly, enhances bank managers’ incentives to disclose 
accurate accounting data. Finally, treating subordinated debt as peirt of bank capi­
tal creates further checks on the bank by establishing a new class of bank monitors, 
i.e. the suppliers of subordinated credit. Thus, the BCL Private Monitoring Index 
ranges from 0 to 9, with higher values indicating more tools and mechanisms for 
private bank monitoring, and is constructed as a principal components indicator.
As mentioned earlier, the banking law section of the LIS uses as a guidepost the 
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision’s Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision (1997). Most of the survey questions are gauging the extent to which 
national banking laws comply with these Core Principles'^. Several of the survey 
questions (Q22 to Q28) are directly concerned with the frequency with which banks 
publish financial statements and the accounting standards being used; with the 
requirement for regular audits of bank financial statements and whether or not ex­
ternal auditors are used; and whether or not banks prepare financial statements on 
a consolidated basis according to the law, and in practice. Thus, Q22 asks whether 
banks generally prepare financial statements that are restated in accordance with 
International Accounting Standards, or the generally accepted accounting principles 
of a country home to an international financial center (such as the United States 
or the United Kingdom). Answers are given on a Yes-No-Unclear scale, and adher­
ence to international accounting standards is awarded 1 point. Lack of clarity in 
the law is penalised at -1/6 of a point. The next two questions are nested within 
Q22. Q23 asks those respondents, who indicate that IAS are being used by banks
^^Principle 21 of the Core Principles establishes that banks must maintain records prepared in 
accordance with consistent accounting practices that enable bank regulators to obtain a fair and 
true view of the financial condition of the bank and its profitability, and that banks must publish 
such financial statements on a regular basis.
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in the preparation of financial accounts, whether the shift to IAS has produced any 
different financial outcomes. Presumably, good local accounting principles would 
mean less of a difference in major accounts when restated along international prin­
ciples. This notion is reflected in the answer weights, with a maximum value of
1 awarded to lack of such disparity across the board; and fractions of a point 0.6 
and 0.4 respectively being awarded when only very few or the majority of banks are 
affected. If all or almost all banks are affected, zero points are given. Finally, the 
last part of Q23 asks the subset of lawyers who say that IAS are not yet used by 
banks, i.e. who give a negative answer to Q22. In this case, the question is whether 
IAS are in the process of being implemented, and an affirmative answer scores 1 
point. Therefore, no IAS and no process of switching to IAS is worth 0 points, 
IAS being implemented but not yet used by banks is worth 1 point; IAS being al­
ready in use, but causing great disparities between statements according to local 
standards and international standards for almost all banks is also worth 1 point; 
and IAS being used and no substantial disparities between local and international 
standards is worth between 1 and 2 points, with complete absence of disparities 
between financial results following local and international standards getting the full
2 points. Thus, the weighting reflects the assumption that good financial disclosure 
is desirable in order to enable both bank supervisors and private agents to acquire 
accurate information about the financial condition of the bank, and that good finan­
cial disclosure by banks should be based on comparable, internationally-acceptable, 
accounting principles, created specifically for the banking industry. Q24 addresses 
the issue who is responsible for setting the accounting standards in general use in 
the respondent’s jurisdiction. The accompanying weights reflect an assessment that 
the professional accounting community is better equipped to adopt accounting laws 
which comply with internationally-accepted rules and principles.
The rationale behind the LIS questions on accounting and the BCL accounting
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variables, which are part of the index of Private Monitoring, is practically the same. 
The LIS, being a survey specifically targeted at transition economies, attempts to 
establish to what degree IAS have become operational and used by banks in their 
financial accounts. Similarly, the BCL survey asks supervisors to specify bank ac­
counting features, and the answers are then employed to form the Bank Accounting 
sub-index.
Recognising the need for an independent external review of the financial informa­
tion released by banks, Q25 of the LIS asks law firms whether banking laws mandate 
that banks’ financial statements get audited at least annually. Presence of at least 
annual audits gets 1/4 of a point, and use of international auditing standards scores 
a further 3/4 of a point. The next LIS question, Q26, asks about the frequency with 
which banks use external auditors for their annual audits. Its menu of answers is 
given on a frequency-rating scale from 1 to 5, with 0 to 1 points being awarded for 
higher frequencies, in equal increments of 0.25. As outlined above, the BCL survey 
of bank supervisors also collects information whether an outside audit is mandatory 
for the financial statements of a bank, and whether the auditor is licensed or certi­
fied, and the answers to these two questions make up two of the dummies used in 
aggregating the Private Monitoring index. As explained earlier, the presence of an 
external audit of financial information issued by banks creates confidence that the 
information submitted to bank supervisors and released to the public is accurate.
Next, the LIS (Q27) attempts to ascertain whether the financial statements 
of banks must be prepared on a consolidated basis, i.e. a parent-bank and bank 
branches prepare joint financial accounts. This question’s answers assume the fa­
miliar Yes-No-Unclear format, with affirmative answer getting 1 point. The benefit 
of having banks report on a consolidated basis is that if the bank is in trouble 
and consolidated reporting is not the norm, it may attempt to shift non-performing 
assets or off-balance sheet items to a subsidiary, and thus conceal the problematic
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assets. This would present an unfair picture of the bank’s financial condition. Hence, 
consolidated reporting of financial results is required. Similarly, the BCL database 
builds the banking law requirements for consolidated financial statements into the 
index of Private Monitoring. The existence of such a requirement is assumed to 
enhance the ability of private agents to monitor bank behavior.
Finally, the LIS (Q28) gathers information about the frequency with which banks 
are examined by the supervisory agency on a consolidated basis, i.e. a parent-bank 
and bank branches are examined together. This effectiveness-type question is built 
upon the usual 1 to 5 rating scale, and scores are awarded from 0 to 1 in equal 
increments of 0.25 for higher rating frequencies.
2.4 3.4 Permissible Bank Activities
The LIS gathers information about restrictions imposed by banking laws on the 
nature and scope of permitted business activities of banks. In particular, Q7 asks 
whether banking laws and regulations include a list of permissible activities for 
banks. A nested sub-question then goes on to elicit information about the specific 
types of activities which banking laws permit banks to engage in. Among the an­
swer options are traditional bank activities such as granting of loans and acceptance 
of deposits. Further, the question also seeks answers as to whether securities un­
derwriting and dealing and insurance activities are allowed for banks. One answer 
option is also ’’only activities closely related to banking”, which one would assume 
would be only lending and deposit-taking activities. Finally, among the menu of 
choices respondents can also check ’’Other” for activities that are allowed, but not 
explicitly shown in the answer menu.
The next LIS question - Q8 - asks whether there are prohibited activities for 
banks and financial institutions, and more specifically, whether securities underwrit­
ing and participation in investment funds are activities legally prohibited for banks.
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In the same line of thought, Q9 asks whether banking laws impose restrictions on 
banks’ holding of both government and private firms’ securities. Therefore, the lat­
ter question also seeks to establish whether banks may own shares in non-financial 
private companies.
These questions attempt to determine whether banking laws impose restrictions 
on the so-called universal banking, i.e. allowing banks not only to engage in typical 
banking activities such as lending and deposit-taking, but also in securities, insur­
ance and other activities, as well as to be shareholders in non-financial firms. This 
mixing of banking and commerce has recently received a lot of attention in the bank­
ing literature. How to assign weights to the LIS questions just mentioned, therefore, 
is a matter of assessing the pros and cons of universal banking, and assessing what 
the empirical evidence shows.
Among the theoretical arguments for restricting the degree to which banks can 
engage in securities, insurance, real estate and other commercial activities is that 
conflicts of interest might arise when a bank underwrites a firm’s securities, while 
it also extends a loan to the same firm. The bank might abuse its informational 
advantage by knowing more about the firm than others, and might ’’dump” low- 
quality securities on other, less-informed customers so as to assist the firm with the 
outstanding loan. Another cost of universal or integrated banking (see Claessens 
and Klingebiel (2001) for analysis of the benefits and costs of integrated banking) 
is that a broader set of activities that may be undertaken can increase risky be­
havior by banks. Next, universal banking might entail a reduction in competition 
in the financial industry, and thus lower market efficiency^^. Further, universal 
banking might be costly since it would lead to larger, more concentrated banking 
and economic power. Such large financial institutions might become so politically 
and economically powerful that they would be ’’too big to discipline” . Therefore,
Claessens and Klingebiel (2001) discuss that this cost might be partially offset by a hberal 
policy toward bank entry.
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universal banking makes bank monitoring more difficult - both from the supervi­
sor’s perspective, and from the market at large. Another potential cost of universal 
banking is that deposit insurance and bank safety nets might be extended to the 
investment and commercial activities of universal banks.
In summary, since universal banking entails conffict of interests, might lead to 
too large and powerful banks which limit market competition, breed more risky 
behavior, and are difficult to supervise and monitor, the government can limit the 
scope of bank activities, and thereby enhance competition and performance in the 
banking industry.
There are, however, alternative views on universal banking, which claim that al­
lowing banks to engage in broader investment and commercial activities can gener­
ate significant benefits. These can stem from informational advantages, which banks 
could obtain from firms through the various services and products they offer. Such 
informational advantages may lead to banks establishing close, long-term relation­
ships with client firms. Fewer restrictions on bank operations may lead to economies 
of scale and scope: for example, economies of scope can arise from access to bor­
rower information, management of different types of risk for customers, economies 
in distribution and marketing of financial services, and reputational economies. On 
the bank consumer side, this might result in lower search, information, monitoring 
and transaction costs. Moreover, economies of scale can lead to potential savings in 
overhead, back-office bank costs, information technology and investment banking- 
type operations. Proponents of universal banking further argue that allowing banks 
to engage in investment and commercial activities can help banks better manage 
risks and diversify risks. Thus, in periods of slow lending activity, universal banks 
can generate higher profits on the investment side. Therefore, income strecuns will 
be diversified and bank profits would be more stable. In addition, cross-selling of 
different products and services can help increase bank revenues, and thus increase
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banks’ franchise values. The latter may bring about more prudent behavior by 
banks.
Existing empirical evidence mostly suggests that there are benefits to gain from 
fewer regulatory restrictions on bank activities. For example, Berger and Udell 
(1996) find that broad-banking powers are associated with a lower cost of capital 
and less stringent cash-fiow constraints. Kroszner and Raj an (1994) establish that 
universal banks did not abuse investors and underwrite low-quality securities in the 
U.S. before the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933^ '^ . They find that the 
market rationally accounted for possible conflicts of interest, and this constrained 
banks to underwrite good-quality securities only.
Barth, et al. (2004) also look at the extent to which banks can engage in commer­
cial and investment activities, such as securities underwriting, provision of insurance 
services and real estate services. They also gather information whether banks may 
be owners in non-financial firms. The results of Barth et al. (1999) on a sample of 
60 countries and of Barth et al. (2001), using an expanded sample of 107 countries, 
indicate that restrictions on bank activities, and specifically restrictions on securities 
activities, affect bank performance (measured as the share of private credit in GDP) 
negatively. Furthermore, more restrictions on bank activities are associated with 
bank supervisory systems less open to private monitoring, with more barriers to en­
try in banking and with more government ownership of banks. Since the empirical 
evidence does not identify some tangible benefits from restricting bank activities, it 
is argued that the preferred option may be to impose less restrictions.
We assume that this logic applies to the transition economies as well. Of course, 
it may be argued that commercial banks in these countries are relatively young, and 
perhaps some limitations of broad-based banking are warranted to avoid abuses and
^^The US Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 prohibited commercial banks to engage in investment 
banking activities. The absence of universal banks in the United States persisted for most of the 
20th century.
Chapter 2. Methodology of the Legal Indicator Survey 69
systemic collapse. Further, universal banks would be more difficult to supervise and 
monitor -  which may be even hgirder for bank supervisors in these countries. Never­
theless, in line with the discussion above, we have assumed that fewer restrictions on 
bank activities would benefit these markets, and have assigned weights accordingly^^. 
In Q7, securities underwriting and insurance activities (answer options c) and d)) 
used to get penalised at fractions of a point (-0.25 and -0.35 accordingly) in accor­
dance with a view for less integrated banking. This is no longer the case. Now both 
answer options get weights of 1/6. The same weights are also awarded to lending 
and deposit-taking activities and other activities. We also award 1/6 of a point to 
banking laws specifying a list of permissible bank activities. Question Q8 also has 
revised weights. Previously, presence of prohibited activities for banks was awarded 
half a point, with the other half awarded for specific legal provisions prohibiting 
securities underwriting and dealing and participation in investment funds. Now a 
lack of such prohibitions scores 1 point. Finally, Q9 previously used to favor the 
presence of legal restrictions on banks’ holdings of public or private securities, with 
1 point previously awarded for a positive answer. In accordance with the above 
review and since restrictions on such holdings of securities, particularly on banks’ 
holdings of shares in non-financial firms are associated with no tangible benefits in 
terms of bank performance and stability, we have also decided to award 1 point 
to answers indicative of absence of such restrictions. Thus, we build an index of 
Permissible Bank Activities and compare it to the Permissible Activities data by 
BCL in Chapter 4.
must note a revision of weights on these questions compared to an earlier version of the 
LIS data.
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2.4.3 5 Supervisory Power
One of the main findings of Barth et al. (2004) and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (2003c) is that official supervisory power is associated with more financing 
obstacles for firms and more corruption and need for special connections in raising 
external finance. Powerful supervisory agencies, which directly monitor banks, are 
found to hinder financial development. Supervisory power is measured as a compos­
ite index of 14 dummy variables and constructed as a principal component indicator. 
Among these 14 sub-components are the BCL survey answers to whether the super­
visory agency can meet up with external bank auditors without the approval of the 
bank; whether the law mandates that external auditors communicate directly with 
the bank supervisory agency in case of presumed involvement of bank directors and 
managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse; whether bank supervisors can 
take legal action against auditors for negligence; whether or not off-balance sheet 
items are disclosed to supervisors. Among the ingredients of the supervisory powers 
index are also powers of the supervisory authority to intervene in troubled banks 
through corrective actions, to initiate bank restructuring, or to declare bank insol­
vency. For example, whether or not the supervisory agency can order bank directors 
to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses is a measure of supervi­
sors’ powers to prevent or correct problems. Other powers, which measure prompt 
corrective actions by bank supervisors, are whether the supervisors can force a bank 
to change its internal organizational structure, or order bank directors to suspend 
distribution of dividends, bonuses or management fees. Declaring insolvency powers 
are proxied by whether the bank law authorizes the supervisory agency to declare a 
bank insolvent, such that this declaration supersedes the rights of shareholders, and 
whether the supervisory agency is authorised to intervene in an insolvent bank by 
suspending bank ownership rights. Finally, restructuring and reorganization powers 
measure the degree to which supervisors can restructure and reorganize an insolvent
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bank. Specifically, these are proxied by the powers of the supervisor to supercede 
shareholder rights, to remove and replace bank management, and to remove and 
replace bank directors.
The LIS also contains a number of questions which could serve as a useful proxy 
for bank powers. Indeed, many of these were built into the survey with the idea that 
having powerful supervision can be beneficial. Most of these powers are envisaged by 
the Basle Core Principles (1997). To determine how these powers afforded to bank 
supervisors affect bank performance and stability is an empirical issue, which will 
be addressed in Chapter 4. Here we describe the survey questions, whose answers 
constitute our index of Supervisory Powers, and compare it with the BCL index of 
Supervisory Powers. Since the LIS was designed to measure to what extent banking 
laws were in agreement with the Core Principles, many of the survey questions were 
designed and weighted with the Core Principles as a benchmark. For instance, Q5 
asks whether bank supervisors are authorised to conduct on-site examinations of 
banks, how often such on-site examinations of banks are conducted, and whether 
the supervisory authority has professionally-trained examiners capable of conducting 
such examinations. This is modeled closely on Principles 16 to 18 of the Basle Core 
Principles. These specify that a system of effective supervision should combine both 
elements of off-site and on-site supervision, and that bank supervisors should have 
a means of independent validation of supervisory information either through on­
site examinations or use of external auditors. Therefore, on-site examinations are 
perceived as a check on the accuracy of reports and financial information which banks 
submit to the supervisory agency. The weighting of Q5 favors on-site examinations 
of banks (awarding a 1/4 of a point for the legal need for such on-site supervision), 
and awards more points for more frequent such examinations (with more than one 
on-site bank visit by supervisors scoring 1/2 of a point). Presence of bank examiners 
trained and capable of conducting effective on-site examinations gets a further 1/4
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of a point. Thus, the answers to Q5 form the sub-index of Supervisory Powers to 
Conduct On-Site Bank Examinations. Q3 and Q4 are related to ongoing supervision 
methods, and garner information about the types of documents banks are obligated 
to provide to the supervisory agency, and the frequency with which supervisors 
collect and review such documents. A wider variety of financial documents given to 
supervisors, as captured by question Q3, is preferred to less documents, with each 
type of document gaining equal fractions of a point (1/5)^®. Higher frequencies of 
supervisory collection and review of the prudential reports, as given in answers to 
Q4, is interpreted as a positive feature of bank supervision, or indeed as effective 
bank supervision. Therefore, higher frequency ratings (on the usual 1 to 5 scale) 
are awarded higher weights, ranging from 0 to 1 and increasing by an increment of
0.25.
Another set of LIS questions is also concerned with supervisory powers. Q13 for 
instance asks whether certain bank activities require prior approval by the Regulator. 
The question tracks whether regulatory approval is needed for a bank before it 
engages in mergers and acquisitions; before it introduces any changes in its ownership 
and control structure; and before it enters into a new line of business activity. The 
latter is related to competition regulation, which is discussed in the next sub-section. 
Legal requirements for each of the three approvals scores 1/3 of a point; lack of 
such a requirement scores zero. This weighting again reflects the ideas behind the 
Basle Core Principles regarding transfer of bank shares and major acquisitions and 
investments by a bank (Principles 4 and 5). Since Q13 is about regulation of bank 
structure, we may also consider it as one of the Competition Regulatory variables.
Finally, Q31 and 32 look at supervisory powers to undertake corrective actions 
against banks. More specifically, Q31 assesses whether bank supervisors have the
^®Here we have introduced a small revision in the weight previously awarded to answer option 
b) Call reports by moving it from 0 to 1/5. Accordingly, the previous weight assigned to category 
’’Other” has now been changed from 1/5 to 0.
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authority to undertake corrective measures against banks for violations of bank 
laws, and tracks whether it is authorised to revoke bank licenses, impose civil fines 
and penalties; and make banks undertake corrective actions. Under the assumption 
that a powerful regulator is beneficial, supervisory authority to undertake all these 
corrective actions scores maximum points. This is an extensiveness question. Q32 
then asks about the frequency with which banks found in violation of the law, have 
been penalised by the supervisors. It is an effectiveness question, measured on the 
1 to 5 rating scale.
2.4.3.6 Com petition Regulatory Variables
The LIS collects data about the legal entry requirements for banks. Thus, Q12 asks 
what kind of information must be provided prior to the establishment of a finan­
cial institution. Again, more comprehensive entry requirements are viewed as being 
desirable, and the total number of points scored depends on such a comprehensive 
disclosure of information. Thus, if the applicant for a bank license must submit 
before the Regulator the bank’s ownership structure; the names and information 
about the directors and senior managers, including their professional qualifications; 
the bank’s operating plan, financial projections and sources of capital, then the 
maximum 1 point is awarded (each of the five entry requirements scores 0.2 points). 
This assessment is based on the assumption that such entry requirements are pru­
dent and needed; to assess whether they are excessive is an empirical question. As 
before, this question and its weighting reflect the Basle Core Principles (1997), in 
particular Principles 2 and 3. The ranking of the transition economies in terms of 
entry requirements shows that, generally, legal requirements for opening a bank are 
comprehensive -  more than half of the sample countries score at least 0.9 points, 
indicating more requirements. Among the most restrictive (or prudent) are Arme­
nia, Belarus, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Uzbekistan. The
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more advanced transition countries rank in the middle around the 0.8-0.9 mark.
2.4.3.7 C ap ital A dequacy R equirem ents
Traditionally, capital is seen as a buffer against bank losses. Bank capital require­
ments are therefore seen as a positive feature of regulation, reducing risk-taking 
activities by bank-managers and ensuring that bank stability is maintained, e.g. 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). There are other theoretical models, however, which 
raise doubts about the ability of capital requirements to reduce risk-taking behav­
ior. For instance, Thakor (1996) shows that risk-weighted capital requirements may 
actually increase credit rationing by banks. Gorton and Winton (1995) argue that 
higher capital adequacy raises the cost of capital. Therefore, theoretically, there is 
a debate about the need for and benefits of capital requirements for banks.
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) attempt to answer this question empirically. 
Their database on bank supervision collects information about overall capital strin­
gency. They take into account whether the capital requirement reflects certain risks 
and deducts certain losses from capital before minimum capital adequacy is deter­
mined. For example, their index of Overall Capital Stringency reflects whether the 
capital-asset ratio is risk-weighted according to the Basle guidelines; whether the 
minimum ratio varies with market risk and with a bank’s credit risk; whether the 
market value of loan losses not yet realized in the accounting books is deducted from 
capital before calculating the capital adequacy ratio; whether unrealized securities 
and foreign exchange losses are likewise deductible; etc. Presence of these features 
scores 1 point, and higher values of the index mean greater capital stringency. A 
second index of Initial Capital Stringency measures whether certain funds may be 
used to capitalize a bank initially and whether the sources of such capital are verified 
by the bank regulatory authority.
The LIS does not go into this level of detail regarding capital adequacy. It has
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two questions concerning capital requirements. First, Q29 asks whether banks need 
to adhere to established capital requirements. A positive answer scores a fraction 
of a point (1/6). The next sub-question asks whether capital requirements are set 
in accordance with those prescribed by the Basle Capital Accord, i.e. whether risk- 
adjusted capital requirements are the norm. Capital requirements are normally 
prescribed in banking laws, hence the question is concerned with the extent of the 
law. This part of Q29 scores 5/6. The next question, Q30, asks whether the laws 
clearly describe capital requirements and whether capital requirements are normally 
understood by bank managers. This is an effectiveness question as it is attempting 
to measure how clear and practicable these provisions are. It is measured on the 
usual 1 to 5 frequency rating scale.
2.5 Some M ethodological Concerns
Having outlined the rationale behind the Securities and Banking Law sections of the 
LIS (we do the same for the contract enforcement section in Chapter 5), we briefly 
outline next two issues which may be problematic: the method of assigning weights 
to the LIS questions described above, and the distinction between extensiveness of 
the law and effectiveness of the law, as measured by the respective legal indices..
2.5.1 Q uestion W eights
As explained in the previous section and Appendices 2. A to 2.D, we have undertaken 
some changes in absolute question weights, with the purpose of treating all questions 
equally in the aggregation of the individual scores; changed some intra^question 
distribution of weights, such as the effectiveness rankings on a 0 to 1 5-point scale, 
as well as changed intra-question weights when economic theory necessitates so. 
A legitimate question is whether our results and country rankings are sensitive to
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the weights employed, particularly whether relative rankings change if we attach 
unequal weights to some questions, which are deemed more important than others.
To glean more information on this, we have conducted a simple test, using the 
Banking Law data. We test for example how the individual question scores change 
if we revert back to the original internal weights for Q26, Q28 and Q30. There­
fore, we change from the following 5-point scale -  0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1 to the 
old scale for some effectiveness questions -  i.e. 0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.8 and 1. Therefore, 
the old scale attached lower values for frequency answer ’’Sometimes”, as well as a 
lower value for frequency answer ’’Rarely”. Conversely, it assigned a higher value 
for answer ’’Frequently”. The weights attached to the two extremes points are the 
same. Q26 is essentially our banking effectiveness index of external audit effective­
ness (EXT_AUDIT_EFF), while Q28 is equal to the index of effectiveness of con­
solidated bank examinations (CONS_EXAM_EFF). Both are found significant for 
private credit and liquid liabilities in Chapter 4. We find that recalculating these 
variables, using the old weighting scale, does not change the relative ranking or the 
significance of the variables. In fact, the correlation coefficient between the vari­
able, using old and the variable, using the new weighting scale, is 0.98 and 0.96 for 
EXT_AUDIT_EFF, and CONS_EXAM_EFF respectively. Employing eax:h in the 
basic regression for PRIVATE CREDIT, controlling for other variables, does not 
change the results -  CON S_EX AM JEFF retains significance at the 5% level. The 
results for EXT_AUDIT_EFF also hold, but the latter’s significance drops to the 
10% level. Conducting a similar comparison between the same variable -  weighted 
differently -  gives the same results for Q30.
We also test how a change in overall question weights will affect the aggregate 
indices -  in this case, we decide to attach a higher weight to certain questions, which 
previously scored 1, and see whether our results are sensitive to such a change. Since, 
however, most of our indices are now disaggregated, and the focus is not on aggregate
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but rather on disaggregated indices based on different aspects of the law, it is not 
anticipated that any such change will affect our results.
2.5.2 Contradictory Answers by Lawyers from the Same 
Country
A limitation of the methodology is also the fact that the LIS allows for conflict­
ing answers. For example, scores are averaged across all answers to a particular 
question from respondents from the same country; however, no restriction is im­
posed on ensuring that the answers are the same or that contradictory answers are 
eliminated. The EBRD approach was always to treat such contradictory answers 
as another symptom of deficiencies in the legal system -  presumably, when prac­
tising lawyers from the same country are in disagreement about a provision of the 
law and/or its enforcement, this signals that unclarities and ambiguities exist, e.g. 
Ramasastry (2002). The indices employed in the thesis -  for all their differences 
with the previously published ones based on the LIS -  do follow the same rule, 
i.e. when respondents from the same country provide differing answers to the same 
questions, we treat each answer equally, apply the intra-question weights and derive 
the country question score as a simple average.
This procedure is contentious -  after all, it may be argued that we are not cap­
turing the precise state of the existing laws even in our extensiveness indices, since 
we allow for conflicting answers to enter the aggregation. However, short of answer­
ing every question according to the law, and then eliminating or discounting the 
answers which are not in agreement with the law, we do not have a clear alternative 
for dealing with this problem. The most neutral thing to do is most likely to dis­
regard potential differences with the existing law, and to average across all answers 
in the way that we do. Furthermore, as we have been emphasizing all along, the 
LIS measures perceptions, so we would not expect that opinions even to the exist­
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ing provisions would always be the same. It is conceivable that lawyers may think 
differently about a certain provision depending on whether it is used, or whether 
a way of contracting around it exists. Therefore, we will be throwing out useful 
information value if we were to harmonize answers to extensiveness-questions from 
the same jurisdiction.
Having said that, we explore an alternative mechanism for dealing with the 
problem of conflicting answers -  namely, adopting a ’’majority rule”, whereby we 
choose the answer to be the one that the highest number of respondents from the 
same country picked, and ignoring the other answers to that question. Again, we 
conduct a sensitivity test to see whether country scores would be systematically 
affected by such an approach in aggregation of scores. Suppose we want to test 
this for Q24 from the Banking Law section, which assesses the extensiveness of 
the law with respect to who writes the country’s accounting rules. The answers 
are summed up in the index of ACCOUNTING, which we find highly signiflcant 
in the PRIVATE CREDIT regressions of Chapter 4. Table 2.4 shows the current 
values of the ACCOUNTING index, and the amended values, calculated using the 
’’majority rule”. For illustration, Bulgaria has 16 survey respondents, 15 provided 
answers to this question. Of these, 13 indicated answer option ” Primarily by the 
government” , and two of them provided answer option ”By both the government and 
the professional accounting community” . Since the majority of respondents picked 
the former, we then ignore the two latter answers, and accept the final answer for this 
question for Bulgaria as being ” Primarily by the government”. Since its associated 
weight is 0 (i.e. less value for government involvement in accounting rules writing), 
and the associated weight of the answer option ”By both the government and the 
professional accounting community” is 0.5, we note a reduction in the aggregate 
score for this question for Bulgaria. In two cases we have an equal split in answers 
-  for Albania and Romania -  where 2 (3) respondents pick the flrst answer option.
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and 2 (3) respondents pick the third one. In these two cases, we adopt the average 
weight between the two options as the question weight (0.25).
We find that the correlation between the country scores is high and positive 
(0.90), and significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the ACCOUNTING_MAJ 
index maintains its significance in the PRIVATE CREDIT regressions (Chapter 4). 
So the results are robust to changes in the aggregation procedure, whereby conflicting 
answers from lawyers form the same country are resolved through a majority rule, 
whereby the answer picked by the majority of respondents is chosen as the final 
answer.
2.5.3 Legal Extensiveness and Legal Effectiveness
As mentioned earlier, we do retain in the thesis the classification of LIS questions into 
extensiveness- and effectiveness-related. The EBRD definitions of the two concepts 
emphasize that extensiveness questions refer to the extent or scope of the law -  
whether or not it has essential elements needed to achieve its purpose, such as 
prohibit insider trading activity, for example. Effectiveness, in contrast, refers to 
the enforceability and enforcement of the law, and the mechanism for achieving its 
objectives. As we reviewed the rationale for question weights earlier, we also noted 
the type of question -  extensiveness or effectiveness. In several instances, which we 
specifically highlight, we have re-defined some of the question classifications to the 
other type. In this sense, our understanding of the two concepts differs somewhat 
from that of the EBRD.
Ramasastry (2002) provides a useful account of the EBRD Legal Indicator Survey 
in a historical perspective. She argues that at the outset of implementation of the 
survey -  in the mid-1990s -  countries tended to score high on extensiveness -  as 
new laws were being passed, but had considerably lower effectiveness scores. While 
this trend continued for some time, by the end of the decade, some jurisdictions had
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Table 2.4: Legal Indices of ACCOUNTING Aggregated Through Different Pro- 
cesses, by Country
Country ACCOUNTING, average ACCOUNTING, majority
Albania 25.00 25.00
Armenia 0.00 0.00
Azerbaijan 0.00 0.00
Belarus 0.00 0.00
Bulgaria 6.67 0.00
Croatia 38.89 0.50
Czech Republic 9.09 0.00
Estonia 42.86 0.50
FYR Macedonia 0.00 0.00
Georgia 0.00 0.00
Hungary 33.33 0.50
Kazakhstan 10.00 0.00
Kyrgyzstan 16.67 0.00
Latvia 37.50 0.50
Lithuania 0.00 0.00
Moldova 12.50 0.00
Poland 21.43 0.00
Romania 25.00 0.25
Russian Federation 2.63 0.00
Slovak Republic 11.11 0.00
Slovenia 83.33 100.00
Ukraine 0.00 0.00
Uzbekistan 37.50 0.00
Correlation coefficient: 0.8981.
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reversed the trend, i.e. had higher effectiveness than extensiveness. She argnes that 
this may be happening due to lawyers believing that, despite of deficiencies and 
unclarities in the law, judges and litigants have developed customs and practices 
that allow the legal system to function reasonably well.
Judicial reforms undertaken in most of the transition economies are another 
source of improved perceptions about effectiveness. What is clear, however, is that 
since both concepts are built upon lawyers’ perceptions, the clear dividing line be­
tween them -  such as extent-of-law questions and enforcement questions, is some­
times hard to maintain. Therefore, in a certain sense, extensiveness and effectiveness 
may also be both picking up the same effects -  which would also explain the fact 
that they are generally correlated.
Due to these conceptual issues, we restrict somewhat our use of the two concepts 
-  and utilise them mainly in the analysis of securities laws in Chapter 3. Our 
approach is not to adopt overall extensiveness and effectiveness proxies for the law, 
but rather to focus on the substantive aspects of the laws, and to look at thematic 
and disaggregated legal indices. Hence, the dichotomy of legal extensiveness and 
legal effectiveness -  while still used -  is less pertinent for the analysis to follow.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we outlined some of the main arguments, justifying the use of legal 
survey data as a tool to measure perceptions of how extensive and effective the laws 
in the transition economies are. Among the pros of using such data are the potential 
for gathering information from the users of the law as opposed to coding of the law by 
scholars based in a foreign country with no immediate understanding of all the other 
related laws or legal institutions; this approach can generate potentially useful data 
not about the exact state of the law, but about the perceptions of its users about 
its state and enforcement. Both approaches are useful in measuring the law -  but
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measure different things. Yet, to the extent that most respondents would agree on 
basic legal provisions in financial laws -  as covered by this thesis -  we would expect 
some correlation between the perception-based measures and other measures, based 
on coding the actual laws. Another positive feature of the legal survey approach 
based on lawyers’ perceptions is that -  while it does not paint a picture of the exact 
state of the law -  it can provide survey results users with an idea about disparities in 
legal thinking, due to ambiguous laws or unclear laws. This is an important point. 
Finally, among the pros of this approach is the scope for repeat interactions over 
many years with the same law firms, used as respondents -  potentially increasing 
the value of the data and tracking changes in the law.
As explained, however, the method adopted suffers from some distinct draw­
backs. Some of these relate to the survey instrument and its implementation. This 
is a self-administered survey, and this may lead to respondents editing their an­
swers or to question order effects, which are hard to anticipate. Unlike structured 
face-to-face survey interviews with trained survey enumerators, the LIS was entirely 
self-administered. This aspect may affect the quality of the answers -  due for in­
stance that the survey was filled in by a less experienced lawyer, or due to insufiicient 
time devoted to its completion. Second, survey questionnaires are always in need of 
improvement. Usually pilot surveys are conducted to see how respondents interpret 
questions and choose answers, and the questions are modified accordingly. The LIS 
was altered in 1999 to include the 5-point scale effectiveness questions. In a sense 
the experience with the 1999 financial law section in 1998 was the pilot (this was 
its first run), and the alterations in 1999 reflected the experience from the previous 
year. Another related drawback is that we have not conducted any tests to see 
whether there are persistent question order effects (there is some indications that 
such may exist, as in some instances answers to essentially the same question in 
different sections of the survey seems to produce different results). This remains an
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under-explored aspect of the data.
As explained in earlier sections there is no unique way of weighting the questions 
and aggregating the indices. Our approach has been -  in contrast to the EBRD one -  
to treat questions equally, and to assign weights on the basis of underlying economic 
concepts which we are testing for -  e.g. such that disclosure requirement legal rules 
should be rewarded since they alleviate market informational asymmetries. Occa­
sionally, our weights differ from those that the EBRD Legal Team attached to the 
questions. In some instances, as in the Banking Law section, the question weights 
also reflect internationally accepted principles, such as the Basle Committee’s Core 
Principles on Effective Bank Supervision^^. It must be stressed, however, that no 
universal laws exist and internationally adopted legal principles may not be appro­
priate for every country. This is a common shortcoming of all data, based on legal 
surveys, which imposes a weighting structure in assessing the law.
Despite these limitations of the survey approach, such data can be useful in com­
paring perceptions of legal rules and how they work across countries. As mentioned 
at the beginning, such surveys of lawyers have become very popular in recent years 
in economic research related to the institutions and their impact on economic and 
financial development. The LIS data have been subjected to systematic cleaning, 
and is shown to be robust to alternative weighting, aggregation of answers and to 
correlate well with our perception-based indices of lawyers, where available (Chapter 
5 offers a comparison in this regard). Therefore, we use the data from the Securities 
Law, Banking Law and Contract Enforcement sections in the chapters, which follow.
^^Other sections’ weights also reflect such principles: for instance, the Pledge Law section (not 
used in the thesis) was weighted in accordance with the so-called ’best practice” law -  the EBRD 
Model Law on Secured Transactions. The Securities Law section weights also reflect the Objectives 
and Principles of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).
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Appendix 2. A Review of Changes in Banking W eights
Let US turn to the sources of differences between the TR99 scores and the thesis 
scores one by one. We will review each of the 6 survey sections, and explain how 
the question weights have been changed and the logic behind the change. Let us 
start with the Banking Law section first, and choose Georgia since, as mentioned 
above, it underwent a change from 30.59 to 48.96 on its Banking extensiveness 
(EXTBANK99) score. As explained earlier, three law firms from Georgia completed 
the survey, and we refer to their coded answers as Geol, Geo2 and GeoS. Their 
respective scores on banking extensiveness were 0.00, 20.24 and 71.53, giving an 
average of 30.59, which was translated into a score of 1 in the Transition Report 
1999. However, the subsequent cleaning of the data by the author noted that it was 
initially overlooked that Geol had a zero score not because the answers indicated 
such a poor legal extensiveness system, but because there were no answers provided 
at all. Thus, this was corrected, whereby the average score should have been 45.88. 
What then explains the remaining difference between the latter value and the 48.96 
score used in the thesis? At this juncture we review the weighting for banking 
extensiveness.
In terms of the Georgia example, we notice that the old Geo2 score of 20.24 is 
equal to 4.25 divided by 21 (the maximum sum of weights) and the Geo3 score of 
71.53 is equal to 15.02 divided again by 21. The new Geo2 score is equal to 5.00 
divided by 20 (the new maximum sum of weights), and the new Geo3 score is equal to 
14.58 divided again by 20. The changes in the denominator affect every response in 
the same manner, the maximum points that can be scored on banking extensiveness 
have dropped by 1 point from 21 to 20. We investigate the source of this reduction, 
and find that this is entirely due to changes in weights. We document these changes, 
and how they affect the extensiveness sum of absolute weights in Tables 2.7 and 2.8.
Then we explore the differences in the numerator. Assuming no other changes.
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we would expect that the changes are due to changes in weights too. Therefore, we 
employ the new weights on the old coded templates for Geo2 and Geo3, and find 
that this is indeed the case. Applying the new weights in the aggregation of the 
answers in the old coding, we find that the aggregatepoints garnered by Geo2 shift 
from 4.25 to 5.00, and the aggregate points garnered by Geo3 shift from 15.02 to
14.58. The fact that we observe a reduction in the latter case, and an increase in the 
former is due to the interaction of weights changes and particular answers chosen 
by the respondents.
Let us now proceed to a question-by-question comparison of new and old weights 
for the Banking section of the survey.
We will first look at the differences in intra-question weights. As shown in 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6, questions 1 to 14 have the same intra-question weights as in the 
Transition Report. Q15 is an effectiveness-type question with a frequency rating 
scale of 1 to 5, mentioned earlier. This question used to have the following weight 
structure: 0 for ’’Never”, 0.2 for ”Rarely”, 0.3 for ’’Sometimes”, 0.8 for ’’Frequently” 
and 1 for ’’Almost Always”. This scale was adopted for many of the effectiveness 
questions previously alongside the other possible scale of 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1. In 
the thesis, we have switched to using only the latter. Hence, the internal weights 
for Q15, and for all other effectiveness questions, using the former set of weights for 
this particular rating scale, have been changed.
At this point we need to mention something else. In moving to a new set of 
weights, we also broke down some of the survey questions into separate questions. 
This was necessary purely for convenience purposes. For instance, previously some 
questions carried a higher weight only because they combined several sub-questions. 
To make matters simpler, we separated such sub-questions into separate questions 
and, if necessary, changed their weights.
Let us go further with the review of intra-question weights. Table 2.5 provides
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a mapping of old questions into new questions and old weights into new weights.
The old sum of absolute weights for extensiveness used to be 21, now it is 20 
due to the changes in internal and absolute weights as shown in the Tables 2.7 and 
2.8. We already mentioned that this number is the denominator of our extensiveness 
scores for each survey entry. In our example of Georgia, as shown in Table 2.9, the 
two old scores were 4.25/21 for Geo2 and 15.02/21 for Geo3. The new scores are 
5.00/20 and 14.58/20. We have already explained the source of the difference of -1 
in the denominator. The numerator differences are due to changes in interim and 
internal (intra-question) weights^®. If we employ the new set of such weights and 
replace in the formulae calculating the indices, we find that with the new weights 
the score of 4.25 of Geo2 becomes 5.00 and the score of 15.02 for Geo3 becomes
14.58. We will conduct the same checks for each survey entry ahead.
We do the same checks for banking effectiveness scores of Geo2 and Geo3. Again, 
the old scores were as follows: 6.11 for Geo2, which was equal to 0.80/13.10 (the 
number of points collected by Geo2, divided by the maximum number of points 
which could be collected on banking effectiveness), and 58.02 for Geo3, equal to 
7.60 divided by 13.10. The new scores are 5.77 for Geo2 (0.75/13.00) and 65.38 for 
Geo3, equal to 8.50 divided by 13.00. The difference in the denominator is due to 
the -0.1 net difference from changes in absolute effectiveness weights. This accounts 
for changes in the score denominator. The numerator changes are due to changes 
in internal and interim weights. We use the new weights in the old spreadsheet and
^®Intra-question or internal weights are used to weight the various parts of a single quesiton 
(to rank answer options essentially). Interim weights are used as an intermediary stage. Once 
the answer options of a single question are weighted and summed to give a score, this score is 
multiplied by the interim weight to give a final score. This was mainly used with the old set of 
weights to give a higher than 1 score. Suppose a question scored 1 by internal weights. Then we 
would multiply this score by the interim score, of say 2, to get a final score of 2. Then the absolute 
score of 2 was essentially the product of the score by internal weights and the interim score. Since 
absolute scores are all equal to 1 under the new set of weights, so are all interim weights.
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Table 2.5: Review of old and new internal weights on Banking questions
Old question New question Old internal weights New internal weight
E l Qi 0.25, 0, 0.75 and 0.25 Same
E2a Q2 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1 Same
E2b Q3 0.2, 0, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2 Same
E3 Q4 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1 Same
E4 Q5 0.25, 0.5, 0.25, 0, 0, and 0.25 Same
E5 Qb 1 Same
E6 Q7 0.2, 0.2, -0.25, -0.35, 0.2 nad 0.2 Same
E7 Q8 0.5, 0.25 and 0.25 Same
E8 Q9 1 Same
E9 QIO 1 Same
ElO Q ll 1 Same
E ll Q12 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2 Same
E12 Q13 0.33, 0.33, 0.33 Same
E13 Q14 0.5, 1/8, 1/8, 1/8, -1/4, 1/8 Same
E14 Q15 0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.8, 1 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1
E15 Qlb 0.75, 0.25 Same
Elba Q17 1 Same
E16b Q18 1, -0.5, -0.25, 0.5, 0.75 Same
Elbe Q19 0.25 1
E17 Q20 0.25 1
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Table 2.6: Review of old and new internal weights on Banking questions
Old question New question Old internal weights New internal weight
E18 Q21 0.5, 0.25, 0.25 Same
E19a Q22 1 Same
E19b and c Q23 0.5, 0.3, 0.2, 0, 0.1 1, 0.6, 0.4, 0, 1
E20 Q24 0, 1, 0.5 Same
E21a and b Q25 0.25, 0, 0.75 Same
E21c Q26 0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.8, 1 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1
E22 Q27 0.5 1
E23 Q28 0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.8, 1 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1
E24a and b Q29 0.25, 1.25 0.17, 0.83
E24c Q30 0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.8, 1 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1
E25a, b, c and d Q31 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25 Same
E25e Q32 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1 Same
E26 Q33 0.5, 0, 0.25, 0.5 Same
Interim weights changes
Old question New question Old interim weight New interim weight
E l Qi 1.25 1
E4 Q5 1.25 1
E18 Q21 2.5 1
E20 Q24 1.5 1
E23 Q28 1.5 1
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Table 2.7: Review of old and new absolute weights on Banking questions
Old question New question Old absolute weight New absolute weight
E l QI 1.25 1
E4 Q5 1.25 1
El6a, b and c Q17, Q18 and Q19 2.25 3 (1 per new question)
E17 Q20 0.25 1
E18 Q21 2.5 1
E19 Q22 and Q23 1.6 2 (1 per new question)
E20 Q24 1.5 1
E22 Q27 0.5 1
E23 Q28 1.5 1
E24 Q29 and Q30 2.5 2 (1 per new question)
formulae, and confirm that with new weights the 0.80 old points of Geo2 become
0.75, and the 7.60 points of Geo3 become 8.50.
At this point, we go and check the overall banking score (BANK99). The old 
overall banking score for Georgia used to be 29.98 (based on three surveys). The 
correct figure (averaged over Geo2 and Geo3 only) should have been 44.97. The new 
figure now (averaged over Geo2 and Geo3) is 43.69. The old Geo2 score is 17.74 
(equal to 6.05 divided by 34.10), and the old Geo3 score is 69.27, equal to 23.62 
divided by 34.10.
The new Geo2 score is 17.42, equal to 5.75 divided by 33, and the new Geo3 
score is 69.95, equal to 23.08 divided by 33. Obviously, the change of maximum 
score (the denominator) from 34.01 to 33 is due to the changes in absolute weights 
in all questions (-1 for extensiveness and -0.1 for effectiveness). The changes in the 
points actually gathered by the two entries are checked by using the new weights in
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Table 2.8: Differences between old and new absolute weights on Banking questions
Old question New question Type Difference
E l QI Ext -0.25
E4 Q5 Ext -0.25
E16a, b and c Q17, Q18 and Q19 Ext 4-0.75
E17 Q20 Ext 4-0.75
E18 Q21 Ext -1.5
E19 Q22 and Q23 Eff 4-0.4
E20 Q24 Ext -0.5
E22 Q27 Ext 4-0.5
E23 Q28 Eff -0.5
E24 Q29 and Q30 Ext and Eff -0.5 (ext)
Change in EXTBANK99 maximum score -1.0
Change in EFFBANK99 maximum score -0.1
Change in BANK99 maximum score -1.1
the old formula. Here we find a summation mistake in the old formula, which was 
corrected in the thesis data. Thus, the old weights points of 6.05 for Geo2 should 
have been 5.05, which turns into 5.75 using new weights. For Geo3, the old weights 
points of 23.62 should have actually been 21.28 (due to the mistake), and when 
corrected and made to using the new weights, turns into 23.08.
Next, we review the changes in weights assigned to the Capital Markets questions.
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Table 2.9: Review of old and new scores for Georgia
Old score New score
Banking Extensiveness
Geol 0.00=0/21 
Geo2 20.24=4.25/21 
Geo3 71.53=15.02/21
N/A
25.00=5.00/20
72.90=14.58/20
Banking Effectiveness
Geol 0.00=0.00/13.10 
Geo2 6.11=0.80/13.10 
Geo3 58.02=7.60/13.10
N/A
5.77=0.75/13
65.38=8.50/13
Overall Banking
Geol 0.00=0.00/34.10 N/A
Geo2 17.74=6.05/34.10 17.42=5.75/33
Geo3 69.27=23.62/34.10 69.95=23.08/33
A ppendix 2.B Review of Changes in Securities Sec­
tion W eights
Similarly to the banking weights, we present the changes in internal question weights 
first. Again some effectiveness questions, such as Q6, QIO, and Q22 change from
the old rating scale of 0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.8 and 1, to the same five-point scale, whereby 
points are added in equal increments: 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1. Since the initial 
assignment of two scales was rather ad hoc, we decided to treat all effectiveness 
questions of this type (on a five-point frequency rating scale) the same way. In all 
other instances of changes in internal weights, the changes are due to the breaking
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up of a given old question into separate questions, thereby gissigning equal values of 
1 to the new questions, and, where necessary, maintaining the same proportions as 
in the old questions. Tables 2.11, 2.12 and 2.13 report this mapping.
Let us now review the capital markets extensiveness part, using Georgia as an 
example. Here we have three survey entries: Geol, Geo2 and GeoS. The old average 
for extensiveness over these 3 entries used to be 74.54; the new average (again over 
the same three entries) is 72.22. The score of Geol used to be 70.28, equal to 8.43 
divided by 12.00, Geo2 had previously a score of 85.83, equal to 10.30 divided by 
12.00 and GeoS gathered 8.10 points, which divided by 12, yield a score of 67.50. 
We show in Table 2.14 that under the new weights, the maximum sum which could 
be collected on capital markets extensiveness questions is 11, whereas it used to 
be 12 under the old weights. The new scores for the same three Georgian entries 
are: Geol’s score is 68.48, equal to 7.53 divided by 11, the new Geo2 score is 82.73, 
equal to 9.10 divided by 11, and the new score for GeoS is 65.45, equal to 7.20, 
divided by 11. The difference in the denominator is clear, we showed that the sum 
of extensiveness weights is down by 1 to 11. To test the differences in the numerators, 
we use the same test as before: we employ the new internal and interim weights in 
the old spreadsheet and formulae, and find that the old points garnered by each of 
these 3 survey entries turn into the new points once the weights are changed. In 
other words, with new weights used in the calculations Geol’s old points of 8.43 
become 7.53; Geo2’s old points of 10.30 become 9.10, and Geo3’s old points of 8.10 
become 7.20.
Next we review the capital markets effectiveness questions, again through the 
example of Georgia. The old capital market effectiveness score for Georgia used to 
be 33.84, the new one is 35.08, both are the average over the scores for the three 
entries of Geol, Geo2 and Geo3. Again, it is easy to demonstrate that once we take 
into consideration the changes in the denominator from 16 to 18 (the maximum
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points for capital market effectiveness), and once we factor in the new weights, the 
sum of old points for each Georgian entry becomes equal to the sum of the new 
points. We summarise these checks in the Table 2.10.
Finally, we also check Georgia’s scores in the overall capital markets scores 
(CAP99). The old score of 50.78 has changed into 49.17, using the new weights. 
Both are the averages over the three Georgian entries. The change in the denomi­
nator from 28 to 29 is due to the change in absolute weights. In conducting checks 
over the number of points gathered by each of the three under old and new weights, 
we have uncovered 2 formulae errors, affecting the old scores. One of these pertains 
to summation of internal question points for question F2 (new questions Q3 and 
Q3; another is related to the old question F12 (new question Q19), which has a 
possibility of Unclear as an answer. Since F I2 was not counted in the scores before, 
but is counted now, the possibility of having an Unclear answer is now taken into 
account. Third, question F3’s answer format was changed from Yes, No, Unclear to 
a five-point answer scale in the 1999 survey. However, in the old template the an­
swer option of Unclear was preserved, thereby potentially generating scores counted 
as Unclear answers whenever option 3 on the 1 to 5 scale was chosen. These er­
rors have been eliminated in the new scores, used in the thesis. We then establish 
that, with these mistakes corrected, the old score of Geo2 should have been 16.73 
instead of 16.31. By sheer coincidence the correct old score of 16.73 equals the new 
scored points of 16.73. This is also corroborated by the sum of scores for Geo2 over 
extensiveness and effectiveness of capital markets.
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Table 2.10: Review of old and new scores for Georgia
Old score New score
Capital Market Extensiveness
Geol 70.28=8.43/12 
Geo2 85.83=10.30/12 
Geo3 67.50=8.10/12
68.48=7.53/11
82.73=9.10/11
65.45=7.20/11
Capital Market Effectiveness
Geol 22.55=3.61/16 
Geo2 40.16=6.43/16 
Geo3 38.80=6.21/16
20.05=3.61/18
42.36=7.63/18
42.82=7.71/18
Overall Gapital Markets
Geol 43.01=12.04/28 
Geo2 58.24=16.31/28 
Geo3 51.10=14.31/28
38.42=11.14/29
57.67=16.73/29
51.41=14.91/29
A ppendix 2.C Review of Overall Scores
The review of overall financial law extensiveness is conducted in much the same 
manner as the earlier variables. We want to check how the old scores become the new 
scores, and in so doing, to explain these differences in terms of changes in weights and 
to identify any other reasons for potential differences. First, the extensiveness score 
encompasses the scores on all extensiveness-type questions from both the Banking 
and Capital Markets sections of the survey. We again use Georgia as our prime 
example. The old score used to be 46.57, the new one is 57.21. The old score was 
the unweighted average of the scores for Geol, Geo2, and Geo3. The new score is 
a weighted average of the banking extensiveness score of Geo2 and Geo3, and the
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Table 2.11: Review of old and new internal weights on Capital Markets questions
Old question New question Old internal weights New internal weight
FI QI 1 Same
F2a Q2 1 Same
F2b, c and d Q3 0.5, 0.25, 0.25 Same
F3 Q4 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1 Same
F4a Q5 2 1
F4b Q6 0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.8, 1 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1
F5 Q7 1.5 1
F6 Q8 0.5, 0.5 Same
F7a, b and c Q9 1/4, 0, 1/4, 3/8, 1/8, 0 Same
F7d QIO 0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.8, 1 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1
F8a and b Q ll 0.5, 3/20, 7/20 Same
F8c Q12 0.5 1
F9a Q13 1 Same
F9b Q14 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2
F9c Q15 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1 Same
FIO Q16 1 Same
FI la, b and c Q17 0.25, 0.25, 0.5 Same
F lld Q18 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1 Same
F12 Q19 0 1
F13 Q20 0.5, 0, 0.5, 0 Same
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Table 2.12: Review of old and new internal and interim weights on Capital Markets 
questions
Old question New question Old internal weights New internal weight
F14a Q21 1 Same
F14b Q22 0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.8, 1 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1
F15 Q23 1 Same
F16 Q24 1 Same
F17a Q25 1 Same
F17b Q26 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1 Same
F18 Q27 0.5, 0.5 Same
F19 Q28 1 Same
F20 Q29 0.5, 0.5 Same
Interim weights changes
Old question New question Old interim weight New interim weight
F3 Q4 0.5 1
F12 Q19 0 1
capital market extensiveness scores for Geol, Geo2, and Geo3. The sum of absolute 
weights (the maximum number of points an entry could attain) were previously 33, 
and are 31 under the new set of weights. This has already been explained by the 
changes in the total sum of absolute weights for banking extensiveness and capital 
market extensiveness. The former were shown to be reduced from 21 to 20, and 
the latter from 12 to 11. Hence the 2-point difference in the total sum of absolute 
weights for overall extensiveness.
Factoring in all new weights in the old formulae for the three Georgian entries.
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Table 2.13: Review of old and new absolute weights on Capital Markets questions
Old question New question Old absolute weight New absolute weight
F3 Q4 0.5 1
F4a and b Q5 and Q6 3 2 (1 per new question)
F5 Q7 1.5 1
F8a, b and c Q ll and Q12 1.5 2 (1 per new question)
F9a, b and c Q13, Q14 and Q15 2.5 3 (1 per new question)
F12 Q19 0 1
we are able to determine that, using the new weights, the old points garnered by 
Geol of 8.43 become equal to the new points of 7.53, the old points of Geo2 of 14.55 
become equal to the new points of 14.10, and the old points of Geo3 of 23.12 become 
equal to the new points of 21.78. We also note that since Geol is the entry with no 
answers provided to the Banking section as mentioned earlier, in averaging across 
the three entries to derive the final country score we use a weighted average of the 
type:
E xt  =  ^  X Exthank +  ^  x  Extcap
where Extbank is the unweighted average of banking extensiveness for Geo2 and 
Geo3, and Extcap is the unweighted average for capital market extensiveness for 
Geol, Geo2 and Geo3.
The results of these checks are presented in Table 2.15.
Next, we repeat the same procedure to check the overall financial effectiveness 
scores. The old overall financial effectiveness score for Georgia was equal to 28.23, 
and averaged over Geol, Geo2 and Geo3. The new score is 35.29, and is a weighted 
average of the banking effectiveness for Geo2 and Geo3, and capital market effec­
tiveness for all three entries for this country. Again, changes in the maximum points
Chapter 2. Methodology of the Legal Indicator Survey 98
Table 2.14: Differences between old and new absolute weights on Capital Markets 
questions
Old question New question Type Difference
F3 Q4 Eff -j“0.5
F4a and b Q5 and Q6 Ext and Eff -1.0 (Ext)
F5 Q7 Ext -0.5
F8a, b and c Q ll and Q12 Eff -|-0.5
F9a, b and c Q13, Q14 and Q15 Ext and Eff -j-0.5(Ext)
F12 Q19 Eff -l-1.0
Change in EXTCAP99 maximum score -1.0
Change in EFFCAP99 maximum score +2.0
Change in CAP99 maximum score +1.0
which could be attained (i.e. the denominator) from 29.10 to 31 are attributable 
to changes in the absolute weights. These explained earlier the drop of banking 
effectiveness sum of absolute weights from 13.10 to 13, and the rise in the capital 
markets sum of weights from 16 to 18. Hence, the move from 29.10 in total effective­
ness points to 31. Using all new weights, we are able to confirm that old formulae 
summing up points scores become equal to the new points. For instance, the old 
points of 3.61 for Geol stay the same (by coincidence) under new weights; the old 
points of 7.23 for Geo2 become equal to 8.38 under new weights, and the old points 
of 13.81 for Geo3 become equal to 16.21 under the new weights.
As in the extensiveness overall score for Georgia, we use a weighted average due 
to the fact that Geol has no Banking section answers. The overall score is:
13 18
^  X E ffb a n k  +  —  X E f f c a p
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The results of these checks appear in Table 2.15.
Table 2.15: Review of old and new scores for Georgia
Old score New score
Overall Financial Extensiveness
Geol 25.56=8.43/33 68.48=7.53/ll(cap. markets only)
Geo2 44.09=14.55/33 45.48=14.10/31
Geo3 70.06=23.12/33 70.27=21.78/31
Overall Financial Effectiveness
Geol 12.40=3.61/29.10 20.05=3.61/18 (cap. markets only)
Geo2 24.83=7.23/29.10 27.02=8.38/31
Geo3 47.45=13.81/29.10 52.28=16.21/31
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Appendix 2.D Review of All Survey Entries by 
Country
Now that we have exhausted all possible checks of weights and changes in scores 
for Georgia, we replicate the same exercise for all other entries by country. We 
re-calculate the new scores for EXTBANK99, EFFBANK99, EXTCAP99, EFF- 
CAP99, EXT99 and EFF99 under old weights for each country entry and calculate 
the differences, if any, with the old points scored. If there are no mistakes, these 
differences should be all zero.
This exercise has produced the expected results: differences are indeed found 
to be zero. One exception related to a mistake in the old scores, which has been 
corrected aheady in the scores under new weights. This affected the scores for Kaz3 
(one of the Kazakhstan entries), Kyrl, Mac3, Rom6, Sln3, Uzb2, Cro4, Cro8 and 
Cro9, Estl, Slk4, Czel4, Bul6, B ulll and Bull2. All these entries share a common­
ality: respondents to the old question E19, which translates into current questions 
Q22 and Q23, answered Yes to parti (whether financial statements are prepared 
according to international accounting standards, and then went on to answer Yes 
to part 3 of the old question (which reads "If no, are IAS in the process of being 
implemented?”). This inconsistency in answers led to the elimination of Yes an­
swers to the latter part for those who answered that IAS are aheady being used. In 
other words, when revising the data under the new weights and tabulating question 
by question scores, inconsistencies of this type were eliminated. While it may be 
logically possible that IAS are simultaneously being used and also in the process 
of implementation, in the process of cleaning the data we have chosen to regard 
the answers to the second part of Q24 only when the answer to Q23 is "No” as 
per Q24’s instruction. Potential differences due to this stem from both double pos­
itive answers, as well as from a positive answer to Q23 and an Unclear answer to
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Q24. Once this is taken into account, all differences between old and new scores for 
Effbank and Eff (since Q23 and Q24 are effectiveness questions) are eliminated.
At this stage, in conducting rigorous country by country checks of survey scores, 
we note that some countries entries were given for the commercial part of the survey, 
but not for the financial. These are the Russian entry Rusl7, the Czech entry Cze3, 
the Slovak entry Slk7 and the Armenian entry Arml. These did not provide answers 
to the financial part of the Legal Indicator Survey.
Finally, the same checks are implemented for the BANK99 and CAP99 scores for 
all entries by country. The old and new scores for each country entry are compared 
by re-calculating new scores under old weights and checking that the scores thus 
derived do not differ from the old scores. This exercise is replicated on each coded 
survey’s entry sheet, and no additional consistency errors are found.
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A ppendix 2.E Pre-Conditions for Successful Secu­
rities Markets
Asymmetric Informa­
tion Between Buyers and Sellers 
of Securities
Self-dealing by Company Insid­
ers and Expropriation of Minority 
Shareholders
Effective 
Regulators, 
Courts and 
Prosecution
1. Honest, well-resourced Regu­
lator; 2, Good judicial system; 3. 
Clear procedural rules
1. Same; 2. Same; 3 Same
Financial 1. Extensive disclosure require- 
Disclosure ments, which allow for indepen- 
Requirement^ dent audit; 2. Good accounting 
and auditing rules; 3. Indepen­
dent institution, which writes ac­
counting rules
1, Extensive disclosure of self- 
deahng; 2. Procedural pro­
tections against self-deahng; 3. 
Ownership disclosure rules; 4. 
Good overall financial disclosure
Securties 1. Competent accountants; 2.
Market Accountant liability for endorsing
Intermediaries false or misleading financial state­
ments; 3. Investment bankers, 
investigating issuers; 4. Compe­
tent securities lawyers 5. Under­
writer liability for false or mis­
leading disclosure 6. Stock ex­
change dehsting firms for false or 
misleading disclosure
1. Same; 2. Same; 3. Account­
ing review of self-dealing trans­
actions; 4. Same; 5. Inde­
pendent directors; 6. Stock ex­
change fines and delistings for 
self-deahng; surveillance opera­
tions to catch insider trading.
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Company 
and insider 
liability
1. Civil liability for companies 
and insiders for false or mislead­
ing disclosure; 2. Criminal liabil­
ity for insiders who intentionally 
mislead investors
1, Civil liability for violations of 
self-dealing rules; 2. Criminal lia- 
bihty for intentional violations of 
self-dealing rules; 3. Prohibition 
of insider trading, and its enforce­
ment. Insider trading defined in 
laws.
Market 
Transparency
1. Time, quantity and price 
of stock market trades disclosed 
promptly; 2. Manipulation of 
trading prices prohibited and its 
enforcement
1. Same; 2. Same
Local
Culture
1. Financial press publicizing 
misleading disclosure; 2. Cul­
ture of honesty among market 
participants.
1. Financial press publicizing 
self-dealing; 2. Same
Other use­
ful
institutions
1. Licensing of intermediaries; 2. 
Self-regulation of intermediaries; 
3. Independent directors; 4. In­
vestment and pension funds, de­
manding disclosure and providing 
investable funds; 6. A reasonable 
tax system
1. A ’’one share, one vote” 
rule, reducing opportunities to 
self-deal; 2. A mandatory take­
out bid requirement; 3. Pre­
emptive and redemption rights; 4. 
Reporting of trades by insiders;
5. Investment and pension funds, 
demanding control of self-dealing;
6. Good bankruptcy system; 7. 
Good judicial system
Chapter 3 
Securities R egulation and Stock  
Market Developm ent in Transition  
Econom ies
3.1 Introduction
Stock markets play an important role in the financial system. The provide a way for 
companies to raise external finance. This allows financially-dependent firms to grow 
faster, given the limits on other sources of finance such as bank credit and internal 
finance. Importantly, better stock market performance is associated with higher 
growth rates. For example, Levine and Zervos (1998) report that stock market 
activity, as measured by the turnover ratio, is positively associated with future 
economic growth. Having well-developed stock markets reduces the risks of a credit 
crunch as firms become less dependent on bank financing. Furthermore, having a 
financial structure with more equity and less debt reduces the risks for firms in the 
case of an economic downturn. Equity markets may also bring benefits in the form of 
stronger governance of firms’ managers and companies’ investment decisions. Recent
104
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empirical evidence, e.g. Beck and Levine (2004), suggests that overall financial 
development and the efficiency of the legal system rather than financial system 
structure (bank-based versus market-based) affect future economic growth.
Theoretical research also predicts an important role for well-functioning and vi­
brant stock markets in alleviating market risks and allowing investments in long-run 
projects to take place. For example, Levine (1991) finds that more liquid stock mar­
kets reduce investors’ disincentives to invest in longer-term projects because they can 
easily sell their stake in the project should they need their savings before the project 
matures. Other models, e.g. Devereux and Smith (1994), emphasize risk sharing 
in internationally-integrated stock markets. Such risk-sharing induces a shift from 
low-risk, low-return investments to high-return investments, thus enhancing pro­
ductivity growth. While some theoretical studies, e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1986), 
caution against market liquidity by arguing that higher liquidity makes it easier to 
sell shares, and thereby reduces shareholder incentives to monitor firm management, 
with negative repercussions on productivity and growth, the empirical evidence does 
not find that market liquidity reduces productivity or growth. Altogether, the recent 
empirical research on the links between stock market development and performance 
and economic growth lends support to the theories that equity markets enhance 
productivity in the economy and economic growth.
A large share of the transition economies now have functioning stock markets. 
Most stock exchanges were established in the early to mid-1990s, and in one group 
of transition countries served as a mechanism to transfer ownership in the process 
of privatization^.
Today, stock markets in transition countries are still largely under-developed. 
Some of the small stock exchanges have already merged with larger, regional ex­
changes -  for example the Estonian and Latvian stock exchanges merged with the
^See Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel (2000) for a discussion of the origins of transition stock 
markets.
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Helsinki Stock Exchange in 2002. On many of the transition stock markets liquidity 
and capitalisation remain low, even by emerging market standards. Some coun­
tries such as the Czech and Slovak Republics, which developed their markets in the 
early 1990s through mandatory privatization-related listings, experienced delisting 
of companies in the second half of the 1990s, after liquidity and disclosure require­
ments were enhanced and many firms found themselves unable to comply with these 
requirements. The volume of initial public offerings (IPOs) in recent years is low 
even in the more advanced transition stock markets. For example, only the Slovene 
and Polish stock markets recorded a reasonable volume of IPOs during 1999-2002. 
Thus, the Ljubljana Stock Exchange recorded 111 newly-listed domestic companies 
during the period from 1999 to 2002 in cumulative terms. The corresponding figure 
for the Warsaw Stock Exchange was 55 newly fisted domestic firms. In contrast, the 
Prague Stock Exchange saw only 2 IPOs during the same years -  by one domestic 
and one foreign company; the Bratislava Stock Exchange saw 7 newly-listed firms, 
and the Tallinn Stock Exchange only 1 newly-listed domestic company. IPO activity 
was also low elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS countries.
There are confiicting views about the role of stock markets in transition. Some 
scholars make the observation that most of the advanced transition economies have 
now developed bank-based financial systems, e.g. Berglof and Bolton (2002). Ac­
cording to this view, transition stock markets are going to be subjected to compe­
tition from larger regional markets, which offer better disclosure and attract large 
transition companies. The small market size in many transition economies is also 
not conducive to securities market development. Furthermore, companies in transi­
tion economies are characterized by ownership concentration, which drives firms off 
the stock market as they become 100% owned by a single owner.
Despite these arguments, in this chapter we investigate whether provisions of 
securities laws and their enforcement across a cross-section of 19 transition countries
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affect their stock market development. This is motivated on grounds of markedly 
different levels of stock market development in the transition economies.
3.2 Literature Review
This paper follows some recent contributions to the growing literature on law and 
finance, such as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003), and on the role of 
institutions in economic development, e.g. Djankov et al. (2003b). Law and finance 
research in the past several years has been instrumental in explaining differences 
across countries in corporate governance, financial structure and economic growth.
In a recent paper La Porta et al. (2003) study the effect of securities laws 
on stock market development in 49 countries. They discuss three distinct theories 
about the role of securities laws. Under the first one, associated with the work of 
Coase (1960) and Stigler (1971), a securities law is not needed to address infor­
mational asymmetries between buyers and sellers of securities. According to this 
view, securities issuers have an incentive to reveal all available information about 
the company because if they fail to do so, investors would assume the worst and 
not invest. Since there are verification costs associated with ascertaining whether 
disclosure is complete and accurate, the market creates its own solution in the shape 
of securities market intermediaries such as auditors, accountants and underwriters, 
who can vouch for the quality of the securities being offered. They are motivated to 
act honestly because of reputational reasons and in order to avoid liability. There­
fore, market participants’ incentives and general contract law would be sufficient to 
overcome existing informational asymmetries and issuers’ incentives to cheat. Un-, 
der the second and third theories securities laws matter because incentives to cheat 
are high, and verification and private litigation are costly. The authors distinguish 
between two schools of thought about how securities laws should be used. They 
define the private enforcement mechanism of securities regulation as one where the
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main benefits of a securities law come from reducing the costs of private contracting. 
Thus, a securities law allows for standard contracting and serves to clarify liability 
for incomplete or inaccurate information disclosure. In this manner, the law reduces 
investors’ costs of enforcing a securities contract in court. Under the so-called pub­
lic enforcement mechanism private enforcement is insufficient and a public enforcer 
of securities laws, such as a securities commission (regulator), is needed. Public 
enforcement is expected to work if the securities regulator is independent and hon­
est, well-funded, empowered to introduce regulations, elicit information, and impose 
sanctions for violations of securities laws.
La Porta et al. (2003) argue that disclosure requirements and liability rules are 
crucial features of private enforcement. The authors conduct a survey of one law 
firm per country, and collect data on various aspects of securities laws. The data are 
summarized in several key index measures. For example, six proxies of the strength 
of disclosure requirements are constructed. These are whether a prospectus is de­
livered to investors ahead of securities issues; whether the company must disclose 
insiders’ compensation; ownership by large shareholders; inside ownership; contracts 
outside the normal course of business; and transactions with related parties. The 
index of disclosure requirements is an average of these six proxies. In addition to 
these specific disclosure requirements, it is common to have a requirement, whereby 
the prospectus needs to include all material information necessary to assess the value 
of the securities being offered. However, when bad news hits the company after it 
has issued securities, the question becomes whether this information was known or 
knowable to the issuer, distributor and/or accountant, and the burden of proof in 
this case determines how easy it is for investors to recover damages if information 
in the prospectus was misleading or omitted. La Porta et al. (2003) distinguish 
four different liability regimes. Public enforcement is also coded and sub-indices of 
Supervisor Attributes, Investigative Powers of the Supervisor, Orders and Criminal
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Sanctions are constructed. La Porta et al. (2003) combine the sub-indices of Disclo­
sure and Burden of Proof into an aggregate index of private enforcement, and their 
cross-country econometric analysis finds that the private enforcement index, rather 
than the public enforcement one, is significantly associated with better securities 
market performance.
The idea that legal factors help explain stock market development is part of 
the general law and finance comparative literature. For example. La Porta et al. 
(1997) examine what determines stock market capitalisation in 49 countries, and 
find that corporate laws -  as encompassed by the legal index of Shareholder Rights 
-  as well as belonging to a given legal origin (family) are statistically significant 
determinants of stock market development. That paper, however, does not focus 
on securities laws but only on certain provisions of the corporate (company) laws, 
which determine minority shareholder protection from managerial and dominant 
shareholder expropriation.
The relevance of laws for securities market development has also been addressed 
in the comparative law literature. Black (2001) examines the pre-conditions for 
successful securities markets from a legal perspective. He draws up lists of legal 
provisions and institutions necessary to a) resolve problems of asymmetric informa­
tion in securities issuance, and b) mitigate moral hazard problems after securities 
have been sold, i.e. that company managers and controlling shareholders have an 
incentive to cheat investors out of the value of their investment. Among the most 
important provisions of the law and institutions to reduce informational asymme­
tries -  according to Black (2001) -  are good financial disclosure; reliable accounting 
and audit rules; an effective securities regulator; presence of securities market in­
termediaries such as accountants, underwriters, auditors; sufficient company and 
insider liability. To counter expropriation by insiders, legal rules on insider dealing 
are listed as particularly important alongside most of the provisions just mentioned
Chapter 3. Securities Regulation and Stock Market Development 110
for controlling asymmetric information.
Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer (2001) focus on securities laws and regulations in 
two transition economies - Poland and the Czech Republic. The authors draw a 
comparison between the two countries in terms of their securities market regulation 
in the 1990s. They argue that government regulation of capital markets may be 
preferable to private enforcement in the presence of a weak judicial system. The 
authors find that stringent capital market regulations in Poland (as encompassed 
in its company and securities laws) have stimulated the development of the stock 
market and led many new firms to go public. In contrast, the lax and poorly enforced 
capital market regulations in the Czech Republic have brought about stagnation 
of the stock market, delisting of a lot of privatized companies and practically no 
new listings. The Czech Republic has also seen rampant expropriation of external 
investors, which led to the term ’’tunneling” , e.g. Johnson et al. (2000).
The series of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000) papers on law and finance do 
not cover the transition economies. The link between legal text, legal enforcement 
and finance in transition economies is explored by Pistor, Raiser and Celfer (2000). 
The authors use coded data for shareholder and creditor rights, based on these 
jurisdictions’ laws on the books from 1992 to 1998.  ^ They follow the basic approach 
of La Porta et al. (1998) in constructing indices of shareholder and creditor rights, 
but extend the La Porta et al. indices to cover additional aspects of shareholder 
protection of particular concern to transition countries.^ The authors also use an
^The methodology of the codification of shareholder and creditor rights in the transition 
economies as well as an extensive analysis of the changes in their corporate laws is provided 
in Pistor (2000).
^For example, they add additional components to the LLSV shareholder index measures of 
VOICE and EXIT. The former refers to corporate control within the company and comprises all 
the LLSV shareholder rights measures plus other measures of the ability of shareholders to assert 
their control over company management. The latter pertains to the rights of shareholders to 
liquidate their holdings in a company when dissatisfied with the way it is managed. In addition,
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index of stock market integrity (SMINTEGR), which does not cover the individual 
protection of shareholders but rather captures the presence of legal rules on insider 
dealing, on an independent share registry and stock market supervision. Some of 
the legal indices which we employ in this paper are similar in content to their stock 
market index, and later we report the degree of correlation between our measures 
and SMINTEGR.^
To measure legal implementation, Pistor et al. (2000) employ three separate 
proxies for legal enforcement - the Rule of Law index published by the Central Euro­
pean Economic Review; the EBRD survey-based index of corporate and bankruptcy 
law effectiveness (which is derived on the basis of the EBRD Legal Indicator Survey, 
used for all the legal variables in this paper); and an enforcement index based on the 
World Bank’s World Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey for 
20 transition economies. The econometric analysis of both stock market and bank­
ing development reveals that legal enforcement, but not legal text, is statistically 
significant for explaining stock market and private credit volume. Unlike in La Porta 
et al. (1997), ’’the law on the books” in transition is not found to be significantly 
associated with measures of external finance. Methodologically, the authors conduct 
OLS and instrumental variable estimations of stock market capitalisation over GDP 
(averaged over 1997 and 1998), and include the Rule of Law measure (as a proxy 
for legal effectiveness), and each of the six indices of shareholder protection among 
the explanatory variables. They also control for method of privatization to account
the authors use ANTIMANAGE and ANTIBLOCK indices to determine how the legal system 
deals with the conflicts between management and shareholders, and blockholders and minority 
shareholders. For instance, cumulative voting rights, pre-emptive rights of current shareholders 
in case of new share issues, quorum requirements for the General Shareholders’ Meeting are all 
examples of indicators, supportive of the rights of minority shareholders when strong blockholders 
are present.
'^We also employ lagged SMINTEGR indices as coded by Pistor et al. (2000) as instruments 
for current securities laws and their enforcement.
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for increases in listed firms and capitalisation due to mandatory listing of privatized 
firms. All estimations of stock market performance reveal that legal effectiveness is 
significantly associated with larger and more liquid stock markets (market turnover 
is also used as a dependent variable).
A study by Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel (2000) focuses on the determinants 
of stock market development in the transition economies. The authors conduct an 
OLS regression analysis, and after controlling for income per capita and geograph­
ical distance to Western Europe, establish that low levels of infiation, adequate 
shareholder protection and the size of institutional investor assets are all significant 
determinants of stock market capitalisation and turnover. Their paper discusses the 
origins of stock markets in transition countries, and also outlines prospects for future 
development. Among the study’s important features is an emphasis on the role of 
institutional investors such as insurance companies and pension funds; employing 
threshold inflation effects in the estimations of the determinants of market capi­
talisation and turnover; and underscoring the positive relationship between private 
credit and market capitalisation in the transition economies.
In the present chapter we would like to empirically test how securities laws and 
their enforcement affect stock market capitalisation and turnover in a sample of 19 
transition economies. In so doing, we will test the La Porta et al. (2003) results 
about the role of securities laws for the sample of economies in transition. The 
present study differs from Pistor et al. (2000) in the fact that it utilises survey-based 
legal data, whereas their paper employs measures of legal investor protection, derived 
from coding the written laws in 24 transition economies. Instead, we are using legal 
indices of perceived extensiveness and effectiveness of law based on attorney opinions 
about securities laws in their respective jurisdictions.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.3 presents the data and the main 
legal indices which we use. Section 3.4 discusses methodological issues, the model
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specification and estimation techniques that we employ. Section 3.5 presents the 
results of the estimations, section 3.6 offers robustness checks, and section 3.7 con­
cludes.
3.3 D ata
3.3.1 Securities M arkets Laws and Regulations
The legal measures we use to assess equity market development in Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union are generated through a survey of lawyers (Legal In­
dicator Survey, or LIS hereinafter) run by the EBRD since 1997 to assess legal 
reform in transition economies. We have at our disposal the raw survey data for 
1999, which covers five main areas of law: company law (corporate governance), 
bankruptcy law, pledge (secured transactions) law, banking law, securities law. In 
addition, the survey always had a sixth section devoted to issues of legal enforcement 
(called General Legal Effectiveness). A hallmark of the LIS is the focus on both the 
extent of the law, and on how the law is used. The survey questions are divided 
into two categories: measuring extent or scope of the law (extensiveness questions), 
and measuring the implementation or use of the law (effectiveness). Questions are 
weighted according to underlying economic theories about desirable legal norms, or 
following so-called "best practice” laws. The banking and securities law sections of 
the survey were added to the main questionnaire in the summer of 1998 during the 
work on Transition Report 1998. Over the years of implementation of the survey, 
the EBRD published scores of legal extensiveness and effectiveness, based on the LIS 
survey scores, but also incorporating expert legal judgments in cases where respon­
dents provided contradictory information. The scores were usually also scaled on a 
rating scale of 1 to 4, with increments of 1. The baseline scores used were derived 
as the average of a survey respondent’s answer to all questions. A country’s legal
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score is derived as the average of all responses from attorneys from that country.
A novel feature of the use of the LIS data in this chapter is related to 1) using 
equal weights for all questions (this differs from the EBRD approach where some 
questions received higher weights); 2) the legal data have been subjected to an 
extensive review and cleaning, which has resulted in some differences between the 
previously published scores and those used in this paper. For instance, coding 
errors were corrected; internal inconsistencies in question answers were eliminated 
in a systematic fashion; and missing answers, which had previously been coded as 
zero values, have now been excluded when aggregating question scores.
3.3.2 Cross-Country Comparisons
In Chapter 2 we discussed the rationale for securities laws and regulations, and 
the main features of these laws captured by the securities law section of the Legal 
Indicator Survey. Let us now turn our attention to a discussion of the four main 
measures of securities laws. We look at each sub-index overall, and broken down 
into its extensiveness and effectiveness components.
3.3.2.1 Disclosure Requirements
We first compare the differences in disclosure requirements. The top-ranking coun­
tries in the overall measure of disclosure requirements are Estonia, Poland, the 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Hungary. The lowest-ranking ones are Georgia, Ar­
menia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan. Surprisingly, Kazakhstan ranks among 
the top six countries in the stringency of disclosure requirements and the Czech Re­
public ranks rather low, below the other Central European countries, and with scores 
similar to those of Albania, Uzbekistan and Belarus. In terms of effective application 
of disclosure requirements -  as shown in Figure 3.1 -  the top-ranking countries are 
Poland, Estonia and Slovenia, whereas the bottom ones are Armenia, Ukraine and
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Figure 3.1: Stock Market Capitalisation and Disclosure Requirements Effectiveness 
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FY R  M acedonia. We note the relatively high ranking of Kazakhstan and Russia -  
with effectiveness of disclosure (DISCL_EFF) scores of a similar m agnitude to that 
of the Czech Republic. W hat explains these rankings?
Our results on differences in securities laws with respect to disclosure require­
m ents for issuers of securities are in line with the findings of Glaeser, Johnson and 
Shleifer (2001) about differences in securities regulation between Poland and the 
Czech Republic in the 1990s. They find that issuers and intermediaries in the two 
countries faced radically different disclosure requirements, and therefore, the two 
securities market regulators had very different access to information on market par­
ticipants. The authors compare the Czech and Polish securities laws in terms of 
regulation of issuers and requirements for financial and ownership disclosure, and 
establish that Polish securities law imposed much more extensive and stringent re-
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Figure 3.2: Stock Market Turnover and Disclosure Requirements Effectiveness Sub­
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quirements for disclosure of issuers’ financial and ownership information than Czech 
law did.^ In terms of ownership disclosure Glaeser et al. find that the Polish law 
required public disclosure each tim e a shareholder exceeded 10, 20, 33, 50, 66 and 75 
percent ownership. This is helpful in preventing expropriation of m inority sharehold­
ers by large shareholders and management. In addition, Polish issuers were required 
by law to report the owners with more than 10% ownership stake in two national
^For example, in Poland the introduction of securities to public trading required both permis­
sion by the regulator and the issue of a prospectus. In the Czech Republic the securities law 
required neither of these features. Both laws prohibited the reporting of false information in a 
company prospectus. Polish law required the reporting of monthly, quarterly, semi-annual and 
annual financial statements by issuer; the Czech law mandated only annual reports. Furthermore, 
Polish law obliged issuers of securities to publish all information material to investors’ decision; 
Czech law mandated only disclosure of significant adverse developments in the company’s business.
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newspapers; Czech law did not impose such a rule. Finally, mandatory takeover 
bids are also found to be treated differently in the two countries’ laws. Thus, Polish 
law required any person who has become a holder of shares representing over 50% 
of the votes at the general meeting to announce an invitation to subscribe for the 
sale or exchange of the remaining shares. However, Czech law did not impose such 
a mandatory bid, which is a provision intended to reduce the risk of expropriation 
of minority shareholders.
These findings on the securities laws of Poland and the Czech Republic are sup­
ported by the data on disclosure requirements provided in lawyers’ answers to the 
relevant questions of the Legal Indicator Survey. As mentioned earher, Poland scores 
much higher than the Czech Republic in overall disclosure requirements. Indeed, 
Poland has the second highest score on the stringency of its disclosure requirements 
after Estonia. On the extensiveness of its Disclosure sub-index Poland also does 
better than the Czech Republic, but drops several places and ranks below Estonia, 
the Slovak Republic, Croatia, FYR Macedonia and Hungary. However, from the 
perspective of effectiveness of disclosure requirements, Poland ranks top among the 
transition countries, as Figures 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate. The value of its effective­
ness of disclosure index (89.29) is considerably higher than the value of the Czech 
effectiveness of disclosure index (74.11). Therefore, our results based on the LIS 
regarding disclosure support the Glaeser et al. (2001) findings about Polish law 
mandating better disclosure than Czech law. Figure 3.2 shows that while Poland, 
Estonia and Slovenia score highest in terms of their effectiveness of disclosure legal 
rules, Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Poland enjoyed the highest turnover ratio 
in 1999.
Looking in more detail at some of the sources of these differences in favour of 
Polish disclosure regulation, we find that, generally, the Polish scores on individual 
questions on Disclosure are higher than the those of the Czech Republic. For exam-
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pie, all interviewed Polish respondents agree that publicly traded firms must provide 
timely and accurate information to investors (mean score is 1.00); not all Czech in­
terviewees so agreed, but the mean is also very high (0.92). However, when asked 
about how often such disclosure occurs, Polish respondents say that on average it 
happens ’’frequently” or ’’almost always”, while on average Czech respondents say 
it happens only ’’sometimes”. The respective scores are 0.86 and 0.60 for Poland 
and the Czech Republic. This difference is consistent with the reported differences 
in the law by Glaeser et al. (2001) that Polish law requires disclosure of all material 
information, while Czech law requires disclosure of significant adverse developments 
only. Comparing the two from the perspective of reliability of the disclosed in­
formation, we find a significant difference in the mandatory use of international 
accounting standards (IAS). The Polish score is 0.57, the respective Czech one is 
0.07. Almost none of the Czech lawyers thought that financial statements by issuers 
need to comply with IAS. In terms of transparency of deals, Poland also appears 
to be better: all Polish survey respondents confirm that a clearance and settlement 
system for both shares and bonds is in operation (mean score of 1.00), whereas not 
all Czech respondents say so about their country’s clearance and settlement system 
(mean score of 0.77). The survey gathers information which could be compared with 
the information provided by Glaeser et al. (2001) on requirements for a prospectus 
and regulatory permission to issue securities. They found that, while Polish law 
mandated both a prospectus and getting regulatory approval, Czech law did not 
mandate either. However, when asked whether issuers must file information with 
the Regulator prior to a securities issue, almost all Czech and Polish respondents 
say that this is indeed the case, and that the information provided should be more 
than that contained in the company’s annual report.® Therefore, the overall LIS
®The Czech mean scores here are somewhat higher than those of Poland (0.25 and 0.19 for 
mandatory filing, and 0.25 and 0.21 for more extensive information being filed). Both these scores 
have a maximum of 0.25. Also, most Polish and Czech respondents consider a prospectus manda-
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ranking of disclosure requirements, whereby Poland scores consistently higher than 
the Czech Republic, captures the essence of the Glaeser et al. (2001) finding that 
Polish law imposed much stricter disclosure rules than Czech law. We summarise 
the individual scores on disclosure in the Appendix 3. A tables.
3.3.2.2 Regulator Attributes
One of the main findings of Glaeser et al. (2001) is that the establishment of an in­
dependent Securities Commission benefited the development of the Polish securities 
market; the lack of an independent commission in the Czech Republic, who chose 
to supervise the securities market through the Capital Markets Supervisors Office 
in the Ministry of Finance -  a body allegedly unconcerned with the regulation of 
the market according to Glaeser et al. (2001) -  brought about stagnation in the 
Czech securities market. How are these conclusions borne out by the Legal Indi­
cator Survey data on regulator attributes? Unfortunately, the survey information 
does not allow for a very detailed analysis of the pertinent Regulator characteristics, 
and does not specify all the detail provided by Glaeser et al. (2001). Nevertheless, 
some useful findings emerge. For example, while the Polish and Czech answers do 
not differ much from the perspective of whether a Regulator exists, and what its 
functional responsibilities are, the Polish Regulator is thought to have, on average, 
better trained and more knowledgable staff, than the Czech Regulator does (mean 
score of 0.50 for Poland versus a means score of 0.42 for the Czech Republic). The 
differences in terms of existence of a Regulator and its focus are marginal.
tory, but not financial statements. The mean scores here are marginally in favor of the Czech 
Republic too. This is somewhat surprising given the Glaeser et al. finding that the Czech law does 
not require a prospectus while Polish law does. Moreover, when asked about the frequency with 
which the Regulator reviews and approves the information provided by a company before a public 
securities issue, Czech respondents also indicate a marginally higher frequency on average (mean 
score of 0.85 against 0.82 for Poland).
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Overall, we do not find much of a difference in the Regulator Attributes sub­
index (mean of 97.14 for Poland and 95.76 for the Czech Republic, with the Czech 
Republic having a slightly higher ranking on its extensiveness component (mean 
of 98.86 against 96.43), but Poland doing considerably better (indeed, a t-test for 
differences in means indicates significance at the 10% level) in terms of the effec­
tiveness component (mean of 100.00 for Poland against a mean of 83.33 for the 
Czech Republic). While these results do not give a full picture of other potentially 
interesting regulator features, such as how its staff are appointed or dismissed, and 
probably the survey questions are not well suited to give even a good notion of 
Regulator independence, we still find that the Polish Regulator is reported to have 
better human resources, which is captured by the effectiveness score. This shows a 
good parallel with the Glaeser et al. (2001) results.
3.3.2.3 Enforcement Powers of Regulator
Much like Glaeser et al. (2001), we do not find many differences in the enforcement 
powers of the securities regulator in Poland and the Czech Republic. Glaeser et 
al. establish that in both countries the Regulator was entitled to issue and revoke 
licenses, to generate regulations and to impose fines for violations of securities laws 
and regulations, but had to refer criminad cases to the public prosecutor. Simi­
larly, when asked whether the Regulator has enforcement powers, all respondents in 
Poland and the Czech Republic agree that this is the case. However, when asked 
what these powers include, all Polish respondents indicate both ability to revoke an 
issuer’s listing and ability to impose civil fines or penalties (scores of 0.15 and 0.35 
respectively), while only half of Czech respondents think that the Czech regulator 
has the authority to revoke a license (mean score of 0.08), and about 77% think that 
the Czech regulator is authorised to impose civil fines and sanctions on violators. A 
more pronounced difference relates to the use of oversight and enforcement powers
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Figure 3.3: Stock Market Capitalisation and Effective Enforcement Powers of tfie 
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by the Regulator. Polish respondents tend to answer that their Regulator has al­
ways used his enforcement powers in the preceding five years (mean score of 100.00); 
Czech respondents agree that their Regulator has used its enforcement powers to a 
lesser degree (mean score of 0.88).
On insider trading rules, all the interviewed Polish and Czech lawyers report 
that insider trading is prohibited. Czech respondents suggest that, on average, such 
a prohibition is supported by a wider array of laws and adm inistrative rules than  
Polish respondents do (the mean score of the comprehensiveness of prohibition is 
0.46 for the Czech Republic and 0.34 for Poland).^ However, when asked next
^For example, six of the seven interviewed Polish respondents agree that insider trading is pro­
hibited through a legislative act; a further four of these agree that it is also prohibited by criminal 
law. Only one respondent indicates prohibition by legislative act, criminal law, administrative
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Figure 3.4: Stock Market Turnover and Effective Enforcement Powers of the Secu­
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about the frequency with which the Regulator engages in cases of insider trading, 
Polish regulators are reported to have been more actively pursuing insider dealing  
violations (mean score of 0.63 versus a mean score of 0.38 for the Czech Republic).
Figure 3.3 presents the effectiveness index of enforcement powers (ENF_EFF), 
and suggests that such powers are highest in Poland, Hungary and Romania. It also 
shows that Estonia is an outlier -  with one of the lowest scores on the effectiveness of 
enforcement powers index, but with one of the highest market capitalisations relative 
to GDP. Figure 3.4 shows the stock market turnover ratio against the effectiveness
rules and regulations, and stock exchange rules. Twelve out of the thirteen Czech respondents 
indicate prohibition by a legislative act; eight confirm that prohibition by criminal law exists; four 
say insider trading is also prohibited by stock exchange rules, and also four respondents say that 
insider trading is prohibited by private law.
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of enforcement powers index (ENF_EFF). It displays a better fit than capitalisation, 
and the fit is further improved after we exclude Moldova and FYR Macedonia from 
the scatter diagram (both are outliers in terms of turnover due to their small market 
size and a few large dominant transactions in the market, and are not shown in 
Figure 3.4).
Overall, the Legal Indicator Survey results on the enforcement powers of the 
Regulator corroborate the conclusions reached by Glaeser et al. (2001). Indeed, we 
do find that the Polish Securities Commission was much more actively involved with 
the supervision of market participants and finding violations of the securities law.
3.3 2.4 Regulation of Securities Intermediaries
A cross-country comparison in the Regulation of Intermediaries sub-index, reveals 
that Poland and Hungary are the two countries with the most stringent regula­
tion of securities market intermediaries, followed by Slovenia, Russia, the Slovak 
Republic and the Czech Republic. The lowest-ranking countries are Kyrgyzstan, 
Azerbaijan, Albania, Georgia and Uzbekistan. In terms of effective regulation of 
market intermediaries only, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and Russia rank top, and as 
shown in Figure 3.5, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan rank bottom. The figure points 
to a generally positive relationship between the effectiveness index of regulation of 
market intermediaries (INTERM_EFF), and stock market capitalisation as percent 
of GDP (STOCK99). Figure 3.6 shows the turnover ratio against the index of ef­
fective regulation of securities market intermediaries. The relationship between the 
two is generally positive. Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Poland have the highest 
turnover ratios.
How do the rankings for the Poland and the Czech Republic compare? Glaeser 
et ai. (2001) argue that some of the key differences in the two countries’ securities 
laws relate to their provisions regarding regulation of market intermediaries such
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Figure 3.5: Stock Market Capitalisation and Effectiveness of Regulation of Securities 
Market Intermediaries
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as brokers, brokerage firms, investm ent advisors, investm ent funds, and custodian  
banks.®
In line with their earlier findings, Glaeser et al. (2001) report that in Poland 
individual brokers and brokerage firms faced considerably stiffer licensing require­
ments and regulations than their Czech counterparts. More specifically, the Polish
®The argument for regulation of intermediaries goes back to Landis (1938), who argued that the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) could not monitor the compliance with 
disclosure, reporting and other rules by all publicly listed companies and the trading practices of 
all market participants. Instead, he argued that the SEC should regulate market intermediaries 
such as investment advisors, brokers, etc., placing on them the burden of ensuring compliance by 
market issuers and traders. It would be in their reputational interest to ensure good compliance 
by other market participants. With intermediaries being relatively few in number, the SEC could 
monitor and regulate them more easily.
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Figure 3.6: Stock Market Turnover and Effectiveness of Regulation of Securities 
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law instituted elaborate licensing requirements for individual brokers accompanied 
by tests. The Czech exams and requirements appeared much easier and pro-forma.^ 
Polish law also established strict requirements for the conduct of investment advisors 
such as subjecting them  to m andatory licensing by the Regulator, requiring them  to 
pass an exam  administered by the Regulator, and subjecting them  to inspections by 
the Regulator as well as to disclosure of ownership information. Czech law contained  
no specific provisions on the regulation of investm ent advisors. Finally, Polish secu­
rities law was more restrictive in terms of regulation of investm ent (mutual) funds
^Czech law, for instance, did not require brokers to engage in ’’honest trading” and act in the 
interest of clients, whereas the Polish law did. Polish law imposed considerable requirements on 
brokerage companies, such as an obligation to report who has more than 5 percent of voting rights; 
to report changes in voting rights above 2 percent; and to allow the securities regulator access and 
inspection rights. Czech law required none of these.
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and custodian banks.
We can test some of these findings since the Legal Indicator Survey contains a 
reasonably extensive subset of questions pertaining to regulation of intermediaries. 
Indeed, we find that in aggregate terms, Poland does considerably better in its 
Regulation of Intermediaries sub-index than the Czech Republic (mean score of 82.10 
for Poland against a mean score of 62.42 for the Czech Republic). Looking for the 
sources of this diflFerence, we find that first, both countries report that the securities 
law regulates the conduct of market intermediaries such as brokers and dealers, 
that brokers and dealers are subject to mandatory licensing and that they must 
have certain professional qualification. Most likely, the question was interpreted 
by respondents as referring to individual brokers. However, when asked about the 
intensity of regulation as measured by the frequency with which brokers have has 
their licenses revoked in case of violations of the law, Polish respondents indicate 
a considerably higher frequency of intervention than the Czech respondents (0.63 
versus 0.44). A large difference arises in answers to the question whether self- 
regulatory organizations exist. Poland scores better than the Czech Republic (0.64 
versus 0.36). In line with the information in Glaeser et al. (2001) that investment 
(mutual) funds must be licensed by the Securities Regulator, all Polish and Czech 
respondents indicate that there are separate rules and regulations for the licensing 
and regulation of investment funds. A source of a difference, however, is whether 
issuers of investment funds are subject to disclosure requirements, and how effective 
such disclosure is. The paper by Glaeser et al. does not provide information on this 
aspect, but the finding that Polish law establishes stricter disclosure on investment 
funds (mean score of 1.00 compared to 0.83 for the Czech Republic), and that Polish 
investment funds are expected to provide such information more regularly than their 
Czech counterparts (mean score of 0.79 versus 0.60), is consistent with the general 
finding about Polish law requiring stricter disclosure from market participants.
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Another source of difference arises from whether, or not, an investor compensa­
tion scheme exists to compensate investors for their losses in case of the failure of a 
market intermediary. While almost all Polish survey respondents agree that such a 
system is in operation, Czech respondents point to its absence (a mean score of 1.00 
for Poland against 0.08 for the Czech Republic). As is obvious from the Appendix 
3. A tables, this is one of the largest differences in individual question scores between 
the two countries. Czech respondents indicate a higher incidence of failures of se­
curities market intermediaries, but report that investors are somewhat less likely to 
receive compensation for their losses (a mean score on frequency of compensation 
of 0.21 for the Czech Republic against 0.38 for Poland).
In conclusion, the Glaeser et al. (2001) results about Polish law regulating se­
curities market intermediaries much more comprehensively and stringently than the 
Czech law is supported by our breakdown of the relevant questions on Regulation 
of Intermediaries. The main differences axe due to a higher intensity of regulation 
of brokers and dealers; the presence of self-regulatory organizations with oversight 
responsibilities over market participants; more extensive and effective disclosure re­
quirements for investment funds; and the existence of an investor compensation 
scheme. Thus, this detailed review of individual differences in question scores be­
tween two of our sample countries shows that the LIS 1999 data are in line -  at least 
for Poland and the Czech Republic -  with other related empirical research. This 
supports the validity of the LIS data, despite its drawbacks which were discussed in 
Chapter 2.
Having conducted an extensive comparison of our disaggregated index ranking 
with the findings of Glaeser et al. (2001) for Poland and the Czech Republic, we 
next compare our securities law extensiveness and effectiveness indices with the Pis­
tor et al. (2000) index of stock market integrity (SMINTEGR). Table 3.1 shows 
the correlation coefficients between the values of the SMINTEGR index for 1998,
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Table 3.1: Stock Market Integrity Index and Sub-indices of Securities Regulation, 
LIS 1999: Correlation Coefficients
SMINTEGR98 SMINTEGR96 SMINTEGR94 SMINTEGR92
DISCL 0.3576* 0.3739* 0.4249* 0.1684
DISCL_EXT 0.2862 0.2413 0.2300 -0.0451
DISCL_EFF 0.3081 0.3940* 0.5025* 0.3682*
INTERM 0.3790* 0.3792* 0.8373* 0.5650*
INTERM .EXT 0.2825 0.3283 0.6496* 0.3884*
INTERM JEFF 0.3631* 0.3336 0.7856* 0.5627*
ENF 0.1693 0.1928 0.4316* 0.3750*
ENF_EXT 0.0791 0.0790 0.2725 0.2569
ENF_EFF 0.3294 0.3628* 0.5623* 0.4579*
REGATTR 0.2519 0.0472 -0.0331 0.4324*
REGATTR_EXT 0.2198 0.0139 -0.0739 0.3599*
REGATTR_EFF 0.1562 0.0723 0.0507 0.2960
CAP99 0.3896* 0.3793* 0.7265* 0.5380*
EXTCAP99 0.3514 0.3215 0.5719* 0.3913*
EFFCAP99 0.3724* 0.3768* 0.7519* 0.5789*
Source: Pistor et al. (2000), and author’s compilations. Note: Asterisks 
indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level 
at a minimum.
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1996, 1994 and 1992 (as coded by the authors), and our LIS-based indices of secu­
rities law extensiveness and effectiveness. Prom the outset, we would expect some 
positive correlation with some of our four main sub-indices, i.e. disclosure, regula­
tion of intermediaries, enforcement powers and regulator’s attributes. However, we 
would expect correlation to be fairly limited since the scope of information coded in 
SMINTEGR differs considerably from the content of the securities law questions in 
the LIS. For example, SMINTEGR is coded on a 0 to 6 scale, with six components. 
Three of these relate to securities regulation directly. One point is given to the pres­
ence of a state agency for capital market supervision, and another point is scored for 
independent capital market supervision. These two elements can be compared with 
the information gathered by LIS on Regulator’s Attributes (Q2). Another point is 
added to the SMINTEGR index, if insider trading is prohibited by law. This part is 
then comparable to our sub-index of Enforcement Powers of the Regulator (namely, 
Q13 and Q14). Therefore, we would expect some presence of correlation. However, 
the SMINTEGR index also contains provisions, which are not related to securi­
ties laws per se, such as mandatory takeover bids; the shareholder register being 
maintained by an independent firm; rules against self-dealing; mandatory disclosure 
triggers for acquisitions of large blocks of shares. Therefore, the Pistor measure 
contains some provisions from general company law, which are supportive of the 
functioning of the stock market. In contrast, our securities measures do not cover 
all these aspects, but go into much further detail about disclosure, intermediary 
regulation, attributes and powers of the Regulator. They allow us to conduct the 
detailed comparisons with other studies, as done above. In contrast, Pistor et al. 
(2000) note that their coding of stock market integrity (SMINTEGR) does not al­
low them to pick up very clearly the differences in Czech and Polish securities laws 
as debated by Glaeser et al. (2001). Altogether, we find some positive correlation 
between SMINTEGR scores for 1998 and earlier years, and our sub-indices for 1999.
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Surprisingly, we find more instances of significant positive correlation between our 
legal sub-indices and SMINTEGR in the earlier years (1992 and 1994). In addition, 
the effectiveness sub-indices show a stronger positive correlation than the extensive­
ness ones. This correlation allows us to use these lagged SMINTEGR indices as 
instruments for our legal indices of securities regulation in 1999.
3.4 M ethodology
We are interested in examining the relationship between stock market development 
and regulation of securities msirkets as captured by the answers of legal experts to 
the LIS. We have outlined above the main sub-indices, based on the survey, and why 
they are important for securities markets. We are particularly interested in testing 
which types of securities regulations, if any, affect market development.
Our testing procedure relies on a standard regression methodology despite the 
serious limitations of the sample size (19 observations), which restricts the degrees 
of freedom with which we operate and make inferences. Nevertheless, we prefer the 
econometric approach for a number of reasons. First, simple ”eye-balling” of the 
association between capital market development and securities regulation reveals 
that some of the regulatory sub-indices exhibit a positive relationship with mar­
ket capitalisation and turnover (see Figures 3.1 to 3.6). However, examining these 
scatterplots is not sufficient to tell us whether this relationship is robust to other 
factors, or what the causality and degree of association are. Moreover, we would like 
to be able to compare our results with earlier findings in the related literature, e.g. 
Pistor et al. (2000), and in order to do so with a reasonable degree of confidence, 
an approach similar to the one used in earlier studies, i.e. one based on econometric 
techniques, must be followed.
Notwithstanding this decision, we also discuss and present our data in graphic 
form in order to identify potential outliers and visually illustrate the association
Chapter 3. Securities Regulation and Stock Market Development 131
between the variables of interest.
Below we address the choice of dependent and explanatory variables to be used, 
and some of the problems which we encounter when conducting the regression 
method chosen.
3.4.1 Choice o f Variables and Regression Specification
We are interested in examining the effect of the extent and effective use of securities 
laws and regulations on stock market development. We use two main proxies for the 
level of stock market development. One is the ratio of stock market capitalisation 
to GDP in 1999. The second variable is stock market turnover, i.e. the ratio of 
the value of stocks traded and market capitalisation. Capitalisation and turnover 
measure different aspects of stock market development. Market capitalisation is 
the product of number of listed stocks and the price of the stocks. It is scaled by 
GDP to control for economy size. Therefore, high capitalisation may reflect either 
a high number of listed companies, or a high valuation of listed companies, or both. 
Capitalisation is thus a measure of the size of the stock market. More importantly, 
recent theoretical models, e.g. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), establish that better 
investor protection is associated with both a higher number of listed domestic firms, 
and with higher valuations of listed shares. Since capitalisation reflects both, it is a 
suitable proxy for stock market development.
Market turnover is a measure of stock market liquidity. It is equal to the value of 
stocks traded divided by stock market capitalisation. Thus, it measures the extent 
to which stocks are traded relative to the size of the stock market. For example, 
a market with high capitalisation is not necessarily a liquid one. Stocks may be 
dormant or not actively traded, which would lead to low turnover despite high 
capitalisation. Another market liquidity measure is the value of stocks traded as 
percent of GDP. This measures stock market liquidity relative to the size of the
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economy. The two measures of market liquidity are different: turnover will be high 
in a small and liquid stock market, but value traded as percent of GDP will be low.
Measuring stock market development in transition economies is not a straight­
forward exercise. Stock market capitalisation -  which is commonly used in the 
literature -  suffers from some drawbacks, mainly due to the mandatory listing re­
quirements after privatization. High market capitalisation to GDP may thus reflect 
not a large equity market or flrms raising flnance through the stock exchange, but 
rather a high number of listed shares, which are never traded. Glaeser et al. (2001) 
also consider several measures of stock market development, and note that in 1998 
the Czech market had a still larger capitalisation relative to GDP than the Polish 
market (at 24.2% versus 14.1% in Poland).
Furthermore, the 1999 market capitalisation data, which we utilise, are also 
higher for the Czech Republic than Poland although the difference between the two 
-  compared to 1998 -  is diminishing -  23.1% in the Czech Republic compared to 
20% in Poland. This suggests that stock market capitalisation is, perhaps, not the 
most appropriate measure of securities market development in transition economies. 
An alternative measure that we employ, which is arguably more appealing than 
the market capitalisation measure, is market liquidity, as measured by the turnover 
ratio. The latter measure should overcome the problem of having a mass of dormant
^^This was in spite of the Czech market displaying a declining trend in capitalisation over time, 
delistings on its free market segment, and no IPOs issued for cash -  either by private companies, 
or as part of privatization -  between 1991 and 1998. At the same time, Poland saw an upward 
trend in its equity market capitalisation and listed firms figures, as well as 50 privatizing firms 
selling equity for cash as part of initial privatization, and 136 private firms going public during 
the period of 1991-1998. The corresponding figures for the Czech market were zero. Glaeser et 
al. (2001) also note that the Polish market was outperforming the Czech one on another measure 
-  the IFC Investable Index -  which is compiled by the International Finance Corporation, and 
measures stocks which are liquid enough for foreign investors to buy. The Polish index comprised 
more stocks than the Czech one, and displayed a higher value than the Czech one in 1998.
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shares due to mandatory privatization-related listings since it measures the volume 
of shares traded (number times price) as percentage of market capitalisation (total 
number of listed shares times price at last transaction). Having a large amount of 
dormant shares would result in a low turnover ratio.
Market turnover also has some shortcomings -  some of the transition stock mar­
kets are very small and had only a few listed stocks in 1999 (such as FYR Macedonia 
with 2 listed firms). One or few large transactions -  usually related to privatiza­
tion listings -  can result in large turnover ratios in any given year. The turnover 
ratio would be high although trading in most listed stocks is low, firms do not find 
it attractive to list on the stock exchange and the stock market has less relevance 
for the external financing needs of private firms than other sources of finance. We 
overcome these problems by dropping extreme outliers from the regression analysis.
Among the other variables which proxy stock market development and which 
are used in the related literature, are the value of initial public offerings (IPOs) 
relative to the country’s GDP; the number of domestic publicly-traded firms scaled 
by population; subjective assessments about the ease of raising equity finance on a 
given stock market measured by cross-country surveys of investors, etc. We have at 
our disposal limited information about the number of listed firms and value of IPO 
activity in our sample countries. The data have missing observations for a number 
of countries, which reduces the sample size considerably and does not allows us to 
conduct meaningful econometric estimations.
Therefore, we employ both stock market capitalisation and market turnover as 
the main dependent variables in our regression estimations. Acknowledging that 
both suffer from some shortcomings, we take the results of the next sections as 
merely suggestive. Furthermore, in the capitalisation regressions we control for 
mandatory privatization-related stock listings, which should somewhat mitigate the 
problems associated with the capitalisation variable.
Chapter 3. Securities Regulation and Stock Market Development 134
In order to isolate the effect of legal development on financial development, we 
control for a number of variables identified as significant predictors of financial de­
velopment in previous research. Thus, both Djankov et al. (2000) and Pistor et 
al. (2000) introduce in stock market capitalisation regressions a control variable for 
mandatory privatization-related listings on the stock m a r k e t . I n  a similar fashion, 
to control for forced listings due to privatization, we include a dummy variable for all 
countries where mass voucher privatization was the primary method of privatization, 
using information from the EBRD Transition Reports.
A second control variable is the level of economic development as measured by 
the logarithm of GDP per capita. The law and finance literature recognises the 
need for isolating the effect of general economic development from the effect of 
legal factors on financial outcomes. Economic development is generally associated 
with more developed and deeper capital markets. Moreover, richer countries may 
have generally better laws and institutions for law enforcement. Therefore, some 
scholars argue that legal development may only affect financial development through 
its carrying a ’’general development effect”, i.e. legal development may only affect 
financial development insofar as it picks up this general economic development effect. 
Therefore, we need to isolate the effect of the laws beyond the effect of economic 
development. We address how this will be done in the following sub-sections.
Macroeconomic stability is also an important factor for financial market devel­
opment. High inflation reduces expected returns and the willingness of investors
^^ For example, several transition countries which had mass voucher privatization programs, 
such as the Czech and Slovak RepubHcs, Lithuania and Romania, forced privatized firms to list 
on the stock exchange, and the transfer of ownership passed through the stock exchange. This 
is in contrast to other countries where there was no mass privatization and stock markets were 
established with relatively few IPOs, and to a third group of countries which fall somewhere in 
between -  i.e. where there was mass privatization, but initial exchanges of shares took place off 
the stock exchange, and there were no mandatory listings for all privatized firms as in the first 
group of countries.
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to buy shares. Theoretical literature shows that inflation interferes with the ability 
of flnancial markets to allocate resources efficiently. Recent empirical research, e.g. 
Boyd, Levine and Smith (2001), suggests that there is a significant negative rela­
tionship between stock market activity and inflation. In addition, the authors find 
evidence of thresholds -  economies with inflation rates exceeding 15% per annum 
exhibit a discrete drop in flnancial sector performance. In recognition of these flnd- 
ings and since many transition countries have or did have high inflation, we include 
a measure of average inflation over the preceding 5 years and including 1999 in our 
regressions.^^
Financial development is also shown to be affected by general institutional devel­
opment such as legal origin, or the prevailing system of law and order in a country. 
Since the transition economies all underwent an extended period of time under com­
munism, time spent under communism may serve as a good proxy for historical mem­
ory of markets. The idea that historical memory of markets and institutions matters, 
has been put forward in a number of empirical studies of transition economies, e.g. 
Pistor (2000). Shared historical past with Western European countries and experi­
ence with laws and market institutions, such as banks and stock markets, prior to 
the onset of communism in some of these countries might be reflected in the present 
degree of banking and stock market development and regulation. In other words, 
we may expect that historical memory would play a role in the effective application 
of flnancial laws and functioning of capital markets. The number of years under 
communism could serve as a useful proxy for the memory of market institutions. In 
this respect the transition economies could be divided into three main groups: those, 
which spent a low number of years under communism (40-45 years), those with a 
high number of years under conununism (70-75), and the medium-range countries 
(51-52 years). Among the first group axe most of the Central and Eastern European
^^The years are chosen so as to reflect the timing of stock market development (which started 
in many places in the mid-1990s), and to also smooth out inflation fluctuations over the period.
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countries; the three Baltic countries and Moldova fall into the intermediate range, 
and all the other former Soviet republics are at the high end of the scale. We have 
conducted a simple analysis of differences in means of securities law effectiveness for 
these three groups of countries, shown in Table 3.2. The results indicate statisti­
cally significant differences in mean effectiveness of securities laws (for all 5 indices) 
between the countries with high and low number of years under communism, and 
for three of the five indices when comparing the group of countries with high and 
medium number of years under communism.
As witnessed by the literature on law and finance, the causal effect of legal 
development on financial development cannot be established with certainty, and it 
is crucial to find suitable instruments for legal development. We address this issue 
in the next section in more detail. We test several instrumental variable sets such as 
legal origin (LEGAL ORIGIN) as defined in Pistor (2000); legal transplant status 
(TRANSPLANTJST), as defined by Berkowitz et al. (2003) and Pistor et al. (2000); 
lagged values of the stock market integrity index (SMINTEGR) by Pistor et al. 
(2000); the number of years under communism (YRCOMM); and the main religion 
practised by the largest fraction of each country’s population (RELIGION)
In summary, our basic regression specification is as follows:
S T O C K D E V ^ ^ i=  C L h   ^LEGEXTQQi-\-c * LEGEFFQQi-\-d * GontTolsi-\-u
S T O C K D E V 9 9  is the measure of stock market development, a is a constant 
term, L E G E X T 99  and LE G EFF99  are the respective extensiveness and effective­
ness components of securities laws, and the set of control variables include GDP per 
capita, average inflation, and a voucher privatization dummy; the subscript i refers 
to country
^^ For example, Stulz and Williamson (2003) find that cultural proxies, such as religion and lan­
guage, help explain both creditor rights across a sample of 49 countries, as well as legal enforcement
of shareholder and creditor rights.
An earlier version of this paper included the GDP growth rate among the explanatory variables.
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Table 3.2: Years under Communism and Securities Law Effectiveness: Average 
Scores for Each Country Group
Years under DISCL-EFF INTERM-EFF REGATTR-EFF ENF-EFF EFFCAP99
communism (mean) (mean) (mean) (mean) (mean)
70-75 64.89 26.75 71.20 36.44 41.67
50-55 74.55 43.71 81.85 40.31 53.23
40-45 73.95 40.46 89.72 58.07 55.03
T- -1.66* -3.20*** -0.75 -0.39 -2.67**
test 70-75 / (0.0696) (0.0063) (0.2356) (0.3506) (0.0115)
50-55
T- -1.96** -1.71* -1.45* -2.14** -2.18**
test 70-75 / (0.0340) (0.0527) (0.0904) (0.0237) (0.0220)
40-45
T- 0.11 0.54 -0.98 -2.22** -0.36
test 50-55 / (0.4563) (0.3014) (0.1874) (0.0258) (0.3615)
40-45
Note: The table reports average scores for each category as well as 
the probabilities of rejecting the null hypothesis of equal means. 
One-tailed t-tests are reported. P-values are shown in parentheses 
next to t-statistics.
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Finally, we must stress that the pure cross-sectional regression model, which we 
are going to estimate has some distinct shortcomings. These are the inability of 
cross-sectional regressions to take into account time dimensions of data; potential 
omitted variable bias due to country-specific effects, which cannot be captured by 
the model; and potential simultaneity bias. In addition, cross-sectional regression 
models face common problems such as multi-collinearity. We address these draw­
backs in the next sub-sections, and explain possible ways to overcome them.
3.4.2 Endogeneity Problem s
Endogeneity problems are quite common in a multiple regression model of the type 
we specify here, i.e. looking at contemporaneous measures of financial development 
and legal development. The presence of an endogenous explanatory variable in a 
multiple regression model could be due to an omitted variable, to measurement 
error or to simultaneity. Each of these may cause the endogenous variable to be 
correlated with the error term of the regression, which violates the standard as­
sumption of the OLS estimator of a zero conditional mean, and produces biased 
and inconsistent OLS estimates. In such cases, measures need to be taken to ensure 
that the parameter estimates are unbiased and consistent. One way to correct for 
endogenous explanatory variables in cross-sectional multiple regression models is to 
employ instrumental variables (IV) estimation. The IV estimator relies on identify­
ing a new variable, z, such that it is correlated with the endogenous variable, but is 
not correlated with the regression error term n, i.e. is exogenous to the regression 
specification.
To confront problems of endogeneity in our regressions due to simultaneity or
Since many studies on the finance-growth links have established that financial development predicts 
economic growth, i.e. causality runs from finance to growth, it is questionable whether growth 
belongs in the type of model we are estimating. We have conducted robustness checks, controlfing 
for average GDP growth from 1995 through 1998, and find that our results do not change.
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omitted variable bias, we have chosen to employ instrumental variable techniques in 
addition to, and as a robustness check to our OLS results in a cross-country regres­
sion framework. As we mentioned above, there are two conditions which must be 
met for a variable to be a suitable instrument for securities regulation extensiveness 
and effectiveness in our stock market development regressions. First, we need to 
find a variable exogenous to securities development over the sample period. Second, 
it has to be correlated with our legal and regulatory measures.
One possible candidate for an instrument for our legal (regulatory) scores would 
be lagged values of the same. However, we do not have at our disposal the securities 
law variables before 1998. We only have measures of commercial law (i.e. company, 
bankruptcy, pledge and general effectiveness) effectiveness and extensiveness for 
1997, when the commercial law part of the LIS was conducted for the first time. 
However, we do have measures of stock market regulation (SMINTEGR) for earlier 
years, as coded by Pistor et al. (2000). This index is available for 1992, 1994, 1996 
and 1998, and we have aheady tested that it is reasonably correlated with our legal 
measures of securities regulation extensiveness and effectiveness, particularly for the 
early years (see Table 3.1). Since the laws governing stock markets in 1992, for 
example, could not have been affected by stock market developments in 1999, we 
assume that the lagged indices are exogenous to our regression model.
We also utilise legal origin dummies even though the transition economies are 
usually classified as having Socialist legal origin, and no distinction is made among 
them as belonging to the major legal traditions of the wor l d .T ab l e  3.3 presents
the extent that some transition countries adopted different West European legal codes, such 
as civil, commercial and criminal codifications, at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th 
centuries, a classification is sometimes attempted, linking them to the origin country from which 
major codes were copied. For example, Central European countries such as the Czech Republic 
and Hungary are often classified as German legal origin countries. Others, such as Poland, initially 
borrowed more extensively from French and Italian legal codes, but later the German influence was
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t-tests for diflFerences in mean effectiveness securities law indices across the three 
types of legal origin countries in our sample. We observe significant differences in all 
five of our indices between the German and Socialist legal origin countries. Also, in 
three of the five indices, the German legal origin countries score significantly higher 
than the French legal origin ones.
Table 3.3: Legal Origin and Securities Law Effectiveness: Average Scores for Each 
Country Group
Legal origin DISCL-EFF INTERM-EFF REGATTR-EFF ENF-EFF EFFCAP99
(mean) (mean) (mean) (mean) (mean)
German 78.32 47.86 90.70 58.16 59.99
French 66.72 26.27 83.34 37.86 43.72
Socialist 65.00 28.43 71.58 39.36 42.35
T-test 3.03** 2.88** 0.93 1.4475 2.42**
German/French (0.0104) (0.0117) (0.1972) (0.1026) (0.0296)
T-test 3.32*** 2.83*** 1.64* 2.1429** 3.56***
German /  Sociahst (0.0022) (0.0058) (0.0643) (0.0241) (0.0012)
T-test 0.38 -0.28 0.90 -0.10 0.20
French /  Socialist (0.3558) (0.6068) (0.1926) (0.5383) (0.4244)
Note: The table reports average scores for each category as well as the 
probabilities of rejecting the null hypothesis of equal means. One-tailed t- 
tests are reported. P-values are shown in parentheses next to t-statistics.
stronger. In addition, some countries developed their pre-war basic laws by mixing from different 
Western sources, such as borrowing from German sources for their pre-war commercial codes, but 
from French sources for their civil codes (e.g. Bulgaria). Following Pistor (2000), we distinguish 
three legal origins: German, French and Socialist among the sample of transition economies. For 
more on this classification see Chapter 4.
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Another potential instrument for our legal scores would be the so-called legal 
transplant status, i.e. how a country adopted its system of fundamental laws.^ ® 
However, as we shall see later on, transplant status is generally a weak instrument 
for most of our legal indices.
Therefore, we choose to estimate our basic regression model above with OLS, and 
then with two-stage least squares using the various instrument sets just described. 
We implement two diagnostic tests for the IV regressions. First, we test whether 
endogeneity is indeed present. We perform the Hausman test, which compares the 
coefficient estimates of the OLS and IV regressions and indicates whether OLS is 
inconsistent, assuming that the IV estimator is consistent. If we can reject the 
null hypothesis of no systematic difference between the OLS and IV estimates, this 
means that OLS is inconsistent and endogeneity may well be present. Another way 
to test for endogeneity is done by regressing the endogenous variable on all exogenous 
variables included in the structural model (including the instruments), and using the 
estimated residual in an OLS regression of the ’’structural” equation (including the 
endogenous and exogenous variables). If the residual is found statistically significant, 
we can conclude that endogeneity is present. This procedure is given by Davidson 
and MacKinnon (1993).
^®Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (2003) analyse transplantation of legal codes from ’’origin” 
countries to ’’transplant” countries. Jurisdictions of 49 countries are categorized as either being 
origins, i.e. where legal codes and orders developed internally, or transplants, i.e. where laws and 
codes were copied from foreign countries, usually through colonization and conquest, but sometimes 
through a process of voluntary transplantation. Depending on whether or not transplant countries 
adapted the transplanted laws to local conditions and/or had a population already familiar with 
the basic principles of the transplanted laws, they are divided into receptive and unreceptive 
transplants. It is established that transplant status is a significant determinant of current legal 
eflFectiveness or legality, with origins and receptive transplants enjoying the highest levels of legal 
effectiveness. Pistor et al. (2000) apply this analysis to the transition economies, and divide them 
into three categories: receptive transplants, unreceptive transplants and new transplants.
Chapter 3. Securities Regulation and Stock Market Development 142
Since we employ more instruments that the number of endogenous variables, 
our model is over-identified. Therefore, we can test whether the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term, i.e. test for the validity of the instrument set. This 
is done through a test of the over-identifying restrictions. The test is summarized 
as follows: the structural model is estimated via 2SLS, and the residuals are then 
regressed via OLS on all exogenous variables (including the instruments). The
from this regression is then multiplied by the number of observations, n, and 
this equals the test statistic. Under the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term, it is distributed as a Chi-square with degrees 
of freedom equal to the number of instruments minus the number of endogenous 
variables. Therefore, if we cannot reject the null hypothesis, the instruments pass 
the over-identification tests. In the instrumental variables regression output we show 
the value of the Sargan test statistic, which we have just described.
3.4.3 M ulti-collinearity
Some of our explanatory variables in the main regression specification are highly 
correlated. Their simultaneous inclusion in the regression specification would then 
result in multi-collinearity, which leads to larger standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients of the affected independent collinear variables, thereby reducing signifi­
cance levels and making inferences difficult. Which are the collinear variables?
First, as explained above, we would like to control in the regressions for the level 
of economic development as measured by GDP per capita. There is a debate in 
the law and finance literature whether or not to include GDP per capita among 
the regressors. There are studies, e.g. La Porta et al. (1997) and (2003), which 
control for economic development. Most studies, however, choose to omit GDP per 
capita from regressions of financial development on legal development on grounds 
that the level of a country’s economic development is usually highly correlated with
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the legal development variables, and this induces multi-collinearity in a standard 
multiple regression estimation. It is a legitimate question whether such an omission 
is desirable, since one might argue that legal development might just reflect ”a level 
of economic development” effect, rather than the quality of laws or their enforcement 
per se.
One way to overcome this problem is to regress financial development on GDP 
per capita, and to use the estimated residuals as the dependent variable in a new 
regression, which tests for the effect of the legal variables and the control variables. 
In this manner, we can investigate whether the legal variables offer any explanatory 
power over and above that provided by general economic development. We conduct 
this two-step procedure for all our securities regulation legal scores. However, this 
procedure entails serious problems. Importantly, it assumes that GDP per capita 
and the legal variables are independent. Only then would the first step of regressing 
financial development on GDP per capita yield unbiased and consistent estimates 
and residuals. Then the second step of regressing these residuals on legal develop­
ment would also give unbiased and consistent parameter estimates. However, this 
assumption is likely to be violated if economic development and legal development 
are highly correlated (as indeed they are). In that case, the regression in the first 
step would suffer from omitted variable bias (due to the exclusion of legal devel­
opment from the regressors), and therefore the estimated coefficients and residuals 
will be biased and inconsistent. The problem is carried over to the second step, 
and in a sense rather than dealing with multi-collinearity, it actually poses further, 
more serious problems of introducing bias and inconsistency. On the other hand, 
suspected multi-collinearity satisfies all the assumptions of efficiency, consistency 
and unbiasedness of the estimated OLS coefficients, and only affects the standard 
errors and the significance of the estimated coefficients. Therefore, acknowledging 
that multi-collinearity is most likely a problem, we do show regressions with GDP
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Figure 3.7: Residuals of a Regression of Stock Market Capitalisation on (log) GDP 
per capita and a Constant, and Disclosure Requirements Effectiveness Sub-index
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per capita alongside the legal development variables in our regressions. We also per­
form the two-step procedure, but note that it is subject to severe problems related 
to biased and inconsistent estimates.
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 depict the relation between the part of stock market capi­
talisation, non-attributable to GDP per capita, and effectiveness index of disclosure 
requirements (DISCL_EFF), and the effectiveness index of aggregate capital market 
regulation (EFFCAP99)
Similar two-step procedures to correct for multi-collinearity could also be applied 
to other correlated variables such as our extent-of-law and enforcement indices, as 
well as our composite indices. Table 3.4 shows the correlation matrix of the former, 
and indicates significant correlation coefficients in four of the five index pairs. Table 
3.23 in Appendix 3. A shows the correlation among the composite indices of securities
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Figure 3.8: Residuals of a Regression of Stock Market Capitalisation on (log) GDP 
per capita and a Constant, and Aggregate Capital Market Effectiveness Sub-index
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regulation. However, given the problems associated with the two-step procedure, 
we also use extensiveness and effectiveness indices together in the OLS estimations.
3.5 Regression Results
3.5.1 Disclosure Rules
3.5.1.1 M arket C apitalisation Regressions
In this section we describe the main regression results for the impact of legal extent 
and legal effectiveness of disclosure rules on stock market development, control­
ling for other potential determinants of stock market development. The dependent 
variable in these regressions is stock market capitalisation in 1999. In the next sec-
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Table 3.4: Correlation Between Extenisveness and Effectiveness Scores of Securities 
Laws
DISCL-EFF INTERM-EFF REGATTR-EFF ENF-EFF EFFGAP99
DISCL_EXT 0.3635*
INTERM-EXT 0.5064**
REGATTR-EXT 0.1581
ENF.EXT 0.6609***
EXTCAP99 0.7356***
Note: The table reports pairwise correlation coefficients. *** Sig­
nificant at 1%; ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
tion we will present robustness checks, using stock market capitalisation in 2000 
(STOCKOO).
First, we present the results on the impact of securities disclosure rules, as cap­
tured by lawyers’ perceptions. The results in Table 3.5 indicate a strong, positive 
relation between each of the three disclosure indices and market capitalisation in 
1999. Having voucher privatization as the main method of transfer of state owner­
ship into private hands also has the expected positive sign, but is generally insignif­
icant (it is also collinear with DISCLJEXT and DISCL, and we omit it from the 
specification testing for the impact of aggregate disclosure requirements). Regres­
sions (4) and (5) in Table 3.5 show the results of the two-step procedure described 
earlier isolating the impact of GDP per capita and inflation. In a joint specification 
both DISCL_EXT and DISCLJEFF are statistically insignificant, most likely due to 
multi-collinearity. However, the effectiveness measure has a stronger impact than 
the extensiveness one, and is only marginally insignificant in this joint specification. 
After we omit DISCL_EXT from the specification (equation (5)), we find that the 
effectiveness of disclosure requirements (DISCL_EFF) re-gains significance, albeit
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at the 10% level only. This is an indication that the effective use and application 
of securities disclosure rules, as perceived by the surveyed lawyers, has explanatory 
power for stock market development beyond that of general economic development 
(proxied by the log of GDP per capita), and macroeconomic stability (proxied by 
inflation).
As mentioned earlier, a potential lack of independence between GDP per capita 
and the legal indices of securities development casts doubts on the two-step pro­
cedure -  and calls for including GDP per capita in the same regressions alongside 
the legal variables. Therefore, we run our main OLS regressions including the loga­
rithm of GDP per capita among the regressors. The last column of Table 3.5 shows 
the OLS results for the effectiveness of disclosure index (DISGL_EFF) alongside the 
logarithm of GDP per capita (LGDPPG99). The logarithm of GDP per capita is 
significant at the 10% level, and DISCL_EFF is significant at the 5% level. GDP 
per capita is not significant in any of the other specifications. Among the three legal 
disclosure indices, only the enforcement one (DISGLJEFF) maintains significance 
with and without the VOUGHER dummy in the presence of the log of GDP per 
capita.
We then test for potential endogeneity of our legal variables by running in­
strumental variables (IV) regressions. Before we report the second-stage of the IV 
regressions, we first look at the first-stage results -  i.e. the regression of the endoge­
nous variable -  in our case each of the three disclosure indices -  on the instruments 
and the other exogenous variables, which enter the structural equation. We compare 
two sets of instruments -  legal transplant status (TRANSPLANT_ST) and legal ori­
gin (LEGAL ORIGIN), and although both yield reasonable results, we find LEGAL 
ORIGIN more appropriate as an instrument for our disclosure measures. Panels A 
and B of Table 3.7 display the first-stage results for the two instrument sets.
Table 3.6 shows the second-stage results of the estimations using the LEGAL
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Table 3.5: Disclosure Requirements and Stock Market Capitalisation, 1999. OLS 
Estimations
Independent STOCK99 STOCK99 STOCK99 (4) (5) STOCK99
variable
DISCL_EXT 0.7871***
(0.2169)
0.1706
(0.2524)
DISCL_EFF 0.9829*** 0.3917 0.5370* 0.6848**
(0.2668) (0.2593) (0.2938) (0.3055)
DISCL 0.9209***
(0.2757)
VOUCHER 15.6956** 5.6028 11.1286 8.7204 7.7254
(7.0250) (6.8621) (7.4012) (6.4600) (6.6561)
LGDPPC99 3.9459*
(2.2396)
Intercept -47.1*** -60.9*** -72.8** -44.1* -42.0* -69.2***
(14.4928) (18.3999) (29.32) (23.0633) (20.3004) (21.2998)
Number of 19 19 19 19 19 19
observations
Adjusted 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.21 0.20 0.38
R-squared
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Robust
standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefllcient estimates. Estimations (4)
and (5)’s dependent variable is the residual of an OLS regression of (1) STOCK99
on the log of GDP per capita, infiation and a constant.
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Table 3.6: Disclosure Requirements and Stock Market Capitalisation, 1999. Instru­
mental Variables (IV) Estimations Using 2SLS and Legal Origin as an instrument
Independent STOCK99 STOCK99 STOCK99
variable
DISCLJEXT 0.7260** (0.3261)
DISCL_EFF 1.1214** (0.5153)
DISCL 0.8851** (0.3818)
VOUCHER 14.6632** 6.0537 (6.0864) 11.3178**
(5.5819) (5.2200)
Intercept -42.5* (23.5618) -71.1* (36.9920) -54.0* (27.3555)
Number of 19 19 19
observations
R-squared 0.37 0.32 0.41
F-test on first- F(3, 15)=10.39 F(3, 15)=3.46 F(3, 15)=9.20
stage equation [0.0006] [0.0433] [0.0011]
Hausman test 0.05 [0.8227] 0.09 [0.7584] 0.35 [0.5523]
OIR test (Sargan % (^1) =  0.901 X^(l) =  0.447 X^(l) =  0.772
test) [0.3426] [0.5036] [0.3797]
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%.
Robust standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient esti­
mates. P-values shown in square brackets for the F-test and diagnostic
tests.
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Table 3.7; Disclosure Requirements and Stock Market Capitalisation, 1999. Instru­
mental Variables (IV) Estimations: First-Stage Estimations
Dependent
variable
DISCL_EFF DISCL_EXT DISCL
Panel A: TRANSPLANT_ST, omitted category is Receptive 
Transplant (REC.TR)
NEW-TR -8.5830** (3.9113) -11.9902** (4.9110) -10.2831** (3.9736)
UNREC-TR -6.1499 (5.7371) 5.8459 (7.2035) -0.1545 (5.8285)
VOUCHER -0.4596 (4.0281) -10.7607** (5.0576) -5.6124 (4.0923)
Intercept 77.1*** (2.4549) 77.0*** (3.0824) 77.1*** (2.4940)
No of obs 19 19 19
Adjusted R-sq 0.15 0.51 0.39
F-test F(3, 15)=2.03 F(3, 15)=7.14 F(3, 15)=4.80
[0.1534] [0.0033] [0.0154]
Panel B: LEGAL ORIGIN, omitted category 
origin
' is French legal
German 9.5501* (4.5305) 12.2095** (5.5436) 10.8814** (4.1969)
Socialist -0.0692 (5.0724) -2.8432 (6.2067) -1.4511 (4.6989)
VOUCHER -1.2656 (3.6959) -13.1427** (4.5224) -7.2064* (3.4237)
Intercept 69.0*** (3.8585) 69.2*** (4.7214) 69.1*** (3.5744)
No of obs 19 19 19
Adjusted R-sq 0.29 0.61 0.58
F-test F(3, 15)=3.46 F(3, 15)=10.39 F(3, 15)=9.20
[0.0433] [0.0006] [0.0011]
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Standard 
errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. P-values shown in square 
brackets for the F-test.
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ORIGIN dummies. All three legal variables are found significant. We perform 
two diagnostic tests. In none of the specifications in Table 3.6 is the Hausman 
test statistic significant, which indicates that there is no presence of endogeneity. 
Despite this evidence, we present both the IV and OLS results. The Sargan test of 
over-identifying restrictions is passed by all three reported IV estimations, thereby 
confirming that the instruments are valid.
We interpret these results to mean that 1) the relationship between stock market 
capitalisation and the perceived effectiveness of disclosure rules is robust to control­
ling for economic development, method of privatization and infiation, and 2) that 
the same relationship is also robust to correcting for potential endogeneity between 
effectiveness of disclosure rules and stock market performance. We also find evi­
dence that the extent of disclosure rules as proxied by the perceived extensiveness 
of disclosure rules in the securities laws is positively associated with market capi­
talisation and is robust to endogeneity, but not so to the inclusion of controls for 
income per capita. Finally, choosing a good instrument set improves the first-stage 
estimates and allows us to estimate the second-stage with better accuracy -  moving 
from TRANSPLANT_ST to LEGAL ORIGIN as instruments for the legal indices 
reduces the standard error of the second-stage estimates and raises the significance
^^Note that the Hausman test and the Sargan OIR test are implemented assuming conditional 
homoscedasticity. We have used robust standard errors in the IV regressions to correct for het- 
eroscedasticity of any form. The relevant test statistic for tests of over-identifying restrictions 
would then be the Hansen J  statistic. Tests indicate that most estimates pass this test. Only 
the INTERM_EFF and INTERM, as well as the EFFCAP99 and CAP99 regressions show a sig­
nificant Hansen J  statistic, thereby casting some doubts on the validity of the instruments. In 
addition, employing the Hausman test for endogeneity when estimating IV with robust standard 
errors sometimes generates negative test statistics. New techniques are now available to overcome 
the latter problem, see Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2003) for a discussion of IV estimation and 
hypotheses testing, including different tests of endogeneity (Durbin-Wu-Hausman, Wu-Hausman), 
etc.
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levels of the three disclosure legal measures, thereby supporting the simple OLS 
results.^®
3.5.1.2 Market Turnover Regressions
We repeat the same regressions described above using the turnover ratio in 1999 as 
the dependent variable^^. The results support the earlier finding that information 
disclosure rules exert a significant positive effect upon securities market develop­
ment -  both the index of extensiveness and the index of enforcement of disclosure 
requirements (DISCLJEXT and DISCL_EFF respectively) are significant and have 
the expected signs of the coefficients in OLS estimations of the turnover ratio, con­
trolling for voucher privatization. It is not clear why the voucher privatization 
dummy should belong to this regression -  but we choose to keep it to maintain 
comparability to the capitalisation regressions.^^ The disclosure enforcement index 
is significant at the 1% level, whereas the extensiveness and composite indices are 
significant at the 10% and 5% levels only (Table 3.8).
Utilising the two-step procedure to correct for the effect on turnover of GDP 
per capita and average infiation in succession, we find that none of the legal in-
^®There is a literature which shows that weak instruments -  i.e. low correlation between the 
instrumental variable and the endogenous variable -  increases the inconsistency of the IV estimates, 
and reduces the power of hypothesis tests even in large samples, see Shea (1997) and Staiger and 
Stock (1997).
®^We have tried different sources of information on market turnover such as the IFC Emerging 
Stock Markets Factbook (various issues), as well as the Standard and Poor’s /  IFC Emerging Mar­
kets Database (EMDB). Alternative measures for market turnover in some of our sample countries 
can be obtained from Claessens et al. (2000). The data on market turnover for several transition 
economies not covered by the EMDB have been obtained pooling the different sources and using 
stock exchange websites. These countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, FYR Macedonia, Kaza­
khstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Uzbekistan. Whenever these data come from stock exchange 
websites, they were double-checked for consistency with other published sources.
Leaving the VOUCHER dummy out of the regressions does not change the results.
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Table 3.8: Disclosure Requirements and Stock Market Turnover, 1999. OLS Esti­
mations
Independent TURNOVER99 TURNOVER99 TURNOVER99 (4) (5)
variable
DISCL_EXT 0.8985*
(0.4493)
-0.6399
(0.6312)
DISCL_EFF 1.2746***
(0.3408)
1.0236*
(0.5023)
0.4351
(0.3291)
DISCL 1.2030**
(0.4417)
VOUCHER 5.2555 -6.6677 1.5504 -11.2742 -2.3667
(8.0812) ^ (8.7496) (7.3541) (7.2674) (7.9791)
Intercept -39.2 -66.5*** -61.5** -27.1 -31.0
(28.5832) (21.1830) (27.5277) (23.4295) (21.4472)
Number of 18 18 18 18 18
observations
Adjusted 0.20 0.26 0.25 0.09 0.04
R-squared
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at
10%. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient
estimates. Estimations (4) and (5)’s dependent variable is the residual
of an OLS regression of (1) TURN0 VER99 on the log of GDP per capita
(LGDPPC99) and a constant.
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dices retains its significance levels. In a specification which tests simultaneously 
for DISCL_EXT and DISCL_EFF the effectiveness index has a stronger impact, 
which is positive and significant; however, it is not found significant once we drop 
DISCL_EXT from the estimated regression. Since the two are highly correlated, the 
joint specification likely suffers from multi-collinearity. We also include GDP per 
capita in the main turnover regressions in the same manner done above for market 
capitalisation (output not shown). Thus, in the presence of LGDPPC99 only the 
effectiveness of disclosure index is found significant (with or without the VOUCHER 
dummy). The other two disclosure indices lose significance. These results suggest 
that -  similarly to the capitalisation results -  only the effectiveness of disclosure 
index has an any explanatory power over stock market turnover after controlling for 
the level of economic development.
The main OLS results are also confirmed by instrumental variables estimations, 
which are not reported here.^^
Summing up, the turnover regression results are in line with the capitalisation 
results reported above. Like capitalisation -  turnover appears to be affected by 
both the extent of disclosure rules in the securities laws and by their enforcement. 
Controlling for GDP per capita, however, leaves only the index of effective disclo­
sure (DISCL_EFF) significant in both the capitalisation and turnover regressions. 
It appears that only the enforcement of disclosure rules is robust to controlling for 
economic development in the regressions, but this result should be taken with cau­
tion due to potential multi-collinearity when the log of GDP per capita enters the
Correcting for potential endogeneity between TURNOVER99 and the legal indices in IV re­
gressions using legal origin dummies as an instrument for the three legal indices on disclosure, we 
find that all three are significant in the second-stage regressions and have a positive sign. The 
instruments pass the F-tests of joint significance, and the first-stage regressions display a reason­
able explanatory power. The second-stage regressions pass the Hausman and Sargan tests -  i.e. 
endogeneity is not present, and the instruments employed are valid.
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regression alongside the legal measures, and to estimation problems associated with 
the two-step procedure described earlier.
3.5.2 Interm ediaries Regulations
3.5.2.1 Market Capitalisation Regressions
We next run the above estimations, using the subset of indices on regulation of 
capital market intermediaries. First, separate OLS estimations of the impact of the 
extensiveness and effectiveness sub-indices (INTERM_EXT and INTERM_EFF), 
shown in Table 3.9, reveal a positive and statistically significant association with 
stock market capitalisation in 1999. The aggregate index of market intermediary 
regulation (INTERM) is also statistically significant and has a positive sign. The 
voucher privatization dummy is not significant in any of the estimations.
Controlling for the logarithm of GDP per capita in the two-step procedure de­
scribed earlier, we establish that INTERM_EFF still retains significance, albeit at 
a lower level than in the basic OLS model without controls for GDP per capita 
or infiation. In contrast, INTERM_EXT loses significance after we control for the 
effect of GDP per capita and past infiation. In a similar fashion, including the log 
of GDPPC99 alongside the legal indices of intermediaries regulation (see the last 
column of Table 3.9) supports the findings of the two-step procedure. It shows that 
the index of effectiveness of regulation securities intermediaries (INTERM_EFF) is 
significant -  albeit at the 10% level -  when GDP per capita is included simultane­
ously. The logarithm of GDP per capita is not significant in the latter specification, 
but is significant in the INTERM_EXT and INTERM regressions. The latter two 
indices are insignificant. Therefore, these results indicate a role for effective reg­
ulation over stock market intermediaries in benefiting stock market development. 
Furthermore, these results are consistent with the ones on effective disclosure rules 
benefiting stock market development in the presence of GDP per capita from the
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Table 3.9: Regulation of Intermediaries and Stock Market Capitalisation, 1999. OLS
Independent STOCK99 STOCK99 STOCK99 (4) (5) STOCK99
variable
INTERM_EX1).3576* -0.1162
(0.1780) (0.1922)
INTERM_EFF 0.4926*** 0.3133* 0.2670* 0.3356*
(0.1374) (0.1773) (0.1494) (0.1671)
INTERM 0.5874***
(0.1871)
VOUCHER 2.2547 3.4817 3.0005 7.7065 7.5566 6.3482
(7.0978) (6.6261) (6.3704) (6.5535) (6.2192) (6.0701)
LGDPPC99 4.0955
(2.3605)
Intercept -16.3 -8.1 -22.1** -5.8 -13.1** -33.2**
(12.8211) (5.5240) (10.4068) (13.0722) (5.9720) (15.1534)
Number of 19 19 19 19 19 19
obs.
Adj. R- 0.10 0.31 0.27 0.20 0.19 0.37
squared
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Robust
standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. Estima-
tions (4) and (5)’s dependent variable is the residual of an OLS regression of
(1) STOCK99 on the log of GDP per capita, inflation and a constant.
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Table 3.10; Regulation of Intermediaries and Stock Market Capitalisation, 1999. 
Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimations Using 2SLS and Lagged SMINTEGR as 
an instrument
Independent STOCK99 STOCK99 STOCK99
variable
INTERM.EXT 0.9688* (0.4663)
INTERM_EFF 0.5236***
(0.1713)
INTERM 0.6775** (0.2344)
VOUCHER 1.9999 (7.0095) 3.5496 (6.6461) 3.0920 (6.2889)
Intercept -64.7* (36.18.23) -9.3 (7.2289) -27.3* (13.3296)
Number of 19 19 19
observations
R-squared - 0.31 0.27
F-test on first- F(4, 14)=2.66 F(4, 14)=14.11 F(4, 14)^14.48
stage equation [0.0767] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Hausman test 3.65 [0.0632] 0.11 [0.7354] 0.57 [0.4501]
OIR test (Sargan X^(2) =  2.166 X^(2) =  3.679 X^(2) =  3.255
test) [0.3386] [0.1589] [0.1964]
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. 
Robust standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient esti­
mates. P-values shown is square brackets for the F-test and diagnostic 
tests.
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Table 3.11: Regulation of Intermediariess and Stock Market Capitalisation, 1999. 
Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimations: First-Stage Regressions using Lagged 
SMINTEGR Values
Dependent INTERM JEFF INTERM_EXT INTERM
variable
SMINTEGR96 -2.7460* (1.2881) -0.9026 (1.6003) -1.9169* (0.9940)
SMINTEGR94 9.6319*** (2.0463) 6.7487** (2.5423) 8.3345*** (1.5791)
SMINTEGR92 3.6060* (1.9356) -0.4486 (2.4047) 1.7805 (1.4937)
VOUCHER -7.2210 (4.1965) -0.0771 (5.2136) -7.2064* (3.4237)
Intercept 30.4*** (4.5083) 71.1*** (5.6010) 48.7*** (3.4790)
No of obs 19 19 19
Adjusted R-sq 0.74 0.27 0.75
F-test F(4, 14)=14.11 F(4, 14)=2.66 F(4, 14)=14.48
[0.0001] [0.0767] [0.0001]
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Standard 
errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. P-values shown in square 
brackets for the F-test.
previous sub-section.
In the instrumental variables (IV) estimations, we again explore the relevance of 
the instruments first. We test several instrument sets and find that lagged values 
of the stock market integrity index (SMINTEGR) perform best in the first-stage 
regressions (Table 3.11). In the second-stage regressions all three legal indices are 
found significant (Table 3.10). In the TV diagnostic tests only the INTERM_EXT 
regression reveals endogeneity; in the other two regressions do not indicate that 
endogeneity is present. The instruments also pass the test of over-identifying re-
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strictions for all three estimations.
3.5.2.2 Market Turnover Regressions
We repeat the same analysis performed for stock market capitalisation above. We 
find that both the extensiveness of regulation of securities market intermediaries and 
the enforcement of regulations on market intermediation affect market turnover. In 
separate regressions of the turnover ratio (TURNOVER99) on INTERM_EXT and 
INTERM_EFF, we find that the effectiveness index displays a higher significance 
than the extensiveness index (see Table 3.12). The aggregate composite index of 
intermediary regulation (INTERM) has also a positive and significant effect on mar­
ket turnover. The voucher privatization dummy (VOUCHER) has a negative effect, 
but is not statistically significant.
Utilising the residuals from the two-step procedure controlling for the level of 
economic development, we find that neither INTERM_EXT, nor INTERM-EFF is 
significant. Therefore, controlling for GDP per capita (and for inflation) in the 
usual two-step procedure leads our legal indices to lose significance. However, con­
trolling for the logarithm of GDP per capita (LGDPPC99) in the regressions of 
TURNOVER99 on the legal variables leaves both the legal variables and LGDPC99 
insignificant. This is most likely due to multi-collinearity (the pairwise correlation 
coefficient between LGDPPC99 and INTERM JEFF is 0.61, which is significant at 
the 1% level).
Finally, we run IV regressions and employ the values of SMINTEGR for earlier 
years as instruments for our legal variables. Similarly to the results of capitalisation, 
we find that the lagged SMINTEGR indices work best in the first-stage regressions^^. 
The results of the IV regressions indicate that all three legal variables maintain
^^The first-stage results are not shown to save space, but are similar to those reported earlier in 
the capitalisation sub-section.
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Table 3.12: Regulation of Intermediaries and Stock Market Turnover, 1999. OLS 
Estimations
Independent TURNOVER99 TURNOVER99 TURNOVER99 (4) (5)
variable
INTERM.EXT 0.8026* 0.1150
(0.4034) (0.5917)
INTERM-EFF 0.7783** 0.2334 0.2772
(0.3254) (0.4729) (0.3729)
INTERM 1.0159**
(0.4562)
VOUCHER -9.9251 -6.8465 -8.1729 -2.7179 -2.4057
(9.4941) (9.2861) (8.9023) (8.2322) (8.3548)
Intercept -36.7 -4.0 -31.5 -17.5 -10.2
(30.8894) (11.4447) (24.7158) (41.2116) (14.0083)
Number of 18 18 18 18 18
observations
Adjusted R- 0.17 0.32 0.31 0.06 0.05
squared
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at
10%. Robust standard errors; shown in parentheses next to coefficient
estimates. Estimations (4) and (5)’s dependent variable is the residual
of an OLS regression of TURN0 VER99 on the log of GDP per capita
(LGDPPC99) and a constant.
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significance in the second-stage regressions, which is in line with the capitalisation 
results reported above. Again, the Hausman test does not indicate presence of 
endogeneity in the first place; the instruments passed the tests of over-identifying 
restrictions.
3.5.3 Enforcement Powers o f Regulator
3.5.3.1 Market Capitalisation Regressions
We next check for the significance of the Enforcement Powers of the Regulator mea­
sures, including legal prohibitions of insider trading and their enforcement. None 
of the indices of Enforcement Powers of the Regulator are significant in these re­
gressions, shown in Table 3.13. Correcting for inflation and GDP per capita in a 
two-step procedure (estimations 4 and 5) leaves all three legal indices insignificant 
as well. The explanatory power of these estimations is rather low. These results also 
hold when LGDPPC99 is included in the same specification as the legal variables.
These results suggest that the enforcement powers of the securities regulator 
(such as ability to revoke issuer’s licenses and impose civil penalties; insider trading 
prohibitions, and their enforcement in practice) are not significantly associated with 
market capitalisation^'^.
We test several instrument sets and find that lagged values of SMINTEGR work 
well in the first stage regressions for ENF_EFF and ENF; however, transplant status 
dummies perform best for ENFJEXT. In the second-stage regressions ENF_EFF and 
ENF are found significant, but not ENFJEXT. Employing alternative instruments
These last results are not shown to save space. They are available upon request.
Looking at more disaggregated forms of these indices, we find some evidence of a positive
association between legal prohibitions of insider dealing being comprehensive and market capital­
isation, and effective use of Regulatory powers to revoke licenses and fine securities issuers and 
market capitalisation. We do not report these regressions for considerations of space. They are 
available upon request.
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Table 3.13: Enforcement Powers of Regulator and Stock Market Capitalisation,
Independent STOCK99 STOCK99 STOCK99 (4) (5)
variable
ENF_EXT 0.2955 -0.0163
(0.2222) (0.2323)
ENF JEFF 0.3133 0.1342 0.1283
(0.2254) (0.2162) (0.1921)
ENF 0.4155
(0.2688)
VOUCHER 2.4883 6.2717 4.5274 8.6252 8.5560
(7.3520) (7.7994) (7.2281) (8.1344) (7.6744)
Intercept -8.0 -5.2 -14.0 -8.5 -9.3
(15.0089) (13.5943) (17.6348) (15.6567) (11.6396)
Number of 19 19 19 19 19
observations
Adjusted 0.07 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.11
R-squared
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at
10%. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient
estimates. Estimations (4) and (5)’s dependent variable is the residual
of an OLS regression of (1) STOCK99 on the log of GDP per capita,
inflation and a constant.
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Table 3.14: Enforcement Powers of Regulator and Stock Market Capitalisation, 
1999. Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimations Using 2SLS and Lagged SMINTEGR 
as an instrument
Independent STOCK99 STOCK99 STOCK99
variable
ENF-EXT 0.3584 (0.4037)
ENF_EFF 0.5906***
(0.1703)
ENF 0.8776***
(0.2764)
VOUCHER 2.5063 (7.2822) 9.6963 (7.0428) 6.8894 (7.1584)
Intercept -12.3 (27.2818) -20.5* (11.0414) -43.1** (18.9943)
Number of 19 19 19
observations
R-squared 0.07 0.04 -
F-test on first- F(3, 15)=2.80 F(4, 14)=6.73 F(4, 14)=3.51
stage equation [0.0761] [0.0031] [0.0348]
Hausman test 0.03 [0.8660] 3.26 [0.0708] 2.73 [0.0983]
OIR test (Sargan X^(l) =  2.139 X^(2) =  2.082 X^(2) =  2.490
test) [0.1436] [0.3530] [0.2880]
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%.
Robust standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient esti­
mates. P-values shown is square brackets for the F-test and diagnostic
tests. The regression of ENFJEXT uses TRANSPLANT_ST dummies
in the first stage.
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Table 3.15: Enforcement Powers of Regulator and Stock Market Capitalisation, 
1999. Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimations: First-Stage Regressions Using 
Lagged SMINTEGR Values
Dependent
variable
ENF-EFF ENF_EXT ENF
SMINTEGR96 -1.4544 (1.9063) -1.2832 (1.9884) -1.3510 (1.6008)
SMINTEGR94 5.6409* (3.0283) 2.3289 (3.1588) 3.6536 (2.5430)
SMINTEGR92 6.6707** (2.8644) 2.7050 (2.9879) 4.2909* (2.4054)
VOUCHER -18.1118** (6.2103) -3.3602 (6.4779) -9.2606* (5.2151)
Intercept 44.6*** (6.6717) 65.8*** (6.9592) 57.3*** (5.6026)
No of obs 19 19 19
Adjusted R-sq 0.56 -0.04 0.36
F-test F(4, 14)=6.73 F(4, 14)=0.84 F(4, 14)=3.51
[0.0031] [0.5220] [0.0348]
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Standard 
errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. P-values shown in square 
brackets for the F-test.
such as RELIGION and YRGOMM (results not reported) also works well in the 
first stage, but all three enforcement powers indices are then found insignificant in 
the second-stage regressions.
Therefore, the IV results on Enforcement Powers of the Regulator are less conclu­
sive than the ones on Disclosure Rules and Intermediary Regulation. The second- 
stage results are not robust to different instrument sets, and display a generally 
weaker association with STOGK99. The Hausman test statistic is significant at 
10% for the ENF_EFF and ENF regressions, indicating that endogeneity is an issue.
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The Sargan test is passed by all three regressions -  i.e. the instruments appear to 
be valid.
Thus, our regression analysis does not show a robust and significant association 
between stock market development and the powers afforded to the Securities Regu­
lator. These results hold when controlling for GDP per capita and infiat ion, and are 
generally supported by IV regression output controlling for potential endogeneity of 
legal and stock market development.
3.5.3.2 Market Turnover Regressions
We also test for the impact of the Enforcement Powers of the Securities Regu­
lator on stock market turnover. We find that all three legal indices (ENF_EXT, 
ENF JEFF and ENF) are significant at the 5% level in separate OLS regressions of 
TURNOVER99, controlling for voucher privatization (Table 3.16). These results 
are in contrast to the ones on market capitalisation, where the three legal indices 
are insignificant. Therefore, enforcement powers of the Regulator seem to matter 
for market liquidity but not for market size.
In the two-step procedure to control for GDP per capita neither ENFJEXT nor 
ENF JEFF is significant, although ENF_EXT has a stronger positive effect. The 
two however are highly correlated (correlation coefficient is 0.66), so the joint spec­
ification suffers from multi-collinearity, which reduces the significance levels of the 
variables. Given the bias associated with the two-step procedure, we also perform 
additional tests by including the logarithm of GDP per capita (LGDPPC99) along­
side the legal variables in OLS estimations. In all three separate specifications, each 
of the three legal indices and the logarithm of GDP per capita are found significant 
at the 10% level. Therefore, there is some evidence that controlling for GDP per 
capita does not weaken the impact of the legal indices of Enforcement Powers on 
market turnover. This is in contrast to the results for the effect of Enforcement
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Table 3.16: Enforcement Powers of Regulator and Stock Market Turnover, 1999. 
OLS Estimations
Independent TURNOVER99 TURNOVER99 TURNOVER99 (4) (5)
variable
ENF_EXT 0.8733**
(0.3597)
0.4393
(0.3822)
ENF_EFF 0.5845**
(0.2410)
0.0398
(0.2707)
0.2737
(0.2347)
ENF 0.8497**
(0.3493)
VOUCHER -11.2773 -4.8516 -8.0262 -4.1802 -1.3056
(10.2900) (8.1954) (8.4986) (10.0174) (7.9899)
Intercept -29.9 -3.3 -23.8 -29.7 -13.2
(21.0236) (9.9400) (19.0629) (19.7199) (10.4240)
Number of 18 18 18 18 18
observations
Adjusted 0.35 0.29 0.37 0.14 0.08
R-squared
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at
10%. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient
estimates. Estimations (4) and (5)’s dependent variable is the residual
of an OLS regression of TURN0VER99 on the log of GDP per capita
(LGDPPC99) and a constant.
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Powers on capitalisation.
Next, we perform the instrumental variables (IV) estimations using country legal 
transplant status (TRANSPLANT_ST) as the instrument for the suspected endoge­
nous legal variables. The IV regression results support the OLS findings in that all 
three enforcement powers indices are found significant in the second stage of the 
2SLS regressions. The TRANSPLANT_ST instrument set performs reasonably well 
in explaining the variability of the endogenous variables^^. All three regressions pass 
the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions; and in none of them is endogeneity 
detected.
Altogether, we find some evidence that the enforcement powers of the Securi­
ties Regulator -  as embodied in the extent-of-law and enforcement indices -  have 
a positive impact upon market turnover, but not so on capitalisation. The IV ev­
idence of a positive significant impact of ENF_EFF and ENF on capitalisation is 
not particularly robust to different instrument sets and does not permit us to make 
inferences with a reasonable degree of confidence. However, both the IV and OLS 
results indicate a significant positive impact of Enforcement Powers of the Regulator 
on market turnover, even after controlling for GDP per capita. This is a case of 
different results for capitalisation and turnover.
^^Alternative instruments were also tested and found to perform well in explaining the three 
Enforcement Powers legal indices. Among these are LEGAL ORIGIN (with or without the 
VOUCHER dummy) and Years under Communism (YRGOMM). The instrumented legal vari­
ables are then found significant in the second stage for Legal Origin. Years under communism, 
however, produces different results in the second stage, depending on whether or not VOUCHER 
is included in the equation. These results are not shown to save space, and are available upon 
request.
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3.5.4 Regulator A ttributes
3.5.4.1 Market Capitalisation Regressions
We next test for the effect of Regulator Attributes on market development. We 
find only weak evidence that regulatory attributes have a significant association 
with stock market capitalisation (Table 3.17). For example, in the separate OLS 
regressions the index of effectiveness of Regulator Attributes (REGATTR_EFF) 
is found positively and significantly associated with market capitalisation. The 
aggregate index of Regulator Attributes (REGATTR) is also significantly associated 
with market capitalisation, albeit at a lower level of significance. However, having 
controlled for GDP per capita and inflation, we do not find any of the legal indices 
significant. The same result holds if we include the logarithm of GDP per capita in 
the regression alongside the Regulator Attributes measures.
We attempt instrumenting the three Regulator Attributes indices by a set of 
different potential instruments such as TRANSPLANT_ST, LEGAL ORIGIN, RE­
LIGION, lagged values of SMINTEGR, etc. All the first-stage regressions however 
reveal weak instruments, and the legal measures are consistently insignificant at the 
second stage. Consequently, we do not report any IV results.
These results indicate no particular role for the legal provisions about existence 
and independence of the Regulator, and some role for an effective Regulator (RE- 
GATTR_EFF is built upon answers to the question whether the Regulator has 
trained and knowledgeable professional staff). The basic OLS results, however, are 
not robust to controlling for GDP per capita and inflation; corrections for endo­
geneity are difficult due to the weakness of the instruments.^® These results are not 
entirely surprising, given the limited content of the Regulator Attributes indices.
In summary, we do not find any evidence from the regression analysis that the
^®The capitalisation results are confirmed by results for turnover with the only difference that 
REGATTR_EFF is no longer significant in the OLS regression.
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Table 3.17: Regulator Attributes and Stock Market Capitalisation, 1999. OLS 
Estimations
Independent STOCK99 STOCK99 STOCK99
variable
REGATTR_EXT 0.3279 (0.3446)
REGATTR_EFF 0.1801** (0.0677)
REGATTR 0.3979* (0.2205)
VOUCHER 1.5975 (7.7157) 1.4614 (7.3418) 1.2048 (7.5078)
Intercept -16.8 (29.9345) -2.5 (4.9964) -22.3 (17.9893)
Number of obs. 19 19 19
Adj. R-squared 0.05 0.11 0.09
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at
10%. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient
estimates.
legal indices of Regulatory Attributes (REGATTR_EXT, REGATTR_EFF and RE­
GATTR) have any significant explanatory power for market turnover and market 
capitalisation^^.
3.5.5 Aggregate Indices o f Securities Regulation
3.5.5.1 Market Capitalisation Regressions
In this sub-section we present evidence of the impact of the aggregate indices of secu­
rities laws and their enforcement on stock market development. Our results indicate 
that the aggregate measures of extent of securities laws, as perceived by the lawyers, 
and their enforcement exert a significant and positive impact upon stock market
do not report these results for considerations of space. They are available upon request.
Chapter 3. Securities Regulation and Stock Market Development 170
Table 3.18: Aggregate Indices of Securities Regulation and Stock Market Capitali­
sation, 1999. OLS Estimations
Independent STOCK99 STOCK99 STOCK99 (4) (5) STOCK99
variable
EXTCAP99 0.9421**.
(0.3458)
-0.1038
(0.4185)
EFFCAP99 0.7429*** 0.4257 0.3781* 0.5897*
(0.2101) (0.2853) (0.2112) (0.3054)
CAP99 0.9846***
(0.2901)
VOUCHER 5.7735 5.3674 6.1138 8.2996 8.4806 6.6945
(6.5240) (6.0441) (5.9615) (6.4352) (6.3041) (5.8112)
LGDPPC99 2.4725
(2.8988)
Intercept -60.4** -28.3** -53.3** -17.4 -22.7* -39.1**
(24.9516) (10.786) (18.5369) (24.3876) (11.1161) (14.0999)
Number of 19 19 19 19 19 19
observations
Adjusted 0.26 0.39 0.38 0.20 0.20 0.40
R-squared
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Robust
standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. Estima-
tions (4) and (5)’s dependent variable is the residual of an OLS regression of
(1) STOCK99 on the log of GDP per capita, inflation and a constant.
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Table 3.19: Aggregate Indices of Securities Regulation and Stock Market Capital­
isation, 1999. Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimations Using 2SLS and Lagged
Independent STOCK99 STOCK99 STOCK99
variable
EXTCAP99 0.3509 (0.4972)
EFFCAP99 0.7217***
(0.2351)
CAP99 1.0482***
(0.3379)
VOUCHER 3.6591 (6.1418) 5.2829 (6.1647) 6.3534 (6.1009)
Intercept -14.9 (37.3163) -27.2** (12.6591) -57.5** (22.3756)
Number of 19 19 19
observations
R-squared 0.16 0.39 0.38
F-test on first- F(3, 15)-4.39 F(4, 14)=17.16 F(4, 14)=9.86
stage equation [0.0209] [0.0000] [0.0005]
Hausman test 1.70 [0.1928] 0.04 [0.8455] 0.11 [0.7423]
OIR test (Sargan X^(l) =  2.804 X^(2) =  3.589 f ( 2 )  =  3.112
test) (0.0941) (0.1662) (0.2110)
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. 
Robust standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient esti­
mates. P-values shown is square brackets for the F-test and diagnostic 
tests. The regression of EXTCAP99 uses TRANSPLANT_ST dummies 
in the first stage.
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Table 3.20: Aggregate Indices of Securities Regulation and Stock Market Capitali-
Dependent
variable
EFFCAP99 EXTCAP99 CAP99
SMINTEGR96 -1.6833* (0.8852) -0.4171 (1.0633) -1.0095 (0.8353)
SMINTEGR94 6.0311*** (1.4063) 3.0148* (1.6891) 4.4261*** (1.3270)
SMINTEGR92 3.9602** (1.3302) 1.3600 (1.5977) 2.5780* (1.2552)
VOUCHER -8.2153** (2.8840) -4.8327 (3.4639) -6.4144** (2.7213)
Intercept 46.2*** (3.0982) 72.0*** (3.7213) 59.9*** (2.9235)
No of obs 19 19 19
Adjusted R-sq 0.78 0.27 0.66
F-test F(4, 14)=17.16 F(4, 14)=2.65 F(4, 14)=9.86
[0.0000] [0.0773] [0.0005]
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Standard 
errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. P-values shown in square 
brackets for the F-test.
capitalisation. The three OLS regressions, including EXTCAP99, EFFCAP99 and 
CAP99 one at a time, and shown in Table 3.18, point to the significance of each of 
these indices. After controlling for GDP per capita and average inflation (equations 
4 and 5 in Table 3.18), we find that in a joint specification both EXTCAP99 and EF- 
FCAP99 lose significance (likely due to multi-collinearity). Omitting EXTCAP99 
from the regression shows that the enforcement of securities laws (EFFCAP99) re­
gains significance, but at a lower level (10%). Similarly, controlling for GDP per 
capita in our main regression leaves only EFFCAP99 and CAP99 significant, but 
not the aggregate extensiveness index (EXTCAP99). The logarithm of GDP per
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capita is never significant.
We test different instrument sets and establish that lagged SMINTEGR values 
work best in the first-stage regressions for EFFCAP99 and CAP99; in contrast, 
TRANSPLANT_ST performs best for EXTCAP99.^® We then go on to use the 
SMINTEGR lagged values and find that all three legal measures are significant in 
the second-stage regressions. However, SMINTEGR is a somewhat weak instru­
ment for EXTCAP99, therefore the latter’s significance in the second stage must be 
taken with caution (and is not shown). For this reason, in the case of EXTCAP99 
we choose to use transplant dummies, which explain more of its variation than 
SMINTEGR does in the first-stage regressions. Table 3.19 shows these combined 
second-stage results. The Hausman test again shows no presence of endogeneity 
in all three regressions. The EFFCAP99 and the CAP99 regressions pass the Sar­
gan test, whereas the EXTCAP99 regression does not pass it at the 10% level 
(although it passes at the 5% level), thus causing some doubts about the validity of 
the TRANSPLANTJST instruments in this regression.
These results suggest two things: first, our aggregate legal indices affect stock 
market development as proxied by market capitalisation positively and significantly. 
However, only the results of the enforcement of securities regulation are robust to 
controlling for economic development, and for endogeneity in the main model. The 
results for the extent-of-law measure in the second-stage IV regressions are mixed, 
whereas the enforcement measure is always significant in the second-stage IV results.
®^We also explore alternative instruments such as RELIGION (defined here as Mushm, Orthodox 
and Catholic-Protestant) and the SMINTEGR indices, and both are used without the VOUCHER 
control. They work well in the first stage. In both cases, all three aggregate legal indices are 
significant in the second-stage regressions for STOCK99.
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3.5.5.2 M arket Turnover Regressions
Finally, we conduct the OLS and IV estimations for market turnover using the 
aggregate indices of securities regulation (EXTCAP99, EFFCAP99 and CAP99). In 
separate OLS estimations we find that each of the three legal indices is significant 
at the 5% level for market turnover in the presence of the VOUCHER dummy. All 
three explain about 38% to 40% of the variation in TURNOVER99 (Table 3.21).
Controlling for GDP per capita in the two-step procedure renders both the en­
forcement index of securities regulation (EFFCAP99) and the extent-of-law one 
(EXTCAP99) insignificant, even though they both have a positive effect on market 
turnover. However, if we include the logarithm of GDP per capita in each estima­
tion we find that the legal indices generally maintain significance, while GDP per 
capita is never significant (output not shown). Among the three legal indices, the 
extensiveness and aggregate one (EXTCAP99 and CAP99) are still significant at 
the 10% level, while the effectiveness one (EFFCAP99) narrowly misses significance 
at the 10% level.
The IV results support the OLS findings: each of the three aggregate legal 
indices is significant, with the extensiveness one being significant at the 1% level 
in the second-stage IV regression, using country legal transplant status dummies as 
an instrument. The effectiveness and aggregate indices are found significant at the 
5% level. The first-stage regressions results point to transplant status, religion and 
lagged SMINTEGR indices performing well for the three aggregate legal measures.^^ 
Thus, in line with the rest of the turnover results, and in contrast to the same of the 
IV results for capitalisation, we find that all three legal variables have explanatory 
power over market turnover.
Overall, all results reported for the five thematic disaggregated indices of securi-
do not report these results to save space. They are similar to the first-stage results for 
capitalisation.
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Table 3.21: Aggregate Indices of Securities Regulation and Stock Market Turnover, 
1999. OLS Estimations
Independent TURNOVER99 TURNOVER99 TURNOVER99 (4) (5)
variable
EXTCAP99 1.6081**
(0.5813)
0.3103
(0.9238)
EFFGAP99 1.0745**
(0.4003)
0.2289
(0.6687)
0.3962
(0.4252)
CAP99 1.4356**
(0.5297)
VOUCHER -6.1194 -6.1244 -5.9041 -2.0377 -2.1209
(8.4351) (8.6061) (8.1711) (8.5021) (8.2863)
Intercept -94.3 -29.9 -66.2 -34.6 -20.1
(41.6830) (19.2428) (32.7329) (47.3717) (20.7490)
Number of 18 18 18 18 18
observations
Adjusted 0.37 0.38 0.41 0.08 0.07
R-squared
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at
10%. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient 
estimates. Estimations (4) and (5)’s dependent variable is the residual 
of an OLS regression of TURNOVER99 on the log of GDP per capita 
(LGDPPC99) and a constant.
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ties regulation indicate that both better disclosure regulation and better regulation 
of intermediaries appear to raise stock market capitalisation and turnover, regard­
less of the estimation technique employed. The results also suggest that stronger 
Enforcement Powers of the Securities Regulator -  as measured by the LIS respon­
dents’ opinions -  enhance market liquidity but have no significant effect on market 
capitalisation. Finally, the attributes of the Securities Regulator appear irrelevant 
for stock market development, but this may be due to the way this variable is mea­
sured. Finally, we also observe differential effects of controlling for GDP per capita 
alongside the legal indices -  generally, the enforcement indices maintain significance, 
whereas the extent-of-law ones do not.
3.6 Robustness Checks and Discussion  
3.6.1 A lternative Dependent Variables
As mentioned earlier, we subject our results to a set of robustness tests to see 
whether the main results described in the previous section still hold. For example, 
we test the main regression model, using stock market capitalisation data for 2000 
(STOCKOO) instead of 1999^°. We conduct the same regressions for each of our four 
main thematic sub-indices, and for the aggregate indices, controlling for voucher 
privatization in the first instance, and then also for GDP per capita and average 
inflation. In the basic OLS estimations for each of the three thematic indices, we find 
support for our earlier findings. If anything, the basic OLS results for STOCKOO 
are even stronger and display a better fit than those for STOGK99. The first three
There are many missing observations for stock market capitalisation and turnover in 2001 and 
2002 in the World Development Indicators (2003) data, as well as in the 2003 EBRD Transition 
Report, seriously reducing the number of observations. Hence, we do not use the capitalisation 
and turnover data for these years.
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columns of Table 3.22, for instance, show the basic OLS results for the Disclosure 
extensiveness, effectiveness and aggregate indices. All are significant at the 1% 
level, alongside the voucher privatization dummy, which loses significance only in 
the DISCL_EFF regression. Thus, they echo the results of Table 3.5. Controlling 
for GDP per capita in the main OLS regression alongside the extensiveness and 
effectiveness legal variables included together (output not shown) reveals that the 
indices of effective disclosure rules (DISCL_EFF) and effective regulation of market 
intermediaries (INTERM_EFF) are significant and have the correct sign, whereas 
their extensiveness counterparts are not. The two maintain their significance in 
the presence of the log of GDP per capita and the voucher dummy. However, 
the effective use of regulatory enforcement powers and regulator attributes are not 
found to produce a significant impact, once GDP per capita is controlled for. These 
regressions, however, are probably suffering from multi-collinearity.^^
The results described for the three disclosure indices also hold for other measures 
of securities regulation -  such as the three sets of indices on intermediaries, regula­
tory attributes and enforcement powers. Thus, in line with the basic OLS results for 
STOGK99, the significance levels attained by the INTERM_EFF, INTERM_EXT 
and INTERM indices are maintained. Using the residual from successive regressions 
of STOGKOO on the log of GDP per capita and inflation, leaves the INTERM_EFF 
index insignificant in the presence of a marginally significant VOUGHER dummy. 
In a regression controlling for the log of GDP per capita directly, however, IN-
Controlling in succession for GDP per capita (LGDPPC99) and inflation (AVINFL) in the 
usual two-step procedure (column 4 of Table 3.22), we find that none of the explanatory variables 
are signiflcant. Eliminating DISCL_EXT, leaves DISCL_EFF insignificant, but raises the effect of 
the voucher privatization dummy -  significant at 10%. These last results are in contrast to those 
reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.5, where DISCL_EFF maintains significance even after 
controlling for GDP per capita and average inflation. Since the two-step procedure suffers from 
some problems of omitted variable bias, however, we do not attach too much importance to these 
results.
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TERM-EFF is significant.. The results for the other two variables (Enforcement 
Powers and Regulator Attributes) are also corroborated when using STOCKOO as 
the dependent variables, with the only difference that the Regulator’s Powers indices 
are significant in the STOCKOO basic OLS regressions (but not after controlling for 
GDP and infiation).
Correcting for potential endogeneity through IV estimations for the main regres­
sions using STOCKOO as the dependent variable, employing legal origin as an in­
strument for the Disclosure indices, confirms the earlier results -  all three Disclosure 
legal indices (DISCLJEFF, DISCL_EXT and DISCL) are significant in the second 
stage. The instruments work well. Similarly, the results for intermediary regulation 
and its impact on STOCK99 are also confirmed -  all three indices (INTERM_EFF, 
INTERMJEXT and INTERM) are significant in the IV regressions using lagged 
SMINTEGR values as instruments. The Enforcement Powers indices are also signif­
icant in the IV regressions, using appropriate instruments (the lagged SMINTEGR 
indices for ENF_EFF and ENF, and TRANSPLANT_ST for ENF_EXT), however 
sometimes the instruments are not very strong. Some of the Regulatory Attributes 
indices are again difficult to instrument, although reasonable results are obtained 
using TRANSPLANT_ST for REGATTR. Finally, the aggregate index of effective­
ness EFFCAP99 and the index of CAP99 are both significant at the 1% level, using 
lagged SMINTEGR values as instruments. The extensiveness index (EXTCAP99) 
is also significant (as in the STOCK99, its instrument is TRANSPLANTJST).
Overall the OLS and IV results for STOCKOO are as expected, and in some 
cases even stronger than those for STOCK99. We show only the OLS results to save 
space.
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Table 3.22: Disclosure Requirements and Stock Market Capitalisation, 2000. OLS 
Estimations
Independent STOCKOO STOCKOO STOCKOO (4) (5)
variable
DISCL_EXT 0.6427***
(0.1653)
0.0088
(0.2299)
DISCLJEFF 0.6972***
(0.1833)
0.2241
(0.1796)
0.2314
(0.2040)
DISCL 0.7877***
(0.1903)
VOUCHER 11.6189*** 2.0203 7.9819** 4.5146 4.3821*
(2.3431) (3.7143) (2.7735) (2.8794) (2.3919)
Intercept -37.8*** -40.8*** -47.9*** -18.0 -17.9
(10.6610) (12.2319) (12.9681) (15.9642) (13.5939)
Number of 19 19 19 19 19
observations
Adjusted 0.54 0.45 0.58 0.16 0.16
R-squared
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 
10%. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient 
estimates. Estimations (4) and (5)’s dependent variable is derived as: 
(1) get the residual of an OLS regression of STOCKOO on the log of 
GDP per capita and a constant , and 2) the residual of the latter on 
infiation and a constant.
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3.7 Conclusions
The results of this chapter support previous findings in this field, e.g. Pistor et 
al. (2000), about the role of legal enforcement on financial market development in 
transition. Furthermore, our results are based upon disaggregated indices of stock 
market laws -  such as information disclosure requirements, regulation of market 
intermediaries. Regulator’s attributes and enforcement powers -  and indicate that 
disclosure rules and intermediary regulation rules axe significantly associated with 
higher market capitalisation and turnover, usually through their enforcement (ef­
fectiveness) component. We find weak evidence that the Regulator’s attributes and 
powers affect stock market capitalisation, but do find that stock market turnover 
is significantly higher with better enforcement powers of the Securities Regulator 
(both extent-of-law and effectiveness measures).
Our results axe not definitive but merely suggestive. First, we rely on a small 
sample of observations covering at most 19 countries. As explained earlier, we 
face problems measuring stock market development in transition economies due 
to privatization-related listings. In addition, our legal measures utilise perception- 
based survey responses, and do not record the precise provisions of the law, although 
a lot of care is taken in Chapter 2 in explaining the value of the legal survey approach. 
Aside from the quality of the data, we encounter estimation problems, such as the 
inability to isolate economic from legal development, and difficulties in obtaining 
good instruments for our legal measures. Nonetheless, the results and the approach 
followed axe useful and provide new information about the way securities laws and 
regulations and their enforcement affect maxket size and liquidity, and enable us 
to pin down those areas of the law (such as information disclosure or intermediary 
regulation), which appear to have a robust effect on securities maxket development.
Altogether, our study is supportive of recent findings, e.g. La Porta et al. (2003), 
that private enforcement through stricter information disclosure and liability rules
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is associated with better stock market performance across a broad cross-section of 
countries (but not including the transition economies). La Porta et al. (2003) also 
establish that securities supervisory powers and attributes, as captured by their 
index of Public Enforcement, are not significantly associated with stock market 
development. Our results are in line with these findings, and help shed some more 
light by expanding the scope of these indices. For instance, we are able to assess 
the impact of better securities intermediary regulation, which has been discussed 
extensively in the literature, e.g. Glaeser et al. (2001) for Poland and the Czech 
Repubhc, by including some additional information and expanding the number of 
sample countries.
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Appendix 3.A D ata Tables
Table 3.23: Correlation Between Different Aspects of Securities Laws
DISCL INTERM REGATTR ENF
DISCL 1.0000
INTERM 0.5387*** 1.0000
REGATTR 0.3501 0.1336 1.0000
ENF 0.4339** 0.5270*** 0.3931* 1.0000
Note: The table reports pairwise correlation coefficients. *** Sig­
nificant at 1%; ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 3.24: Definition of Variables
Variable Description
STOCK99
STOCKOO
TURNOVER99
TURNOVEROO
AVINFL
LGDPPC99
VOUCHER
TRANSPLANT_ST
DISCL_EXT
DISCL_EFF
DISCL
INTERM_EXT
INTERM_EFF
INTERM
ENF_EXT
ENF_EFF
ENF
RECATTR_EXT
RECATTR_EFF
RECATTR
EXTCAP99
EFFCAP99
CAP99
Stock market capitalisation, % of CDP, 1999.
Stock market capitalisation, % of CDP, 2000.
Stock market turnover, 1999.
Stock market turnover, 2000.
Average annual rate of inflation, 1994-1999.
Logarithm of CDP per capita, 1999.
Dummy for mass voucher privatization.
Dummy for country legal transplant status.
Index of extensiveness of legal disclosure rules.
Index of effectiveness (enforcement) of legal disclosure rules.
Aggregate index of legal disclosure rules.
Index of extensiveness of legal rules on market intermediaries.
Index of effectiveness of legal rules on market intermediaries.
Aggregate index of legal rules on market intermediaries.
Index of extensiveness of legal powers of enforcement of the Regulator. 
Index of effectiveness of legal powers of enforcement of the Regulator. 
Aggregate index of legal powers of enforcement of the Regulator.
Index of extensiveness of legal rules on Regulator’s attributes.
Index of effectiveness of legal rules on Regulator’s attributes. 
Aggregate index of legal rules on Regulator’s attributes.
Aggregate index of extensiveness of capital market legal rules. 
Aggregate index of effectiveness of capital market legal rules. 
Aggregate index of capital market legal rules.
Note: All legal indices are as of 1999. Sources: World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank; EBRD 
lYansition Reports, various issues; Pistor (2000).
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Table 3.25: Securities Market Variables by Country
Country STOCK99 TURNOVER99 STOCKOO TURNOVEROO
Albania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Armenia 1.3 4.6 1.3 n.a.
Azerbaijan n.a. 5.9 0.1 n.a.
Belarus n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bulgaria 6.0 6.0 4.8 9.2
Croatia 13.8 2.7 14.5 7.4
Czech Republic 23.1 36.7 20.9 60.3
Estonia 37.1 24.1 34.4 18.9
FYR Macedonia 0.2 345.1 0.2 n.a.
Georgia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Hungary 35.7 95.8 25.8 90.7
Kazakhstan 16.5 1.2 7.5 2.0
Kyrgyzstan 0.3 8.6 0.3 n.a.
Latvia 6.3 11.9 8.0 48.6
Lithuania 10.7 26.2 14.2 14.8
Moldova 3.6 87.0 n.a. n.a.
Poland 20.0 45.8 18.1 49.9
Romania 3.1 36.2 3.4 23.1
Russian Federation 44.4 5.9 15.3 36.9
Slovak Republic 3.8 59.7 3.9 129.8
Slovenia 11.9 32.4 13.7 20.7
Ukraine 4.6 14.8 6.0 19.6
Uzbekistan 0.9 21.7 1.0 n.a.
Sources: EBRD Transition Report 2003, World Development Indicators (WDI), 2003, IFC Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, 
Standard Sc Poor’s — IFC Emerging Markets Database (EMDB), stock exchange websites.
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Table 3.26: Economic and Dummy Variables by Country
Country GDPPC99 AVINFL VOUCHER TRANSPLANT_ST
Albania 1040 14.8 n.a. Unreceptive
Armenia 590 324.2 0 New
Azerbaijan 571 312.0 0 New
Belarus 1208 456.6 n.a. New
Bulgaria 1582 175.2 0 Receptive
Croatia 4371 3.0 0 Receptive
Czech Republic 5332 7.6 1 Receptive
Estonia 3790 17.7 0 Receptive
FYR Macedonia 1837 11.0 0 Unreceptive
Georgia 524 1095.1 1 New
Hungary 4757 18.2 0 Receptive
Kazakhstan 1127 213.1 0 New
Kyrgyzstan 266 39.3 1 New
Latvia 2792 12.6 0 Receptive
Lithuania 3033 17.5 1 Receptive
Moldova 306 38.0 1 New
Poland 4011 16.9 0 Receptive
Romania 1585 65.5 0 Receptive
Russian Federation 1346 81.2 1 New
Slovak Repubhc 3651 8.4 0 Unreceptive
Slovenia 10098 10.1 0 Receptive
Ukraine 631 112.0 1 New
Uzbekistan 341 256.9 0 New
Sources: EBRD Transition Report 2003; Pistor (2000); Djankov, Claessens and Klingebiel (2000).
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Table 3.27: Legal Indices of Disclosure and Market Intermediaries by Country
Country DISCL_EXT DISCL_EFF DISCL INTERM-EXT INTERM_EFF INTERM
Albania 59.72 71.30 71.60 9.85 37.64
Armenia 54.17 58.33 56.25 88.89 38.64 61.25
Azerbaijan 58.33 51.39 54.86 71.60 10.61 38.06
Belarus 54.17 75.00 64.58 85.19 16.67 47.50
Bulgaria 66.06 69.64 67.85 62.36 31.29 45.32
Croatia 81.52 70.14 75.83 78.70 26.55 50.02
Czech Republic 63.99 74.11 69.05 91.17 38.89 62.42
Estonia 93.85 85.71 89.78 78.31 43.51 59.17
FYR Macedonia 80.56 63.89 72.22 72.84 27.02 47.64
Georgia 73.61 45.83 59.72 37.04 19.95 27.64
Hungary 82.60 77.72 80.16 82.91 64.70 72.89
Kazakhstan 76.11 75.00 75.56 78.52 39.17 56.88
Kyrgyzstan 50.00 72.22 61.11 80.25 11.87 42.64
Latvia 71.53 68.75 70.14 78.70 43.56 59.38
Lithuania 63.43 77.78 70.60 72.84 44.19 57.08
Moldova 57.99 65.97 61.98 72.22 43.56 56.46
Poland 77.18 89.29 83.23 95.24 71.36 82.10
Romania 61.11 73.61 67.36 87.90 36.82 59.81
Russian Federation 63.55 73.97 68.76 85.76 50.18 66.19
Slovak Repubhc 85.19 78.01 81.60 95.99 39.92 65.15
Slovenia 87.50 83.33 85.42 80.25 58.08 68.06
Ukraine 50.69 61.46 56.08 75.36 43.29 57.72
Uzbekistan 59.72 70.83 65.28 48.77 10.35 27.64
Sources: E B R D  1999 Legal Ind icator Survey and au th or’s com p ila tion s as described  in  C hapter 2 and C hapter 3.
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Table 3.28: Legal Indices of Regulator Attributes and Regulator’s Enforcement 
Powers by Country
Country ENF-EXT ENF-EFF ENF REGATTR_EXT REGATTR_EFF REGATTR
Albania 62.50 22.92 46.67 100.00 66.67 93.33
Armenia 61.67 62.50 62.00 75.00 0.00 60.00
Azerbaijan 23.52 -5.56 11.89 63.89 100.00 71.11
Belarus 73.33 75.00 74.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Bulgaria 69.81 44.86 59.83 100.00 86.67 97.33
Croatia 68.15 59.52 64.70 89.06 100.00 91.25
Czech Republic 77.05 62.92 71.40 98.86 83.33 95.76
Estonia 65.87 34.82 53.45 82.14 85.71 82.86
FYR Macedonia 63.15 42.36 54.83 100.00 100.00 100.00
Georgia 73.89 41.67 61.00 100.00 33.33 86.87
Hungary 82.95 77.88 80.92 97.44 91.67 96.28
Kazakhstan 44.33 40.42 42.77 95.00 100.00 96.00
Kyrgyzstan 73.33 23.61 53.44 88.89 100.00 91.11
Latvia 62.92 54.17 59.42 88.89 66.67 84.44
Lithuania 80.00 43.06 65.22 88.89 100.00 91.11
Moldova 64.58 29.17 50.42 93.75 75.00 90.00
Poland 78.10 81.25 79.36 96.43 100.00 97.14
Romania 75.78 79.17 77.13 83.33 80.00 82.67
Russian Federation 72.92 59.06 67.37 89.17 95.00 90.33
Slovak Repubhc 82.08 59.84 73.19 83.33 88.89 84.44
Slovenia 65.37 50.00 59.22 73.61 100.00 78.89
Ukraine 37.99 38.54 38.21 82.44 62.50 78.45
Uzbekistan 62.92 29.17 49.42 78.13 50.00 72.50
Sources: E B R D  1999 Legal Ind icator Survey and au th or’s com p ila tion s as described  in C hap ter 2 and C hapter 3.
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Table 3.29: Aggregate Legal Indices of Securities Law, by Country
Country EXTCAP99 EFFCAP99 CAP99
Albania 76.67 28.41 54.08
Armenia 71.80 46.59 60.00
Azerbaijan 55.64 22.85 40.30
Belarus 77.27 46.97 63.09
Bulgaria 71.06 46.78 59.70
Croatia 78.50 47.77 64.12
Czech Republic 82.49 54.89 69.57
Estonia 79.67 55.36 68.29
FYR Macedonia 76.71 43.18 61.02
Georgia 64.73 31.57 49.21
Hungary 85.17 71.87 78.95
Kazakhstan 72.37 51.93 62.80
Kyrgyzstan 72.71 34.47 54.81
Latvia 74.82 53.41 64.80
Lithuania 74.87 55.68 65.89
Moldova 70.42 48.48 60.15
Poland 86.98 79.35 83.41
Romania 77.83 56.52 67.85
Russian Federation 77.89 60.32 69.67
Slovak Republic 88.03 56.16 73.11
Slovenia 77.36 65.40 71.76
Ukraine 61.60 48.25 55.36
Uzbekistan 59.49 32.07 46.65
Sources: E B R D  1999 Legal Ind icator Survey and au th or’s com p ila tion s as de­
scribed  in C hap ter 2 and C hapter 3.
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Table 3.30: Question Scores on Securities Law: Questions Q2-Q13
Country Q2 Q3 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 QIO Qll Q12 Q13
Albania 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.61 0.13 0.88 1.00 0.88 0.21 0.75
Armenia 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.50 0.65 1.00 1.00
Azerbaijan 1.00 0.28 1.00 0.38 0.00 0.50 0.75 0.67 0.11 -0.11 0.50
Belarus 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00
Bulgaria 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.64 0.21 0.63 0.84 0.82 0.76 0.62 1.00
Croatia 1.00 0.78 0.89 0.72 0.76 0.44 0.90 0.94 0.64 0.69 1.00
Czech Republic 1.00 0.98 0.92 0.60 0.07 0.77 0.92 0.85 0.85 0.88 1.00
Estonia 0.86 0.79 1.00 0.82 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.75 0.58 0.40 0.86
FYR Macedonia 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.50 1.00 0.67 0.75 0.75 0.49 0.22 1.00
Georgia 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.38 0.33 0.33 0.88 0.67 0.88 0.33 1.00
Hungary 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.71 0.71 0.81 0.77 0.81 0.93 1.00 1.00
Kazakhstan 1.00 0.90 1.00 0.65 0.33 0.60 0.95 1.00 0.53 0.46 0.60
Kyrgyzstan 1.00 0.78 1.00 0.50 -0.17 0.67 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.22 1.00
Latvia 1.00 0.78 1.00 0.63 0.21 0.75 0.94 0.69 0.79 0.71 0.75
Lithuania 1.00 0.78 1.00 0.75 -0.06 0.67 0.96 0.92 1.00 0.61 1.00
Moldova 1.00 0.88 0.71 0.42 0.25 0.63 0.78 0.94 0.79 0.17 0.75
Poland 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.86 0.57 1.00 0.74 0.82 1.00 1.00 1.00
Romania 0.83 0.83 1.00 0.63 -0.08 0.75 0.92 0.83 0.83 0.83 1.00
Russian Federation 0.95 0.83 1.00 0.61 0.03 0.73 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.85
Slovak Republic 1.00 0.67 0.89 0.75 0.78 0.78 0.89 0.81 0.96 0.76 1.00
Slovenia 1.00 0.47 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.83 0.96 0.67 0.49 0.67 1.00
Ukraine 0.83 0.76 0.60 0.41 0.19 0.75 0.73 0.69 0.69 0.58 0.38
Uzbekistan 1.00 0.56 0.71 0.63 0.21 0.50 0.88 1.00 0.74 0.46 0.75
Sources: EBRD 1999 Legal Indicator Survey and author’s compilations as described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
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 Table 3.31: Question Scores on Securities Law, Questions Ql4-Q29b_____
Country Q14 Q15 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q26 Q27 Q29b
Albania 0.25 0.25 0.39 0.00 -0.04 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 -0.08 0.00 0.50 0.33
Armenia 0.20 0.25 1.00 0.38 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Azerbaijan 0.10 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.50
Belarus 0.20 0.50 1.00 0.25 -0.17 0.33 1.00 0.50 1.00 -0.17 0.00 1.00 0.50
Bulgaria 0.33 0.28 1.00 0.31 0.36 0.33 0.62 0.35 0.39 0.17 0.16 0.85 0.43
Croatia 0.40 0.50 0.83 0.44 0.23 0.54 0.73 0.50 1.00 -0.03 0.07 0.69 0.50
Czech Republic 0.46 0.38 1.00 0.44 0.36 0.77 1.00 0.60 0.83 0.08 0.21 0.95 0.42
Estonia 0.54 0.29 0.89 0.43 0.52 0.75 0.86 0.57 0.67 0.26 0.25 0.71 0.43
FYR Macedonia 0.40 0.63 1.00 0.38 -0.11 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.28 0.22 0.17 0.83 0.50
Georgia 0.33 0.50 1.00 0.38 0.67 0.33 -0.06 0.00 -0.11 -0.11 0.00 0.67 0.17
Hungary 0.55 0.56 1.00 0.46 0.83 0.54 1.00 0.71 0.73 0.71 0.42 0.88 0.46
Kazakhstan 0.20 0.35 1.00 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.77 0.56 0.77 -0.07 0.13 1.00 0.50
Kyrgyzstan 0.20 0.25 1.00 .. -0.08 0.50 1.00 0.38 0.61 -0.06 0.17 0.75 0.50
Latvia 0.35 0.38 1.00 0.44 0.46 0.63 1.00 0.44 0.42 0.13 0.44 1.00 0.33
Lithuania 0.40 0.25 1.00 0.33 0.61 0.11 0.67 0.38 1.00 0.61 0.00 1.00 0.50
Moldova 0.40 0.42 1.00 0.44 0.75 0.46 1.00 0.42 0.42 0.17 0.25 0.75 0.38
Poland 0.34 0.63 1.00 0.63 0.64 0.79 1.00 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.50
Romania 0.44 0.75 0.89 0.42 0.47 0.83 1.00 0.54 0.83 0.11 0.08 0.80 0.40
Russian Federation 0.44 0.29 0.98 0.46 0.90 0.74 0.89 0.45 0.78 0.25 0.22 0.95 0.48
Slovak Republic 0.50 0.44 1.00 0.38 0.41 0.94 1.00 0.66 0.88 0.19 0.13 0.94 0.44
Slovenia 0.47 0.33 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.61 0.28 0.42 1.00 0.50
Ukraine 0.08 0.19 0.91 0.46 0.73 0.55 0.88 0.41 0.56 0.19 0.16 0.94 0.31
Uzbekistan 0.40 0.13 0.83 0.38 0.00 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.61 -0.06 0.00 0.75 0.25
Sources: EBRD 1999 Legal Indicator Survey and author’s compilations as described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 
3. Note: means that no answer was provided.
Chapter 3. Securities Regulation and Stock Market Development 191
Appendix 3.B Securities Law Questionnaire
Ql. Have securities laws or regulations been enacted or amended in the past 8 years? 
Y _  N __U__
A ’Yes’ answer gets 1, a ’No’ answer carries 0, ’Unclear’ is penalised at -1/6. 
Omitted from aggregation of indices.
Q2. Is there a government agency or an independent body (’’Regulator”) that
regulates securities operations (e.g., a securities commission)? Y N  U__
A ’Yes’ answer to part one carries 1, ’No’ carries 0, ’Unclear’ is worth -1/6. 
Type of question: extensiveness
Q3. If yes, does the regulator have the ability to conduct on-site investigations 
and examinations of issuers?
Y _  N _ U _
If yes, does it regulate the offering of the following types of securities to the 
public:
Shares? Y__ N _ U _ _
Bonds? Y N  U__
A ’Yes’ answer to part 1 carries 0.50, and 0.25 each to parts 2 and 3. A ’No’ 
carries 0, ’Unclear’ is worth -1/6. Maximum overall is 1.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q4. Are securities sold, marketed or traded to the public through mechanisms 
other than a securities exchange?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always 
Never gets 0 points. Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Omitted from aggregation of indices.
Q5. Are publicly listed (traded) companies required to provide timely and accu­
rate disclosure of financial results and other information to the public (e.g., infor-
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mation that is ’’material” to investor’s decisions)? Y N  U__
A ’Yes’ answer carries 1; a ’No’ is worth 0; ’Unclear’ is penalised at -1/6.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q6.If yes, how often is this information provided to the public?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always 
Never gets 0 points, Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Type of question: effectiveness
Q7. Must publicly-traded companies use international accounting standards
when preparing their financial statements? Y N  U__
A ’Yes’ answer carries 1; a ’No’ is worth 0; ’Unclear’ is penalised at -1/6.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q8. Is there a functioning clearance and settlement system for the following: 
(Please tick all that apply)
a) for shares?
b) for bonds?
Both options a) and b) carry 0.50 each; overall maximum is 1.
Type of question: effectiveness
Q9. Are companies required to file information with the Regulator prior to selling
securities on the open market? Y N  U__
If yes, what type of information must be provided:
a) Less than contained in the annual report?
b) More than contained in the annual report?
In what form must the information be provided (please tick all that apply):
c) Prospectus/Listing Particulars
d) Financial Statements
e) Other (e.g. Notice to Shareholders)
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A ’Yes’ answer to part 1 of the question is worth 0.25; option a) carries 0, option
b) gets 0.25; options c) gets 3/8, d) gets 1/8 and e) gets 0. The maximum overall is 
1.
Type of question: extensiveness
QIO. If yes, does the Regulator review and approve any of the information filed 
by a company prior to a public offering?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points. Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Type of question: effectiveness
Q ll. Does the regulator have enforcement powers? Y N  U__
If yes, do these enforcement powers include:
a) Authority to revoke an issuer’s listing?
b) Authority to impose civil fines or penalties?
A ’Yes’ answer to parts 1 gets 0.50; option a) is worth 0.15, option b) receives 
0.35. A ’No’ answer to part 1 is worth 0. ’Unclear’ is penalised at -1/6. Maximum 
score is 1.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q12. Has the regulator (if any) undertaken any actual oversight or enforcement 
action under its regulatory powers within the past 5 years? Y N  U__
A ’Yes’ answer gets 1, a ’No’ answer is worth 0. ’Unclear’ is penalised at -1/6. 
Maximum score is 1.
Type of question: effectiveness
Q13. Is insider dealing prohibited? Y N __
A ’Yes’ answer to part 1 carries 1, a ’No’ answer is worth 0.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q14. If yes, is it prohibited (please tick all that apply):
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a) By legislative act?
b) By administrative rules or regulations?
c) By securities exchange rules?
d) By private law?
e) By criminal law?
Each option from a) to e) is worth 0.20. Maximum score is 1.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q15. How frequently does the Regulator use its enforcement powers if there is a 
problem of insider dealing or fraud?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points, Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Type of question: effectiveness
Q16. Is there (or are there) a functioning stock exchange(s) in your jurisdiction? 
Y _  N
A ’Yes’ answer gets 1, a ’No’ answer carries 0, ’Unclear’ is penalised at -1/6.
Omitted from aggregation of indices.
Q17. Do the capital markets or securities laws regulate the conduct of interme­
diaries such as brokers and dealers? Y N  U__
If yes, must brokers or dealers obtain a license? Y N  U__
If yes, are brokers required to have professional qualifications? Y N  U__
A ’Yes’ answer to the first two parts gives 0.25; a positive answer to part 3 of 
the question gets 0.50. ’No’ answer carry 0. Unclear’ answers are penalised at -1/6. 
Maximum score is 1.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q18. Have any brokers had their licenses revoked by the Regulator or any other 
self-regulatory organisation?
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Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points, Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Type of question: effectiveness
Q19. Are there self-regulatory organisations that have oversight responsibilities 
over market participants in specific sectors? Y N  U__
A ’Yes’ answer gets 1, a ’No’ answer is worth 0. ’Unclear’ is penalised at -1/6. 
Maximum score is 1.
Type of question: eflFectiveness
Q20. Are collective investment schemes (e.g., pension funds or mutual funds) 
authorised in your jurisdiction? Y N  U__
If yes, what type are in existence (if any)
a) State-sponsored?
b) Private schemes?
c) Both private and state-owned?
A ’Yes’ answer to part 1 gets 0.50, option b) is worth 0.50 too, options a) and
c) get 0. The maximum score is 1.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q21. Are there separate rules and regulations for the licensing and regulation of 
investment funds or collective investment schemes? Y N  U__
A ’Yes’ answer gives 1, a ’No’ answer is worth 0, ’Unclear’ is penalised at -1/6.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q22. In practice, do collective investment schemes provide material and accurate 
information to members of the public?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points. Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
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Type of question: effectiveness
Q23. Are the issuers for collective investment schemes also required to disclose 
material information to the investor? Y N  U__
A ’Yes’ answer gives 1. ’No’ is worth zero, ’Unclear’ is penalised at -1/6.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q24. Does an investor compensation scheme exist to protect investors in the 
event of a failure of a securities market intermediary (e.g. an investment firm)?
Y__ N _ _ U _
A ’Yes’ answer gives 1. ’No’ is worth zero, ’Unclear’ is penalised at -1/6.
Type of question: effectiveness
Q25. Have there been recent failures (in the past 3 years) of securities market 
intermediaries? Y N  U__
Omitted from aggregation of indices.
A ’No’ answer gets 1, ’Yes’ is worth zero. Unclear is penalised at -1/6.
Q26. If yes, have investors been able to receive compensation for their losses?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points. Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Type of question: effectiveness
Q27. Is there a legal basis for the provision of professional custodial services 
(e.g. shareholder depository)? Y N __
If yes, is such a system in operation? Y N __
A ’Yes’ answer to both parts carries 0.50, a ’No’ answer carries 0. Maximum 
score is 1.
Type of question: parti extensiveness, part 2 effectiveness.
Q29b. Are there trained and knowledgeable staff in agencies that regulate:
Securities firms and intermediaries? Y N __
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A positive answer carries 0.50, a negative answer is worth zero. Maximum overall 
is 0.50.
Type of question: effectiveness
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Table 3.32: A Comparison of Securities Law Legal Indi­
cator Survey Questions and Other Related Studies
LIS
Qn
No.
Belongs to Question on Relevance
to
Black
(2001)
La Porta et 
al. (2003)
Q2 Regulator
Attributes
Independent Securities 
Regulator exists
extensiveness honest,
well-
resourced
Regulator
Part of 
Regulator 
Attributes 
sub-index
Q3 Regulator
Attributes
Regulator autho­
rized to conduct on­
site examinations of is­
suers; regulates bond 
and share issues
extensiveness does not 
cover
Investigative
Powers
sub-index;
focused
regulator
Q29b Regulator
Attributes
Regulator has profes­
sionally trained staff
effectiveness core
institution
does not 
cover
Q5 Disclosure
Requirements
Publicly traded firms 
must disclose financial 
information in a timely 
manner
extensiveness extensive
financial
disclosure
stresses
importance
Q6 Disclosure
Requirements
Frequency of informa­
tion disclosure by com­
panies in practice
effectiveness does not 
cover
stresses
importance
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Q7 Disclosure
Requirements
Publicly
traded firms must use 
IAS to prepare finan­
cial statements
extensiveness core
institution
does not 
cover
Q8 Disclosure
Requirements
Operational clearance 
and settlement system 
for trade in shares and 
bonds
effectiveness stresses im­
portance of 
mar­
ket trans­
parency of 
trades
does not 
cover
Q9a Disclosure
Requirements
Publicly traded firms 
must file information 
with Regulator prior 
to securities issue
extensiveness stresses
mandatory
disclosure
covers spe­
cific disclo­
sure
requirements
Q9b Disclosure
Requirements
Mandatory filing of 
prospectus and finan­
cial statements
extensiveness stresses
importance
codes 
delivery 
of prospec­
tus by 
promoters
QIO Disclosure
Requirements
Frequency of disclo­
sure and regulatory 
approval prior to secu­
rities issue
effectiveness does not 
cover
does not 
cover
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Q ll Enforcement 
Powers of 
Regulator
Regulator enforcement 
powers, which include 
authority to revoke li­
censes and impose civil 
fines
extensiveness does not 
cover
’’Orders” 
sub­
index, non­
criminal 
sanctions
Q12 Enforcement 
Powers of 
Regulator
Regulator has used its 
enforcement powers
effectiveness does not 
cover
’’Orders”
sub-index
Q13 Enforcement 
Powers of 
Regulator
Insider dealing 
prohibited
extensiveness core
institution
does not 
cover
Q14 Enforcement 
Powers of 
Regulator
Comprehensive ban on 
insider
dealing through crimi­
nal and civil law
extensiveness core insti­
tution; 
stresses 
criminal 
sanctions
stresses 
criminal 
sanctions 
in general
Q15 Enforcement 
Powers of 
Regulator
Frequency of Regula­
tor’s intervention in 
cases of insider dealing
effectiveness core insti­
tution; 
stresses 
enforcement
does not 
cover
Q17 Regulation of 
Market
Intermediaries
Securities laws regu­
late conduct of market 
interme­
diaries; mandatory h- 
censing and standards
extensiveness useful
institution
does not 
cover
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Q18 Regulation of 
Market
Intermediaries
Frequency of interme­
diary licenses being re­
voked by Regulator
effectiveness useful
institution
does not 
cover
Q19 Regulation of
Market
Intermediaries
Intermediaries sub­
ject to mandatory self­
regulation
effectiveness useful
institution
does not 
cover
Q20 Regulation of
Market
Intermediaries
Private in­
vestment and pension 
funds authorized
extensiveness useful
institution
does not 
cover
Q21 Regulation of 
Market
Intermediaries
Separate rules for li­
censing of investment 
and pension funds
extensiveness does not 
cover
does not 
cover
Q22 Regulation of 
Market
Intermediaries
Frequency of informa­
tion disclosure by in­
vestment and pension 
funds
effectiveness does not 
cover
does not 
cover
Q23 Regulation of 
Market
Intermediaries
Issuers of securities for 
investment and pen­
sion funds subject to 
disclosure
extensiveness does not 
cover
does not 
cover
Q24 Regulation of
Market
Intermediaries
Investor compensation 
scheme exists
effectiveness does not 
cover
stresses
importance
Q25 Regulation of 
Market
Intermediaries
Number of market in­
termediary failures
outcome does not 
cover
does not 
cover
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Q26 Regulation of 
Market
Intermediaries
Frequency of 
investor compensation 
for losses due to inter­
mediary failure
effectiveness does not 
cover
stresses
importance
Q27a Regulation of 
Market
Intermediaries
Law provides for 
shareholder depository
extensiveness useful 
institution 
for market 
transparency
does not 
cover
Q27b Regulation of 
Market
Intermediaries
Shareholder deposi­
tory in operation
effectiveness useful
institution
does not 
cover
Chapter 4 
Banking Law and Private Credit 
in Transition Econom ies
4.1 Introduction
Many of the crises that have gripped the transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union are financial in nature, e.g. failing banks, pyra­
mid deposit schemes, collapsing investment funds. They encompass lack of investor 
protection and instances of sheer fraudulence. Economists and legal scholars argue 
that good investor protection laws and their adequate enforcement are essential for 
sound finance. Consequently, legal reform has occupied an integral part of political 
transition in Eastern Europe and governments across the region have been delegated 
the laborious task of enacting new legal rules, supportive of a market economy.
Recent empirical work on law and finance, and regulation and finance has ad­
dressed the role of banking regulation and supervision for bank development, e.g. 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004). The main purpose of this chapter is to establish 
whether specific banking laws and regulations play a role for the availability of fi­
nance to investors in transition economies. In particular, our objective is to look at
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disaggregated indices of bank law and regulation -  constructed from answers to the 
Banking Law section of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) Legal Indicator Survey (LIS)- and to examine the impact of individual 
aspects of banking laws and bank regulation and supervision on bank development 
in the sample of transition economies.
As outlined in the previous chapter, external finance has generally been very 
tight in transition economies over the past ten years. Thus, compared to other 
countries with similar levels of per capita GDP, the transition economies have much 
lower ratios of private credit to GDP. Several explanations of this outcome have been 
put forward in the literature on corporate finance in transition. According to one 
of them bank lending to state-owned enterprises crowds out lending to the private 
sector.^ In line with this view, for example, functioning banks and stock markets 
were virtually non-existent at the outset of reforms in the early 1990s. At that time 
liberalization of financial services and privatization gave rise to over-abundance of 
banks in most of these countries. However, many of these banks continued to openly 
or covertly finance their old clients - debt-ridden state-owned enterprises. In many 
countries this process continued well into the mid- to late 1990s, and was marked 
by bank failures and bank crises -  examples are Bulgaria in late 1996, Croatia in 
1997, Russia in 1998.
A second explanation for the low levels of private bank credit is the outstanding 
stock of bad loans on banks’ balance sheets. The problem of bad loans, accumulated 
from the past, was largely resolved at the beginning of transition, when many of these 
loans were written off bank balance sheets or replaced by long-term government 
bonds, or inflation depreciation kicked in. Despite these measures, bank credit 
remained generally tight, and enterprises had to resort to other forms of financing, 
notàbly through accumulation of wage, tax and payment arrears and increased use of
^Perotti (1993) builds a model of bank lending, which explains this type of behaviour.
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barter and trade credit. Even to this date, the bias towards lending to state-owned 
enterprises, or for politically-motivated reasons is substantial in many transition 
economies.
Thirdly, weaknesses in corporate governance and banking supervision create am­
ple opportunities for asset-stripping both in the banking and corporate sector in 
transition, and thus necessitate a review of the legal and financial interactions in 
transition. Despite the growth of private firms in these countries, external finance 
has been largely unavailable, as documented in Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000).
Fourth, the reasons for lack of external finance to private enterprises have been 
linked with the method of privatization. The corporate sector in these countries has 
undergone dramatic changes during the transition period. But the very nature of 
privatization has proved an obstacle to bank lending. Privatization of state enter­
prises has been constrained by insiders, who had assumed effective control in the 
years immediately preceding and following the collapse of Communism. Powerful 
entrenched managers have thus made external investors wary, and finance has been 
scarce. This in itself reinforces the bad equilibrium of no restructuring and asset 
stripping. Thus, bank finance as well as stock market development are linked to the 
patterns of corporate ownership and control, which have emerged as a result of pri­
vatization. In a quantitative survey of the literature on enterprise restructuring in 
transition, Djankov and Murrell (2002) discuss both corporate and bank ownership 
issues and institutional factors. For example, they summarize one of the findings of 
the literature: weak corporate governance results in higher ownership concentration, 
which in turn limits the sources of external financing. Also, they quote evidence that 
state ownership of banks in transition is the critical factor for persisting soft budget 
constraints.
Obviously, the interest in banking law and bank development in the transition 
economies is also generated by a series of banking crises that have gripped almost
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all of them in recent years. Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, and 
Russia all had their share of banking troubles. Perotti and Sgard (2001) present an 
interesting overview of the mechanics of the Russian crisis in the summer of 1998. 
Their study stresses that the Russian financial meltdown was the result of perverse 
individual incentives built on a system of weak legal enforcement. The overwhelm­
ing incentive to strip cash out of old and new Russian banks and firms led to a 
high outfiow of capital, and the banks were both a major channel and a leveraging 
tool which fed the flow. So contrary to the belief that the crisis was triggered by 
the government default and devaluation due to inability to raise tax revenues, the 
main reason for the banking collapse is thought to be the system of perverse, albeit 
rational, incentives to strip cash and send it abroad. The latter was generated by 
the failure of the Russian institutional environment: poor enforcement of laws and 
a lack of protection of property rights. If property rights are not protected, rational 
agents adopt short-term strategies: ignoring payment obligations, appropriating any 
cash and immediately transferring it abroad. Perotti and Sgard (2001) argue that 
both the banks and the government debt market in Russia before the crisis turned 
into two pyramids, leaking any assets out as capital flight, and leaving behind li­
abilities and empty boxes. To a large extent, the unrestricted power of bank and 
firm managers and the size of related party lending are thought to have caused the 
ultimate collapse.
Our main purpose in this chapter is to define meaningful indices of banking law 
extensiveness and enforcement, and to investigate their role for different measures of 
bank development such as the share of domestic banks’ credit to the private sector, 
liquid liabilities of domestic banks, and the share of foreign banks in the domestic 
banking system. We use relevant data for 1999 and thereafter, and our legal variables 
are based on the 1999 edition of the EBRD Legal Indicator Survey. The rest of the 
chapter is organized as follows: section 4.2 presents the related literature, section
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4.3 describes the data used in the analysis; section 4.4 presents the methodology; 
section 4.5 shows the main regression results, section 4.6 displays some robustness 
checks, and section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
We have already introduced some of the related literature on banking law, regu­
lation and bank development in earlier chapters. Here we provide a review of the 
related work in two areas: 1) the law, finance and institutional aspects of financial 
development, which we call the ’’law and finance” branch for short; and 2) the grow­
ing literature on banking in transition, which focuses on one or a few countries. In 
these two areas we consider both theoretical work, and empirical studies. We also 
consider work both pertaining to transition, and to other economies in general.
4.2.1 Law, Institutions and Finance
There is a burgeoning literature about the interactions between the legal system, 
institutions and the financial system, as well as the interaction between financial 
development and economic growth, and how legal, cultural and institutional factors 
affect finance and growth. A lot of this literature has been spurred by the papers 
by La Porta et al. (1997) and (1998), as well as by subsequent contributions by 
these authors. One of the findings of the La Porta et al. (1997) and (1998) papers 
is that legal origin -  that is, the belonging of a country to a certain legal tradition -  
affects current financial development, and that the legal rights of shareholders and 
creditors according to the commercial/ company laws of a country determine -  at 
least up to a point -  how developed equity and credit markets are today.
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4.2.1.1 Legal Origin, Endowments or Politics
The La Porta et al. (1997) and (1998) papers took legal origin as exogenous, and 
hence useful as a measure of current financial development. Some of the recent work 
in this field has attempted to answer why legal origin matters, and whether alter­
native theories can provide a better explanation for observed variation in financial 
market development across countries and across time. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (2003b), for example, examine two different channels, through which legal 
origin may affect financial development -  the so-called "political channel" on the 
one hand, and the "legal adaptability channel" on the other. The political chan­
nel argues that the English common law essentially developed to protect private 
landowners and their property from the Crown, while French and German civil law 
sought to solidify state power by placing the King above the law. In contrast, the 
legal adaptability theory claims that common law is better suited to adapting to 
changing contractual and economic needs, mainly through the role of common-law 
judges interpreting the law and responding to changing transactional needs. This 
process of judicial powers of interpretation in the application of case law allows for 
efficient legal rules to get adopted with time. In contrast, in France the judges apply 
the written law and are not endowed with the powers of interpretation of the law 
that common-law judges have. Therefore, the proponents of the legal adaptability 
theory argue that observed differences between the English common law and French 
civil law traditions are linked to the way the law adapts to the needs of the econ­
omy. Beck et al. (2003b) analyse empirically the role of these two channels -  the 
power of the state versus the process of law-making and application -  for explaining 
current financial development in a cross-section of up to 115 countries (the sam­
ple size is cut almost in half in some regressions due to data limitations). Using a 
cross-sectional instrumental variables estimation, the study finds evidence that legal 
origin affects financial development (private credit, stock market development and
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property rights) through the adaptability channel (measured by the use of case law 
as a source of law, and need for legal justification of court decisions from Djankov 
et al. (2003a)). The political channel, measured by the tenure of Supreme Court 
judges and the powers of the Supreme Court, is not significantly associated with 
financial development measures. Legal origin dummies -  which instrument for both 
the political and legal adaptability variables -  are found to have an independent 
effect on financial development.
A related paper by the same authors. Beck et al. (2003a), looks at cross-country 
data on 70 former colonies and assesses whether financial development in these coun­
tries today is explained better by legal origin, brought by the colonizers, or by the 
geographical and disease environment encountered by the first European settlers. 
The second view is called ’’the endowment theory of development”, as explained by 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001). The endowment view is that initial Eu­
ropean settler mortality affected the type of institutions that colonizers built in the 
colonized lands -  in harsh environments, where settler mortality was high, extrac­
tive institutions developed; in colonies where settler mortality was relatively low and 
comparable to European mortality at the time, colonization policy was to establish 
long-lasting and better institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2001) produce evidence that 
settler mortality actually explains cross-country variation in economic and finan­
cial development, and the quality of current institutions. To assess whether legal 
origins or endowments affect financial development. Beck et al. (2003a) employ 
cross-country regressions of private credit, stock market development and property 
rights (averaged over the period 1990-1995), and test for the impact of legal origin 
and endowments (as proxied by settler mortality). They find that high settler mor­
tality is negatively associated with current financial development and the results are 
robust to controlling for additional variables. They also find that legal origins also 
explain financial development, but these results are generally not robust to alter­
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native specifications and controls. Finally, they establish that endowments explain 
a higher amount of the cross-country variation in financial development than legal 
origin does. The results suggest that endowments have an edge over legal origin in 
explaining financial development.
4.2.1.2 Law, Finance and Growth
There is a substantial theoretical and empirical literature on the linkages between 
financial development and economic growth. Levine (1997) provides a survey of 
the literature and reviews how the different functions of the financial system affect 
capital accumulation and technological innovation, and through them -  economic 
growth. The empirical strand of the literature on the hnkages between finance and 
growth is concerned with the impact of the legal system and shareholder and credi­
tor protection through the laws on finance, and how financial systems affect growth 
and the ability of firms to raise external finance. Some of the methodologies em­
ployed utilise standard cross-country regressions, using data averaged over a number 
of decades to assess the effect on long-run growth. For instance, Levine and Zervos 
(1998) study the impact of stock market performance and banking development on 
growth, capital accumulation and productivity growth in 47 countries from 1976 
through 1993. They find that both stock market liquidity and bank credit to the 
private sector are positively and significantly associated with contemporaneous and 
future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation and productivity growth. 
These results are found robust to controlling for a number of variables. However, 
since they use standard cross-sectional regressions, the results may be subject to 
biases due to country-specific effects. Another limitation of the approach is the 
potential simultaneity of financial development and growth. Subsequent papers 
have addressed these concerns. Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) further explore 
the linkages between banking development and growth, and address some of the
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limitations of earlier studies. Thus, they employ two methodologies to confront si­
multaneity and omitted variable biases in the Levine and Zervos (1998) paper. One 
methodology is to estimate cross-country regressions through instrumental variables 
techniques, which should correct for potential endogeneity between financial devel­
opment and economic growth (legal origin dummies are used as instruments). A 
second approach is to employ dynamic panel estimation techniques, which exploit 
the time series dimension of the data, and account for unobserved country-specific 
effects. Such methods also control for potential endogeneity by using instrumen­
tal variables based on earlier realizations of the explanatory variables. The results 
from both methods indicate that financial intermediary development (measured in 
several ways, including bank credit to private sector, bank and non-bank credit to 
the private sector, and liquid liabilities) is positively and significantly associated 
with both real per capita GDP growth and productivity growth. The results for 
the effect of financial intermediary development on capital accumulation and pri­
vate savings rates are found less robust, and therefore less conclusive. The upshot 
of the paper is that the data support the theory that better financial intermedia­
tion improves allocation of resources and affects growth through changes in total 
factor productivity growth. A similar study by the same group of authors -  Levine, 
Loayza, and Beck (2000) -  precedes and corroborates the findings of Beck et al. 
(2000), using the same techniques on data from 1960 through 1995 in 74 countries. 
It again examines the relationship between financial intermediary development and 
economic growth, but does not explore the channels through which financial inter­
mediation affects growth. In addition, however, it also establishes that legal rights 
of secured creditors, the proper enforcement of contracts, and accounting standards 
which produce comprehensive, high-quality and comparable financial statements, 
are all significantly associated with better financial intermediary development. The 
authors note that one also ought to look at financial intermediary regulation in as­
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sessing its development across countries, but due to data limitations they leave this 
task to future research.
Raj an and Zingales (1998) explore the financial dependence of growth. While 
they allow for possible reverse causality in the sense that growing economies are 
likely to generate more financial innovation and thus more efficient financial mar­
kets, the main argument is that financial sector development reduces the costs of 
raising external finance to financially dependent firms and thus enhances growth. 
The authors also test empirically whether financial market imperfections affect in­
vestment and growth. In a different paper, Raj an and Zingales (1995) look at 
capital structure of firms across countries and establish that tax codes, bankruptcy 
laws, state of development of bond markets and patterns of ownership matter for 
firms’ leverage. Thus, for example, strict enforcement of creditor rights enhances 
ex-ante contractibility and commits creditors to penalise management, if the firm 
gets into trouble. They find supportive evidence that the concentration of owner­
ship in Continental European and Japanese firms and the diffused ownership and 
active takeover market in the U.K. and the U.S. (and Canada to a certain degree) 
are partly determined by existing conunercial law norms (bankruptcy law in their 
study). Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) are also linking law and finance to 
growth. They ask how differences in legal and financial systems affect firms’ use 
of external finance to fund growth. They find that higher efficiency of the legal 
system leads to a higher proportion of firms using long-term external finance. Also 
an active stock market and a large banking sector are correlated with externally 
financed growth. The latter is supposed to be essential for small and medium-sized 
enterprises.
Some studies also try to identify whether the balance of financial institutions 
-  bank-based or market-based -  affects economic growth. For instance. Beck and 
Levine (2004) examine the joint impact of stock market development (measured by
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the turnover ratio) and bank development (measured by private credit) on economic 
growth, using panel data from 1976 through 1998 in 40 countries. Using different 
versions of the generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) estimator, they establish 
that stock market development and bank development are jointly significant in de­
termining economic growth. These findings, however, require qualification since in 
some of the estimations either bank credit or stock market turnover are not found 
individually significant. Furthermore, using the panel estimator with annual data 
rather than data averaged over five-year periods, they find no individual significant 
relationship between private credit and economic growth. Given these uncertainties, 
the paper’s findings are suggestive rather than conclusive.
Some of the contributions to the law, finance and growth strand of research 
have focused on firm-level data on access to finance. A recent study by Carlin 
and Meyer (2003) examines the role of institutional features of developed OECD 
economies for firm growth, investment in fixed capital, and investment in research 
and development (R&D) in 27 industries over the period 1970-1995. Specifically, 
the authors look at the interaction of country characteristics such as the quality of 
accounting standards, bank concentration, and corporate ownership concentration, 
and industry characteristics -  such as industry equity dependence, bank depen­
dence and skill dependence -  and their effect on industry growth, fixed investment 
and R&D investment. Since there are no time series data on the independent vari­
ables, cross-sectional estimations are undertaken, using averaged data on the three 
dependent variables over the sample period, and robustness checks are run using 
averaged data over sub-periods. To control for endogeneity of the country struc­
tures, instrumental variables estimations are employed, using legal origin, rule of 
law and population as instruments for the level of accounting standards, banking 
system concentration and the concentration of ownership in non-financial private 
firms. The results indicate significance of the interacted country and industry char­
Chapter 4. Banking Law and Private Credit 214
acteristics in the growth regressions. Better accounting standards, for example, are 
associated with higher growth in equity- and skill-dependent industries. Higher firm 
ownership concentration is also significantly associated with higher growth in eq­
uity and skill-dependent industries. Finadly, higher bank ownership concentration 
is significantly associated with lower growth in equity-dependent industries. The 
results on the R&D regressions generally confirm the growth results; however, none 
of the country and industry variables are found significant for the fixed investment 
regressions. The authors interpret these results as supportive of the information 
and renegotiation theories of finance. Thus, equity-dependent industries are shown 
to have higher growth in countries with better accounting standards and less con­
centrated banking system. Institutional structures and industry growth are more 
closely associated with investment in R&D than investment in fixed capital. Finally, 
in low-income OECD countries, there is a positive association between bank concen­
tration and bank-dependent industry growth. Corporate governance theories -  i.e. 
that concentrated ownership is associated with internally funded firm activities -  
are not supported by the data. Growth in equity and skill-dependent industries was 
found higher in countries with concentrated rather than dispersed ownership. In 
summary, the study indicates that financial system structure and institutional fac­
tors, such as information disclosure, coupled with industry characteristics, explain 
the types of activities undertaken by firms in industrial economies.
4.2.2 Banking in Transition
A growing number of papers are devoted to banking developments in the transition 
economies since the beginning of transition. Many of the early studies were naturally 
concerned with economic policy toward banking in the early years of reform. In par­
ticular, the leading questions of the day were how to ensure that banks and financial 
markets in general undergo the necessary transformation from a socialist monobank
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system, with no competition or market for credit risk, to a system which assumes 
the basic functions of market finance -  allocation of credit to its most productive 
uses, assessment of credit risk, monitoring and governance of debtors, and provision 
of payment services. The focus of these early studies was duly on potential methods 
for bank restructuring, strengthening and privatization. A strong emphasis was also 
placed on maintaining financial stability and preventing system-wide bank failures 
-  an understandable concern, given the high volume of bad debts inherited from 
the socialist past, and the substantial monetary overhang in the early transition 
years, which fuelled inflation and led to financial disintermediation. For instance, 
Thorne (1993) provides one of the early summaries of transition banking and the 
strategies for reform. A common feature of some of this early work is the lack of any 
cross-country regression analysis due to short time series data; in addition, the early 
stages of transition did not allow for a reasonably long time-span to assess reforms 
and how they worked. Moreover, the financial transition in many of the formerly 
socialist countries was yet to begin. Thorne (1993) reviews three of the more ad­
vanced transition countries: the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, as well as 
Romania and Bulgaria as of 1991-1992, and assesses steps made in each of these five 
countries to reform the banking systems inherited from the past. He conducts a his­
torical comparison of the pre-transition experience of these countries, highlighting 
that both Poland and Hungary had already established a two-tier banking system 
in the late 1980s, and had opened up their banking markets by allowing bank man­
agers a greater role in credit allocation. Nevertheless, all five countries had common 
problems at the outset of transition: a large proportion of non-performing loans 
mainly to state-owned enterprises form the previous regime; an inefficient payment 
system; a lack of legal, regulatory and supervisory framework suited to the needs 
of a market economy; a lack of bank managerial skill and experience in credit risk 
evaluation; and large state enterprises owning banks, causing inadequate bank gov­
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ernance and interfering with bank lending decisions. The paper also examines the 
early banking legislation and some of its main provisions such as what type of bank­
ing activities were permitted by the five countries’ banking laws (as of late 1991-early 
1992) and whether universal banking was allowed, or not; whether laws introduced 
limits of bank exposure to a single borrower, and on lending to bank shareholders; 
rules on minimum capital requirements and meeting international capital adequacy 
standards; provisions on deposit insurance, etc. The study also outlined the role 
of other supportive laws such as effective bankruptcy laws to address the problem 
of financially weak corporate borrowers, and the crucial role of bank supervision 
in enforcing and applying the banking law. Importantly, the author recognises the 
need for effective supervision defined as supervisory ability to conduct both on-site 
and off-site examinations of banks as a means of restoring the public’s trust in the 
banking system. In this regard, his paper strikes a good parallel with our study.
More recent work addresses issues of bank performance and efficiency towards 
the end of the 1990s, and investigates how bank restructuring, privatization and 
consolidation of the early 1990s have affected subsequent bank performance and 
bank intermediation as well as the structure and concentration of national banking 
markets. Many studies deal with foreign bank entry, which has been a distinctive 
feature of banking privatization and reform in the advanced transition countries. 
This body of work features both individual country case studies (e.g. Bonin and 
Abel (2000), Szapary (2002) and Hasan and Marton (2003) on Hungary; Bonin 
and Leven (2001) on Poland; Amaghlobeli, Farrell and Nielsen (2003) on Georgia; 
Weill (2003) on Poland and the Czech Republic; Perotti (2002) on Russia; Kraft and 
Tirtiroglu (1998), Jemric and Vujcic (2002) and Kraft and Jankov (2003) on Croatia; 
Kloc (2002) on Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan), and cross-country analyses, using 
both country-level and bank-level data. For example. Fries, Neven and Seabright
(2002) use a sample of 515 banks in 16 transition economies over the years 1994-
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1999, and estimate cost and revenue functions, using Bankscope bank balance sheet 
data and employing panel data estimation techniques. They find that progress in 
banking sector reform -  as measured by the EBRD index of progress in liberalization 
and institutional reform of the banking sector (on a scale of 1 to 4+) -  affects bank 
performance. Specifically, dividing the countries into two groups -  low and high- 
reform countries -  produces different results for bank performance outcomes. The 
results indicate that in high-reform countries banks are earning comfortable profit 
margins on their loans and also offering competitive interest rates to their depositors. 
Their return on equity, however, is still negative. In contrast, banks in low-reform 
countries are earning high negative returns on their loans, mainly at the expense of 
their depositors. They have been appropriating the inflation tax on deposits and 
have been using it to sustain their weak loan portfolios. The return on equity is 
found insignificantly different from zero. In addition, net interest margins are found 
to be falling over time everywhere, and to be systematically lower in the high-reform 
countries -  indicating higher competition. The authors conclude that since such 
divides between the two country groups are observed, and since intermediation levels 
are still low by developed-country standards even in the high-reform countries, more 
attention should be given to establishing an appropriate bank regulatory framework 
and policy toward the banking industry.
A lot of the recent literature has focused on the impact of foreign ownership 
on bank performance. Thus, Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel (2003) investigate the im­
pact of foreign bank ownership on bank performance and efficiency over the period 
1996-2000 in eleven advanced transition economies. At the end of the 1990s eight of 
these countries had a banking industry where more than half of bank assets were in 
banks with majority foreign ownership. Among the remaining three -  Slovakia and 
Romania had foreign ownership close to 50% , and only Slovenia remained with a 
low level of foreign-owned banks -  estimated at 15.6% of bank assets in 2000. The
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authors use an unbalanced panel dataset of 220 banks from these eleven countries, 
and distinguish between several types of bank ownership -  government ownership, 
foreign ownership, domestic private ownership and international institutional in­
vestor ownership (for those banks where the EBRD or the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) have an ownership stake). They utilise the stochastic frontier 
analysis approach to estimate bank cost and profit efficiency scores, and use these 
scores alongside the return on bank assets as the dependent variables in panel re­
gression estimations on ownership dummies and a set of control variables such as 
year effects and bank size. Country effects are also included in the regression for 
the so-called relative efficiency scores -  i.e. the efficiency of banks relative to all 
other banks in the same country. The results indicate that bank size reduces bank 
efficiency significantly, therefore larger banks are found less efficient. The year ef­
fects are estimated to be negative and generally significant for the years after 1996 
in the return on assets regressions, thereby lending support to the view that after 
1996 banks have been exposed to more competition, lowering the return on assets. 
The efficiency score regressions indicate that efficiency -  both profit and cost -  has 
improved significantly since 1998, which is when foreign participation in banking 
increased dramatically in many of these countries. Accordingly, the results indicate 
that foreign-owned banks have significantly higher efficiency scores compared to pri­
vate banks in their own countries. Some of these results, are however not robust to 
using different efficiency measures -  for example, when using raw efficiency scores as 
opposed to relative efficiency scores. The results strongly suggest that government 
ownership is associated with less efficient banks -  and these regression results are 
less sensitive to the dependent variable being used. Finally, the additional impact 
(beyond that of having a foreign owner) of having an international institution as 
a shareholder (in all cases these are foreign-owned banks) is found to be positive, 
significant and large on the return on assets and profit efficiency, but insignificant
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on cost efficiency. This led the authors to conclude that international institutional 
investors are more interested in ’’cherry-picking” the best banks rather than in fa­
cilitating the transfer of new technology, know-how or superior banking practices.
A related paper by Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel (2003) examines the role of bank 
privatization in improving bank performance in the transition economies. Employing 
data in six transition economies in which large state-owned banks were privatized, 
usually to strategic foreign owners, they find that bank privatization to foreign own­
ers has had a significant positive impact on the financial performance of these banks. 
Privatized banks are found to be collecting more deposits and making more loans rel­
ative to their assets than they were before the privatization. Loan-loss provisioning 
is much lower post-privatization, indicating government policies aimed at clean-up 
of bank balance sheets and recapitalization prior to their privatization. Moreover, 
privatized banks are found to be earning significantly higher levels of commission 
income than both state-owned banks and foreign greenfield banks, indicating that 
privatized banks are adopting changes in their business strategies and seeking out 
new market niches. One notable drawback, however, is the finding that banks pri­
vatized to strategic foreign investors do not appear to be increasing their lending, so 
the level of financial intermediation remains about the same as before privatization. 
This is a valid concern, particularly in view of the fact that most of these banks 
collect a substantial proportion of deposits in their countries. It is worth noting 
that these cross-country bank-level panel studies are beginning to emerge now, and 
new evidence will be available in the future on the bank reforms undertaken by the 
more advanced group of transition economies in the mid- to late 1990s.
Among the individual country banking efficiency studies, a recent paper by Weill
(2003) examines the role of foreign ownership for bank efficiency in the Czech Repub­
lic and Poland. Using the stochastic frontier approach to compute bank efficiency 
scores, the results indicate that foreign bank ownership is significantly associated
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with higher cost efficiency scores, controlling for other factors. The author contrasts 
this finding to general findings in the related literature on foreign banking in de­
veloped economies, where foreign banks are found to be less efficient than domestic 
ones. He conjectures that the observed advantages of foreign banks in transition 
economies are due to benefits from transfer of banking know-how, and better gover­
nance exercised by foreign shareholders. Similarly, Hasan and Barton (2003) apply 
the same methodology in assessing the role of foreign-owned banks in Hungary. They 
provide a useful account of the Hungarian banking system development in the early 
1990s, specifically paying attention to institutional features such as the restrictions 
on foreign bank ownership imposed by the banking law before 1996. These restric­
tions on share ownership were removed in the amended Banking Law of 1996, when 
foreign participation was actively encouraged in the privatization of the state-owned 
banks. Computing profit and cost efficiency scores and conducting pooled OLS es­
timations reveal that foreign banks outperformed their domestic counterparts, and 
that their involvement in local banks has also improved the efficiency of those Hun­
garian banks (Bonin and Abel (2000) report a similar finding). Higher foreign shares 
were found to be associated with lower inefficiency. Therefore, their study echoes 
other findings in the literature on the effects of foreign bank ownership in transition 
that we mentioned above.
In general, while the early transition literature on banking focused primarily 
on the state and strategies for consolidation and privatization of banks, and offered 
limited data analysis, the more recent literature has begun to utilise the accumulated 
time series data since the mid-1990s and to offer dynamic panel data estimations, 
using bank financial accounts. Most of the recent work has focused on the effects 
of bank privatization and of bringing in foreign bank owners -  a natural outcome 
given the high degree of foreign bank ownership attained at the end of the 1990s in 
the group of advanced transition economies. The general findings of this literature
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point to the positive effects of foreign ownership and private ownership on different 
bank efficiency measures.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Banking Law Variables: Cross-Country Comparisons
We presented in detail the rationale for the Banking Law LIS questions and their 
aggregation and weights in Chapter 2. Here we summarise and illustrate how the 
main thematic banking legal indices compare to alternative measures, and how the 
countries rank.
4.3.1.1 Supervisory Independence
Among the surveyed LIS countries in 1999, Georgia ranks a surprising top coun­
try on supervisory independence (see Figure 4.1). This is based on one survey 
answer^, which claims that there is an independent banking regulator. The next 
three highest-ranking countries on supervisory independence from the LIS are Latvia 
(0.88), Poland (0.85) and Hungary (0.83). The bottom three are Albania (0.44), 
Uzbekistan (0.44) and Armenia (0.25). In Latvia, for instance, the 0.88 score is the 
average of four answers, 3 of which indicate that banks are regulated and supervised, 
and the regulator is a separate body with at least some political independence. One 
answer confirms that there is a separate regulator, but asserts that the latter has no 
political independence.
According to the Barth et al. (2001) database, the Bank of Latvia’s Credit
second survey answer, which had been counted before the cleaning of the data, has almost 
entirely missing answers for the Banking Law section of the survey and is therefore excluded. 
A third questionnaire has no answers to the Banking Law section at all, and had already been 
excluded from the index aggregation previously.
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Institutions Supervision Department is the bank supervision authority. However, 
no information is reported about its independence within the government, or from 
banks and other parties. Therefore, a comparison between the Barth et al. (2001) 
and our sub-indices of regulatory independence is not possible.
In the case of the LIS score for Hungary, the value of 0.83 is the average of 
13 answers, 9 of which specify that the regulator is a separate body with at least 
some political independence. Three answers assert that the Regulator is a separate 
body with no political independence, and 1 answer claims that the Regulator is the 
Minister of Finance.
The Barth et al. (2001) score for overall supervisory independence is 2, 1 for 
independence within the government and 1 for independence from banks. Political 
independence is considered to be low since bank supervisors are accountable to the 
Ministry of Finance; the head of the supervisory authority is appointed by the Prime 
Minister upon the joint recommendation of the Minister of Finance and the President 
of the Hungarian National Bank, and is removed from his post by the Prime Minister. 
Therefore, the executive branch of government had a strong say in matters of bank 
supervision as of 1999, hence the low score for within-government independence. 
Since bank supervisors are not liable for their actions before the courts, the sub-index 
for independence from banks is 1. The regulator is the State Banking and Capital 
Market Supervision department of the Central Bank of Hungary, as confirmed by 
the Barth et al. (2001) dataset. Twelve of the thirteen LIS answers suggest that 
there is a separate regulator, as is the case. One answer suggests the regulator is the 
Minister of Finance, probably due to the strong say of the latter, as evidenced by 
the Barth et al. (2001) data, on monitoring the activity of the supervisory authority 
and selecting its leadership.
For the 11 countries, which have both LIS and Barth et al. (2001) scores, we find 
that the Barth sub-index of overall supervisory independence is negatively correlated
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with the LIS index of independence (correlation coefficient of -0.26). For example, 
the fifth- and sixth-ranked countries in the LIS are Moldova (0.81) and Russia (0.80), 
but both score only 1 (low independence) on within-government independence of 
the supervisory authority. In Russia the Regulator is the Central Bank of the 
Russian Federation. Fourteen of the twenty LIS respondents say that a separate 
body with some political independence is responsible for bank regulation. Only two 
respondents say that a separate body exists, but it is not endowed with political 
independence, while four think that the regulator is the Minister of Finance. The 
low score for within-government independence by Barth et al. is due to the fact that 
the country’s President nominates the head of the supervisory authority, who is then 
approved by the State Duma (Parliament), and is also dismissed from his post by the 
President. Bank regulators are accountable to Parliament. In the case of Moldova 
there are four LIS responses, 3 of which claim that there is a separate regulator, 
which has at least some political independence. One respondent thinks that the 
bank regulator is the Minister of Finance. According to the Barth et al. (2001) 
database, there is a separate body responsible for bank regulation and supervision: 
namely, the Banking Supervision and Relations Department of the National Bank of 
Moldova. The supervisors are accountable to the Council of Administration of the 
National Bank. The head of the supervision department is appointed and removed 
by a respective order of the Governor (of the National Bank) in accordance with 
the provisions of the Labor Code. Since accountability and appointment/ removal of 
the head and directors of the supervision department are not directly determined by 
political institutions (such as the executive branch), it is not clear what motivates 
the low score of within-government independence.^
^Author’s correspondence with James Barth, Jerry Caprio and Ross Levine led to the following 
explanation: Essentially two factors determined the BCL index of supervisory independence -  
how the head of supervision was appointed, and how he or she was removed. The closer the 
situation was to that in which one person could remove the head of supervision with no oversight
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Figure 4.1: Private Credit in 1999 and Supervisory Independence
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According to the Barth et al. (2001) data, the three top-ranking countries in 
terms of supervisory independence from the government with a score of 3 are Slove­
nia, Poland and Belarus. Both Slovenia and Poland have high LIS scores (0.75 and
0.85 respectively) on independence of the supervisory authority. However, Belarus 
is among the group of low-ranking LIS countries. Its score of 0.50 is based on one 
survey response, which claims that a separate body is responsible for supervision 
and regulation of banks and other financial institutions, but that it has no political
or accountability, the lower the ranking. Accordingly, the low ranking for Moldova is motivated on 
grounds that the Governor of the Central Bank could remove the head of bank supervision without 
the protection of the law -  they mention that it is only a Code and not a law that offers protection 
in this case, and conjecture that unlike a law, a code may not allow for courts to arbitrate whether 
it had been followed. However, this distinction between a code and a law is purely semantic, and 
in my opinion probably a code and a law have the same status and meaning. In fact, the two 
words are often used interchangeably by foreign, non-English-speaking legal experts.
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independence. The Barth et al. data confirm that a separate regulator is in exis­
tence, i.e. the National Bank of Belarus. The data reveal that bank supervisors 
are accountable to the President of Belarus; and that the head of the supervisory 
authority is appointed by the President with the consent of the Council of the Re­
public, and removed again by the President on grounds stipulated by law and with 
notification of the Council of the Republic. Given the high degree of dependence on 
the executive authority of the President, it is extremely puzzling why this country 
gains the maximum score for supervisory independence within the government in 
the Barth et al. (2001) database.'^
4.3.1.2 Ease of Foreign Bank Entry
In Chapter 2 we explained the rationale, citing some of the recent literature on the 
effects of foreign bank ownership, for the LIS questions on the legal regime for foreign 
bank entry. We get the following ranking of the transition countries on the sub-index 
of Ease of Foreign Bank Entry (FOR_EASE_P): the top five ranking countries are 
Hungary, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic and Georgia (Figure 4.2).
The most striking outcome of the ranking on the sub-index of Ease of Foreign 
Ownership (FOR_EASE_P) are the very high rankings of Georgia and Albania, and 
the extremely low ranking of Slovenia with 1.92 points out of 4, surpassing only 
Belarus. Also noticeable are the relatively high rankings of Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan attaining similar 
scores on the legal ease of foreign bank entry to those of Estonia and Poland (72.02 
for Estonia and 70.83 for Poland). How are these perceptions of the lack of restric-
^Again, email correspondence with the authors of the BCL database, revealed that in the 
case of Belarus the high score was due to the authors’ understanding that the law offers some 
insulation from political pressures to remove the head of bank supervision, i.e. ’’the head of the 
bank supervisory agency is removed by the President on grounds stipulated by law with notification 
of the Council of the Republic”.
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Figure 4.2: Share of Foreign Banks in 1999 and Legal Ease of Foreign Bank Entry
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tions on foreign bank ownership justified? The high rankings of Hungary and the 
Czech Republic are not surprising in view of the fact that both countries increased 
the share of foreign ownership in banking throughout the 1990s, both through de 
novo greenfield investment and also through privatizations of domestic banks to for­
eign owners, and had a share of foreign banks in total bank assets around 65% in 
1999. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Hungary has now a banking system, in which 
foreign-owned banks are actively involved in retail banking. The low ranking of 
Slovenia is due to two of the three responding firms indicating that a special license 
is mandatory before a foreign entity can acquire shareholdings in a local bank (the 
third respondent did not provide an answer), and that the licensing requirements 
for foreign banks are different. The mid-table rankings of Poland and Estonia also 
stem from the fact that four out of seven Polish respondents and three out of seven 
Estonian respondents also indicate that such a license is needed. A similar outcome
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appears for Croatia too, where one of the nine respondents also says that foreign 
ownership in banking is not permitted.
The Barth et al. (2001) database also builds an index of the limitations on 
foreign ownership (FOREIGNLIMITS) which varies from 0 to 2, with increments of 
1 added, if foreign banks may not own domestic banks, and if foreign banks may 
not enter a country’s banking industry. If both foreign ownership and foreign bank 
entry are restricted, the index is equal to 2. If both are allowed, it takes on the 
value of 0. If either one or the other is restricted, the index has the value of 1. Of 
the transition economies covered by the Barth et al. (2004) sample, only Lithuania, 
Romania and the Russian Federation score 1; the remaining transition countries 
have score values of 0 on this measure, indicating a lack of restrictions on foreign 
bank ownership and entry. The index is based on answers to a survey run by the 
U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which is used in the Barth 
et al. (2001) database.^
4.3.1.3 Private M onitoring of Banks
In Chapter 2 we outlined the need for effective instruments for private agents’ mon­
itoring of banks such as proper accounting standards for banks, regular financial 
disclosure and annual audits, external audit review and examinations of banks on
^For the 11 countries for which we have at our disposal the Barth et al. (2004) measure of 
FOREIGNLIMITS, we check the correlation with our measures of the ease of foreign entry. The 
BCL index gains higher values for more restrictiveness, whereas our aggregate index of the ease of 
foreign bank entry (FORJEASE_P) gain higher values for less restrictiveness, so we would expect 
a negative association. Indeed, this is found to be the case: the correlation is negative at -0.17. 
Furthermore, comparing the BCL index to our two sub-indices which are closest in content to it 
(FORJPERMJP and FORJRESTR_P), we find an even stronger negative association: at -0.52 and 
-0.51 respectively. This is not surprising since Barth et al.’s measure is 0 for all but three transition 
countries. This is in line with the fact that most of these countries did allow and had foreign banks 
in 1999.
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Figure 4.3: Private Credit and Accounting Rules Writing
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a consolidated basis. Here we present some cross-country comparisons of the main 
indices related to private monitoring of banks based on the LIS. Figure 4.3 illus­
trates the index of ACCOUNTING (based on Q24) against private credit. The 
ACCOUNTING index measures the degree to which the professional accounting 
community has a say upon rules for bank accounting. We find that many countries 
score zero points, i.e. their laws prescribe no role for the accounting community in 
rule-writing. The highest-ranking country is Slovenia, followed by Estonia, Groa- 
tia, Latvia and Hungary. We note from the diagram the relatively low ranking of 
both the Gzech and Slovak Republics, where, according to respondents’ perceptions, 
accounting rules were set mostly by the government in 1999. These two countries 
are clear outliers, and may improve the regression fit if they are dropped from the 
estimations later on.
Figure 4.4 presents the index of effectiveness of external auditing of banks (EXT_
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Figure 4.4: Private Credit and Effectiveness of External Auditing of Banks
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AUDIT_EFF), which is based on the answers to Q26, against the ratio of private 
credit to GDP in 1999. We note that many of the advanced transition countries and 
the ones with most developed credit markets, such as the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Estonia, Hungary and Poland score high on this measure. Among them we note the 
presence of Georgia and Belarus, whose respondents indicate that banks have their 
books audited by external auditors almost in all cases. The lowest-ranking countries 
on this index are Ukraine, Armenia, and FYR Macedonia.
Next, Figure 4.5 shows a scatter diagram of PRIVATE99 against the index of 
effectiveness of consolidated examinations of banks (CONS_EXAM_EFF). The latter 
index is based on question Q28, which measures the frequency with which banks are 
examined on a consolidated basis by bank supervisors. The graph displays a positive 
relationship between private credit and the frequency of consolidated examinations. 
Upon inspection, the only outlier is the Czech Republic, which has the highest ratio
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Figure 4.5: Private Credit and Effectiveness of Consolidated Examinations of Banks
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of private credit to GDP, but has one of the lowest scores on this index. Its score 
is close to those of Lithuania and Georgia, and exceeds only the same score for 
Kyrgyzstan. We may want to remove it from the regressions -  that will be expected 
to improve the fit.
We aggregate all the answers to the LIS questions related to private monitoring 
together (Q22 to Q28 as given in Table 4.29 in Appendix 4.B) and compare this 
measure to the BCL aggregate index of Private Monitoring. The two measure similar 
concepts, and some of their ingredients are identical (i.e. whether certified audits 
are mandatory for banks, or whether banks must produce consolidated accounting 
information, covering all bank and non-bank financial subsidiaries). For the 21 
transition economies covered by both the LIS and BCL studies (Barth et al. (2004) 
does not cover Ukraine and Uzbekistan), we establish that there is a moderate
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positive correlation (0.29) between the two aggregate indices of Private Monitoring.® 
This allows us to compare our results of the eflPect of Private Monitoring of banks 
to theirs.
4.3.1.4 Permissible Bank Activities
We next examine the sub-indices of Permissible Activities, Prohibited Activities 
for Banks and Restrictions on Banks Holding of Securities, based on the LIS ques­
tions Q7, Q8 and Q9, and the aggregate index of Restrictions on Bank Activities 
(ACTJRESTR_P), which is the average of the three. We compare them with the 
BCL index of Restrictions on Bank Activities. The latter measures the degree to 
which banks can engage in securities, insurance and real estate activities, and also 
includes measures of legal restrictions on the ability of banks to own non-hnancial 
firms. Each of the four components of the BCL index is measured on a 1 to 4 scale, 
with higher values standing for greater restrictiveness^. Since our LIS indices give 
higher scores for less restrictions on bank activities, we would anticipate a negative 
correlation between our index of Restrictions on Bank Activities and the BCL one.
®In terms of comparing the sub-indices which are closest in content, we find a positive cor­
relation (0.32) between our CONS_STAT_EXT index (i.e. the extent-of-law measure of whether 
consolidated statements are mandatory) and the Barth et al, sub-index of whether consolidated 
accounting is mandatory. However, there is almost zero correlation (0.03) between our index of 
the enforcement of consofidated examination (CONSJEXAMJEFF) and the Barth et al. measure, 
which is not surprising given that they measure different things. Finally, there is no variation in 
the Barth et al. sub-index of mandatory certified audits (all 21 countries score 1), so we cannot 
compare it to our two indices related to mandatory annual bank audits and the use of external
auditors for these (MAND_AUDITJEXT and EXT_AUDIT_EFF).
^See Barth et al. (2004) for the specific survey questions and the index scoring. The following
values are attached to the BCL indices on bank activities: 1 stands for Unrestricted, 2 stands for
Permitted, 3 stands for Restricted, and 4 stands for Prohibited. Therefore, the most restrictive
regime would have a total score of 16 (for securities, insurance, real estate and banks owning
non-financial firms).
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Indeed, this is found to be the case. The correlation coefficient between the two 
aggregate measures is (-0.24). It is driven by the correlation of the sub-index of 
Prohibited Activities for Banks and the BCL index (-0.25), and the correlation of 
the sub-index of Permissible Activities for banks and the BCL index (-0.20). How­
ever, there is a very low negative correlation between the BCL index and the LIS 
sub-index of Restrictions on Banks Holding of Securities (-0.08). Therefore, overall 
comparisons are possible of the use of the BCL and LIS aggregate indices on legal 
restrictions on banking activities in the regression analysis.
4.3.1.5 Supervisory Power
Chapter 2 presented the rationale for the LIS questions on supervisory powers. One 
of these powers includes supervisory authority on ensuring bank compliance with 
bank anti-money laundering laws. We build an index of the enforcement options 
available to bank supervisors to ensure such compliance (ANTLLAUND_EFF), and 
show its relationship with private credit to GDP in 1999 in Figure 4.6. We find 
that this index measure scores highest in Bulgaria, followed by Hungary, Estonia, 
Romania, Albania, and the Czech and Slovak Republics. Our aggregate index of 
Bank Supervisory Powers^ displays a high positive correlation with the BCL Official 
Supervisory Power index (correlation coefficient of 0.59, which is significant at the 
1% level). This high and significant positive correlation is not telling much since 
the two measures -  while in principle measuring the same concept, i.e. the official 
powers which Banking Laws endow bank supervisors with -  have a limited common 
coverage. For example, the Barth et al. index of Official Supervisory Power is a sum 
of answers to 14 ” Yes/No”-type questions, eliciting information on whether super­
visors can meet with banks’ external auditors without the banks’ consent; whether
®It aggregates the individual indices based on questions Q3, Q4, Q5a, b and c, Q13, Q14a and 
b, Q15, Q16, Q31 and Q32.
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supervisors can take legal action against bank auditors; whether supervisors can 
suspend bank directors’ decisions to distribute dividends, bonuses and management 
fees; whether supervisors are authorised to intervene in a problem bank, etc. The 
LIS measure of Supervisory Powers is the sum of Q3, Q4, Q5a, b and c, Q13, 
Q14, Q15, Q16, Q31 and Q32. The most prominent of these are whether supervi­
sors are authorised to conduct on-site examinations and the frequency with which 
they occur; whether there are professional supervision staff to conduct such on-site 
examinations; whether supervisors have powers related to undertaking anti-money- 
laundering actions against banks and how much of this occurs in practice; whether 
supervisory approvals are mandatory for important bank decisions; and whether 
supervisors can undertake corrective actions against banks. Therefore, while some 
overlap between our and their measures exists, the two indices also cover diflFerent 
issues related to supervisory power, and the high correlation may, at least in part, 
be spurious. We also compare the Barth et al. index of Prompt Corrective Power 
to our two measures of supervisory corrective action, based on Q31 and Q32, and 
find a relatively high positive correlation (0.43 and 0.38). Unfortunately, two of our 
interesting supervisory powers measures -  i.e. ability to conduct on-site examina­
tions and the frequency of doing so do not have an immediate counterpart in the 
BCL database and no comparison is possible.
4.3.1.6 Competition Regulatory Variables
As explained in Chapter 2, the LIS gathers information on bank entry requirements 
(Q12), which gives rise to the index of ENTRY_REQ_P. The Barth et al. (2004) 
database also contains similar information about entry requirements. For instance, 
their Entry into Banking Requirements index measures the legal requirements for 
obtaining a license to operate as a bank^. They also add to it information about
®They track which of the following are required to be submitted in applying for a bank hcense: 
draft by-laws; intended organisation chart; financial projections for first three years; financial infor-
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Figure 4.6: Private Credit and Effectiveness of Bank Anti-Laundering Regulations
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limitations on foreign bank ownership and entry. The two capture how difficult it is 
to open a new bank. A comparison between their sub-index of Entry into Banking 
Requirements with the LIS measure reveals that the two are only weakly correlated 
(0.14). This may be due to the BCL index not having much variation, with most 
countries scoring the maximum 8 points, indicating a comprehensive entry test. Only 
several countries - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Georgia, Hungary and Poland -  
score 7 points on the BCL measure. The weak correlation between the two measures 
does not permit a comparison of the BCL results and our results on the impact of 
entry requirements on private credit and other banking development measures.
mation on main potential shareholders; background/experience of future directors and managers; 
sources of funds to be disbursed in the capitalisation of the new bank; market differentiation in­
tended for thew new bank. Their list is more comprehensive than the corresponding one in Q12 
of the LIS, but both are very similar.
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4.3.1.7 C ap ital A dequacy R equirem ents
As outlined in Chapter 2, we measure adherence to the Basle Capital Adequacy 
Rules by question Q29. The extent of such legal rules are captured by the index 
of CAPADEQJFIULES. We get the following results for this index (shown against 
private credit in Figure 4.7): Georgia scores again the maximum points, but this 
is based on one survey answer. Slovenia, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech Republic 
and Estonia rank next. The bottom-ranking countries are Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan 
(not shown in Figure 4.7 since no private credit data are available), Kazakhstan and 
Belarus. From the perspective of capital adequacy being well specified in the laws 
and understood by bank managers (CAPADEQ.UND), the ranking has eight coun­
tries scoring maximum points, among which Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, FYR Macedonia and Georgia. Asked whether the minimum 
capital-asset ratio must be risk-weighted in accordance with Basle guidelines, all 
transition economies in the BCL database answer positively. Comparing our index 
of CAPADEQJRULES and the Barth et al. index of Overall Capital Stringency^®, 
we find a positive correlation of 0.23. Such a positive, hmited correlation should be 
expected since both measures assign higher scores to greater capital stringency, but 
the Barth et al. measure covers provisions related to capital, which are not included 
in the LIS measure.
Figure 4.7 shows that a positive relationship exists between the private credit 
share in GDP and capital adequacy, and the fit will be stronger if the outlier of 
Georgia is omitted.
Finally, Figure 4.8 displays the index of Banking Law enforcement (EFFBANK99) 
and private credit in 1999. The index of EFFBANK99 is a composite of the
^®The index of Overall Capital Stringency covers whether the minimum capital requirement for 
banks must be risk-weighted, and whether certain market losses must be deducted from capital 
before the capital adequacy ratio is determined.
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Figure 4.7: Private Credit and Capital Adequacy Rules
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four indices of EXT_AUDIT_EFF, CONS_EXAM_EFF, ANTLLAUND.EFF and 
PROF_EXAM_P (the latter index measures the availability of professional bank ex­
aminers to conduct on-site examinations of banks, and is based on Q5c). These are 
the main effectiveness (enforcement)-related indices from the Banking Law section 
of the LIS. The diagram shows a positive relationship, with higher values of PRI- 
VATE99 being attained when EFFBANK99 scores higher. The Czech Republic is 
an outlier again.
4.4 M ethodology
The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether the perceived extent of banking 
laws and their enforcement in practice have an impact upon bank development in 
the transition economies. To accomplish this, we will follow the same methodology
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Figure 4.8: Banking Law Enforcement and Private Credit in 1999
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outlined in Chapter 3. We adopt a standard cross-sectional regression approach 
which we consider preferable to simple descriptions of scatterplots of the data. Our 
approach is motivated by the need to control for various factors, found to affect 
financial development in previous studies, and by an objective to compare our find­
ings with others in the literature, e.g. Barth et al. (2004). Thus, we conduct 
ordinary least squares estimations (OLS) of the main regression specification, and 
supplement these with instrumental variables (IV) estimations. We must note that 
a drawback of the chosen method is the rather low degrees of freedom with which 
we operate -  the sample size is 22 observations at most. Nevertheless, we attempt 
to overcome such weaknesses by conducting extensive robustness checks of the main 
results.
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4.4.1 Choice o f Variables and Regression Specification
We employ one main measure of bank development -  private credit relative to GDP. 
Private credit (PRIVATE) measures the volume of loans, extended by domestic 
commercial banks to private firms and households. Therefore, it measures lending 
activity to private borrowers, and higher private credit fiows as a share of national 
income mean that domestic banks engage actively in financial intermediation. It is 
a standard measure of the size and liquidity of the domestic credit market.
Alternative outcome measures in our regression analysis are the share of non­
performing loans in the total loans of domestic banks (NON_PERFORMING), and 
the share of foreign banks (FORBANK) in the domestic banking industry. Non­
performing loans is a measure of the quality of the bank loan portfolio, and refiects 
the overall level of domestic bank efficiency. This measure is somewhat controver­
sial for the transition economies since it can also be affected by the degree of bank 
restructuring and firm restructuring. Since many countries adopted legislation to 
clean up bank balance sheets by writing off non-performing loans inherited from the 
past, a low level of non-performing loans may only be indicative of a recent clean-up 
of bank balance sheets. The degree of foreign bank penetration is a measure of 
market structure. As discussed earlier, many studies on bank performance in tran­
sition find that foreign entry is associated with increased competition and improved 
efficiency in the provision of banking services. Therefore, we take the percentage of 
foreign banks operating in the domestic bank market as another outcome measure, 
and test how various banking regulation measures affect foreign entry.
There are also other variables which are used as proxies for bank development 
in the related literature. These include liquid liabilities of domestic banks, which 
comprise currency, demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-bank 
financial institutions, and is a proxy of the size of the financial system. Another 
available measure equals the ratio of commercial bank domestic assets to the sum
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of commercial bank domestic assets and central bank domestic assets. The un­
derlying intuition behind this variable is that commercial banks are more likely to 
identify profitable financial projects, monitor managers, facilitate risk management 
and mobilize savings than the central bank. Indeed, previous research has found 
that richer countries, which enjoy more developed financial industries, have higher 
levels of COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK measures (around 0.9), while in the 
poorest countries the same variable attains lower levels. Another measure which 
Beck et al. (2000) employ in a series of papers is the volume of private credit by 
both domestic deposit money banks and non-bank financial intermediaries, divided 
by GDR Therefore, that measure is broader than the one which we employ. We 
must stress that the two are likely to be very highly correlated for our sample of 
countries since non-bank financial intermediaries are still nascent in the transition 
economies. Finally, some authors, e.g. Barth et al. (2004), employ banking crises as 
an outcome variable to assess the impact of bank regulation on bank development 
and performance. Banking crises are a proxy for financial instability. Since some 
of the transition economies went through banking crises (notably, Russia in 1998; 
Bulgaria in 1996-1997) in the years prior to 1999, but our banking legal data are for 
1999, we are not going to employ this measure in our analysis. We will assess, how­
ever, the robustness of our results by using as dependent variables both the liquid 
liabilities of domestic bank and non-bank financial intermediaries (LIQUID), and 
the degree of intermediation by commercial banks as opposed to the central bank 
(COMMERCIAL).
We employ several control variables in the regressions of bank development on 
banking law and regulations to control for factors which are likely to affect bank 
lending. For example, much like in the securities regulation regressions of Chapter 
3, macroeconomic stability is likely to affect banking development. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, recent empirical evidence finds that inflation significantly reduces the
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volume of private credit, e.g. Boyd, Levine and Smith (2001). Inflation reduces 
expected returns of depositors, and therefore erodes the deposit base of a country’s 
flnancial system. Furthermore, inflation distorts prices and interferes with the bank­
ing system’s ability to allocate resources to their most efficient use. In recognition of 
this evidence, we again employ average inflation (the average of annual CPI-based 
rate of inflation) over the period 1995-1999 as one of the control variables in the 
regressions. Preliminary correlations indicate that inflation (AVINFL) is negatively 
associated with PRJVATE99 (partial correlation coefficient of -0.36).
An important factor for bank lending is the availability of information about 
the riskiness of potential projects to be financed. The availability of information 
about borrowers is a crucial element in the decision to lend. Most developed mar­
ket economies rely on credit-rating agencies and credit registries which can provide 
information about borrower history. To correct for availability of information, we 
employ a variable which measures the presence of a public credit registry, and the 
scope of information provided in it. This variable is available for all the transition 
countries in our sample with the exception of Estonia, and has been constructed 
by the World Bank Investment Climate Department, World Bank (2004a). The 
PUBLIC_REG index is an average of four sub-indices about the collection of infor­
mation, the distribution of information, the access to information and the quality 
of information contained in it. It is measured on a 0 to 100 scale, with higher val­
ues indicating better and more extensive information in the public credit registry. 
A value of 0 indicates that the country does not maintain a public credit registry. 
The PUBLICJIEG index is positively correlated with PRIVATE99 (the correlation 
coefficient is 0.47, and is significant).
An important factor for banks’ lending decisions in transition economies is the 
degree of banking competition, as well as the market incentives which banks face. 
For instance, limited competition and state ownership of banks can distort incen­
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tives and lead to credit rationing, or credit being directed to politically-motivated 
projects or government enterprises. Such a description fits well most of the transi­
tion economies at some point during the first decade of transition. Privatization of 
banks, which generally occurred later than privatization of companies, and is still 
an ongoing process in a number of sample economies, is important for better align­
ing bankers’ incentives and for providing discipline and restructuring. To capture 
the effects of bank privatization and restructuring, we also control for the share of 
bank assets held by domestic banks, in which the government holds a controlling 
stake (STATE-BANKS). Prior research has shown government ownership of banks 
to be negatively associated with bank development and performance, e.g. La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002). We find negative correlation between state 
ownership of domestic banks, and PRIVATE99, but the negative association weak­
ens as we move closer to 1999 (the correlation coefficient between STATE_BANKS 
in 1995 and PRIVATE99 in 1999 is -0.28, but only -0.02 between STATE_BANKS 
in 1998 and PRIVATE99 in 1999).
Another factor, affecting banks’ lending decisions, is whether or not bank portfo­
lios continue to roll over bad and non-performing loans, inherited from the previous 
regime.
Finally, bank development is also likely to depend on general economic devel­
opment. For instance, past research has demonstrated that as countries grow and 
become richer, financial markets become more sophisticated in managing risks, allo­
cating resources and monitoring borrowers. Richer countries have deeper financial 
markets, therefore we would expect a higher lending activity in countries with higher 
incomes per capita. To control for economic development, we employ the logarithm 
of GDP per capita in 1999. Since it is correlated with some of the explanatory 
variables, however, we use the same procedure as used in Chapter 3 to isolate the 
impact of economic development. First, we regress in an OLS estimation private
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credit in 1999 on the log of GDP per capita and a constant, and then use the resid­
uals from the estimated model to assess whether banking law and its enforcement
have any impact beyond that of economic development. As mentioned in Chapter 
3, this procedure assumes that GDP per capita and our banking law variables are 
independent. If however, GDP per capita and the banking law variables are corre­
lated, which is usually the case here, the procedure results in biased and inconsistent 
estimates. Acknowledging the difficulty in disentangling legal from economic devel­
opment, we also perform robustness tests by including the log of GDP per capita in 
the regression alongside the legal and other variables.
Our basic regression model is as follows:
BAN KD EV^^i=  a  4" 6  *  LEGEXT^^i~\~c * LEGEFF^^i-\~d *  Gontvols 4 - u
B A N K D E V 9 9  is the measure of bank development, a is a constant term, 
L E G E X T 99  and LE G E FF 99  are the respective extensiveness and effectiveness 
components of banking laws, and the set of control variables include average in­
flation (AVINFL), an index of public credit registry (PUBLIC-REG), the share of 
state banks in total domestic bank assets in 1998 (STATE_BANKS98), and (the 
logarithm) of GDP per capita in 1999 (LGDPPC99). In order to capture the re­
lationship between private credit and bank regulation, we will use disaggregated 
indices of banking law and regulation, most of which have both an extent-of-law 
(extensiveness) dimension and an enforcement (effectiveness) dimension.
In summary, the estimated model uses cross-sectional data, generally relies on 
contemporaneous dependent and explanatory variables and poses endogeneity, si­
multaneity and multi-collinearity issues. These were discussed in detail in Chapter 
3, so it suffices to say that we will undertake steps, similar to those outlined in 
Chapter 3 to confront these estimation problems.
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4.4.2 Endogeneity and Instrum ental Variables
We address potential endogeneity between our financial development and legal de­
velopment variables by estimating our model both via ordinary least squares (OLS) 
and instrumental variables (IV) techniques. As explained in Chapter 3, to correct 
for bias in the OLS estimates due to endogeneity of the dependent variable and the 
regressor on banking law, we must identify a suitable instrument for our banking 
law measures -  both those relating to extent-of-the law and to its enforcement. We 
adopt instrument sets similar to the ones already used in Chapter 3.
First, as in Chapter 3, legal origin is a natural candidate for instrumenting cur­
rent legal development. In the growing empirical literature on law, finance and 
growth, legal origin dummies are routinely employed to correct for endogeneity in 
the estimated regressions. Those studies, which cover transition countries, place 
them all as belonging to the same legal family -  as having a Socialist legal origin. 
Other studies exclude the transition countries, e.g. La Porta (1997, 1998), due to 
the rapid changes and reform of economic laws in these countries during the 1990s. 
Notwithstanding their common past and the legacy of several decades of socialist 
legal institutions, the transition economies are actually heterogeneous with respect 
to their legal heritage. Legal scholars, such as Pistor (2000), note this heterogeneity 
and argue that the experience of some of these countries, such as those from Central 
Europe, differs substantially from the experience of others, such as the former Soviet 
republics. The Central European countries -  the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia and Croatia -  had their major commercial and civil legislation at 
the end of the 19th and beginning of 20th centuries heavily modeled on the then 
German commercial and civil codes. This effect also came through the Austrian 
codes for Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia, which had all been part of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. Poland, and the three Baltic states -  Latvia, Lithuania 
and Estonia -  were also infiuenced by German laws mostly, although French civil
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law and the Napoleonic codes influenced Polish codifications in the 19th century, 
but subsequently the German influence has been stronger. Some authors also ar­
gue that Scandinavian law affected the Baltic countries, and particularly Estonia. 
In contrast, the South-Eastern European countries, such as Bulgaria, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Albania, FYR Macedonia and Romania have a legal heritage deter­
mined by their being part of the Ottoman Empire. French law was adopted by the 
Ottoman Empire toward its end, and thus French law affected these countries as 
well as Greece. Therefore, all the South-Eastern European countries (the Balkan na­
tions apart from Croatia) can be classified as mainly French legal origin countries. 
Finally, Pistor (2000) argues that the former Soviet Union had quite a disparate 
legal history prior to the formation of the USSR in 1922. First, imperial Russia 
was affected by German codes in the late 19th century, and its prior legal history 
could be traced back to Roman and Byzantine law. The Central Asian countries, 
which were subsumed in the Soviet Union, had their legal systems based on Islamic 
law. Despite this diversity, most commercial law governing a capitalist productive 
system had not taken a firm foothold in Russia prior to the revolution (Russia and 
the other constituent republics had a mostly feudal system of production until late 
in the 19th century). Therefore, it is justified to group these countries together as 
Socialist legal origin countries (since most of them moved from a feudal to a social­
ist system). We have therefore, as in Chapter 3, decided to explore this distinction 
between French, German and Socialist legal origin countries within the subset of 
transition economies. Preliminary analyses indicate that legal origin -  thus defined 
-  helps explain recent shareholder and creditor legal rights, e.g. Pistor (2000), as 
well as current legal enforcement. In addition, t-tests for differences in mean banking 
laws, shown in Table 4.1, indicate significant results for most of our legal variables 
across the three legal origin countries. Therefore, we use legal origin dummies as 
our main instrument set for our banking law measures.
11Apart from legal origin, we also consider legal transplant status as an instrument of current
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Table 4.1: Legal Origin and Banking Law Effectiveness: Average Scores for Each 
Country Group
Legal Origin ANTI-LAUND-EFF CONS_EXAM_EFF 
(mean) (mean)
EXT_AUDIT_EFF
(mean)
CAPADEQJR.ULES EFFBANK99 
(mean) (mean)
Socialist 8.80 60.06 89.04 26.39 61.00
French 42.00 72.40 81.01 58.11 70.13
German 47.33 74.64 94.05 46.85 75.76
T-test -2.50** -1.86** 1.51* -2.09** -2.29**
Socialist/French (0.0282) (0.0435) (0.0786) (0.0328) (0.0308)
T-test -6.53*** -1.78** -1.08 -1.85** -3.52***
Socialist /  German (0.0000) (0.0476) (0.1476) (0.0422) (0.0023)
T-test -0.40 -0.28 -2.97*** 0.85 -1.08
French/ German (0.3533) (0.3908) (0.0092) (0.2133) (0.1515)
Note: The table reports average scores for each category as well as the proba­
bilities of rejecting the null hypothesis of equal means. One-tailed t-tests are 
reported. P-values are shown in parentheses next to t-statistics.
Second, as indicated in Chapter 3, cultural factors, and religion in particular, 
have been found to also affect creditor rights and their enforcement across large 
samples of countries, e.g. Stulz and Williamson (2003). Since, like legal origins and 
transplants, religion can be assumed exogenous to current financial development, 
but is correlated with current legal development and enforcement, it can serve as 
another instrument for legal development. Accordingly, we use religion dummies -  
defined as the main religion practised by the majority of the population, as given by
banking laws. However, as in Chapter 3, transplant status dummies turn out to be poor instruments 
for most of our endogenous banking law variables. We, therefore, do not use TRANSPLANT_ST 
in the IV regressions.
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Table 4.2: Religion and Banking Law Effectiveness: Average Scores for Each Coun- 
try Group
Main Religion ANTI_LAUND_EFF CONS-EXAM_EFF EXT_AUDIT_EFF CAPADEQ-RULES EFFBANK99
(mean) (mean) (mean) (mean) (mean)
Muslim 19.67 60.83 89.65 34.95 64.50
Orthodox 20.00 66.40 84.17 38.30 63.75
Catholic 48.57 76.19 95.02 48.13 77.37
Protestant 43.00 69.20 90.63 42.37 70.13
T-test -0.03 -0.61 0.94 -0.19 0.19
Muslim /  Orthodox (0.4900) (0.2797) (0.1817) (0.4280) (0.4254)
T-test -2.78** -1.33 -1.13 -0.81 -2.89***
Muslim/Catholic (0.0139) (0.1054) (0.1451) (0.2228) (0.0079)
T-test -1.20 -0.54 -0.10 -0.37 -0.39
Muslim/Protestant (0.1861) (0.3216) (0.4680) (0.3639) (0.3789)
T-test -2.93*** -1.13 -2.27** -0.79 -2.91***
Orthodox/Catholic (0.0067) (0.1459) (0.0207) (0.2206) (0.0064)
T-test -1.20 -0.21 -0.63 -0.24 -0.44
Orthodox/Protestant (0.1890) (0.4329) (0.3073) (0.4134) (0.3645)
T-test 0.32 0.46 0.45 0.39 0.50
Catholic/Protestant (0.3996) (0.3468) (0.3605) (0.3721) (0.3487)
Note: The table reports average scores for each category as well as the probabihties 
of rejecting the null hypothesis of equal means. One-tailed t-tests are reported. P- 
values are shown in parentheses next to t-statistics. The Muslim countries covered 
are: Albania, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The Ortho­
dox countries are: Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Moldova, 
Romania, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The Catholic countries are: Croa­
tia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia. The Protestant (Lutheran) countries cover only Estonia and Latvia.
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the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Country Factbook 2004 (on-line edition) 
-  as an alternative instrument set for our banking law measures. Table 4.2 presents 
tests for differences in mean banking law scores across the sample countries grouped 
by religion.
Finally, we also use years under communism as a measure of historical memory 
of market institutions to instrument for current legal development.^^
4.5 Regression Results
In this section we present regression results for private credit (PRIVATE99) as the 
dependent variable. We first take an approach of checking for the significance of 
a broad set of our banking law variables, which are as disaggregated as possible. 
Then we also show results for aggregate indices of banking law and its enforcement. 
This approach allows us to pin down which specific legal structures contribute to 
financial development.
We proceed with OLS estimations of PRIVATE99 in 1999 on the different bank­
ing law indices and controlling for inflation, the share of state-owned banks and the 
presence and scope of information-sharing among lenders as captured by the public 
credit registry index.
4.5.1 Information Disclosure (Private M onitoring)
We test for the independent impact of all the variables related to the disclosure of 
information by banks. First, we find that the use of external auditors for banks’ an­
nual financial (EXT_AUDIT_EFF) audits is positively and significantly associated
T-tests for differences in means for the main banking law variables shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 
indicate that there are significant differences in mean ANTIXAUND_EFF across all three groups 
of countries as well as in mean EFFBANK99 and CONSJEXAM-EFF across the countries with 
high and low number of years under communism. These results are not reported to save space.
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Table 4.3: Bank Disclosure Requirements and Private Credit, 1999. OLS Estima- 
t ions
Indep. variable PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99
EXT_AUDITJEFF 0.5238**
(0.2193)
CONS_EXAMJEFF 0.3192**
(0.1245)
ACCOUNTING 0.2405***
(0.0769)
ACCJDISCREP -0.1546**
(0.0643)
DISCLOSE_EFF 0.8742***
(0.2988)
AVINFL -0.0218*** -0.0126 -0.0081 -0.0206*** -0.0252***
(0.0068) (0.0074) (0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0085)
STATE_BANKS98 -0.1512* -0.2001* -0.1307 -0.1693* -0.0927
(0.0748) (0.0988) (0.0934) (0.0862) (0.0690)
PUBLICJIEG 0.1618 0.2349** 0.2291** 0.2340** 0.1779*
(0.1071) (0.1103) (0.1058) (0.1023) (0.0874)
Intercept -26.4 -3.1 11.9** 24.1*** -53.1**
(17.633) (8.6681) (4.1523) (5.1785) (24.9044)
F-test (4, 15) 2.99* 6.50*** 16.17*** 3.63** 4.20**
[0.0533] [0.0031] [0.0000] [0.0292] [0.0178]
No of obs. 20 20 20 20 20
R-squared 0.48 0.52 0.47 0.44 0.53
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance atl%, 5%, and 10%. Robust 
standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. P- 
values for F-tests shown in square brackets.
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with private credit (column 1 of Table 4.3). Inflation and the share of state-owned 
banks have the expected negative signs, and are also statistically significant (at the 
1% and 10% levels respectively). The availability of information about borrowers as 
captured by the index of public credit registry (PUBLIC-REG) has a positive impact 
on the volume of private credit, but in this particular specification misses significance 
at the acceptable levels. It must be stressed that the index of EXT_AUDIT_EFF is 
the effectiveness question related to mandatory annual audits. The corresponding 
extent-of-law (extensiveness) question is whether banks are subject to mandatory 
auditing of their annual results, and whether local and international accounting stan­
dards apply. In a separate specification, including simultaneously EXT_AUDIT_EFF 
and MAND_AUDIT_EXT -  the mandatory requirement for annual audits -  and the 
three control variables, we find that the extent-of-law measure is insignificant (and 
has a negative sign), while the enforcement measure EXT_AUD1T_EFF retains its 
significance at the 5% level (we do not report these simultaneous results here for 
brevity). Therefore, we find evidence that the effectiveness of this aspect of infor­
mation disclosure matters for bank lending to private firms.
Another aspect of information disclosure is the requirement for banks to disclose 
financial results on a consolidated basis -  CONS_STAT_EXT, and the frequency 
with which bank supervisors examine banks’ consolidated accounts in practice -  
CONS_EXAM_EFF. As discussed earlier, consolidated statements and examinations 
are desirable since they can prevent banks shifting losses to a branch to hide its 
financial position. Again, we find evidence that the enforcement of provisions with 
respect to bank disclosure of consolidated financial accounts is beneficial for private 
credit volume. Thus, the CONS_EXAM_EFF index is statistically significant and 
positively associated with PRIVATE99. The control variables attain the expected 
signs, and are significant, with the exception of inflation which narrowly misses 
significance at the 10% level. In contrast, a separate specification (not reported here)
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finds that the extent-of-law index CONS_STAT_EXT is positively associated with 
PRIVATE99, but is not statistically significant. In a specification which contains 
simultaneously the extent-of-law and effectiveness measures, we find again that the 
effectiveness component is significant at the 5%, whereas the extent-of-law one is 
not. In the latter regression all three controls are significant and have the expected 
coefficient signs. These results indicate that information disclosure by banks affects 
bank credit -  in particular, enforcement of requirements related to consolidated 
accounts disclosure, as measured by CONS_EXAM_EFF, strengthens bank lending 
to the private sector, possibly due to more private monitoring of banks.
The other LIS questions related to information disclosure are on accounting stan­
dards and accounting rules. The index of accounting rules writing (ACCOUNTING) 
-  whether accounting rules are set by the professional accounting community or the 
government -  is found significant at the 1% level in the basic specification. It is 
robust to the inclusion of the standard control variables, of which only the degree of 
information-sharing among lenders, as measured by the public credit registry index, 
is significant. This finding again confirms the role of accounting standards which has 
been found by many related studies to be of crucial importance for financial mar­
kets. This accounting index is considered an extent-of-law (extensiveness) measure 
since it is related to the legal rules on who writes and adopts accounting rules.
Interestingly, we find that use of international accounting standards does not 
affect private credit -  the association is statistically insignificant in the basic speci­
fication controlling for inflation, state-owned banks and credit information-sharing. 
Neither are IAS in process of being adopted found significant in the standard model. 
We do find evidence, however, that discrepancy between IAS and local standards, 
as captured by Q23, part 1, and summarized in the index of ACC_DISCREP, exerts 
a negative and significant impact upon private credit. The control variables are 
also found significant. This is considered an enforcement question even though it
Chapter 4. Banking Law and Private Credit 251
mainly considers disparities in financial statements issued in accordance with local 
accounting rules, and the same financial statements issued in accordance with IAS. 
The idea is that better enforcement of accounting standards would lead to lower dis­
parities between accounts issued according to the two sets of standards. Therefore, 
we would expect that the coefficient on ACCJDISCREP would have a positive sign,
i.e. lower disparities score higher weights, which should lead to better enforcement 
of accounting rules, and hence result in higher lending. Therefore, the significant 
negative sign is puzzling. Moreover, it is robust to the inclusion of the index of 
ACCOUNTING (both keep their significance) and CONS_EXAM_EFF. It loses sig­
nificance when we include the effectiveness of auditing (EXT_AUDITJEFF), but the 
two indices are correlated (-0.39), so probably this is due to multi-collinearity.^^ 
Finally, we also use the information collected by the LIS on document disclosure 
to bank supervisors. As explained earlier, a wider array of documents being dis­
closed is thought beneficial, and attains higher scores. Since document disclosure is 
meaningless without ensuring the quality of the disclosed information, we combine 
this sub-index with the index of auditing enforcement -  EXT_AUDIT_EFF, i.e. we
possible explanation for this counter-intuitive result is the way the question is phrased -  
’’Has the shift in accounting standards (i.e. from local to IAS) affected the financial and income 
statements of financial institutions (e.g. banks that previously showed a profit are now shown as 
having a loss)?” -  and the particular answer menu chosen, ’’Not at all”, ’’Only for a few banks”, 
’’For the majority of banks (greater than 50%)”, and ’’For nearly all banks (almost 100%)”. It 
is conceivable that respondents have interpreted the question to mean whether IAS have been 
adopted by the majority of banks or not, rather than the intended meaning of whether the shift 
has produced any substantial discrepancies between disclosed reports before and after the shift. 
After all, the wording of the main part of the question would easily lead one to infer the first 
meaning, and the part which contains the essence of the intended meaning is given in brackets, 
which may be overlooked. If such a wording effect is indeed occurring in this case, this would 
actually mean that lower scores are associated with more banks adopting IAS and this would 
result in higher lending. Since we have no way of testing whether this is true or not, we choose to 
treat this question with caution, but nonetheless report the results.
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would like to test for the impact of document disclosure and auditing requirements 
in tandem. The new index -  DISCLOSE_EFF, which is a simple average of the 
two -  is statistically significant in our main specification and robust to the inclu­
sion of the usual three control variables. In contrast, we do not find evidence that 
document disclosure by itself affects private credit significantly -  when we test for 
DOCUMENT-DISCL alone in the same regression -  its coefficient has a positive 
sign, but it is insignificant. Therefore, these results indicate that extensive disclo­
sure requirements in the law are not sufficient by themselves to give bank supervisors 
an accurate picture of banks’ financial standing -  only when extensive disclosure re­
quirements are coupled with enforcement of auditing requirements, do significant 
benefits materialise.
In summary, our results indicate that information disclosure rules and specifi­
cally their effective enforcement have a significant impact upon bank lending to the 
private sector. The effective application of auditing and consolidated examination 
requirements as well as the role of the private sector in accounting rule-writing axe 
found to exert a statistically significant and positive impact on private credit, con­
trolling for past inflation, availability of information about borrowers and presence 
of state-owned banks. Furthermore, we find evidence that adoption of foreign ac­
counting standards by the majority of banks may also be associated with higher 
lending, but the interpretation of the estimated regression may be affected by ques­
tion wording effects. Extensive disclosure by itself is not related to volume of private 
credit, but extensive disclosure and effective auditing are. Finally, the imposition 
of rules on mandatory auditing and consolidated reporting as well as use of IAS axe 
also not found to affect private credit significantly. We interpret these results as 
supporting the recent theories of bank regulation as being beneficial when it allows 
for effective disclosure and enables good private sector monitoring. We also consider 
these results supportive of the finding in the literature on law and finance about the
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importance of accounting standards and their application.
The results described here are based on OLS estimations, correcting for het- 
eroscedasticity (Table 4.3). However, they are robust to alternative estimations. 
Table 4.4 shows the results of instrumental variables estimations of the same five 
basic equations, using Legal Origin, Religion and Years under communism as sepa­
rate instruments for the banking ind ices .T ab les 4.5 and 4.6 show the first-stage 
results for our main legal variables, using these three different instrument sets. For 
brevity, we show the best fit for each endogenous legal variable. We also show the 
first-stage regressions for ANTI_LAUND_EFF and EFFBANK99 for both Religion 
and Years under communism. The first-stage regressions indicate significance of 
most of the explanatory variables and significant F-tests. Some of the F-tests are 
not very high, suggesting that the instruments are not very strong, but overall they 
are relevant.
We then report the second-stage results and two diagnostic tests -  the Hausman 
test for the presence of endogeneity, and the over-identifying restrictions test (we 
report the Sargan test statistic) for the validity of the instrument sets. In four of 
our equations the Hausman test indicates endogeneity -  i.e. the test statistic is 
significant at the acceptable levels. Therefore, a correction is needed.
The second-stage of the IV regressions shows that all our legal variables maintain 
significance and have the same signs as in the OLS estimations. In addition, four of 
the five equations (except for ACCJDISCREP) pass the over-identifying restrictions 
test -  i.e. the test statistic is statistically insignificant, so we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of no independent impact of the instruments upon private credit other 
than through the three legal indices. Only the estimation of ACCJDISCREP has a 
Chi-square test statistic which fails the test, i.e. we can reject the null hypothesis
Protestant countries in our sample are only two (Estonia and Latvia), and since there 
are no significant differences between them and the Catholic countries, we group them together 
(Catholic-Protestant) for the purpose of the IV estimations using Religion dummies.
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Table 4.4: Disclosure Requirements and Private Credit, 1999. Instrumental Vari­
ables (IV) Estimations Using 2SLS and Legal Origin, Religion and Years under 
communism as instruments
Indep. variable PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99
EXT_AUDIT_EFF 1.2622***
(0.4170)
CONS-EXAM-EFF 0.8428* (0.4321)
ACCOUNTING 0.7633** (0.3429)
ACCJDISCREP -0.2523* (0.1352)
DISCLOSE_EFF 2.5438** (0.9167)
AVINFL -0.0310***
(0.0077)
0.0065 (0.0079) -0.0290**
(0.0104)
-0.0460**
(0.0166)
STATE-BANKS98 -0.1549* (0.0785) -0.1474 (0.1047)
Intercept -87.4** (36.2259) -42.3 (28.7732) 1.4948 (5.7523) 33.5*** (10.4728) -185.4**
(72.9869)
No. of obs. 21 22 21 21 21
F-test (1st stage) F(4,16)=3.61 F(2,19)=2.40 F(3,17)=3.12 F(4,16)=2.45 F(3,17)=3.20
[0.0278] [0.1176] [0.0535] [0.0883] [0.0500]
Hausman test 5.58 [0.0182] 4.13 [0.0422] 5.59 [0.0181] 0.55 (0.4597) 5.52 [0.0188]
OIR test (Sargan test) X ^ (l) =0.592. X ^ (l) =0.209 X ^ (l) =2.218 X ^ (l) =9.652 X ^ (l) =1.613
[0.4416] [0.6478] [0.1364] [0.0019] [0.2040]
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Robust standard 
errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. P-values shown is square 
brackets for the F-test and diagnostic tests. Regressions in columns 1, 4 and 5 use 
Legal Origin as an instrument; regressions in columns 2 and 3 use as instruments 
Years under communism and Religion respectively.
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Table 4.5: Disclosure Requirements and Private Credit, 1999. Instrumental Vari-
ables (IV) Estimations: First-Stage Regressions______________________________
Panel A: LEGAL ORIGIN, omitted category is French legal origin
EXT_AUDIT_EFF DISCLOSE.EFF ACC_DISCREP
German 16.3714*** (5.5429) 7.8932** (3.5974) -32.9805* (17.4043)
Socialist 4.2455 (6.2712) 3.6378 (3.9206) -37.6956* (19.6910)
AVINFL 0.0208** (0.0089) 0.0142** (0.0063) -0.0371 (0.0280)
STATE_BANKS98 0.1477 (0.0847) -0.6797** (0.021)
Intercept 73.1*** (6.3243) 74.9*** (3.0090) 90.6*** (19.8577)
No of obs 21 21 21
Adjusted R-sq 0.34 0.25 0.22
F-test F(4,16)=3.61 [0.0278] F(3,17)=3.20 [0.0500] F(4,16)=2.45 [0.0883]
Panel B: RELIGION: omitted category is Cathohc-Protestant
ACCOUNTING ANTI_LAUNDJEFF EFFBANK99
Muslim -13.4444 (11.7780) -13.2864 (12.5599) -11.2172* (5.9385)
Orthodox -25.4444*** (8.3283) -19.9625* (9.9152) -12.0156** (4.6586)
AVINFL -0.0278 (0.0191)
STATE_BANKS98 0.3373* (0.1651)
Intercept 30.8*** (5.8890) 37.7*** (7.8904) 75.8*** (3.2941)
No of obs 21 21 22
Adjusted R-sq 0.27 0.40 0.21
F-test F(2,18)=4.67 [0.0233] F(4,16)=4.40 [0.0137] F(2,19)=3.78 [0.0415]
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Standard 
errors shown in parentheses next to coefllcient estimates. P-values shown in square 
brackets for the F-test.
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Table 4.6: Banking Enforcement Indices and Private Credit, 1999. Instrumental 
Variables (IV) Estimations: First-Stage Regressions
Panel A: Years under communism, omitted category is ’’Low 
number of years”
CONS_EXAM_EFF ANTI_LAUND_EFF EFFBANK99
YRCGMMJIIGH -16.8025** (7.8052) -43.6*** (6.9938) -18.7787*** (5.3543)
YRCOMMJVIED -11.1875 (9.7348) -18.6** (8.7227) -13.4815** (5.7142)
AVINFL 0.0074 (0.0090)
STATE_BANKS98 0.0628 (0.0835)
Intercept 77.0*** (5.2035) 51.6*** (4.6625) 74.7*** (4.5389)
No of obs 22 22 20
Adjusted R-sq 0.12 0.64 0.46
F-test F(2, 19)=2.40 F(2, 19)=19.44 F(5, 14)=4.23
[0.1176] [0.0000] [0.0149]
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Standard 
errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. P-values shown in square 
brackets for the F-test.
of no independent impact of the instrument on private credit. The result indicates 
that the instruments and the error term are correlated.
Overall, these IV results support the main OLS results, albeit with some qualifi­
cations and cautions, particularly with respect to the regression of PRIVATE99 on 
ACC_DISCREP.
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Table 4.7: Bank Capital Adequacy and Private Credit, 1999. OLS Estimations
Indep. variable PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99
CAPADEQ JIULES 0.1188* 0.2098** 0.2349**
(0.0656) (0.0843) (0.0999)
CAPADEQ.UND 0.0123
(0.2888)
-0.1684
(0.3250)
AVINFL -0.0182*** -0.0226*** -0.0147* -0.0227***
(0.0058) (0.0068) (0.0070) (0.0065)
STATE_BANKS98 -0.0771
(0.1072)
-0.1114
(0.1023)
PUBLIC_REG 0.1746
(0.1215)
0.2255*
(0.1209)
Intercept 12.0*** 10.5*** 15.2 24.8
(3.9788) (2.8976) (26.1704) (27.8154)
F-test 3.03* 5.78** 1.72 4.23
[0.0514] [0.0115] [0.1986] [0.0210]
No of obs. 20 21 20 21
R-squared 0.37 0.29 0.33 0.31
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance atl%, 5%, and 10%. Robust
standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. P-
values for F-tests shown in square brackets.
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4.5.2 Capital Adequacy
Next we test for the impact of capital adequacy regulations on private credit. As 
explained in the Data section, we have two LIS questions related to capital re­
quirements, which give the two sub-indices we use as regressors. First, we have 
the index of CAPADEQ_RULES, which measures whether banks are required by 
law to establish minimum capital requirements, and whether those requirements are 
in accordance with the requirements imposed by the Basle Capital Accord. This 
is considered an extent-of-law (extensiveness) legal measure. The second measure 
-  CAPADEQ.UND -  was previously considered an enforcement measure, but as 
explained earlier, since it reflects the clarity of the law and the law being well un­
derstood by bank managers, and does not measure directly the application of the 
laws with respect to capital requirements, it is, in my opinion, more appropriate to 
treat it as an extent-of-law (extensiveness) measure. The results of our regressions 
show that it is the first variable which has a significant effect upon bank lending to 
the private sector (Table 4.7).
Table 4.7 shows the OLS regression results for the two legal measures of capital 
adequacy on PRIVATE99. First, we establish that the index of CAPADEQJIULES, 
i.e. the extent of which capital requirements exist in the banking law and follow 
the Basle capital requirements, is found statistically significant, albeit at the 10% 
level only, in our basic regression model, controlling for inflation, the share of state 
banks and information-sharing. Among the controls, only inflation is found signifi­
cant, so in the estimation in column two of Table 4.7 we report the same regression 
without the STATEJBANKS98 and PUBLICJIEG controls. The capital adequacy 
rules index increases its significance to the 5% level, and inflation retains its sig­
nificance. In contrast, the legal index of clarity and understanding of the rules on 
capital adequacy -  CAPADEQ.UND -  is found insignificant in our basic model with 
the three controls. The controls have the expected signs and both inflation and the
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public registry index are significant at the 10% level. Finally in column 4 of Table 
4.7 we present an equation which estimates for the impact of the two capital ad­
equacy indices simultaneously. The rules index again is found significant, and the 
understanding index is again insignificant (and has a negative sign due probably to 
multi-collinearity between the two -  correlation coefficient is 0.40).
We interpret these results as indicating a positive association between the extent 
of which capital adequacy rules follow the guidelines of the Basle Accord, and private 
credit. Countries which have adopted minimum capital requirements, and these 
requirements conform to those set by the Basle Accord, are enjoying higher levels of 
lending to the private sector, controlling for other factors. We do not find evidence, 
however, that the clarity of the law or perceptions of how well capital requirements 
are understood by bank managers affect private credit.
These basic results are also confirmed by instrumental variables estimations, 
using Legal Origin and Years under communism as instruments.^^
4.5.3 Com petition Regulatory Variables
4.5.3.1 Foreign Entry
We look at the four questions which collect information about regulation of foreign 
ownership of banks first separately, and then in the aggregate. We find some evidence 
that less restrictions on the ownership stake in domestic banks allowed to foreign 
banks is significantly associated with the volume of private credit. We also find 
strong evidence that less legal restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic banks 
increase foreign bank entry (expressed as the share of foreign banks in the number
These results are not shown to save space. They are available upon request. We tested 
several instrument sets, and found that Legal Origin, Years under Communism, and, to a lesser 
degree. Legal Transplant Status work best as instruments for CAPADEQ_RULES in the first-stage 
regressions, but are weak as instruments for CAPADEQ.UND.
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of total banks operating in the country).
The four variables, which provide information about banking law stipulations 
about ownership of domestic banks by foreign firms are: FORJRESTR_P, which 
measures the presence of restrictions on the percentage share of foreigners in the 
capital of domestic banks, allowed by law; FOR_PERM_P, which measures whether 
foreign ownership in domestic banks is permitted by law; FOR_LICENSE_P, mea­
suring whether a license is required for a foreign firm to buy shares in a local bank; 
and FOR_LIC_DIFF_P, measuring whether licensing requirements for foreign banks 
are different from those for domestic banks. Since there is no underlying theory 
about how licensing procedures of foreign banks would affect bank lending or for­
eign entry, we leave it to the data to provide an answer. We also test for the impact 
of these provisions in the aggregate -  the aggregate index is FOR_EASE_P. All these 
indices refer to extent of the law, so there is no enforcement index on foreign entry 
requirements.
The results indicate that only foreign ownership restrictions (FOR_RESTR_P) 
are significantly associated with PRIVATE99. The other three variables and the 
aggregate index are not found to be statistically significant in our basic regression 
model. Only FOR_RESTR_P has a significant coefficient in the standard regression, 
although it is not significant when all three controls are included. Successive esti­
mations, shown in Table 4.8, dropping the insignificant state ownership and public 
registry variables, lead to significance of the legal variable, albeit at the 10% level 
only. In contrast, neither foreign ownership being permitted (FOR_PERM_P), nor 
the two licensing variables are significant in the same regression (output not shown). 
Finally, we test for the aggregate index of foreign ownership ease -  FOR_EASE_P. It 
is found to have a positive effect on private credit, but the coefficient is not signifi­
cant. Therefore, we establish only weak evidence that less foreign entry restrictions 
facilitate bank lending to the private sector, through encouraging more foreign bank
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Table 4.8: Regulations on Foreign Bank Ownership and Private Credit, 1999. OLS 
Estimations
Indep. variable PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99
FOR_RESTR_P 0.2142 0.1710* 0.1763*
(0.1348) (0.0937) (0.0917)
FOR_EASE_P 0.2261
(0.1939)
AVINFL -0.0164** -0.0139* -0.0181** -0.0134**
(0.0065) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0051)
STATE_BANKS98 -0.1372
(0.0874)
PUBLICJIEG 0.2329* 0.1856 0.2043*
(0.1115) (0.1130) (0.1146)
Intercept -2.7
(11.6698)
-2.3 (7.7296) 2.0 (6.0764) -3.3
(14.0738)
F-test 2.40* 2.31 [0.1157] 3.32* 3.33**
[0.0959] [0.0592] [0.0464]
No of obs. 20 20 21 20
R-squared 0.39 0.32 0.17 0.35
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance atl%, 5%, and 10%. Robust
standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. P-
values for F-tests shown in square brackets.
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Table 4.9: Regulations on Foreign Bank Ownership and Foreign Bank Entry: OLS 
Estimations
Indep. variable FORBANK99 FORBANK99 FORBANK99 FORBANK99
FORJlESTR_P 0.7263** 0.7311***
(0.2733) (0.2490)
FORJEASE_P 1.3519*** 1.2896***
(0.2317) (0.2139)
AVINFL -0.0288* -0.0298** -0.0256*** -0.0298***
(0.0157) (0.0128) (0.0074) (0.0075)
STATE_BANKS98 0.0361 0.1419
(0.2085) (0.1450)
PUBLICJIEG 0.0161 0.0935
(0.2006) (0.1184)
Intercept -28.0 -26.7 -64.1*** -52.1***
(26.0918) (22.2291) (17.9929) (14.5097)
F-test 2.61* 6.10*** 9.70*** 18.20***
[0.0722] [0.0086] [0.0003] [0.0000]
No of obs. 22 23 22 23
R-squared 0.31 0.31 0.73 0.69
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance atl%, 5%, and 10%. Robust
standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. P-
values for F-tests shown in square brackets.
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Table 4.10: Regulations on Foreign Bank Ownership and Foreign Bank Entry: OLS 
Estimations
Indep. variable FORBANK00.02 FORBANK00_02 FORBANK00_02 FORBANKOO-02
FOR_RESTR_P 0.9647* 0.9774**
(0.4617) (0.3918)
FOR_EASE_P 1.3393*** 1.3156***
(0.2713) (0.2630)
AVINFL -0.0392** -0.0413*** -0.0325*** -0.0350***
(0.0133) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0099)
STATE_BANKS98 0.1036 0.2514 0.2415*
(0.2115) (0.1476) (0.1230)
PUBLICJIEG -0.0054 0.0657
(0.2181) (0.1446)
Intercept -39.4 -36.7 -54.3** -49.8**
(45.8842) (37.2554) (22.0309) (20.6272)
F-test 3.40** 9.61*** 10.35*** 15.48***
[0.0385] [0.0016] [0.0004] [0.0001]
No of obs. 19 20 19 20
R-squared 0.45 0.44 0.72 0.71
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance atl%, 5%, and 10%. Robust
standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. P-
values for F-tests shown in square brackets.
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entry.
As an alternative dependent variable we also employ the share of foreign banks 
in the number of domestic banks operating in 1999 (FORBANK99) and later years 
(FORBANKOO-02) as a measure of foreign bank penetration. The results indicate 
that less restrictions on ownership by foreigners are significantly associated with 
more foreign bank entry, controlling for macroeconomic conditions, share of state 
banks and presence of credit information in the market. We also find that licensing 
requirements for foreign banks do not deter foreign entry; on the contrary, special 
licensing requirements (FOR_LICENSE_P) and different licensing requirements for 
foreign banks (FOR_LIC_DIFF_P) are found to have a positive and significant im­
pact on foreign entry (output not shown). These results are robust to employing as 
dependent variables the share of foreign banks averaged over 1999 to 2002, averaged 
over 1999 to 2001, and averaged over 1999 and 2000. We report partial results of this 
set of regressions in Tables 4.9 and 4.10. Among the control variables only inflation 
is found significant. Notably, the share of state-owned banks in 1998 usually enters 
with a positive sign, which indicates that state-ownership attracts foreign entry -  
this result is possibly driven by opportunities for privatization of state-owned banks 
to foreigners.
The results are particularly strong for the aggregate index of ease of foreign own­
ership as given by the law (FOR_EASE_P). This index together with past inflation 
explains about 70% of the variation in the share of foreign banks in 1999, and in 
the period 2000-2002 (see Tables 4.9 and 4.10). It is worth noting that when we 
use the average share of foreign-owned banks for the period 2000-2002 the results 
on all legal variables on foreign ownership hold. We find some weak evidence (Table 
4.10) that state ownership of banks in 1998 has a positive impact upon foreign entry 
in later years (the coefficient on STATE_BANKS98 is significant in the aggregate 
index regressions for 2000-2002, but not in 1999). In general, however, only inflation
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exerts a consistently significant negative effect upon foreign entry. We do not show 
the results for the other three legal indices, but the two licensing indices are found 
significant for both sets of regressions, while the index of permission of foreign entry 
is generally insignificant.
Finally, instrumental variables estimations, using four different sets of instru­
ments, provide limited support for the role of FOHJR,ESTR_P on PRIVATE99, 
but are generally supportive about the effect of the aggregate index of the ease 
of foreign ownership (FORJEASE_P) on foreign bank entry in 1999 and thereafter 
(FORBANK99 and FORBANK00_02).i®
4.5.3.2 Entry Requirements
We also investigate the impact of strict requirements for entry into banking in gen­
eral. The index of entry requirements (ENTRY_REQJP) is based on an extent-of- 
law (extensiveness) LIS question (question Q12; see Table 4.28 for a mapping of LIS 
Banking Law questions into the relevant indices and their comparison to the Barth 
et al. indices). Much like Barth et al. (2004), we do not find evidence of any signifi­
cant impact of entry requirements on the amount of private credit. We do find some 
evidence that more rigorous bank entry requirements are positively associated with 
a larger fraction of foreign-owned banks. Therefore, rather than reducing foreign 
entry, stricter licensing appears to be, in fact, attracting it. We test for the average 
fraction of foreign-owned banks in various years, but the results are sensitive to the 
inclusion of the three controls. In particular, the entry requirements legal index is 
correlated with the state ownership of banks control variable (STATE_BANKS98) -  
the correlation coefficient is -0.32 -  which is likely causing some multi-collinearity. 
Whenever STATE_BANKS98 is omitted from the regression equation, the legal vari­
able loses significance at the standard levels. Therefore, we interpret these results
These results are not reported to save space. They are available upon request.
Chapter 4. Banking Law and Private Credit 266
Table 4.11: Entry Requirements, Private Credit and Foreign Bank Entry: OLS 
Estimations
Indep. variable PR1VATE99 FORBANK00_02
ENTRY_REQ_P 0.0887 0.1876 1.1809* 0.9720* 0.6809
(0.2947) (0.3114) (0.5741) (0.5025) (0.4909)
AVINFL -0.0153* -0.0146* -0.0367** -0.0374** -0.0400***
(0.0079) (0.0083) (0.0161) (0.0144) (0.0108)
STATE_BANKS98 -0.1021 0.3968* 0.2841
(0.0960) (0.1945) (0.2009)
PUBLIC-REG 0.2230* 0.1886* -0.1086
(0.1203) (0.1100) (0.2123)
Intercept 8.0 -3.8 -65.8 -44.1 -7.7
(26.1494) (27.8794) (57.5693) (50.3840) (45.8216)
F-test 1.65 92.00 4.91** 4.72** 7.06***
[0.2132] [0.1548] [0.0110] [0.0152] [0.0058]
No of obs. 20 20 19 20 20
R-squared 0.33 0.30 0.37 0.32 0.24
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance atl%, 5%, and 10%. Robust 
standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. P- 
values for F-tests shown in square brackets.
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to mean that entry requirements, as proxied by the information of the LIS, do not 
have a significant impact upon bank lending to the private sector; the results sug­
gest a stronger positive impact of strict legal entry requirements for banks upon the 
entry decisions of foreign banks, but these results are not robust to the inclusion of 
the three control variables. Table 4.11 provides a brief summary of these regression 
results.
4.5.4 Perm issible A ctivities
We next examine how legal restrictions of permissible bank activities affect bank 
lending and foreign entry into banking. There are three LIS questions, which relate 
to scope of permissible activities -  Q7, Q8 and Q9. We use three indices based on 
these -  PERM_ACT_P, PROHIB_ACT_P and SEC_RESTR_P. The first one scores 
higher if a broad range of financial activities are allowed by law. The second one 
measures whether securities underwriting and dealing and participation in invest­
ment funds are prohibited, scoring higher if no prohibitions are stipulated. The third 
index measures whether banks can hold securities and whether legal restrictions on 
this exist. The aggregate index of permissible banking activities (ACT_RESTR_P) 
is the average of the three.
We do not find any evidence that restricting bank activities has any impact upon 
private credit. Neither of the legal measures are significant in the basic regression 
of PRIVATE99 with the usual controls. These results are also obtained when using 
private credit in 2000 (PRIVATEOO) as the dependent variable.
We do find some evidence that not restricting bank holding of securities -  both 
public and private -  has a negative effect upon foreign bank entry. These results are 
not very robust, however, and sensitive to the inclusion of different control variables. 
In addition, SEC_RESTR_P becomes insignificant in the regressions for the share of 
foreign banks over 2000-2002 (FORBANKOO-02).
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Finally, we also try to see the impact of banking activities restrictions on the 
share of non-performing bank loans over 2000-2002 (BADLOANS00_02). We find 
limited evidence that lack of legal prohibitions of securities underwriting and deal­
ing, and participation in investment funds is significantly associated with a higher 
share of future non-performing loans. In addition, the aggregate index of activi­
ties restrictions, ACT_RESTR_P, is positively associated with a higher fraction of 
non-performing loans, although the results fail the standard significance tests by a 
narrow margin. We do not attach much weight to these findings since the model 
estimating the share of non-performing loans is not properly identified.
4.5.5 Supervisory Attributes
4.5.5.1 Supervisory Powers
We explore the impact of several different supervisory powers over banks as given 
by the LIS. We establish that most of them have no particular impact upon private 
credit. However, our results suggest that anti-money-laundering regulations, and 
specifically their enforcement, are supportive of credit expansion and foreign entry. 
We also find that supervisory powers of conducting on-site examinations of banks 
are also associated with more private credit. Interestingly, however, more frequent 
on-site examinations have the opposite effect -  they seem to stifle credit. Strict 
requirements on related lending and related party transactions, and bank powers 
to undertake corrective actions against banks in violation of banking laws have a 
generally positive, but usually insignificant effect on private credit. Finally, bank 
powers to grant prior approvals before certain bank actions can take place, and 
the frequency of supervisory corrective actions bear no impact upon private credit. 
These results also hold for alternative dependent variables, such as foreign bank 
entry.
Therefore, we get mixed evidence about the role of supervisory powers over
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Table 4.12: Anti-Laundering Regulations and Private Credit: OLS Estimations
Indep. variable PRIVATE99
ANTI_LAUND_EXT 0.0274 (0.0647)
ANTI_LAUND_EFF 0.2213** (1008) 0.2564*** (0.0823)
AVINFL -0.0115 (0.0092) -0.0057 (0.0056)
STATE_BANKS98 -0.1272 (0.1049) -0.1822* (0.0989) -0.1858* (0.0946)
PUBLIC_REG 0.2266* (0.1198) 0.1971* (0.1112) 0.1970* (0.1071)
Intercept 14.9 (4.6940) 10.7** (4.1313) 8.9*** (2.7085)
F-test 1.97 [0.1503] 4.11** [0.0192] 4.83** [0.0140]
No of obs. 20 20 20
R-squared 0.34 0.43 0.42
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance atl%, 5%, and 10%. Robust 
standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. P- 
values for F-tests shown in square brackets.
banks. Table 4.12 presents the results of OLS regressions of PRIVATE99 on the 
two legal anti-laundering indices, ANTI_LAUND_EXT and ANTLLAUND_EFF^^, 
and the usual control variables. The results indicate that the enforcement of anti- 
money-laundering legal rules matters for private credit -  it is statistically significant 
and has a positive coefficient. The extent-of-law measure, i.e. whether banking 
laws contain provisions against money-laundering, is not significant. We must stress 
that the two legal measures and inflation are highly negatively correlated -  in an 
attempt to correct for multi-collinearity, we have also tested for the impact of each 
of the two legal indices on the residual of PRIVATE99 after regressing it on inflation 
and a constant. The results hold through -  ANTI_LAUND_EXT is not significant.
^^The two are highly correlated, and not included in a regression simultaneously.
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Table 4.13: On-Site Examinations and Private Credit: OLS Estimations
Indep, variable PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99 PRIVATE99
EXAM_EXT_P 0.0952
(0.0762)
0.1221*
(0.0673)
0.1661**
(0.0638)
EXAM_FREQJP -0.2934***
(0.0906)
-0.2513**
(0954)
-0.3355***
(0916)
PROF_EXAM_P 0.1212**
(0.0419)
0.0710
(0.0428)
AVINFL -0.0120* -0.0099* -0.0115** -0.0160* -0.0149*** -0.0138**
(0.0058) (0.0048) (0.0050) (0.0083) (0.0049) (0.0053)
STATE_BANKS98-0.0867 -0.1881** -0.2150** -0.1895**
(0.1099) (0.0731) (0.0816) (0.0793)
PUBLIC-REG 0.2342* 0.2091* 0.2697** 0.2502** 0.2591** 0.1827
(0.1236) (0.1183) (0.1082) (0.1051) (0.0962) (0.1116)
Intercept 6.3 1.3 12.4* 28.0*** 22.5*** 9.7**
(9.6677) (7.2554) (6.8064) (5.3545) (4.8844) (3.6690)
F-test 2.30 3.20* 4.58** 3.84** 6.50*** 3.33**
[0.1065] [0.0518] [0.0110] [0.0241] [0.0021] [0.0447]
No of obs. 20 20 20 20 21 21
R-squared 0.36 0.33 0.58 0.51 0.62 0.30
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance atl%, 5%, and 10%. Robust stan­
dard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. P-values for 
F-tests shown in square brackets.
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while ANTI_LAUND_EFF is (results are not reported). We also find evidence that 
both measures have a significant positive impact upon foreign bank entry in the 
period 2000-2002 (results not reported here). Therefore, unlike for private credit, 
the extent of the law with respect to preventing money laundering, as captured by 
the LIS, is found significant for foreign banks entry. Finally, we do not find any 
significant relationship between the share of non-performing bank loans over the 
period 2000-2002, and the two legal measures.
We next report the results on another aspect of bank powers -  supervisory 
authority to conduct on-site bank examinations (Table 4.13). We consider three 
elements of this: whether bank supervisors are legally empowered to conduct on­
site examinations, which measures the extent of the law (EXAM_EXTJP); the fre­
quency with which supervisors enter banks in practice and conduct such examina­
tions, which we call EXAM_FREQ_P; and the availability of experienced profes­
sionals in the supervisory agency, who can conduct such examinations effectively 
(PROF_EXAM_P). We consider the first of these indices as an extent-of-law (ex­
tensiveness) measure, while the other two axe enforcement-related (effectiveness- 
related). The results for their impact upon private lending indicate that having 
legal provisions, which empower bank supervisors to conduct on-site examinations 
of banks, is positively associated with private credit, while more frequent on-site 
supervisory examinations are associated with less private credit. The results are 
statistically significant. Therefore, the evidence seems to tell, that while on-site ex­
aminations can be beneficial in monitoring banks, their over-use can be harmful for 
credit market outcomes. If the frequency measure is a proxy for real banking powers, 
then this is in line with the findings of Barth et al. (2004) about the negative effects 
of extensive supervisory powers. Indeed, more frequent visits may actually refiect 
regulatory capture or corruption, and thus lead to less rather than more credit expan­
sion. In addition, our equation may suffer from selection bias since more visits may
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be associated with more troubled banks, which lend less. There may be self-selection 
in this case. The results hold for an equation which includes both EXAM_EXT_P 
and EXAM_FREQ_P simultaneously (the two are not highly correlated). Finally, 
the availability of professional examiners is positively associated with private credit, 
but the result is sensitive to the specification and the control variables included. 
In particular, PROF_EXAM_P is correlated with STATE_BANKS98, which induces 
multi-collinearity, and can account for the significant coefficient of PROF_EXAMJP 
in column 4 of Table 4.13. Dropping the state bank variable, leads PROF_EXAM_P 
to just miss significance at the 10% level.
We do not report the results on the effect of other supervisory powers granted by 
the law, such as prior approvals, restrictions on related lending and ability to under­
take corrective actions since none is found significant in the standard regressions for 
private credit.^® Moreover, these variables are not found significant for alternative 
dependent variables such as foreign bank entry and share of non-performing loans 
over the period 2000-2002. Perhaps, the most surprising finding is that corrective 
actions and their use in practice have not been found to affect private credit, as 
initially expected.
Finally, IV regressions for ANTI_LAUND_EFF and EFFBANK99 (which is a 
composite index of the two disclosure effectiveness indices and two of the Supervisory
^®The LIS index of supervisory powers to undertake corrective actions against banks (based on 
question Q31) barely misses significance at the 10% level in the standard regression of PRIVATE99, 
controlling for inflation and the availability of a pubhc credit registry, and has a positive sign. This 
is in contrast to Barth et al. (2004), where their index of Prompt Corrective Power has a negative, 
but insignificant effect on private credit when not controlfing for other supervisory variables. The 
differential impact of their and our indices -  despite a positive correlation of 0.43 -  may be due to 
different coverage, e.g. the BCL index measures whether the law estabfishes pre-determined levels 
of bank solvency deterioration which can force automatic supervisory intervention. Our index 
measures what types of corrective actions bank supervisors are authorised to undertake against 
banks which violate the banking laws or their own procedures.
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Powers indices, i.e. EXT_AUDIT_EFF and CONS_EXAM_EFF, ANTIXAUND_EFF 
and PROFJEXAM) confirm the OLS results for ANTI_LAUND_EFF and that en­
forcement components of disclosure and supervisory powers matter. First-stage 
regressions (see Panel B of Table 4.5 and Table 4.6) showed earlier that both Re­
ligion and Years under communism work well for both these variables. Table 4.14 
reports the second-stage results.
4.5.5.2 Supervisory Independence
Finally, we also examine the impact of bank supervisory independence and private 
credit provision. We do not have very rich data on independence, and rely on two 
variables: SUP JNDEPJP, which measures whether there is bank regulator (super­
visor), and whether it is independent, and on INDEP_EVAL_P, which measures the 
frequency with which bank supervisors make independent evaluations of bank prac­
tices and procedures for granting of loans and making investments. The first is an 
extent-of-law (extensiveness) variable, while the second is concerned with enforce­
ment of the law (effectiveness measure). We find only limited evidence that higher 
independence of the bank supervisory authority results in higher private credit. We 
find no association between independent supervisory evaluations of bank activities 
and private credit (results not reported for space considerations).
These results should be taken with caution since our measure of independence 
is based on a single question and probably not well designed to capture the dif­
ferent aspects of institutional independence of the supervisory agency. We report 
some of the regression results of PRIVATE99 on SUP_INDEP_P (Table 4.15). Since 
SUP JNDEP_P and AVINFL are correlated (0.41), we show some specifications with­
out inflation. Controlling for inflation makes SUPJNDEP_P insignificant. So does 
using the usual two-step procedure through employing as a dependent variable the 
residual of a regression of PRIVATE99 on AVINFL. Therefore, we conclude that al-
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Table 4.14: Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimations of Enforcement-Related Bank- 
ing Indices Using 2SLS and Religion and Years under Communism as instruments
Indep. variable PRIVATE99 PR1VATE99 PRIVATEOO PRIVATE99
Instrument: Years under Instrument: Religion
communism
ANTIXAUNDJEFF 0.3381** 0.9029**
(0.1193) (0.4125)
EFFBANK99 0.6990**
(0.2517)
1.5658***
(0.5341)
AVINFL -0.0104**
(0.0042)
0.0234
(0.0221)
STATE_BANKS98 -0.2084*
(0.1079)
-0.3171
(0.2216)
PUBLICJIEG 0.1877*
(0.0937)
Intercept 4.8 (2.7975) -28.1* ' -8.0 -92.0**
(15.4308) (13.2365) (36.2982)
No. of obs. 22 20 21 22
F-test (1st stage) F(2, F(5, F(4, F(2,
19)=19.44 14)=4.23 16)=4.40 19)=3.78
[0.0000] [0.0149] [0.0137] [0.0415]
Hausman test 2,15 [0.1429] 0.03 [0.8593] 6.02 [0.0142] 9.14 (0.0025)
OIR test (Sargan X^(l) =0.001.. x^(l) =0.434 X^(2) =1.380 % (^2) =0.425
test) [0.9809] [0.5102] [0.2402] [0.5143]
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Robust
standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. P-
values shown is square brackets for the F-test and diagnostic tests.
Chapter 4. Banking Law and Private Credit 275
Table 4.15: Supervisory Independence and Private Credit: OLS Estimations
Indep. variable PRIVATE99 (4)
SUPJNDEP_P 0.1038 0.1934 0.1890* 0.0783
(0.1478) (0.1195) (0.0990) (0.1154)
AVINFL -0.0134
(0.0081)
STATE_BANKS98 -0.1127 -0.0826 -0.1212
(0.1039) (0.0948) (0.0957)
PUBLICJIEG 0.2031 0.2025 0.1655 0.2033
(0.1227) (0.1219) (0.1143) (0.1184)
Intercept 10.5
(11.4275)
2.1 (7.8247) 0.8 (5.8362) -5.4 (8.0156)
F-test 2.82* [0.0601] 2.57* [0.0883] 3.92**
[0.0377]
1.48 [0.2552]
No of obs. 21 21 22 21
R-squared 0.33 0.27 0.26 0.23
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance atl%, 5%, and 10%. Ro-
bust standard errors shown in parentheses next to coeflEicient estimates.
P-values for F-tests shown in square brackets. Equation (4)’s depen­
dent variable is the residual from an OLS regression of PRIVATE99 on
AVINFL and a constant.
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though supervisory independence appears to have a positive eflFect on private credit, 
this effect is not robust to controlling for past inflation. Table 4.15 shows some of 
the regression results on supervisory independence.
The results on the supervisory independence legal measures also hold for regres­
sions using private credit in 2000, and FORBANK00_02 as dependent variables.
4.6 Robustness Checks
4.6.1 Alternative dependent variables
As explained in Section 4.3, we test the robustness of our main results by using 
alternative measures of bank development in the transition economies. The two 
measures we consider are the share of liquid habilities of banks and non-bank finan­
cial intermediaries in GDP (LIQUID99), and the ratio of commercial bank domestic 
assets and the sum of commercial bank and central bank domestic assets (COM- 
MERCIAL99). The former measures flnancial depth, while the latter measures the 
degree to which commercial banks rather than the central bank allocate society’s 
savings. We have re-run our OLS and IV regressions from the previous section, 
using the share of liquid liabilities of banks and non-bank flnancial intermediaries 
in GDP. Our main results hold through. Thus, we find that the effective disclosure 
of bank information through consolidated supervisory examinations and the use of 
external auditing flrms in the preparation of flnancial information both maintain a 
signiflcant and positive effect on flnancial development as proxied by LIQUID99 and 
using the regular control variables such as average inflation, the share of state banks 
in 1998 and the index of public credit registry. We also find, as in the private credit 
regressions, that who writes the country’s accounting rules -  be it the government, 
or the professional community, or both -  matters for LIQUID99. More indepen­
dent accounting rules-writing, as captured by higher values of the AGGOUNTING
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Table 4.16: Selected Banking Law Indices and Liquid Liabilities, 1999. OLS Esti­
mations________________________________________________________________
Indep.
variable
EXT-AUDIT-EFF
CONS_EXAM_EFF
ACCOUNTING
CAPADEQJIULES
FOR_EASEJ>
ANTLLAUND.EFF
EFFBANK99
AVINFL
LIQUID99 LIQUID99LIQUID99LIQUID99 LIQUID99 LIQUID99LIQUID99
0.5885**
(0.2320)
0.3878*
(0.2043)
0.2858**
(0.1206)
0.2906**
(0 .1012)
0.5988**
(0.2718)
0.4783***
(0.1231)
-0.0424*** -0.0305** -0.0272** -0.0428*
(0.0119) (0.0086)
24.4*** 20.1***
(0.0118) (0.0138)
Intercept -21.2 3.5
(19.3306) (16.6016) (6.0791) (3.8244)
F-test (2,19) 7.93*** 7.90*** 19.91*** 14.70***
[0.0031] [0.0032] [0.0000] [0.0001]
No of obs. 22 22 22 22
R-squared 0.38 0.41 0.36 0.42
-0.0375***
(0.0077)
-12.3
(19.9173)
12.58***
[0.0003]
22
0.48
0.8886***
(0.1952)
-0.0102 -0.0259***
(0.0071) (0.0086)
11.5** -32.0**
(4.3193) (14.9163)
22.32*** 25.30***
[0.0000] [0.0000]
22 22
0.57 0.55
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance atl%, 5 % ,  and 10%. Robust stauidard errors shown in parentheses 
next to coefficient estimates. P-values for F-tests shown in square brackets.
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index, is significantly associated with higher values of LIQUID99. Similarly to the 
PRIVATE99 regressions, we also find evidence that adoption of internationally ac­
cepted capital adequacy requirements -  measured by the CAPADEQJIULES index 
-  significantly increases the share of liquid liabilities. As in the previous section, the 
results also indicate that the ease of foreign bank ownership supports local financial 
market development -  indeed, the index of foreign ownership ease (FOR_EASEJ^) 
is also positively and significantly associated with higher LIQUID99. The earlier 
results on the impact of effective anti-money-laundering banking law provisions 
(ANTLLAUND_EFF) on PRTVATE99 are also corroborated by the LIQUID99 re­
gression results. The enforcement of anti-money-laundering legal rules is positively 
and significantly associated with a higher share of liquid liabilities of the financial 
system. Finally, EFFBANK99 -  i.e. the enforcement of banking laws on consoli­
dated examinations, external auditing, anti-money laundering and the presence of 
professional bank supervisors -  are also significantly and positively associated with 
financial development.
These results hold for both OLS and IV regressions, using legal transplant dum­
mies as instruments for the legal variables. Interestingly, among the control variables 
only inflation (AVINFL) is found significant; the share of state ownership of banks 
in 1998 and the index of public credit registry are not found significant for liquid 
liabilities.
We present a summary of the main results for LIQUID99 in Table 4.16.
Some of the other banking law indices are also found significant. For instance, un­
like in the private credit regressions the index of entry requirements (ENTRY JIEQT*) 
is found significant at the 10% level. In line with the private credit regressions, we 
also find that more frequent bank examinations by supervisors (EXAMJPREQT*) 
are significantly associated with worse rather than better financial outcomes. Just 
like in the regressions for foreign bank entry, both the extent of law with re-
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spect to money laundering activities (ANTI_LAUND_EXT), and its enforcement 
(ANTLLAUND_EFF) have a positive and significant impact upon liquid liabilities 
as percent of GDP in 1999. We also check for the significance of the ingredients of 
foreign ownership ease (FOR_EASE_P), which is found highly significant. We find 
that less restrictions on the percentage of domestic bank ownership by foreign banks 
-  i.e. higher values of FOR_RESTR_P -  are associated with higher liquid liabilities. 
It is this component of foreign ownership ease, which drives the earlier results of 
FOR_EASE_P.
4.6.2 Controlling for G D P per capita
The results reported thus far do not take into account GDP per capita. However, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, GDP per capita affects both financial development and 
institutions. Earlier studies have been able to show that countries with higher GDP 
per capita have better developed financial systems, and also have established better 
institutions. Furthermore, more financial development may trigger more institu­
tional or legal development. As in Chapter 3, we isolate the effect of GDP per 
capita by running a regression of financial development (PR1VATE99, L1QU1D99) 
on the logarithm of GDP per capita and a constant term, and then use the resid­
uals from this regression to test for the effect of our legal indices and the infiat ion, 
state-owned bank share and public credit registry index control variables. Table 
4.17 briefly summarises the main results of the two-step procedure. We find evi­
dence that better rules on financial disclosure by banks, as captured by the index 
of DISCLOSEJEFF, are robust to correcting for GDP per capita. Less restrictions 
on foreign bank ownership -  i.e. higher values of the FORJRESTR_P -  are also 
robustly related to PR1VATE99, after controlling for GDP per capita. This, the 
results for the effect of effective information disclosure and less legal restrictions on 
foreign bank ownership are robust to controlling for GDP per capita in the private
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Table 4.17: Private Credit and Liquid Liabilities after Controlling for GDP Per 
Capita, 1999. OLS Estimations
(1)Indep. variable
DISCLOSE_EFF 0.3035* 
(0.1669)
FOR_RESTR_P
FOR_EASE_P
ANTI_LAUND_EFF
(2) (3) (4)
0.1735**
(0.0652)
0.4920***
(0.0884)
0.5767***
(0.1529)
(5)
0.2117*
(0.1181)
AVINFL -0.0153**
(0.0055)
-0.0147**
(0.0052)
-0.0021
(0.0077)
STATE_BANKS98 -0.0907*
(0.0506)
-0.1126**
(0.0491)
Intercept -21.8 -12.5** -43.2*** -39.4*** -6.6
(14.0801) (5.0033) (6.0091) (10.4788) (5.6100)
F-test 6.20*** 5.43** 16.22*** 7.58*** 5.15**
[0.0089] [0.0143] [0.0001] [0.0038] [0.0163]
No of obs. 21 21 22 22 22
R-squared 0.19 0.22 0.42 0.50 0.21
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Robust 
standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefiicient estimates. P- 
values for F-tests shown in square brackets. Regressions (1) and (2) have 
as a dependent variable the residual of an OLS regression of PRIVATE99 
on the log of GDP per capita and a constant. Regressions (3), (4) and 
(5) have as a dependent variable the residual of an OLS regression of 
LIQUID99 on the log of GDP per capita and a constant.
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credit regressions. The latter two-step procedure of isolating the impact of GDP 
per capita rests on the assumption that GDP per capita and the legal variables 
are not correlated, which is not the case here. Hence, we have also run all these 
regressions for PRIVATE99 and LIQUID99 with the log of GDP per capita among 
the explanatory variables, but note the presence of multi-collinearity.^^
4.7 Conclusions
The present chapter investigated the impact of various aspects of banking laws and 
their application through bank supervision on the availability of private credit in 
the transition economies. It utilised^ data from the Banking Law section of the 1999 
EBRD Legal Indicator Survey. One of the important, and original, features of this 
chapter was to query the robustness of some of the findings of Barth et al. (2004) 
-  namely their strong claim that greater supervisory powers weaken rather than 
strengthen banking development.
The LIS data on banking law and its enforcement differ from the Barth et al. 
(2004) data. Indeed, as carefully outlined for each group of legal variables in Sec­
tion 4.3, this chapter demonstrates the difficulties in obtaining robust measures of 
banking law and regulatory features. The in-depth look at the Barth et al. (2004) 
measures is very useful in identifying four groups of LIS variables depending on their
^^The results of Table 4.17 hold. For example, in the regressions of PRIVATE99 we find that 
DISCLOSE_EFF and FOR-RESTRJP are significant at 5% in the presence of GDP per capita, 
inflation and the state bank share controls. The public registry index is never significant and is 
dropped. Similarly, in the LIQUID99 regressions we find that the indices of ANTI_LAUND_EFF, 
FOR_EASE_P and FOR_RESTR_P are highly significant at 1% in the presence of log GDP per 
capita and the usual controls. The index of capital adequacy rules (CAPADEQJRULES) is also 
robust to inclusion of GDP per capita in the liquid liabilities regressions. The log of GDP per capita 
is significant at 1% in all cases. These results are not reported for brevity. They are available upon 
request.
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degree of correlation with supposedly similar Barth et al. (2004) variables.
•  One group of LIS and BCL banking law and supervision variables, which mea­
sure similar banking legal and regulatory concepts, display a high or, at a 
minimum, a moderate positive correlation. This group includes the aggregate 
indices related to Information Disclosure and Private Monitoring of Banks, 
where the correlation between the BCL and LIS aggregate indices is 0.29; and 
the aggregate indices of Supervisory Powers (with a statistically significant 
correlation between the BCL and LIS indices of 0.59) and Supervisory Correc­
tive Actions (with a correlation coefficient of 0.43). It also includes the indices 
of foreign bank entry restrictions, where the correlation coefficients between 
two of the four LIS measures on foreign bank entry restrictions and permis­
sions (FOR_RESTR_P and FOR_PERM_P) and the BCL counterpart measure 
of FOREIGNLIMITS are -0.51 and -0.52 respectively, and the negative associ­
ation is expected since the two measure restrictions in opposite ways, i.e. the 
BCL measure assigns higher values to more restrictions, and the LIS does vice 
versa).
•  A second group of BCL and LIS measures, which are similar in content, are also 
positively correlated, but the degree of association is lower, i.e. the correlation 
coefficients are around 0.15 to 0.25. Examples are our two capital adequacy 
measures and the BCL Overall Capital Stringency index, as well as the BCL 
and LIS measures related to Permissible Activities for banks.
•  In a third group of measures, however, the observed correlation of allegedly 
similar LIS and BCL variables is negative. An example would be the legal
®^In the latter case, the correlation is negative (-0.24), but this is expected since the BCL index 
assigns higher values for more restrictions, whereas the LIS indices assign higher values for less 
legal restrictions.
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measures related to supervisory independence (the correlation coefficient is 
-0.26).
• Finally, in a fourth group of variables, there is a very low or almost zero corre­
lation between the BCL and LIS variables, which are purportedly measuring 
the same banking law features. These include the Entry into Banking indices 
(correlation coefficient of 0.14 or less) as well as some of the sub-indices of the 
different aggregate measures.
We can expect to compare our results to those of Barth et al. (2004) only in 
those cases where our and their measures of banking law and supervision have a high 
or, at a minimum, a moderate positive correlation, and there is a sufficient degree of 
overlap in the actual content of the indices being compared. When there is virtually 
no correlation, or a very low correlation between similar variables, a comparison 
of estimated regression results is not very useful. Since the variables are not well 
correlated, we would expect them to have different effects on the same dependent 
variables, but we cannot say which is the relevant effect. The same applies when the 
LIS and BCL variables display a moderate degree of negative correlation (except 
those cases where the two measure the same concept in different directions).
In general, this chapter has two central findings: 1) better private monitoring of 
banks is associated with better banking development, and 2) more supervisory pow­
ers to conduct on-site examinations of banks and to enforce anti-money-laundering 
rules are also associated with better banking outcomes. Other supervisory powers, 
however, are found largely irrelevant. It is fortunate that these two are the types of 
variables with the highest or a reasonably high positive correlation with the BCL 
counterpart measures, so we can compare the results. My results on private mon­
itoring are generally supportive of the Barth et al. (2004) and Beck et al. (2003c) 
findings that better enforcement of information disclosure rules is associated with 
better banking market outcomes, most likely through better private monitoring of
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banks. Thus, we establish that the use of external auditors by banks for their annual 
financial statements as well as the frequency with which bank supervisors examine 
banks on a consolidated basis are significantly associated with higher levels of pri­
vate credit, controlling for inflation, availability of information on borrowers, and 
the share of state banks. The results also indicate that the determination of na­
tional accounting rules by the accounting community rather than the government 
also raises private credit. Furthermore, we establish that document disclosure to 
supervisors by banks is not significantly associated with higher private credit; when 
it is interacted with the use of external auditors by banks, however, the composite 
index of disclosure attains significance.
However, in terms of supervisory agency powers, we get some results -  albeit 
not conclusive -  which contrast the findings of Barth et al. (2004). First, our re­
sults show that more powers directed at anti-money laundering and their effective 
application by bank supervisors are associated with more private credit, and attract 
foreign banks. Second, we find some evidence that supervisory authority for con­
ducting on-site examinations of banks is associated with better, rather than worse 
outcomes. In support of the latter finding, the results also show that more profes­
sional bank supervisors are also positively linked to private lending. These results 
are different from the ones on the effects of supervisory powers reported by Barth 
et al. (2004), who find a negative but insignificant effect of the index of Official 
Supervisory Powers on private credit. Unfortunately, the comparison between the 
effects of the BCL index and our composite measure of Supervisory Powers will not 
work in this case despite the high positive correlation between the two. As men­
tioned earlier, this correlation may be spurious since the two index components are 
found -  upon a closer inspection -  to be quite different. In fact, Barth et al. (2004) 
acknowledge that their index of Official Supervisory Powers is subject to limitations 
and does not contain information about some important bank supervisors’ powers.
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For instance, our sub-indices of on-site examinations and their frequency are two 
elements the that the their index is lacking, and we find that these two elements 
appear to be affecting banking outcomes in a significant manner (positively and neg­
atively, respectively). Importantly, the frequency of bank on-site examinations does 
not necessarily and exclusively represent supervisory power. More frequent bank 
supervisory on-site examinations are found to reduce private credit significantly -  
however, we conjecture that this result may be due to self-selection -  in the sense 
that a higher frequency of examination is associated with worse banks to begin with. 
The latter finding should be explored further. In terms of corrective actions, where 
the BCL and LIS measures are positively correlated, we find a positive impact on 
private credit, which just misses significance; in contrast, Barth et al. (2004) find 
a negative impact of their index on private credit when not controlling for other 
supervisory variables. As mentioned earlier, the differential impact may be due to 
the different content of the BCL and LIS measures.
In terms of legal rules on foreign bank ownership, our results are in line with 
previous studies, which find that less restrictions on foreign bank entry are associated 
with better banking outcomes and more credit expansion. Thus, our results show 
that less restrictions on the share of ownership by foreign banks in domestic banks 
-  as prescribed by the law -  are associated with significantly higher volumes of 
private credit, and a higher penetration of foreign banks into the domestic banking 
market. Overall, the indications are that a more competitive banking market -  
as characterised by lower barriers to foreign entry -  allows for credit expansion. 
Our indices of foreign bank ownership are well correlated (negatively since they are 
measured in opposite directions) -  and for two of the four LIS indices the correlation 
with the BCL measure is high at -0.51 and -0.52. In line with this, the effects are as 
expected: Barth et al. (2004) find a significant negative effect of more restrictions 
on foreign bank ownership (captured by higher index values) on bank development
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measures; we find a significant positive impact of less restrictions (higher index 
values) upon bank development.
For the second group of BCL and LIS variables -  where we observe a limited 
positive correlation between the BCL and LIS measures -  we find that bank capital 
adequacy rules appear to play a supportive role for private credit, possibly through 
reducing bank managers’ incentives for high-risk-taking activities, and promoting 
bank stability. Our results show that adherence to the Basle Capital Adequacy 
Rules is significantly associated with more private credit in the economy. In contrast, 
Barth et al. (2004)’s results are not very robust: the Capital Stringency index is 
found negatively but insignificantly related to private credit in the presence of other 
controls and banking law regressors; in separate IV regressions, however, it has a 
positive and significant effect on private credit. So, their evidence on its impact 
is somewhat inconclusive.^^ In addition, the BCL and LIS indices of measuring 
restrictiveness of bank activities and mixing banking and commerce (which display 
a negative correlation at -0.24, but measure restrictiveness in opposite directions) 
are also found to have different impacts on bank development. For instance, I find 
that the index of restricting bank activities (ACT_RESTR_P) is not associated with 
private credit and the other bank development measures. In contrast, Barth et 
al. (2004) find that their index reduces private credit significantly and raises the 
likelihood of banking crises. It could be the case that their larger sample allows 
them to pick up more variation in both the dependent and explanatory variables. 
Clearly, further work on this is necessary.
In terms of supervisory independence -  which is the only variable with a negative 
correlation between the BCL and LIS measures -  we find some limited and not very 
robust evidence of a positive effect of independence on private credit. Barth et
must note that Barth et al.’s Capital Stringency Index has a wider scope than our CA- 
PADEQ-RULES index, but certain components of the Capital Stringency Index do not display 
much variation among the transition countries.
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al. (2004) find that their measure of supervisory independence is not related to 
bank development variables, although their IV regressions estimate a positive and 
significant effect of supervisory independence on private credit. Since our measure 
is very limited and based on a single question, and potential weaknesses in the BCL 
independence measure were outlined in Section 4.3, both the Barth et al. (2004) 
and our results are very tentative.
Finally, in terms of banking entry requirements, where the association between 
BCL and LIS is positive, but very low (0.14), we find that more comprehensive entry 
rules do not affect private credit, but may have a positive impact on foreign entry. 
Barth et al. (2004) establish that tighter entry rules raise banks’ overhead costs, but 
have no effect on bank development outcomes. Given the low degree of correlation, 
it is somewhat surprising that similar effects on private credit emerge.
Altogether, we do not find results entirely supportive of recent findings by Barth 
et al. (2004) that supervisory powers axe associated with less banking development. 
These results on the effects of supervisory powers can benefit from further research. 
We do find strong evidence, however, that supervision through better enforcement 
of information disclosure rules does lead to more credit and a more open banking 
market -  a finding which is consistent with Barth et al. (2004) and other previous 
research.
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Table 4.18: Definition of Variables
Variable Description
PRIVATE99
FORBANK99
FORBANK00_02
LIQUID99
AVINFL
STATE_BANKS98
PUBLIC_REG
EXT_AUDIT_EFF
CONS_EXAM_EFF
ACCOUNTING
ACCJDISCREP
DISCLOSE_EFF
CAPADEQ_RULES
CAPADEQ.UND
FOR_RESTR_P
FOR_EASE_P
ANTI_LAUND_EXT
ANTI_LAUND_EFF
EXAM_EXT_P
EXAM_FREQ_P
PROF_EXAM_P
SUPJNDEP_P
Bank Credit to the Private Sector, % of GDP, 1999.
Share of foreign banks in the number of total banks, 1999.
Share of foreign banks in the number of total banks, 2000-2002. 
Liquid liabilities of banks and non-banks, % of GDP, 1999. 
Average annual rate of inflation, 1994-1999.
Share of total bank assets, held by government banks, 1998. 
Index of a public credit registry and the scope of its information. 
Index of actual use of external auditors by banks.
Index of use of consolidated examinations of banks by supervisors. 
Index of accounting rules writing (extent of law).
Index of discrepancy between local acc. standards and IAS.
Index of effective document disclosure by banks.
Index of extensiveness of capital adequacy rules.
Index of understanding of capital adequacy rules by bank 
managers.
Index of restrictions on foreign ownership share of domestic banks. 
Index of ease of foreign ownership of domestic banks.
Index of extensiveness of anti-money-laundering rules for banks. 
Index of enforcement of anti-money-laundering rules for banks. 
Index of bank powers to conduct on-site examinations of banks. 
Index of frequency of bank on-site examinations.
Index of professional bank supervisors /on-site examiners.
Index of supervisory authority independence.
Note: All legal indices are as of 1999. Sources: World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank (2004b); EBRD IVansition 
Reports, various issues; World Bank Doing Business Database, World Bank (2004a).
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Table 4.19: Definition of Variables
Variable Description
PRIVATEOO
COMMERCIAL99
BADLOANS00_02
LGDPPC99
CONS_STAT_EXT
MAND_AUDITJEXT
DOCUMENT-DISCL
FOR_PERM_P
FOR_LICENSE_P
FOR_LIC_DIFF_P
ENTRY_REQJP
PERM_ACT_P
PROHIB_ACT_P
SEC_RESTR_P
ACT_RESTR_P
INDEP_EVALJP
EFFBANK99
Bank Credit to the Private Sector, % of GDP, 2000.
Ratio of domestic commercial bank assets over the sum of central 
and commercial bank assets.
Share of non-performing bank loans, 2000-2002, %.
Logarithm of GDP per capita, 1999.
Index of requirements for issue of consolidated statements by 
banks.
Index of mandatory annual audits for banks.
Index of requirements for document disclosure by banks.
Index of permission of foreign ownership of domestic banks.
Index of requirements for a license to buy shares in domestic banks. 
Index of differences in licensing for foreign and domestic banks. 
Index of document requirements for entry into banking.
Index of permitted activities for banks.
Index of prohibited activities for banks.
Index of restrictions on bank securities activities.
Average of PERM JVCT_P, PROHIB^CT_P, ACT_RESTR_P. 
Index of frequency of independent supervisory evaluations of 
banks.
Index of enforcement of
banking laws, average of EXT_AUDIT_EFF, CONS_EXAM_EFF, 
ANTI_LAUND_EFF and PROF_EXAM_P.
Note: All legal indices are as of 1999. Sources: World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank (2004b); EBRD IVansition 
Reports, various issues; World Bank Financial Structure Database.
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Table 4.20: Banking Variables by Country
Country PRIVATE99 F0RBANK99 FORBANK00_02 LIQUID99
Albania 2.1 84.6 92.3 38.9
Armenia 5.8 34.4 40.7 10.5
Azerbaijan n.a. 7.1 8.9 4.4
Belarus 9.3 11.1 31.1 12.4
Bulgaria 14.0 64.7 74.1 28.3
Croatia 22.1 24.5 51.6 39.9
Czech Republic 42.3 64.3 67.9 64.8
Estonia 26.0 42.9 57.1 31.3
FYR Macedonia 10.4 21.7 35.0 8.5
Georgia 5.8 25.0 24.2 3.0
Hungary 25.8 67.4 75.1 44.1
Kazakhstan 7.4 32.7 n.a. 9.9
Kyrgyzstan 3.0 21.7 27.4 12.4
Latvia 16.0 52.2 61.2 25.7
Lithuania 11.1 30.8 34.4 20.4
Moldova 11.1 50.0 56.7 19.7
Poland 18.7 50.7 70.6 39.4
Romania 8.1 55.9 71.3 21.22
Russian Federation 10.9 2.4 2.7 9.5
Slovak Republic 40.5 44.0 70.9 60.1
Slovenia 38.0 16.1 23.2 43.5
Ukraine 8.6 9.3 n.a. 14.5
Uzbekistan n.a. 14.3 n.a. n.a.
Sources: EBRD Transition Report 2003, World Development Indicators (WDI), 
2003.
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Table 4, 21: Economic and Legal Variables by Country
Country STATE.BANKS98 PUBLIC-REG EXT_AUDIT_EFF CONS-EXAM_EFF
Albania 85.6 0 81.25 81.25
Armenia 5.7 0 75.00 75.00
Azerbaijan 65.5 0 100.00 50.00
Belarus 59.5 42 100.00 75.00
Bulgaria 56.4 47 94.64 80.77
Croatia 37.5 0 83.33 80.56
Czech Republic 18.6 60 89.58 45.83
Estonia 7.8 n.a. 100.00 82.14
FYR Macedonia 1.4 42 75.00 58.33
Georgia 0.0 0 100.00 50.00
Hungary 9.8 0 95.83 87.50
Kazakhstan 23.0 0 90.00 65.00
Kyrgyzstan 10.4 0 91.67 25.00
Latvia 8.5 0 81.25 56.25
Lithuania 44.4 63 100.00 50.00
Moldova 0.3 0 81.25 75.00
Poland 48.0 0 96.43 75.00
Romania 75.3 59 79.17 66.67
Russian Federation 41.9 0 88.16 59.72
Slovak Republic 50.0 48 100.00 94.44
Slovenia 41.3 60 100.00 100.00
Ukraine 13.7 0 64.29 57.14
Uzbekistan 67.3 0 100.00 68.75
Sources: EBRD Transition Report 2003, World Bank Doing Business Database, 
World Bank (2004a); EBRD 1999 Legal Indicator Survey and author’s compilations.
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Table 4.22: Banking Law Variables by Country
Country ACCOUNTING CAPADEQJIULES FORJEASE-P ANTIXAUND-EFF PROF_EXAM_P
Albania 25.00 33.33 83.33 58.33 58.33
Armenia 0.00 16.67 75.00 0.00 100.00
Azerbaijan 0.00 11.11 60.42 0.00 100.00
Belarus 0.00 0.00 45.83 0.00 -66.67
Bulgaria 7.00 66.67 78.17 68.75 54.17
Croatia 39.00 17.20 70.92 47.22 66.67
Czech Republic 9.00 61.67 89.18 58.33 66.67
Estonia 43.00 55.56 72.02 60.71 76.19
FYR Macedonia 0.00 50.00 54.17 25.00 100.00
Georgia 0.00 100.00 87.50 0.00 100.00
Hungary 33.00 65.15 91.73 59.62 86.11
Kazakhstan 10.00 4.17 71.25 10.00 66.67
Kyrgyzstan 17.00 50.00 73.61 37.50 66.67
Latvia 38.00 29.17 80.21 25.00 16.67
Lithuania 0.00 50.00 66.67 33.33 44.44
Moldova 13.00 25.00 79.17 12.50 58.33
Poland 21.00 33.33 70.83 50.00 61.90
Romania 25.00 40.56 80.42 58.33 55.56
Russian Federation 3.00 12.50 52.07 20.00 78.33
Slovak Republic 11.00 42.86 90.08 55.56 62.96
Slovenia 83.00 66.67 47.92 33.33 100.00
Ukraine 0.00 33.33 60.42 -3.13 47.62
Uzbekistan 38.00 11.11 67.19 12.50 16.67
Sources: EBRD 1999 Legal Indicator Survey and author’s compilations as described 
in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4.
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Table 4.23: Economic and Legal Variables by Country
Country PRIVATEOO COMMERCIAL99 BADLOANSOO-02 ACT_RESTR_P EFFBANK99
Albania 2.9 69.1 18.4 50.22 75.00
Armenia 7.1 84.8 6.3 28.00 63.64
Azerbaijan n.a. 47.8 46.52 63.64
Belarus n.a. 76.4 11.8 5.67 57.58
Bulgaria 11.6 65.3 9.7 37.15 81.21
Croatia 27.8 99.6 15.4 53.77 , 74.24
Czech Republic 36.6 95.1 14.1 33.13 65.91
Estonia 25.5 99.7 1.1 35.94 84.20
FYR Macedonia 10.5 80.6 42.2 46.52 62.12
Georgia 6.5 29.9 7.9 27.78 63.64
Hungary 30.2 62.1 3.5 33.80 85.33
Kazakhstan 10.6 60.7 31.33 64.24
Kyrgyzstan 2.2 31.0 14.5 35.41 55.30
Latvia 19.5 93.1 3.4 30.78 56.06
Lithuania 10.2 99.8 8.0 22.44 64.65
Moldova 12.6 51.9 12.9 23.61 64.39
Poland 18.1 91.5 20.5 24.83 77.06
Romania 7.2 89.0 3.2 21.11 68.69
Russian Federation 11.9 55.8 13.2 46.89 64.53
Slovak Republic 37.6 98.2 20.6 45.06 86.53
Slovenia 38.7 98.9 46.41 87.88
Ukraine 9.9 41.8 52.89 47.92
Uzbekistan n.a. n.a. 40.28 65.15
Sources: EBRD Transition Report 2003, World Bank Financial Structure Database, 
EBRD 1999 Legal Indicator Survey and author’s compilations.
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Table 4.24: Mapping of LIS Questions Into Banking Law Variables
Variable LIS Question Variable LIS Question
MAND_A.UDIT.EXT Q25*100 FORJ)ASEJ> (Q17+Q18+Q19+Q20)/4*100
EXTJVUDITÆFF Q26*100 ENTRY JIEQJ» Q12*100
CONS.STATÆXT Q27*100 PERMJ^ CTJ) Q7*100
CONS.EXAM.EFF Q28*100 PROHIBJ^ .CTJ» Q8*100
ACCOUNTING Q24*100 SECJIESTR_P Q9*100
ACCJDISCREP Q23*100 ACTJIESTRJ* (Q7+Q8+Q9)/3*100
DOCUMENT JDISCL Q3*100 ANTIJLAUNDJEXT (Q14a/0.5)*100
DISCLOSE.EFF (Q3+Q26)/2*100 ANTIJUAUND_EFF (Q14b/0.5)*100
CAPADEQJIULES Q29*100 EXAMÆXTJ» Q5a/0.25*100
CAPADEQ-UND Q30*100 EXAMJ^REQJ Q5b/0.5*100
FOR-PERMJ* Q17*100 PROFJEXAMJ Q5c/0.25*100
FOR_RESTRJ> Q18*100 INDEPÆVALJ) Q15*100
FOR-LICENSEJ* Q19*100 SUPJNDEPJ) Ql*100
FOR-LICJDIFFJP Q20*100 EFFBANK99 (Q26+Q28+Q14b+Q5c)/2.75*100
Source: Legal Indicator Survey 1999, and author’s compilations.
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Table 4.25: Question Scores on Banking Law: Questions 1-11
Country Qi Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5a Q5b Q5c Q7 Q8 Q9 QIO Qll
Albania 0.44 0.75 0.65 0.88 0.65 0.25 0.25 0.15 0.88 -0.04 0.67 1.00 0.50
Armenia 0.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.84 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Azerbaijan 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.83 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.73 0.00 0.67 0.33 1.00
Belarus 0.50 0.75 0.80 0.50 -0.17 0.00 0.00 -0.17 0.34 -0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bulgaria 0.78 0.63 0.75 0.69 0.50 0.23 0.13 0.14 0.74 0.06 0.31 1.00 0.50
Croatia 0.79 0.69 0.60 0.75 0.51 0.22 0.13 0.17 0.69 0.30 0.63 0.67 0.63
Czech Republic 0.71 0.71 0.77 0.75 0.57 0.25 0.16 0.17 0.75 0.17 0.08 0.58 0.75
Estonia 0.71 0.75 0.63 0.71 0.54 0.25 0.10 0.19 0.67 -0.02 0.43 0.57 0.43
FYR Macedonia 0.75 0.75 0.67 0.92 0.92 0.25 0.42 0.25 0.78 0.28 0.33 0.33 1.00
Georgia 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.83 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Hungary 0.83 0.83 0.78 0.77 0.53 0.25 0.07 0.22 0.68 0.00 0.33 0.92 0.91
Kazakhstan 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.85 0.47 0.25 0.05 0.17 0.74 0.00 0.80 1.00 0.60
Kyrgyzstan 0.50 0.75 0.67 1.00 0.58 0.17 0.25 0.17 0.73 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.33
Latvia 0.88 0.75 0.85 0.63 0.42 0.25 0.13 0.04 0.80 0.13 0.00 0.75 0.33
Lithuania 0.58 0.63 0.53 0.75 0.53 0.25 0.17 0.11 0.78 -0.11 0.00 0.33 1.00
Moldova 0.81 0.69 0.80 0.88 0.71 0.25 0.31 0.15 0.50 -0.04 0.25 1.00 1.00
Poland 0.85 0.80 0.74 0.86 0.40 0.25 0.00 0.15 0.77 -0.02 0.00 1.00 0.83
Romania 0.75 0.58 0.70 0.63 0.51 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.50 -0.03 0.17 0.83 0.67
Russian Federation 0.80 0.68 0.74 0.74 0.61 0.25 0.16 0.20 0.67 0.08 0.65 0.65 0.84
Slovak Republic 0.50 0.86 0.71 0.86 0.44 0.25 0.03 0.16 0.69 0.44 0.22 0.11 0.67
Slovenia 0.75 0.92 0.87 0.92 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.78 -0.06 0.67 1.00 0.50
Ukraine 0.61 0.75 0.73 0.81 0.69 0.25 0.32 0.12 0.75 -0.02 0.86 0.75 0.25
Uzbekistan 0.44 0.88 0.75 0.75 0.67 0.25 0.38 0.04 0.71 0.00 0.50 0.75 0.50
Sources; EBR D  1999 Legal Indicator Survey and author’s com pilations as described in C hapter 2 and C hapter 4.
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Table 4.26: Question Scores on Banking Law, Questions 12-23
Country Q12 Q13 Q14 Q14a Q14b Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q22 Q23
Albania 0.95 0.92 0.79 0.50 0.29 0.88 0.71 1.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.71 0.67
Armenia 1.00 1.00 -0.17 -0.17 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Azerbaijan 0.60 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.79 1.00 0.75 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.20
Belarus 1.00 0.50 -0.17 -0.17 0.00 0.75 -0.17 1.00 1.00 0.00 -0.17 -0.17 0.00
Bulgaria 0.96 0.86 0.84 0.50 0.34 0.61 0.90 1.00 0.96 0.60 0.56 0.42 0.20
Croatia 0.87 0.89 0.66 0.43 0.24 0.67 0.45 0.89 0.97 0.50 0.48 0.89 0.43
Czech Republic 0.98 0.71 0.75 0.46 0.29 0.45 0.76 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.69 0.56 0.32
Estonia 0.83 0.67 0.80 0.50 0.30 0.57 0.71 1.00 0.93 0.57 0.38 1.00 0.84
FYR Macedonia 1.00 1.00 0.24 0.11 0.13 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00
Georgia 1.00 0.67 -0.17 -0.17 0.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00
Hungary 0.95 1.00 0.75 0.45 0.30 0.75 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.77 0.91 0.42
Kazakhstan 0.88 0.92 0.18 0.13 0.05 0.60 0.77 1.00 0.65 1.00 0.20 0.37 0.28
Kyrgyzstan 1.00 0.89 0.69 0.50 0.19 1.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.28 1.00 0.53
Latvia 0.85 0.54 0.46 0.33 0.13 0.56 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.21 0.75 0.30
Lithuania 0.93 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.17 0.75 0.72 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.42 0.50
Moldova 1.00 0.71 0.23 0.17 0.06 0.44 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.50 0.17 0.15
Poland 0.97 0.88 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.68 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.43 0.40 0.17 0.00
Romania 0.70 0.54 0.79 0.50 0.29 0.70 0.62 1.00 0.95 0.60 0.67 0.31 0.17
Russian Federation 0.79 0.54 0.28 0.18 0.10 0.42 0.27 0.95 0.66 0.22 0.25 0.12 0.08
Slovak Republic 0.96 0.89 0.65 0.37 0.28 0.69 0.48 1.00 1.00 0.71 0.89 0.41 0.20
Slovenia 0.87 0.75 0.28 0.11 0.17 0.75 0.78 1.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.33
Ukraine 0.85 0.31 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.64 0.17 1.00 0.96 0.38 0.08 0.55 0.27
Uzbekistan 1.00 0.88 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.69 0.31 1.00 0.81 0.67 0.21 0.21 0.10
Sources: EB R D  1999 Legal Indicator Survey and author’s com pilations as described in C hapter 2 and C hapter 4. Note:
means no answer was provided.
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Table 4.27: Question Scores on Banking Law, Questions 23a-32
Country Q23a Q24 Q25 Q26 Q27 Q28 Q29 Q30 Q31 Q32
Albania 0.25 0.25 0.81 0.75 0.81 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.81
Armenia 0.00 0.25 0.75 -0.17 0.75 0.17 1.00 1.00 1.00
Azerbaijan 1.00 0.00 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.11 1.00 1.00 0.67
Belarus -0.17 0.00 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.00 0.75 -0.17 0.50
Bulgaria 0.83 0.07 0.36 0.95 1.00 0.81 0.67 0.96 1.00 0.68
Croatia -0.17 0.39 0.83 0.83 0.76 0.81 0.17 0.89 0.82 0.61
Czech Republic 0.13 0.09 0.23 0.90 0.83 0.46 0.62 0.80 1.00 0.77
Estonia 0.43 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.82 0.56 1.00 0.96 0.63
FYR Maucedonia 0.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.58 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.83
Georgia 1.00 0.00 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75
Hungary 1.00 0.33 0.39 0.96 0.83 0.88 0.65 0.90 1.00 0.70
Kazakhstan 1.00 0.10 0.50 0.90 0.77 0.65 0.04 0.90 0.75 0.85
Kyrgyzstan 0.17 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.25 0.50 0.88 1.00 0.88
Latvia 1.00 0.38 0.63 0.81 0.50 0.56 0.29 0.81 0.83 0.63
Lithuania n.a. 0.00 0.25 1.00 0.42 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.88
Moldova 0.00 0.13 0.63 0.81 1.00 0.75 0.25 0.94 0.81 0.75
Poland 0.17 0.21 0.38 0.96 1.00 0.75 0.33 0.96 1.00 0.82
Romania 0.67 0.25 0.25 0.79 0.83 0.67 0.41 0.71 0.82 0.67
Russian Federation 0.40 0.03 0.25 0.88 0.67 0.60 0.13 0.80 0.90 0.60
Slovak Republic -0.11 0.11 0.67 1.00 0.87 0.94 0.43 0.94 1.00 0.83
Slovenia 0.00 0.83 0.75 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.88
Ukraine 0.61 0.00 0.59 0.64 0.69 0.57 0.33 0.86 0.83 0.71
Uzbekistan 0.50 0.38 0.44 1.00 1.00 0.69 0.11 0.81 0.92 0.50
Sources; EBR D  1999 Legal Indicator Survey and au thor’s com pilations as described in C hapter 2 and
C hapter 4. Note; ”n .a .” m eans ’’not applicab le” .
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A ppendix 4.B  Banking Law Questionnaire
Q l. Are financial institutions regulated and supervised? Y N __
If yes, is the regulator:
a) The Minister of Finance or other political person?
b) A separate body that has at least some political independence?
c) A separate body that does not have political independence?
A ’Yes’ answer carries 0.25, a ’No’ answer is worth 0. Option a) carries 0, option 
b) 0.75, option c) 0.25. Maximum score is 1.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q2. Do banking supervisors have regular formal contact with bank 
management at financial institutions?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always 
Never gets 0 points. Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Type of question: effectiveness
Q3. W hat sort of reports are financial institutions required to provide 
to banking supervisors? (Please tick all that apply)
a) Financial Statements
b) Call Reports
c) Reports on investment activity
d) Information on the institution’s loan portfolio
e) Internal policies and procedures of the financial institution
f) Other
Parts a, b, c, d, and e get 1/5 each, part f) gets zero.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q4. Do banking supervisors actively collect, review and analyse pru­
dential reports from financial institutions?
Chapter 4. Banking Law and Private Credit 300
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points, Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Type of question: effectiveness
Q5a. Do banking supervisors have the authority or duty to conduct 
on-site supervisory examinations of financial institutions? Y N __
Q5b. If yes, are such examinations conducted:
a) More than once per year?
b) Annually?
c) Once every two years?
d) Only as needed?
Q5c. Is there a staff of professionally-trained bank examiners who conduct these 
examinations? Y N  U__
A Yes answer to the first sub-question gets 0.25; option a) scores 0.50 and option
b) 0.25, c) and d) are worth zero. A Yes answer to the last part yields 0.25. Negative 
answers give zero. ’Unclear’ answers are penalised at -1/6. The overall maximum is 
1 .
Type of question: first part (Q5a) is extensiveness-related; second and third 
parts (Q5b and Q5c, i.e. frequency of supervisory examinations and availability of 
professional bank examiners) are effectiveness-related.
Q6. Have banking laws and regulations been recently (i.e. within the  
past 8 years) enacted or amended? Y N  U__
A ’Yes’ answer carries 1, a ’No’ answer carries 0, ’Unclear’ is worth -1/6.
Type of question: extensiveness
Omitted from aggregation of indices.
Q7. Does banking legislation or regulations include a list of permissi­
ble activities for banks? Y N  U__
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If yes, do these activities include (Please tick all that apply):
a) only activities closely related to banking?
b) granting of loans?
c) securities underwriting or dealing?
d) insurance activities?
e) acceptance of deposits?
f) other
A ’Yes’ answer to the first part carries 1/6; options b) to f) get a weight of 1/6; 
option a) gains 0 points. Maximum score is 1.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q8. Are there any types of activities that are prohibited for financial 
institutions? Y N  U__
If yes, do these include (Please tick all that apply):
a) Securities underwriting or dealing
b) Participating in investment funds
A negative answer to the first part of the question gets a weight of 1, sections a) 
and b), if chosen, carry 0 points. Maximum overall score is 1.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q9. Does banking legislation and/or regulations impose restrictions 
on the holding of securities (public or private) by banks? Y N __
A ’No’ answer carries 1, ’Yes’ gets 0.
Type of question: extensiveness
QIO. D oes banking legislation and/or regulations prescribe minimum  
levels of professional qualifications for board members of banks? Y N
A ’Yes’ answer carries 1, ’No’ gets 0.
Type of question: extensiveness
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Omitted from aggregation of indices.
Q ll .  Does banking legislation and/or regulations provide for rep­
resentation of supervisory authority on the (managing or supervisory) 
boards of banks? Y N __
A ’No’ answer carries 1, a ’Yes’ answer gets 0.
Type of question: extensiveness
Omitted from aggregation of indices.
Q12. In granting a license for the establishment of a financial insti­
tution, what information must the applicant provide? (Please tick all that 
apply)
a) The bank’s ownership structure
b) Names and information about directors and senior management, including 
their professional qualifications
c) Operating plans
d) Projected financial condition
e) Sources of Capital
Each option carries 0.20; maximum score is 1.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q13. Must a financial institution seek prior authority from banking 
regulators before it engages in:
Mergers or acquisitions Y N  U__
Change of control or ownership of the bank Y N  U 
Entry into new line of business Y N  U 
A ’Yes’ answer to each option is valued at 1/3; a No answer brings 0; each 
Unclear is penalised at -1/6. Maximum overall is 1.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q14a. Do banking laws require banks to implement policies and prac-
Chapter 4. Banking Law and Private Credit 303
tices designed to  prevent money laundering such as ’’know your cus­
tom er” policies? Y N  U__
Q l4b . If yes, how are such policies enforced? (Please tick all that apply):
a) Financial institutions are required to provide reports of certain customer trans­
actions
b) Review of anti-money laundering policies are part of the supervisory exami­
nation
c) Financial institutions receive fines for non-compliance
d) No means of enforcement exist
e) Other
A ’Yes’ answer to the first part of the question carries 1/2; each of options a),
b), c) and e) gets 1/8. Option d) is penalised at -1/4.
Type of question: the first question (Ql4a) is extensiveness-related; the second 
part (Q14b) on means of enforcement is effectiveness-related.
Q15. D o bank supervisors independently evaluate the bank’s policies 
and procedures for the granting of loans and the making of investments?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points, Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Type of question: effectiveness
Q16. Do banking laws impose restrictions on lending by banks to their 
affiliates (related companies and individuals)? Y N  U__
If yes, are banks required to lend to affiliates on an arm’s length (fair value) 
basis? Y N  U__
A ’Yes’ answer to the first part of the question carries 0.75; a ’Yes’ answer to 
the second part gets 0.25. ’No’ answers get zero, ”Unclear” answers are penalised 
at -1/6. Maximum overall is 1.
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Type of question: extensiveness
Q17. Is foreign ownership in financial institutions permitted? Y N
A ’Yes’ answer to part one carries 1, a ’No’ answer gets zero.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q18. Are there any restrictions on the percentage of foreign ownership 
permitted?
a) There are no restrictions on foreign ownership
b) Less than 10% foreign ownership permitted
c) Between 10% and 25% foreign ownership permitted
d) Between 26% and 50% foreign ownership permitted
e) Greater than 50% foreign ownership is permitted
Option a) is worth 1, options b) and c) are penalised at -0.50 and -0.25 respec­
tively, option d) gets 0.50 and option e) is worth 0.75.The maximum overall score is 
1.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q19. If yes, is a special license required in order for a foreign entity  
to make an investment in a local financial institution? Y N __
A ’No’ answer gets 1, a ’Yes’ answer carries 0. The maximum overall score is 1. 
Type of question: extensiveness
Q20. Are the licensing requirements for the subsidiaries or branches 
of foreign banks different from the requirements for local banks? Y N
_ U „ _
A ’No’ answer carries 1, a ’Yes’ answer carries 0, ’Unclear’ is worth -1/6.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q21. Must a lender obtain a license from the regulator in order to  
provide subordinated debt to a financial institution? Y N __
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Can the subordinated debt of a financial institution be accelerated prior to final 
maturity? Y N  U__
Is the subordinated debt of a financial institution ranked below unsecured claims 
in bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings? Y N  U__
A ’No’ answer to the first part gets 1/2, a ’No’ answer to the part 2 is worth 
1/4. A ’Yes’ answer to part 3 also carries 1/4. ” Unclear” answers are penalised at 
-1/6. Maximum score is 1.
Type of question: extensiveness
Omitted from aggregation of indices.
Q22. Do financial institutions generally prepare financial statem ents 
that are restated in accordance with the International Accounting Stan­
dards (”IAS”) or the generally-accepted accounting principles of a coun­
try having an international financial centre (e.g., the United States or 
the United Kingdom)? Y N  U__
A ’Yes’ answer gets 1, a ’No’ answer carries 0, ’Unclear’ is penalised at -1/6.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q23. Has the shift in accounting standards affected the financial state­
ments and income statem ents of financial institutions (e.g., banks that 
previously showed a profit are now shown as having a loss):
a) Not at all
b) Only for a few banks
c) For the majority of banks (greater than 50%)
d) For nearly all of the banks (almost 100%)
Q23a. If Q22’s answer is No, are IAS in the process of being implemented? Y__
N ___U_
Each option is worth 1, 0.6, 0.4 and 0 in order of appearance. A ’Yes’ answer to 
the final part (Q23a) carries 1, a ’No’ is worth zero. ” Unclear” answers are penalised
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at -1/6. Maximum overall score is 1.
Type of question: effectiveness
Q24. Are local accounting standards set:
a) primarily by the government
b) primarily by the professional accounting community
c) by both the government and the professional accounting community 
Option a) carries 0, option b) carries 1, option c) is worth 0.50. Maximum score
is 1.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q25. Are financial institutions required to have their financial state­
ments audited at least annually? Y N __
If yes, are the applicable auditing standards
a) local standards 
OR
b) international standards
A ’Yes’ answer gets 0.25; option a) gets 0 and option b) 0.75.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q26. If yes, do financial institutions use external auditors for their 
annual audit?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always 
Never gets 0 points, Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Type of question: effectiveness
Q27. Are the financial statem ents of financial institutions normally 
prepared on a consolidated basis? Y N  U__
A ’Yes’ answer gets 1, a ’No’ answer carries 0, ’Unclear’ is penalised at -1/6. 
Type of question: extensiveness
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Q28. In practice, are financial institutions examined by the supervi­
sory body (if any) on a consolidated basis (e.g., parent bank and branch 
banks are both examined together)?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points, Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Type of question: effectiveness
Q29. Are financial institutions required to establish minimum capital 
requirements? Y N __
If yes, do these requirements meet those established by the Basle Capital Accord? 
Y _  N __ U _
A ’Yes’ answer to part 1 yields 0.17; a ’Yes’ answer to part 2 is worth 0.83. 
” Unclear” answers are penalised at -1/6.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q30. Are minimum capital requirements clearly described in the reg­
ulations and understood by bank management ?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points. Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Type of question: effectiveness
Q31. Do banking supervisors have the authority to take corrective 
action when banks fail to adhere to relevant laws or their own procedures? 
Y _  N __U__
If yes, do their powers include:
Ability to revoke a license? Y N __
Authority to make a financial institution take corrective action Y N __
Imposition of civil fines or penalties Y N __
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A positive answer to each of the first four sub-questions is worth 0.25. ’No’ 
answers are worth 0. ’Unclear’ answers get -1/6.
Type of question: extensiveness
Q32. W hen bank supervisors have identified a violation of law, com­
m itted by a bank, do they take corrective action?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always 
Never gets 0 points, Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Type of question: effectiveness
Q33. Is there separate legislation that deals with bank insolvency?
Y _  N _ _ U _
If yes, how many banks have been formally declared insolvent during the past 
(2) years:
a) 0-10?
b) 11-50?
c) more than 50 financial institutions?
A ’Yes’ answer to part 1 of the question is worth 0.50; option a) gets 0, option
b) 0.25 and option c) 0.50. Maximum overall is 1.
Type of question: effectiveness 
Omitted from aggregation of indices.
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Table 4.28: A Comparison of Banking Law Legal Indica­
tor Survey Questions and Barth et al. (2001) Indices
LIS
Qn
No.
Belongs to Question on Relevance
to
Barth et al. 
(2001) variable
Qi Supervisory
independence
Independent Banking Regula­
tor exists
extensiveness Independence 
of supervisory 
authority
Q3 Disclosure Re­
quirements 
and Supervi­
sory Powers
Types of bank documents dis­
closed to supervisors
extensiveness Does not cover
Q4 Supervisory
Powers
Frequency of collection and re­
view of prudential reports by 
bank supervisors
effectiveness Does not cover
Q5a Supervisory
Powers
Bank supervisors authorized 
to conduct on-site examina­
tions of banks
extensiveness Does not cover
Q5b Supervisory
Powers
Frequency of on-site examina­
tions of banks
effectiveness Does not cover
Q5c Supervisory
Powers
There are professional bank 
examiners to conduct effective 
on-site supervision
effectiveness Supervisory 
tenure index
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Q7 Permissible
Activities
Permissible bank 
activities specified in law and 
a broad range of activities are 
allowed
extensiveness Bank
activity regula­
tory variables
Q8 Permissible
Activities
There are no prohibitions on 
bank activities and securities 
and investment transactions 
are allowed for banks
extensiveness part of Bank 
activity regula­
tory variables
Q9 Permissible
Activities
No legal restrictions exist on 
holding of securities by banks
extensiveness Securities 
activities index
Q12 Entry
Requirements
Types of information to be 
provided by applicants for a 
bank license
extensiveness Entry into 
banking 
requirements 
index
Q13 Supervisory
Powers
Prior approvals from bank su­
pervisors mandatory for 
banks’ important decisions
extensiveness does not cover
Q14a Supervisory
Powers
Anti-money laundering bank 
policies and practices man­
dated by law
extensiveness does not cover
Q14b Supervisory
Powers
A wide array of means of en­
forcement of anti-money laun­
dering rules exist
effectiveness does not cover
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Q15 Supervisory 
Independence 
and Powers
Frequency of independent su­
pervisory evaluation of bank 
policies and procedures for 
granting of loans and making 
of investments
effectiveness does not cover
Q16 Related
Lending
Bank laws impose restrictions 
on bank lending to affiliates, 
and lending is on an arm’s 
length basis
extensiveness does not cover
Q17 Foreign Entry Foreign ownership of banks is 
permitted
extensiveness Limitations of 
foreign
bank entry /  
ownership
Q18 Foreign Entry No restrictions on percentage 
of foreign ownership banks ex­
ist in banking law
extensiveness Limitations of 
foreign
bank entry /  
ownership
Q19 Foreign Entry A special license is not re­
quired for a foreign entity to 
make an investment in a local 
bank
extensiveness Limitations of 
foreign
bank entry /  
ownership
Q20 Foreign Entry Licensing requirements for 
branches or subsidiaries of for­
eign banks do not differ from 
those for local banks
extensiveness Limitations of 
foreign
bank entry /  
ownership
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Q22 Accounting
Standards
Banks prepare statements us­
ing international accounting 
standards
extensiveness close to 
Bank account­
ing index
Q23 Accounting
Standards
Banks’ shift to IAS use has not 
affected their previous finan­
cial results
effectiveness close to 
Bank account­
ing index
Q24 Accounting
Standards
Accounting standards 
set mostly by professional ac­
counting community
extensiveness close to 
Bank account­
ing index
Q25 Disclosure
Requirements
Banks sub­
ject to mandatory annual au­
dits, and international audit­
ing standards apply
extensiveness Certified audit 
required
Q26 Disclosure
Requirements
Frequency of banks’ use of ex­
ternal auditors for their annual 
audit
effectiveness Certified audit 
required
Q27 Disclosure
Requirements
Banks’ financial statements 
normally prepared on a consol­
idated basis
extensiveness Part of 
Bank account­
ing index
Q28 Disclosure
Requirements
Frequency of consofidated ex­
aminations of banks by super­
visory body
effectiveness Part of 
Bank account­
ing index
Q29 Capital
Adequacy
Banks required 
to establish minimum capital 
requirements, and to meet the 
Basle Accord requirements
extensiveness Overall capital
stringency
index
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Q30 Capital
Adequacy
Frequency of understanding of 
minimum capital adequacy re­
quirements by bank managers
effectiveness does not cover
Q31 Corrective Ac­
tions and Su­
pervisory 
Powers
Bank supervisors authorized 
to undertake corrective actions 
against banks for violations of 
banking laws
extensiveness Official
supervisory ac­
tion index
Q32 Corrective Ac­
tions and Su­
pervisory 
Powers
Frequency of supervisory cor­
rective actions against banks
effectiveness Official
supervisory ac­
tion index
Chapter 5 
Legal D eterm inants o f Foreign 
Direct Investm ent in Transition  
Econom ies
5.1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a driving force for enterprise restructuring in the 
process of economic transition. Empirical studies of the impact of FDI indicate that 
among firms in transition economies, it is those with foreign ownership who display 
the highest productivity levels^. The accepted view is that the transition economies 
can benefit directly from FDI inflows in terms of higher employment and capital 
stock, and indirectly as a result of technology transfer, from improved management 
and labour skills and better marketing and distribution. FDI can be complementary 
to local industry by creating backward linkages to local supphers and thus benefit 
local downstream firms, which due to multinational firm entry would initially be 
exposed to stronger competition. As a result of the possibility of FDI acting as
^See for example Djankov and Murrell (2002).
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both a substitute for the local downstream industry and as a complement to the 
local upstream industry, and depending on the magnitude of these effects, it can be 
shown that FDI can lead to growth of local industry.
Despite its apparent benefits, FDI flows have been limited in scale, and some 
transition economies seem to have attracted much less FDI than others. What are 
the reasons for this? Which are the key determinants of FDI in the region? What is 
the role of contract enforcement and the operation of the courts for the decision of 
foreign investors to enter these markets? These are the main questions the present 
chapter aims to address. Our initial conjecture is that institutional factors and legal 
enforcement will affect the willingness of foreign entrepreneurs to invest in these 
markets. Related case studies and investor surveys indicate that property rights 
protection and legal factors axe perceived as being among the main obstacles to 
high FDI inflows in transition.
5.2 Literature Review
There is a growing empirical literature examining the determinants of FDI flows 
into transition economies as well as studying the impacts of FDI on host-country 
economies within the sample of transition countries. In addition, there are numerous 
empirical studies which look at FDI flows into developing economies and developed 
market economies. Within the strand of research investigating the determinants of 
FDI flows worldwide, and in transition specifically, recent work -  reviewed next -  
has already incorporated institutional factors, such as legal development, corruption, 
and government regulation, into estimations of the amount of FDI flows. We review 
both strands of research -  the one on FDI determinants, and the one on FDI effects 
-  focusing mostly, but not exclusively, on the experience of the transition economies. 
Among the flrst strand of papers, we also pay special attention to studies, which 
isolate the impact of institutional and legal factors driving FDI flows.
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5.2.1 Studies of the Determ inants of FDI
Firms choose to set up business operations in a foreign country for three key reasons, 
known as the OLI model developed by Dunning (1980). The OLI paradigm sees the 
decision to invest abroad as motivated by ownership advantages, location advantages 
and internalisation advantages. Ownership advantages refer to firms’ ownership 
over specific assets such as patents, brands, management and marketing practices, 
technological processes, etc. These provide a foreign investor with an advantage 
over existing local producers. Location advantages result from factors such as lower 
production costs in a foreign country due to, for instance, lower labour costs, lower 
energy costs, availability of natural resources, access to specialized labour or skills, 
etc. Location advantages determine where a foreign operation will be established. 
Finally, internalisation advantages occur whenever a firm benefits from retaining 
its assets in a single corporate structure rather than licensing or franchising, i.e. 
leading it to prefer a hierarchical organization over a market transaction. This may 
be the case when licensing or franchising will diminish firm benefits because of, say, 
poor protection of intellectual property rights in host countries, leading it to lose its 
advantage.
In the OLI framework, FDI takes place when a firm has both ownership and 
internalisation incentives, i.e. the firm possesses some proprietary technology, for 
example, and prefers to exploit its ownership advantages internally and directly on 
the foreign market rather than through licensing agreements with an independent 
foreign firm over the use of this technology. Location advantages should also exist 
in order for FDI to occur.
Bevan, Estrin and Meyer (2001) examine empirically FDI fiows from developed 
into transition economies, with a special focus on labor costs and institutional de­
velopment of the host countries. They incorporate institutional variables into the 
traditional OLI paradigm, developed by Dunning (1980, 1998) and just defined
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above, and argue that institutions can be thought of as providing important loca­
tional advantages and affecting the interactions between ownership and locational 
variables. Specifically, the authors augment prior studies which include aggregate 
institutional indices among the determinants of FDI flows, by testing for the impact 
of a series of different measures of institutional development in transition economies. 
Thus, their approach is to use disaggregated indices of institutional quality in or­
der to be able to identify which institutions attract FDI and which are nice to 
have, but irrelevant for FDI. Employing bilateral FDI flows between 18 developed 
(EU-14, Korea, Japan, Switzerland, and the USA), and 12 transition economies, 
and averaging the dependent and explanatory variables over the period 1994-1998, 
the authors develop a model, which explains FDI flows as a function of relative 
unit labor costs between source and host country (measured as the differential in 
average manufacturing wages, adjusted for labor productivity in source and host 
countries), geographical distance between host and source countries’ capital cities 
and the presence of a common border, and source- and host-country GDP. The lat­
ter two variables capture a source country’s ability to generate multinational firms 
and outward FDI, and the scale of the host country market to capture theories 
that FDI is motivated by a large host country market size. The inclusion of dis­
tance in the regression equation is motivated on grounds that it represents a proxy 
for cultural and linguistic differences between source and host country, i.e. the so- 
called ’’psychic distance” .^ A succession of institutional variables are included in 
the regression equation one at a time. These include the overall index of progress in 
transition, compiled by the EBRD as a proxy for overall institutional development; 
privatization measured by the EBRD indices of large-scale privatization, small-scale 
privatization, the share of the private sector in GDP, and the method of privati­
zation; financial market infrastructure, measured by the EBRD indices of banking
^O’Grady and Lane (1996) discuss the ’’psychic distance paradox” for Canadian retailers oper­
ating in the United States.
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sector reform and non-banking financial institutions reform; functioning markets, 
measured by the EBRD index of price liberalization, the EBRD index of foreign 
exchange liberalization and trade liberalization, and the EBRD index of competi­
tion policy; and legal infrastructure and corruption variables, comprising the EBRD 
indices of legal extensiveness and legal effectiveness for 1999. The results of the 
regression estimations indicate that host economy size and the ability of the source 
country to generate FDI have a positive significant impact upon FDI flows; unit 
labor cost differentials increase FDI fiows significantly; and distance reduces them 
significantly, whereas a common border raises them significantly. Among the set 
of institutional variables, privatization and the private sector’s share in output, the 
development of the host-country banking sector, liberalization of the host-country 
foreign exchange and trade, and development of better legal institutions are all sig­
nificantly associated with higher FDI fiows. However, an important limitation is 
that the method chosen cannot test for all these institutional factors simultaneously 
due to multi-collinearity. Therefore, even though the authors are able to test how 
indices related to financial development for example, perform in explaining bilateral 
FDI fiows, they are unable to say how important financial development measures 
are relative to legal development measures, for example. The legal indices employed 
in the main regression one at a time are both positively and significantly associated 
with FDI fiows, but contrary to expectations, legal effectiveness loses significance 
when both are included in the same specification. The authors conjecture that, in 
part, this is due to Russia’s low effectiveness scores -  omitting a Russia dummy 
makes the effectiveness index significant.
Despite these caveats, the focus on laws and their enforcement is an important 
element of the Bevan et al. (2001) analysis. In particular, they emphasize the 
need for trained judges and lawyers, and general knowledge about laws and legal 
proceedings. Therefore, this part of their approach is similar to our focus on the
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role of judicial enforcement for FDI, as shown in later sections.
A study by Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay and Zettelmeyer (2001) is in the same vein. 
The authors examine a wide array of potential determinants of private capital flows 
-  i.e. both direct and portfolio investment -  into the 26 transition economies, using 
panel data from 1990-1992 through 1999. A dynamic panel econometric model is 
estimated, and a general-to-speciflc model selection approach is adopted. Among 
the general determinants of FDI and portfolio investment which are being tested for, 
are host-country inflation, its flscal balance, lagged economic growth, the exchange 
rate regime, and an indicator of market liberalization and privatization. Impor­
tantly, poor indicators of institutional quality and existing laws are shown to deter 
private investment in general, and FDI in particular. The legal and institutional 
factors included in the model are the ease of contract enforcement, the incidence 
of burdensome and unpredictable government regulation of businesses, red tape, 
etc. Market perception indicators are also used as a proxy for institutional factors. 
Some speciflc determinants of FDI are also included in the model. These are aver­
age monthly wages as a measure of competitiveness; trade liberalization as a proxy 
for openness; legal restrictions on FDI; and method of privatization. In addition, 
speciflc determinants of portfolio investment are also considered. These include the 
EBRD index of securities market development, restrictions on portfolio investment, 
indicators of default risk and Treasury Bill rates. The main flndings of the regres­
sion analysis suggest that in the FDI regressions wage costs are overshadowed by 
macroeconomic stability and governance indicators. Among the governance vari­
ables, only the World Bank red tape indicator is found signiflcant. The residual of 
the perception-based Euromoney indicator from its regression on all other dependent 
variables is always signiflcant. In other words, perceptions of institutional quality 
matter over and above their information about economic fundamentals. However, it 
is essential to note that the use of investor magazine ratings such as the Euromoney
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rating suffer from lags with which information on fundamentals becomes available, 
and may be subject to reverse causality, i.e. higher ratings may be due to higher 
observed capital flows rather than the reverse. The portfolio regression displays a 
lower flt, and a high level of statistical significance for the property rights indicator. 
Among the full set of variables employed, only securities market infrastructure -  as 
measured by the EBRD index of securities market development -  and the protec­
tion of property rights, i.e. the confidence that assets will not be expropriated, are 
found to have a significant impact upon portfolio investment fiows. No other factors 
controlled for are found significant.
Unlike Garibaldi et al. (2001), who use aggregate fiows of FDI to estimate their 
determinants, Resmini (2000) utilises a sectoral approach in studying the determi­
nants of FDI in twelve Central and Eastern European countries. She estimates a 
panel model for the period 1991-1995, with FDI fiows in US dollars in four man­
ufacturing sectors as the dependent variable. The four sectors being studied are 
scale-intensive, high-tech and traditional sectors, and specialized producers (accord­
ing to the Pavitt taxonomy). The author hypothesizes that sectoral characteristics 
affect the determinants of FDI. The econometric model tests for significance of mar­
ket size (measured by population and GDP per capita), geographical proximity, 
wage differentials between home and host countries, progress in transition (proxied 
by the Operation Risk Index (ORI) published by BERI S.A.), degree of openness of 
the economy (measured by each country’s bilateral trade with the European Union 
(E.U.) as percentage of its GDP), and the size of the manufacturing sector to test for 
potential agglomeration effects, such as industrial tradition and presence of skilled 
labor. The results of Resmini’s paper indicate that in the pooled regression -  with­
out taking into account sectoral differences -  GDP per capita, population, the ORI 
indicator and the wage differential are significant determinants of FDI fiows. When 
FDI fiows are estimated separately for each of the four sectors, differences emerge
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between the determinants of FDI into the scale-intensive and traditional sectors. In 
contrast to investment in scale-intensive industries, FDI into traditional industries 
is affected significantly by both the size of the host country’s manufacturing sector 
and its degree of trade openness. Conversely, the ORI measure is found significant 
for FDI into scale-intensive sectors, but not so for traditional sectors. Due to some 
methodological concerns, these results are only suggestive. An important element 
related to the current chapter is the inclusion of the ORI indicator, which measures 
the quality of a country’s business environment, and encompasses 15 different cri­
teria, including bureaucratic delays, privatization, attitude toward foreign investors 
and their profits, and enforceability of commercial contracts, among others. It is 
found to be a highly significant determinant of FDI fiows into both capital-intensive 
and science-intensive manufacturing operations.
A recent paper by Shiells (2003) highlights the importance of institutional factors 
for FDI fiows into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries only. 
It contends that FDI fiows into the former Soviet Union have been related to natural 
resource extraction and energy transportation infrastructure projects, and to large 
privatization transactions. The author seeks the impediments to higher FDI fiows 
in the investment climate, and utilizes IMF country staff assessments and survey 
data from various sources to validate the impact of investment climate variables on 
FDI. Weak legal and regulatory frameworks, as well as inadequate property rights 
protection, are quoted among the investment climate features thought to affect FDI 
fiows. Specific case studies and information presented for each CIS country almost 
invariably point to deficiencies in court enforcement of contracts, unclear insolvency 
and corporate governance laws, ineffective banking and stock market supervision, as 
facets of the investment climate which act as crucial deterrents to FDI. For instance, 
in the case of Kazakhstan, it is noted that the Investment Law limits litigants’ rights 
of appeal before international arbitration bodies. In Russia corrupt courts are cited
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as one of the main reasons for foreign investors not doing business there, according to 
a study by the Foreign Investment Advisory Services (FIAS) at the World Bank and 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Among the group of energy-importing 
CIS countries, it is mentioned that foreign investors involved in disputes with local 
business partners in Georgia have been subject to arbitrary court decisions, favoring 
local investors. Moldova is cited as an example of an open trade regime and effective 
banking supervision, both enhancing its investment climate, however it is said to 
suffer from inadequate insolvency, secured transactions and corporate governance 
laws, as well as from ineffective implementation of these laws. A survey of foreign 
investors in Ukraine quoted by Shiells (2003) indicates ambiguity of the legal system 
as one of the main deterrents of FDI. Overall, ranking of various obstacles to FDI 
by the interviewed IMF country teams suggests that inadequate property rights 
protection -  in the form of corruption, excessive regulation, and crime -  is most 
often perceived as problematic for foreign investment. The study, however, does 
not rely on any rigorous econometric technique to evaluate various impediments. It 
is thus unable to isolate those factors of the institutional environment, which best 
explain the low FDI flows to the CIS countries -  be they laws, contract enforcement, 
corruption, or any other one.
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) examine the impact of institutional factors on 
FDI inflows and outflows in a cross-section of over 100 countries worldwide, and in 
particular focus on the effect of what they call ’’governance infrastructure”. The 
governance infrastructure in their paradigm incorporates a country’s political, in­
stitutional and legal environment. The authors use as a starting point the growing 
empirical evidence that cross-country differences in productivity and growth are re­
lated to institutional development and the governance infrastructure, e.g. Hall and 
Jones (1999). The argument then is, that since the business climate of a country 
affects both domestic and foreign investment, and since FDI can enhance efficiency
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in the host-country economy, it is a natural extension of the literature to examine 
the effect of the governance infrastructure on FDI flows. The paper uses cross- 
sectional data, averaged over 1995-1997, and employs as main explanatory variables 
the Kaufmann et al. (1999) indices of governance, the United Nations Human De­
velopment Index (HDI), and the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI), created 
by the World Economic Forum together with Columbia and Yale Universities, and 
measuring environmental quality and regulation. The Kaufmann et al. (1999) in­
dices are estimated, using 31 different qualitative indicators from 13 different sources 
such as the Heritage Foundation, the World Economic Forum, the Economist In­
telligence Unit, BERI, and the World Bank, among others. The indices employed 
in the paper by Globerman and Shapiro (2002) cover political instability, rule of 
law, graft, regulatory burden, voice and political freedom, and government effec­
tiveness. The Rule of Law index employed itself measures contract enforcement, 
property rights, theft and crime, etc. The estimated models for FDI inflows and 
outflows also control for traditional variables such as size the host country economy, 
its trade openness, tax regime, labor costs, exchange rate instability and physical 
infrastructure. None of these variables, with the exception of GDP per capita, are 
however found significant. The results of the preferred parsimonious model indicate 
that both FDI infiows and outfiows are affected significantly and positively by the 
governance infrastructure of the host (source) country. The findings also indicate 
that the effects of the governance infrastructure on FDI infiows diminish as country 
size increases, and that improvements in governance reduce FDI outfiows for small 
economies, but encourage outfiows from larger economies. Restricting the sample 
to developing and transition economies only, shows that governance infrastructure 
raises FDI infiows, but has no effect on outfiows, thus leading to positive effects on 
net FDI inflows. However, there are some concerns about this approach. These are 
using FDI data averaged over the years 1995 to 1997, while many of the independent
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variables are for 1997 and thereafter. For instance the environmental quality index 
(ESI) is for 2000. The authors justify their approach by citing data limitations, and 
on grounds that many of these indices (ESI or the Kaufmann et al. (1999)) are 
unlikely to change much over time. However, for some economies such as developing 
and transition, where there have been legal reforms and changes during the decade 
of the 1990s, one would expect changes in some of the governance indices even over 
short periods of time. Furthermore, a remaining unresolved issue is also the multi- 
collinearity and omitted variable problems, typical in cross-section estimations of 
this type. For instance, GDP per capita is shown to be highly correlated with the 
governance, HDI and ESI indices. This problem is acknowledged, but no steps are 
taken to correct for it. Despite these drawbacks, the paper makes a contribution 
by trying to see whether FDI inflows and outflows respond to governance, human 
development and environmental factors in host economies, and to disentangle which 
of the institutional factors, purported to affect FDI, matter most.
Other related contributions, which emphasize the role of institutions in attracting 
FDI, include Bevan and Estrin (2000), Altomonte (2000), Altomonte and Guagliano 
(2003) and Wei (2000a and 2000b). For example, Bevan and Estrin (2000) estimate 
the determinants of bilateral FDI flows from 14 European Union countries, the 
United States, Japan, Korea and Switzerland, into 11 Central and Eastern Euro­
pean countries, using panel data, covering the period from 1994 through 1998. The 
empirical model includes standard variables, which theory and prior empirical evi­
dence shows as driving FDI flows to a particular location, such as host country size, 
input costs -  labor, energy and natural resources -  and the risk associated with 
investing in a foreign country. The authors proxy country risk by country credit 
ratings published bi-annually by the Institutional Investor magazine. The novelty 
in the paper is attempting to determine which institutional and political factors 
Eiffect these credit ratings, and to investigate how specific E.U. announcements re-
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gaxding the accession process for joining the European Union have affected FDI 
flows and country credit ratings. The paper does acknowledge that country risk 
comprises three main elements: macroeconomic stability, institutional stability and 
political stability. Among the institutional stability variables, the authors list the 
transparency of legal regulations and the scale of corruption, the tax regime and 
speciflc policies toward FDI. The results of the econometric estimations indicate 
that FDI inflows are signiflcantly aflfected by host country GDP, unit labor costs, 
perceived country risk as measured by the Institutional Investor ratings, and by 
gravity factors such as distance between home and host countries. It is also found 
that private sector development, industrial development, the government balance, 
gross reserves and corruption are signiflcant determinants of perceived country risk. 
Announcements related to the accession process are found to raise FDI inflows di­
rectly, which then work to improve country credit risk ratings. While Bevan and 
Estrin’s (2000) results are intuitive and shed light on important effects related to the 
E.U. accession process on FDI inflows, they are by no means conclusive. Thus, credit 
risk and its determinants may be subject to measurement problems, and there may 
be multi-collinearity among the independent variables in the credit risk regressions. 
The authors do highlight the importance of institutional environment factors, but 
do not include a wider set in estimating the credit risk regressions -  in fact, most of 
the employed explanatory variables are related to macroeconomic stability and/or 
political stability. The only institutional measure is the so-called ’’bribe tax”, which 
is based on firms’ responses to the 1999 joint World Bank/EBRD Business Envi­
ronment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), and measures the frequency 
with which firms report making unofficial payments to get things done. Therefore, 
the study fails to capture the richness of the institutional environment, which is 
likely to affect perceptions of country risk.
Altomonte (2000) studies the determinants of industry-level FDI into ten transi-
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tion economies of Central and Eastern Europe, and conducts panel Probit regressions 
with data over the period 1990-1995. He stresses the relevance of the institutional 
environment variables as determinants of FDI inflows, and in particular draws at­
tention to the design of an enforceable legal framework. The novelty of his approach 
lies in applying real option theory to the standard OLI paradigm, and showing how 
ownership and internalisation advantages may, or may not, lead an investment in 
a foreign country to be undertaken, depending on investors’ uncertainty about the 
future and the specificity of the advantages. A crucial element of this theory is the 
uncertainty, which foreign investors face and the general macroeconomic volatility of 
a host country. Variables, which reduce uncertainty and volatility are conjectured 
to be crucial in determining whether or not a foreign investment is undertaken. 
Among the variables, reducing uncertainty, the author lists the institutional envi­
ronment of the host country, which encompasses the regulatory regime of foreign 
operations, transparency and enforceability of laws. Accordingly and like Resmini 
(2000), the regressions control for the Operations Risk Index (ORI) by BERI S.A., 
which measures the business climate as perceived by a permanent panel of world 
experts, and it is found to have a significant and positive impact on the probability 
that an investment operation is undertaken. Furthermore, an objective institutional 
measure is also tested -  called LEGAL -  which measures the extent to which the 
laws related to repatriation of capital, and the practice of dividends, royalties and 
other payments correspond to those of a modern market economy. This index is 
a weighted average of six components, three of which refer to the laws as they are 
written, and three -  to the practice of the law, and is also calculated by BERI S. A. It 
is found insignificant for the FDI inflows -  i.e. the host-country laws on repatriation 
of capital, etc. measured by the LEGAL index, do not affect investors’ expectations 
and uncertainty. Among the economic variables, GDP per capita and population 
of the host countries are found significant, as well as its relative comparative ad­
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vantages with respect to the cost of labor. Among the institutional variables, the 
ORI indicator and the measure of underlying economic volatility of the host country 
affect FDI decisions significantly. Importantly for the analysis of this chapter, en­
forceability of contracts is one of the ingredients of the ORI indicator, which however 
incorporates more macroeconomic measures such as inflation, balance of payments, 
economic growth, currency convertibility, etc. Therefore, it is not clear whether the 
ORI indicator affects FDI because of its components related to macroeconomic sta­
bility, or due to other features such as enforceability of contracts, policy continuity, 
etc.
One of the significant early contributions in the related literature on FDI in 
transition is by Lankes and Venables (1996). Using a survey of senior managers in 
117 Western European manufacturing companies, the authors attempt to identify 
the main determinants of FDI infiows into the transition economies. They also 
examine some of the characteristics of different projects and how these characteristics 
are linked to choice of country location. One of the authors’ main findings is that 
host country progress in transition, as measured by the EBRD transition indicators, 
acts as a significant determinant of FDI. Furthermore, the type of FDI (export- 
oriented or market-seeking) and the control mode (wholly-owned subsidiaries or joint 
ventures and licensing agreements) are found to depend on progress in transition 
too. The transition indicator variable is an average of nine transition indicators, one 
of which is progress in legal reform. Legal and regulatory risks were perceived by 
respondents as one of the main sources of country risk. Also, contract enforcement 
was found to be of concern to foreign investors in relation to control choice. Thus for 
fully-owned projects government regulations appear as one of the significant factors; 
for joint ventures these are control of partner firm’s production quality, sales and 
intellectual property. Judicial enforcement is also found to matter for the decision 
of which control mode to adopt. The authors employ a multinomial logit model and
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find that essential project characteristics - its status, project function and control 
mode - are determined by the country transition indicator. Regulatory concerns 
appeared significant for country choice too.
Lankes and Stern (1997) examine different kinds of capital flows into the tran­
sition countries and pay particular attention to FDI. They argue that progress in 
transition is the main factor behind FDI inflows. The authors also quote Lankes 
and Venables (1996) in criticising laws and regulations as being burdensome and 
ever-changing, the regulatory environment as uncertain, and enforcement of prop­
erty rights as poor and plagued by crime and corruption. Again, as in Lankes and 
Venables (1996), the authors suggest that legal statutes and enforcement are likely 
to affect FDI. They also argue that geographical and cultural proximity of invest­
ment locations to Western Europe may have a strong impact on cost-motivated FDI 
inflows.
Among these early papers on FDI in transition, Papazoglou and Liargovas (1997) 
attempt to identify the main determinants of FDI into the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC) transition countries. They find that progress towards liberali­
sation, and the speed and form of the privatization programme, explain almost all 
the variation in FDI in the BSEC economies. Liberalisation progress is captured by 
an index, constructed by the EBRD in 1995 as a weighted average of estimates of 
liberalisation of domestic transactions, external transactions and entry of new firms. 
Privatization speed and form are proxied by the percentage share of private sector 
output in GDP. Market size, openness of the economy and the ratio of the local 
nominal wage to that in OECD countries are among the other determinants of FDI 
inflows.
Brock (1998) attempts to explain regional differences in FDI in Russia over the 
period 1993-1995. He establishes that the crime level, market size and education of 
the labour force appear as the only signiflcant determinants of regional FDI inflows.
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5.2.2 Studies o f the Impact o f FD I on H ost-Country Economies
It is commonly assumed that FDI can be beneficial to the host economies for a 
number of reasons. First, foreign firms can bring better technology and upgrade 
the machinery and equipment (hardware) as well as the train and introduce new 
production processes (software) into the domestic firms with foreign participation. 
Thus, foreign investment can bring about the much needed restructuring of domes­
tic firms, including improved corporate governance. Second, aside from the transfer 
of new technology, knowledge, management practices and know-how, foreign own­
ership can harden budget constraints since the presence of a foreign owner weakens 
the link between the firm and the state. Third, apart from its direct impact upon 
the domestic firms with foreign participation, foreign ownership can result in posi­
tive externalities -  i.e. spillover effects to other domestic firms along the supply and 
client chain through the transfer of technology and know-how. Such spillover effects 
through backward linkages to domestic supphers and forward linkages to domestic 
customers outside the specific industrial sector can lead to higher productivity be­
yond the firm and industry where FDI takes place. Intra-industry spillovers may also 
ensue -  if imitation of new production methods by domestic competitors increases 
competition and efficiency.
A number of empirical studies address the question of how foreign direct in­
vestment affects firm performance and productivity in transition economies, and 
whether or not positive spillover effects exist, e.g. Djankov and Hoekman (2000), 
Barrell and Holland (2000), Konings (2001), Damijan et al. (2003) and Yudaeva et 
al. (2003), to name a few. Chapter 5 of the EBRD Transition Report 2003 sum­
marizes much of the available empirical evidence on impact of FDI in transition. 
Generally, these studies employ firm-level data on inputs and sales, and estimate 
in a panel-regression dynamic framework the effects of firms’ foreign ownership on 
their total factor productivity, and the effects of average industry or regional for-
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eign ownership on domestic firms in the respective industry or region, i.e. spillover 
effects.
Djankov and Hoekman (2000), for example, examine the effects of foreign owner­
ship on 513 Czech enterprises, of which 173 had some foreign participation. The data 
covers manufacturing, services, mining and construction sectors. They use firm-level 
data from 1992 through 1996, and establish that foreign investment increases growth 
in sales in both OLS and random effects panel estimations, controlling for sample 
selection bias due to foreign firms picking the most productive domestic firms to 
begin with. They find that FDI does increase sales growth significantly in both 
specifications, suggesting that foreign investment involves a transfer of technology; 
in contrast, joint venture participation has a positive but insignificant impact on 
recipient firms’ sales growth. Second, the authors test the hypothesis of positive 
spillovers by including the share of assets of firms with foreign partners in total as­
sets of the economy, lagged one year, among the explanatory variables, and run the 
estimation using as a dependent variables sales growth of domestic firms without 
foreign participation only. They find evidence of statistically significant negative 
spillovers, i.e. greater foreign participation is associated with worse performance 
by other domestic firms. Restricting the spillover effect to cover the share of as­
sets of foreign affiliates in total assets of the sector, i.e. excluding joint ventures 
on grounds that they allow for greater spillovers, does not increase the magnitude 
of the negative spillovers. In fact, it produces an offsetting effect -  the estimated 
coefficient remains negative, but becomes smaller and insignificant. These results 
prompt the authors to conjecture that firms without foreign participation may have 
too low absorptive capacity to avail themselves of spillovers when they occur, and 
that firms with foreign participation may have absorbed a significant share of the 
available stock of labor with requisite skills. In summary, Djankov and Hoekman 
(2000) determine that foreign ownership has had significant positive impacts on TFP
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growth of recipient firms, and that foreign affiliates have a greater impact on TFP 
growth than joint ventures do. Taken together, foreign affiliates and joint ventures 
are found to have a significant negative impact on firms with no foreign links. This 
result however is not robust to excluding joint ventures as a source of spillovers.
In another extension of this strand of literature, Barrell and Holland (2000) look 
at the impact of FDI on labor productivity in eleven manufacturing sectors in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland They conduct panel data analysis of labor 
demand, allowing the stock of FDI to affect technological progress, using data from 
1993 through 1996. The authors show that a relatively high share of these countries’ 
gross fixed capital formation relies upon FDI (with Hungary recording FDI inflows 
accounting for 53% of gross fixed capital formation in 1995), yet they argue that 
FDI does not contribute only toward fixed capital formation, but also brings inflows 
of new ideas, production techniques and management practices. These are likely 
to have the strongest impact on productivity. The estimation results indicate that 
the stock of FDI affects labor productivity significantly and positively in most of 
the manufacturing sectors considered, except for leather, transport equipment and 
” other” industries. In these three sectors productivity increases are driven by other 
exogenous factors. In contrast, in the food, textiles, chemicals and rubber sectors 
there is no evidence of exogenous influences on labor productivity, once FDI is taken 
into account. The results also indicate that the impact of FDI on labor productivity 
has been greater than the impact of domestic investment, or in other words, that the 
impact of FDI on labor productivity is not only driven by fixed capital investment 
but by investment in intangible assets. Various robustness tests -  controlling for the 
share of the private sector, imports and R&D expenditures -  do not alter the main 
findings. There is no evidence that private ownership, imports or R&D have affected 
labor productivity significantly. However, the results do show that FDI is attracted 
to sectors with high research content (measured by average business expenditure
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on R&D to sectoral value added in the 11 sectors object of study, but for the G-7 
countries). Once research content is accounted for, FDI does not have a significant 
impact upon labor productivity. An important limitation of this study is that it 
only determines the impact of FDI on aggregate labor productivity at the sectoral 
level -  it cannot distinguish between differences in productivity of domestic firms 
and firms with foreign participation.
Konings (2001) studies the impact of FDI on domestic firms in Bulgaria, Romania 
and Poland, using a panel firm-level dataset covering the period from 1993 through 
1997. The main questions his paper asks are similar to those asked by the study of 
Djankov and Hoekman (2000): whether foreign firms perform better than firms with 
no foreign participation, and whether foreign firms generate spillovers to domestic 
firms. He argues that technology transfers from foreign to domestic firms can bring 
about positive spillovers, but there is an opposite effect -  a competition effect -  
which could is summarized by domestic firms producing less after foreign entry, 
which pushes them up their average costs curves, if we assume high fixed costs and 
downward sloping average cost curve. Konings’ results indicate FDI inflows does 
not improve firm performance in Bulgaria and Romania, but does so significantly in 
Poland. Since Poland is more advanced in transition progress, this is taken to imply 
that improvements in performance materialize with a lag and depend on progress in 
transition. Furthermore, the results for Bulgaria and Romania reveal statistically 
significant negative spillovers from foreign to domestic firms at the sectoral level, 
and no significant sectoral spillovers in Poland. This is conjectured to be due to the 
competition effect dominating the technology transfer effect from foreign to domestic 
firms in Bulgaria and Romania, which would hold if we assume decreasing average 
costs (increasing returns to scale), and if the technology gap between domestic and 
foreign firms is large. There is also weak evidence that regional spillovers -  i.e. the 
idea that any positive externalities from foreign firms are likely to first accrue to
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their neighbors, as a result of workers usually relocating to jobs in other firms in the 
same region -  with the results for Poland showing marginally significant regional 
negative spillovers, but no significant regional spillovers from foreign to domestic 
firms in Bulgaria and Romania. These results therefore echo Djankov and Hoekman 
(2000) in establishing a positive impact of foreign investment on recipient firms, but 
no or negative spillovers from foreign to domestic firms.
Yudaeva et al. (2003) present evidence on the impact of foreign direct investment 
on the productivity of Russian firms, and establish that firms with foreign ownership 
have higher value added than domestic firms, controlling for sample selection bias 
resulting from foreign investors choosing to invest in the more productive local firms. 
In fact, the results suggest that FDI in Russia has gone into less productive industries 
rather than into more productive ones. The authors also find that more reform- 
oriented Russian regions benefit from more productive FDI. The study tests for 
spillovers from foreign to domestic firms, and establishes that positive spillovers 
are present from foreign to domestic firms in the same industry, but that negative 
spillovers exist from foreign firms to domestic firms in vertically-related industries. 
Therefore, the competition effect FDI generates outweighs the positive spillover 
effect from technological diffusion for upstream and downstream firms. Time is 
found to dampen this negative effect; and to increase the positive spillover effect 
for within-industry firms. Finally, educational attainment of the population in the 
Russian regions is found to enhance positive spillovers from foreign to domestic firms 
in the same industry.
In summary, the related literature on FDI applied to transition economies, shows 
ambiguous results about spillovers from FDI; the literature on FDI determinants has 
recently started incorporating host-country institutional factors in the analysis of 
location advantages.
I shall try to contribute to the empirical literature on FDI by analysing in greater
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detail its legal determinants. While each of the studies on determinants of FDI men­
tioned earlier considers legal factors in one form or another, none of them system­
atically identifies the individual impact of legal and institutional indicators on FDI 
inflows. Therefore, I aim to see which institutional factors are important for FDI, 
whether legal enforcement matters, and whether government regulation has an effect 
on foreign firms’ decisions to invest locally. We want to see whether contract enforce­
ment affects flows of cumulative per capita FDI into the transition economies over 
the period 1999-2002. For this purpose we employ indices of general effectiveness of 
commercial law, constructed on the basis of the 1999 EBRD Legal Indicator Sur­
vey. Alongside our institutional /  legal explanatory variables we employ also market 
size, inflation, growth and geographical distance to Western Europe as explanatory 
variables in the regressions^.
This chapter is organised in the following way: section 5.3 discusses the choice 
of variables and model specification; section 5.4 presents the data; section 5.5 shows 
the main regression results; and section 5.6 offers some concluding remarks. All the 
relevant economic and legal data are shown at the end of the chapter.
^Fortes, Rey and Oh (2001) find substantial evidence that cross-border equity fiows are pri­
marily determined by market size, distance and openness, but that information asymmetries are 
extremely important too. Thus, information transmission as captured by international telephone 
call traffic and multinational bank branches, informational asymmetries between domestic and 
foreign investors, given by the degree of insider trading on the stock market, and financial sector 
efficiency, appear to affect international financial asset fiows. These variables also seem to improve 
standard gravity equations for trade in goods.
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5.3 Choice of Variables and Regression M odel Spec­
ification
As outlined in much of the related literature -  Resmini (2000), Bevan, Estrin and 
Meyer (2001) -  the OLI approach offers a useful set-up for analysing the decision 
to undertake FDI and for studying empirically the pattern of FDI inflows across 
different countries. In particular, it is argued that while ownership and internal­
isation advantages are firm-specific determinants of FDI, location advantages are 
country-specific. Importantly, location advantages include home country character­
istics, which facilitate the development of ownership advantages by domestic firms, 
which allows them to become multinational. But more pertinent to our analysis, 
they include host-country characteristics, which allow them to attract foreign firms 
in possession of ownership advantages.
The literature on determinants of FDI essentially examines the location incen­
tives for investing abroad. These are host-country characteristics, which allow the 
foreign firm to minimize costs in supplying major markets due to market size, rel­
ative labor and material input prices. Among host-country characteristics are also 
restrictions to trade (tariff and non-tariff barriers), which may motivate FDI, as well 
as restrictions on FDI. Other recent studies stress the importance of agglomeration 
effects -  usually summarized by the presence of other foreign companies in the host 
country, its degree of industrialization and its physical infrastructure, e.g. Wheeler 
and Mody (1992). Other factors which have been shown to affect the attractiveness 
of a host country as a location for FDI are its geographical proximity to the source 
country and major markets, which reduces transportation and transaction costs, 
but also affinities between home and host country such as shared language, culture, 
history, and institutions.
This chapter aims to test empirically one of the recent additions to the de-
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terminants of FDI -  the quality of the host country institutions. The quality of 
institutions -  whether called investment climate, or governance infrastructure -  as 
outlined in the previous section -  has recently been incorporated into the studies of 
FDI determinants, and has been found to aEect FDI inflows. Available empirical 
evidence consistently indicates that countries with better performing legal systems 
and contract enforcement mechanisms attract more FDI, controlling for other rele­
vant factors, e.g. Bevan, Estrin and Meyer (2001), Campos and Kinoshita (2003), 
Shiells (2003), EBRD Transition Report (2003), and others. Globerman and Shapiro 
(2002) find strong evidence that governance infrastructure -  encompassing the rule 
of law, the government’s effectiveness and its regulatory burden, among others -  is 
a significant determinant of FDI infiows across a large cross-section of countries.
In addition to the studies already mentioned, other empirical FDI studies pay 
attention to some variations of investor protection (intellectual property rights) and 
legal enforcement in the host country. While explicitly acknowledging that weak le­
gal enforcement discourages FDI, Tao and Wang (1998) attempt to explain the puz­
zle of weak contract enforcement and the substantial flows of FDI under contractual 
arrangements (mostly contractual joint ventures) into China. Other studies relate 
contract enforcement to intellectual property rights protection. Thus, Smarzynska 
(2002) explores the effect of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection on FDI 
inflows in the transition economies, and finds that a regime of poor IPR protection 
has a negative impact on FDI inflows. This impact is particularly pronounced in 
technology-intensive sectors.
Typically, empirical studies have utilised available indices to proxy for institu­
tional quality of the host country. For instance, Bevan et al. (2001) employ various 
EBRD index measures to proxy for institutional aspects, such as the indices of legal 
extensiveness and legal effectiveness for 1999 (composite indices based on the 1999 
Legal Indicator Survey, Commercial Law section as published on a 1 to 4* scale in
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the EBRD Transition Report 1999). Other indices they work with are the EBRD 
indices of bank and non-bank financial reform; indices of price, trade liberalisation 
and competition policy, and indices of main method of privatization. Other studies 
employ alternative measures to proxy institutions: Globerman and Shapiro (2002) 
use the Kaufmann et al. (1999) indices; Altomonte (2000) and Resmini (2000) em­
ploy the Operation Risk Index -  a perception-based index, calculated on the basis 
of responses of experts about various aspects of the business environment.
Despite the different proxies for institutional quality employed in the related re­
search, most studies emphasize the crucial role of the legal environment and mecha­
nisms for contract enforcement and honoring of obligations. For example, Thornton 
and Mikheeva (1996) report findings from a survey of U.S. entrepreneurs who con­
sidered investing in the Russian Far East in the mid-1990s. Out of 11 different 
aspects of the investment climate, potential investors cited the legal system being 
too ambiguous and fluid as the major factor, which made them not invest. The 
second-rated factor was economic risk.
Other subsequent studies also point to the crucial role the court system, the leg­
islative process and the legal infrastructure of the host economy play for attracting 
FDI. However, while researchers have augmented FDI equations with some mea­
sure of the host country’s legal infrastructure, it is far from clear what aspects of 
the law, if any, affect foreign investment fiows. Does the law on the books mat­
ter? Do some laws, such as intellectual property protection laws or competition 
laws, have a stronger impact than other laws related to commercial activity, e.g. 
company, secured transactions, insolvency laws? Or are these laws irrelevant? All 
these are questions, where theoretical and empirical work are yet to develop. In the 
area of intellectual property legislation, the evidence is that it does affect FDI -  
countries with better legal protection of intellectual property do attract more FDI, 
e.g. Smarzynska (2002). The opposite effect, however, appears to emerge with re-
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spect to competition law. Countries with stricter competition law and policies do 
not appear to be attracting more FDI, i.e. the available evidence, e.g. Bevan et 
al. (2001), EBRD Transition Report 2003, suggests that investors are deterred by 
strict competition policy rules and attracted by the possibility of market power. On 
the other hand, it appears rather obvious that better working courts and contract 
enforcement mechanisms would be associated with less risk, and lead to more FDI, 
other things being equal. Associated risk would be lower due to less uncertainty 
and unpredictabihty of complex transactions with foreign customers and suppliers 
in a foreign country. Therefore, well functioning courts and legislative processes, 
including dissemination of the active laws, would reduce investment risk and attract 
FDI.
In this regard, the aim of this chapter is to assess whether contract enforcement 
-  as perceived by lawyers’ answers to the General Effectiveness section of the Com­
mercial Law part of the 1999 Legal Indicator Survey -  played a role in explaining 
FDI flows into the transition economies during 1999-2002. We next describe the 
main questions used to generate the legal data on contract enforcement. We also 
outline the model, the estimation method, and the other variables to be used in the 
estimations.
5.4 Data
5.4.1 Institutional Determ inants: Contract Enforcement D ata
The legal data on contract enforcement come from respondents’ answers to the Gen­
eral Questions section of the 1999 Legal Indicator Survey. Traditionally, this section 
came after the sections of questions dealing with Pledge, Company and Bankruptcy 
laws in the respondent’s jurisdiction, and sought answers to questions related to 
drafting and dissemination of laws; publication of court decisions; justification of
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judgments and rights of litigants to appeal first-instance court judgments; pres­
ence of independent judicial review of administrative decisions; qualification and 
remuneration of first-instance court judges; judicial system’s recognition of foreign 
judgments and arbitration decisions; duration of first-instance court procedure and 
duration of execution of a first-instance court decision in the country’s largest com­
mercial centre; perceptions about courts’ impartiality, speed and the costs of using 
them; general confidence in the courts; and perceptions of crime and government 
corruption. Therefore, for the most part, the questions cover aspects of the work of 
the judiciary, and the regime for resolving disputes before them. These data, like 
the legal data from the rest of the LIS, have been cleaned systematically, check­
ing for internal inconsistencies and coding errors, and corrected for missing values 
previously coded as zeros. As in previous chapters, we will take a disaggregated 
approach and break down the aggregate index, previously calculated as a simple 
average of all the questions in this section, into its individual components. Since 
all questions in this section refer to law enforcement and the functioning of the 
courts, no distinction was made in prior use of these data in terms of extensiveness 
and effectiveness. Rather, all questions were considered effectiveness-related, and 
the aggregate index was called GEN_EFF99 (general commercial law effectiveness 
in 1999). We retain this classification, and consider the section as entirely legal 
effectiveness or enforcement-related.
5.4.1.1 Dissemination of draft laws, new laws and court decisions
The first question of the contract enforcement section of the LIS -  Q l-  ask re­
spondents how often legally trained personnel draft new commercial laws, and the 
answers are measured on a frequency rating scale of 1 to 5, with increasing values 
in increments of 1 indicating higher frequency (from ’’Never” to ’’Almost Always”). 
The weighting is as in other LIS sections for this type of question, with higher
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frequencies attaining higher weights (from 0 to 1 in equal increments of 0.25). It 
reflects a rationale that it is beneflcial to have legal experts engaged in drafting of 
commercial legislation. The next two questions -  Q2 and Q3 -  refer to the publica­
tion and dissemination of national laws related to investment activity. Q2 assesses 
the frequency with which respondents perceive such dissemination as happening 
throughout the country; Q3 assesses who is responsible for publishing the laws -  
whether the government, the private sector or both. The highest weight of 1 is 
given to answers, indicating that both the private sector and the government pub­
lish laws and disseminate them. Q4 assesses the speed with which laws affecting 
investment are published -  with the highest weight given for publication of the laws 
within a month of their being passed. Q5 and Q6 assess the dissemination and dis­
cussion within the legal community of draft laws related to investment. Q5 examines 
the frequency with which such draft laws are published and accessible to lawyers, 
and Q6 -  the frequency with which legal practitioners axe allowed to comment on 
such draft laws. Both questions’ weights favour the possibility of such review and 
commenting on draft legislation. Finally, Q7 and Q8 refer to the dissemination of 
important court judgments. Q7 assesses the frequency with which important judg­
ments are published and made available to legal practitioners, while Q8 determines 
whether or not such court judgments are published within a year of their issuance. 
As before, all the frequency rating questions (Q5 to Q8) are weighted in the same 
rating scale, from 0 to 1, with higher weights attached to higher frequency ratings 
(in increments of 0.25).
We average the scores for each country across these 8 questions into an index 
of law dissemination -  LAWJDISSEM. As outlined above, it measures the extent 
to which drafting new legislation is done in an open and transparent manner, with 
contributions from the professional legal community; and to what extent legal texts 
are published and distributed nationally. Since such efforts are made to address
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informational asymmetries and to enhance the transparency of the legal process, 
it is expected that LAW-DISSEM would affect the regime of contract enforcement 
positively.
5.4.1.2 Procedural Regulations of Courts
Several questions assess the regulation of judicial process -  whether judgments con­
tain motivations for the decision in writing (QlO), whether there is a meaningful 
right of appeal against first-instance court judgments (Q ll), and whether an inde­
pendent right of judicial review of administrative decisions by government agencies 
exists (Q12). In addition, Q15 asks respondents whether their legal system recog­
nises and enforces judgments issued by foreign courts (including foreign arbitration 
decisions), and does not mandate a new judicial re-examination and hearing on the 
merits of the case. All four questions are measured on the usual 1 to 5 frequency 
rating scale, with weights from 0 to 1. The weighting in the case of Q15 is straight­
forward -  acceptance of foreign judgments and arbitration decisions can be beneficial 
-  especially where the court system works with delays and is purported to be cor­
rupt -  because of speedier trials for those firms, who can afford it. Acceptance of 
foreign arbitral awards also assumes that the jurisdiction has adopted international 
legislation on arbitration, which can expand litigants’ options to resolve disputes 
out of the courts. The weighting of the other three questions is somewhat more 
controversial. For instance, it is not clear whether mandating written reasoning for 
the court judgment is beneficial or not. On the one hand, written reasons allow 
for a legally justified judgment, and therefore reduce the opportunities to bribe the 
judge. However, some studies have shown that higher procedural complexity and 
more written elements of the court process -  such as mandating a written, legally 
justified judgment -  actually delay the first-instance process, and are associated with 
worse, rather than better, court performance, measured by duration of a standard
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first-instance procedure over non-payment of a debt, e.g. Djankov et al. (2003a), 
World Bank (2004a), Slavova and Ryterman (2004), etc. Given this evidence, we 
leave it to the data to tell us whether or not provision of written reasons is ben­
eficial or not. Finally, appeals and judicial review of administrative decisions are 
also thought beneficial in expanding the rights of litigants to seek a fair outcome. 
Again, Djankov et al. (2003a) caution that rights of appeal should be limited in 
straightforward cases, since appeals can be used strategically by judgment debtors 
to delay payment further. However, unlike Djankov et al. (2003a), the LIS does not 
investigate in detail the regulation of the appeal process, and we assume that the 
presence of appeal is a positive feature.
We average these four questions (QlO, Q ll, Q12 and Q15) to arrive at the 
aggregate index of regulation of court process -  REG_COURTS. Since the acceptance 
and execution of foreign judgments is likely to be of importance to multinational 
firms, which can avail themselves of courts and arbitration tribunals in their home 
jurisdiction, we will test this index separately in the regression analysis.
5.4.1.3 Confidence in the Courts
Two questions evaluate respondents’ confidence in the court system. Thus, Q13 asks 
whether respondents believe that their country’s courts would normally recognise 
and enforce their legal rights against other private parties; Q14 asks the same with 
respect to disputes with the government. Again both questions are measured on the 
usual frequency rating scale, with higher values recording higher frequencies and 
scoring higher points (a belief that courts would almost always enforce their rights 
against third parties scores 1, while a belief that courts would never do so scores 0). 
Trust in the courts is important, because it would in many cases determine court 
use. If litigants believe that courts will not recognise their rights, they will avoid 
using them.
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We aggregate the answers to these two questions in an index of confidence in the 
courts -  CONFID-COURTS. We expect it to affect FDI fiows positively.
5.4.1.4 Perceptions of Court Performance
Aside from general confidence that the courts will uphold their contractual rights, 
three additional questions evaluate certain aspects of court performance, such as 
their impartiality and speed of delivering a decision, and the monetary costs of using 
them. Thus, Q17 asks whether the involvement of the court affects enforcement due 
to courts tending to protect the debtor; Q18 asks whether enforcement is affected 
because of high court fees; and Q19 asks whether enforcement is affected due to 
long court proceedings. All three questions share the usual 1 to 5 frequency ratings 
scale, with higher values indicating more frequent effects upon enforcement. In 
reviewing the data from these three questions, we corrected a prior error in the 
weighting structure. Previously an answer ’’Never” scored 0 points, and an answer 
of ’’Almost always” scored 1 point, with answers in between scoring 0.25, 0.5 and 
0.75. However, lack of any effects upon contract enforcement due to high court fees, 
courts being pro-debtor (i.e. biased courts), and lengthy court proceedings, should, 
in our opinion, score the highest points since lack thereof would imply impartial 
courts, and fairly cheap and speedy judicial process. Therefore, we have reversed 
the weighs to these questions, with ’’Never” scoring 1 point, and ’’Almost Always” 
scoring 0, and accordingly in between. This is one example of a change in internal 
question weights^.
The three questions’ answers are aggregated in an index of court performance -  
COURT_PERF.
^We leave this question’s weights open, since the previous weighting may also have been done 
with a view that effects upon enforcement as a result of existing high fees, lengthy procedures or 
biased judgments, are a positive feature, since they allow htigants to move away from the courts. 
However, such interpretation is very unlikely, given the wording of the questions.
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5.4.1.5 Duration of Trial and Enforcement
Two questions also assess the expected duration of a first-instance court trial and 
execution of a first-instance court judgment. Thus, Q16 asks how long it takes a 
court in the country’s most important commercial centre to conduct a hearing on 
the merits of the case (and presumably issue a judgment); Q20 examines how long 
on average it takes to execute a judgment over a payment of a sum of money, e.g. 
through seizure and sale of debtor’s property. Both questions have the same answer 
options, specifying five different ranges. At one extreme is less than 6 months; at 
the other -  more than 3 years. The intermediate options are ’’from 7 months to 
1 year” , ”1 to 2 years” , and ”2 to 3 years”. The shortest duration scores 1 point, 
the longest -  0 points, and scores are distributed in equal increments of 0.25. The 
average of the two questions gives the index of DURATION.
We also calculate the average number of days to get a judgment and enforce a 
judgment, using the mid-point values in each range.
5.4.1.6 Corruption and Crime
Four questions assess the general regime of law and order in the country, including 
corruption and crime. Corruption is found to be a strong deterrent of FDI in the 
literature, e.g. Wei (2000a, 2000b). Q21 assesses the frequency with which cases 
of corruption of public officials are investigated and prosecuted. Q24 asks whether 
government corruption is perceived to be declining, about the same or increasing. 
Q23 asks whether business-related crime in the country’s most important commercial 
centre is declining, static or increasing. Finally, Q22 addresses an issue from the 
Securities Law section of the survey -  whether insider dealing is prohibited by law. 
This question is asked here in its relation to overall business crime, and its effects 
on investment.
Q21 is weighted on a rating scale of 0 to 1, for higher frequencies; Q22 has the
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typical Yes-NoUnclear answer scale, with positive answers getting 1 point; and Q23 
and Q24 score 1 point each if corruption/ crime are perceived to be declining, and 
zero otherwise.
We aggregate the answers to these four questions to arrive at the index of 
CORR_CRIME.
5.4.1.T Judges’ Qualifications
Question Q9 assesses the frequency with which judges in commercial and arbitration 
courts (the latter term is for the arbitrazh courts in the former Soviet Union, and does 
not refer to arbitration as such) are legally qualified. Higher reported frequencies of 
adequate qualifications gain higher scores, using the 0 to 1 weighting scale. Finally, 
an additional question -  Q9a -  previously not used in the generation of indices 
based on this section of the survey -  assesses judicial salaries. It asks respondents to 
provide an estimate of the annual average salary of a private lawyer and an entry- 
level primary school teacher in their country, assuming that the annual average 
salary of a judge in a first-instance court is normalised to be 100. Thus, the aim is 
to assess the opportunity costs of being a judge rather than a private lawyer; and to 
assess how much judges earn compared to other public servants, such as teachers. 
The results indicate that the median wage of a judge across the whole sample of 
transition economies is 35.5% of the salary of a private lawyer. Judges earn least, 
compared to private attorneys, in Ukraine -  3.3%, and Russia -  8.8%, and the most 
-  66.7% in Armenia. Judges earn more than twice the average salary of primary 
teachers -  the median across the sample is 235.3% of a teacher’s average salary. 
Judges earn the most compared to teachers in Georgia -  ten times more, and the 
least in FYR Macedonia and Romania, where court judges are reported to earn 
more or about the same as primary teachers. The scoring of this last question is as 
follows: half a point is awarded whenever the average salary of a judge -  relative to
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a private lawyer and relative to a teacher -  is above the median, and zero otherwise. 
The maximum score is one, reflecting a relatively well-paid judiciary.
We aggregate Q9 and Q9a’s answers into an index of judges’ qualifications: 
JUDGES.QUAL.
5.4.2 Dependent variable
We use as a main dependent variable cumulative FDI inflows per capita over the 
period 1999-2002. The data are taken from the 2003 EBRD Transition Report, and 
cover all transition countries. The choice of years is determined by the availability 
of the Legal Indicator Survey data, which we wish to employ as a proxy for contract 
enforcement and institutional development. Since these data are for 1999, we are 
essentially testing how contemporaneous and future FDI flows are affected by the 
regime of contract enforcement^. It is true, however that the decade of the 1990s saw 
extensive legal reforms in the transition economies -  brand new laws with regard to 
investment, finance, corporate governance, and commercial activity were adopted. 
Legal reforms were far too sweeping to assume that the laws remained constant.
In contrast, it may not be fax from reality to assume that the contract enforce­
ment and the institutional environment for legal implementation, have not changed 
much. In fact, most legal and economic studies of the late 1990s and later have 
argued, e.g. Pistor et al. (2000), EBRD Transition Report 1998, that legal en­
forcement lags behind legal text. The courts and other institutions for enforcing 
contracts, which existed prior to transition, are largely the same institutions today, 
and new specialized or small-claims courts, existent in many developed and emerg-
® An earlier version of this chapter used as a dependent variable cumulative inflows of FDI per 
capita from 1989 through 1998, which created methodological concerns about explaining FDI flows 
from time t  — n  until time t — 1 by the legal environment at time t. One may, however, justify 
such an approach on grounds that legal and, in particular, institutional factors change slowly over 
time, and for estimation purposes in large cross-country datasets may be assumed constant.
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ing market economies, are very rare in transition countries. In fact, reforms of the 
judiciary -  including independence, improvements in the physical infrastructure -  
court buildings, computers, filing and record systems, case management systems -  
and in training of judicial personnel have been undertaken only recently, mainly in 
the more advanced transition economies. In view of this, it may be justifiable to 
assume that the institutional environment for contract enforcement, as captured by 
the specific indices outlined above for 1999, may be a good proxy for the average in­
stitutional environment in preceding years. To test this, we also employ cumulative 
FDI flows per capita over the period 1989-2002.
Usually studies use FDI flows, either scaled by population or GDP. Some studies, 
however, use unsealed FDI data in millions of dollars, and control on the right-hand 
side of the regression equation for the scale variable, e.g. Garibaldi et al. (2001). 
Since we are conducting a cross-sectional estimation on a rather small sample of 
23 countries, for which LIS data are available, we are constrained by the degrees 
of freedom with which we can operate, and have opted to use normalized FDI 
flows, scaled by population. Finally, we must note that the FDI inflows used in the 
chapter are net inflows, i.e. gross inflows less gross outflows. Globerman and Shapiro 
(2002) argue that FDI inflows and outflows are in a sense symmetrical -  i.e. the 
factors which help attract FDI inflows to a country, also help it grow multinational 
flrms, which invest abroad. Studying the determinants of FDI inflows and outflows 
separately, they present results largely in support of this view.
5.4.3 M acroeconomic D eterm inants
Macroeconomic stability is generally viewed as creating an environment conducive 
to foreign direct investment. Among the macroeconomic determinants included 
in related studies are a multitude of variables, such as inflation, lagged economic 
growth, the fiscal balance, and the exchange rate regime. Usually evidence suggests
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that inflation has a negative eflFect upon FDI inflows since foreign investors are wary 
of markets with rising prices. The expected sign on past and expected GDP growth 
is more ambiguous. One may argue that investors prefer growing economies, which 
benefit from higher demand and relative political and social stability. However, 
one may also argue that recessions increase the marginal product of new capital by 
freeing resources, and perhaps by lowering asset prices.
We control in the regressions for both past inflation and GDP growth. Growth 
(GDPGR) is employed as a control variable because it captures the macroeco­
nomic environment and sends signals to potential foreign investors about the growth 
prospects of a given economy. Real GDP growth is average real GDP growth for 
1996, 1997 and 1998 and, the data come from EBRD 1998 Transition Report. The 
choice of years is determined by the need to include lagged growth, and by an at­
tempt to start in the mid-1990s, when restructuring efforts had aheady started in 
earnest across most transition economies as well as to avoid the output decline of 
the early 1990s.
We also control for past inflation (AVINFL). The inflation measure is averaged 
over the period 1994-1999, and is the same as used in Chapters 3 and 4. It covers a 
somewhat longer period than growth in order to smooth out inflation fluctuations. 
We also test a second measure of inflation, averaged over 1996-1998. The results are 
qualitatively the same.
5.4.4 Size of Economy and Local Dem and
Market size is often regarded as a major determinant of FDI. Notably though, it 
depends on the main function of foreign projects - to serve local markets or to 
be export-oriented. Thus, Lankes and Venables (1996) establish that local market 
size is more important for those transition economies, where projects predominantly 
serve local demand. Since we already normalize FDI flows by population, we can use
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data on aggregate host-economy gross national income (GNI) data for the period 
1996-1998 to proxy for market size We also take GNI data for 1998. These data 
come from the World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank (2004b), and are 
in current US dollars and calculated according to the Atlas method. We employ the 
natural logarithm of GNI98 in the regressions.
A measure for demand -  which should affect market-driven FDI -  is also GDP per 
capita in the host country. This is another standard market-seeking FDI determinant 
in the related literature. We therefore employ the natural logarithm of GDP per 
capita in 1999 (LGDPPC99).
5.4.5 Distance
Distance is a variable that has been frequently used in the international trade litera­
ture, using arguments similar to those in Krugman and Venables (1990, 1995). Prox­
imity to Western Europe might be beneficial due to lower transport costs, shared 
history of capitalist institutions and markets, similar historical and cultural past, 
lower perceived risk on the part of Western investors, etc. Geographical distance is 
now routinely used in gravity models of international trade, but is also used in the 
FDI literature as a proxy for cultural affinities between the source and host coun­
tries, and also as a measure of transportation and transaction costs. We chose to 
include the distance in kilometres between each of our sample countries’ capital city 
and Vienna (DIST.VIEN) because Austria features among the major Western trad­
ing partners and investors in Eastern Europe. The distance measures are obtained 
online at www.indo.com/distance.
5.4.6 Costs
Finally, unit labor costs in the host country relative to the source country are among 
the determinants of efficiency-seeking FDI. However, unit labor costs are hard to
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come by for a cross-section of all transition economies on a consistent basis. One 
approach is to employ average wages in manufacturing -  as a measure of relative 
labor costs. Wages however have often been found a poor determinant of FDI -  
it is the joint interaction of labor productivity and wages that determines relative 
unit labor costs, and should matter for FDI. Therefore, we will ignore labour costs 
considerations, and leave them out of the estimated model.
5.4.7 Some m ethodological concerns
As mentioned earlier, we would like to test for the effect of disaggregated index 
measures of the contract enforcement environment on FDI inflows in transition 
economies. Potential problems involve multi-collinearity -  for instance some of our 
independent variables display high and significant correlation (Table 5.1). This, the 
DIST_VIEN variable is correlated with some of our legal measures -  it has a coeffi­
cient of correlation with LAWJDISSEM of -0.73, which is statistically significant. It 
is also correlated with the REGUL_COURTS index -  coefficient of -0.46, which is 
also significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, GDP per capita is correlated signifi­
cantly with most of the indices of the institutional environment, as well as with the 
average inflation (AVINFL) and distance (DIST.VIEN) measures.
5.5 Regression Results
5.5.1 Legal D issem ination
We are interested in determining the impact of the overall contract enforcement 
environment -  as captured by the indices related to the work of the courts described 
in the previous section. Unlike in earlier chapters, we do not make a distinction 
between legal extensiveness and effectiveness indices. Rather, we focus on the general 
effectiveness or enforceability regime. Our initial conjecture is that a better contract
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Table 5.1 : Correlation Between Independent Variables
LAWJDISS REC-CO CONFID-CO SHORT_PR AVINFL CDPCR LCNI98 DIST.VIEN
REG-COURTS 0.43**
CONFID-COURTS 0.51** 0.53***
SHORT-PROC -0.51** -0.55*** -0.53***
AVINFL -0.26 -0.18 -0.11 0.18
CDPCR -0.11 0.01 -0.03 -0.09 0.37*
LCNI98 0.41* 0.14 0.29 -0.53*** 0.06 -0.13
DIST.VIEN -0.73*** -0.46** -0.30 0.45** 0.36* 0.08 -0.31
LCDPPC99 0.76*** 0.37* 0.43* -0.54*** -0.45** 0.14 0.32 -0.69***
Note: The table reports pairwise correlation coefficients, 
niflcant at 1%; ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
*** Sig-
enforcement environment should exert a positive influence on FDI inflows, other 
things being equal. Also, in line with previous empirical studies of obstacles to FDI, 
we would expect that the enforceability of commercial contracts and the efficiency of 
the judiciary would be of high signiflcance for foreign investors, compared to other 
institutional factors such as competition policy in the host economy, e.g. Table 5.1 
in Chapter 5 of 2003 EBRD Transition Report. When Bevan et al. (2001) study 
the effect of the legal environment on FDI inflows in transition economies, they 
differentiate between legal extensiveness and legal effectiveness (as per the EBRD 
deflnitions). Since the two measures are correlated, however, they are unable to say 
which one is dominant. In fact, in earlier chapters we have demonstrated that some 
of these measures may be biased due to many effectiveness questions essentially 
being unrelated to enforcement, as well as due to treatment of missing observations. 
Our approach here is to use more disaggregated data from the same survey, which
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Figure 5.1: Cumulative FDI per capita, 1999-2002, and Index of Legal Dissemination
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directly relates to court enforcement.
What does our approach reveal? We first look at the set of indices pertaining to 
dissemination of laws, and legislative processes, including commentary and publica­
tion of draft laws. We first test for the effect of the aggregate index of LAW_DISSEM 
on cumulative FDI flows per capita from 1999 through 2002 (FDICUM99_02), con­
trolling for average inflation (AVINFL), (lagged) growth (GDPGR) and economy 
size -  the logarithm of gross national income in 1998 (LGNI98). We find a sta­
tistically significant and positive effect of the LAW_DISSEM index on FDI flows. 
Inflation and past growth are also signiflcant and their coefficients have the correct 
signs. The economy size measure -  LGNI98 -  is not signiflcant, and is dropped from 
the regression. Indeed, the logarithm of CNF is found insignificant in all regression 
specifications that follow, so we omit it hereafter. It is, perhaps, surprising that we 
find market size not to affect FDI inflows.
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Table 5.2: Law Dissemination and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows, 1999-2002. 
OLS Estimations
Independent FDICUM99_02 FDICUM99-02 FDICUM99j02 FDICUM99_02 FDICUM99-02
variable
LAW-DISSEM 18.3027**
(7.5431)
20.8806**
(8.8142)
LAW-DRAFT 14.4633**
(6.5171)
LAW-PUBL 18.0666**
(8.5069)
PRIV-PUBL 21.4179**
(8.4400)
AVINFL -0.9235** -0.8564*** -1.2292*** -1.1223*** -1.3655***
(0.3256) (0.2768) (0.3096) (0.2930) (0.4219)
GDPGR 53.9386** 50.7691** 43.2876** 42.2761* 62.5274***
(21.5774) (20.2096) (20.6316) (21.6530) (20.6770)
LGNI98 47.3192
(84.3284)
Intercept -1918.9 -1001.0* -501.1 -1062.9 -1529.4*
(1945.269) (542.1156) (347.9138) (642.5683) (769.2717)
Number of 23 23 23 23 23
observations
F test 4.51** 5.82*** 6.05*** 6.03*** 5.31***
[0.0106] [0.0054] [0.0045] [0.0046] [0.0079]
Adjusted 0.38 0.37 0.33 0.34 0.28
R-squared
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at
10%. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient
estimates. P-values shown is square brackets for the F-tests.
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The same results also hold if we employ as a dependent variable cumulative FDI 
flows per capita over the years 1989-2002 (FDICUM89-02). The fit in the latter 
regression is better.
We interpret these results to mean that greater transparency and openness of 
the legislative process -  through timely publication of new laws and allowing legal 
practitioners access to draft and new legislation as well as publication of important 
court judgments -  are supportive of more investment. This is hardly surprising since 
more legal information and distribution of such can alleviate asymmetric information 
in the market, particularly for foreign investors. It also probably means that the 
court system itself is more transparent and effective.
. We also test for each individual question, which is included in the index of 
LAWJDISSEM. We find that the individual sub-indices of LAWJDRAFT (the de­
gree to which legally trained personnel dr gift legislation), LAW_PUBL (the degree 
to which laws are published and distributed across the country), PRJV_PUBL 
(both private and public sectors publish laws) are signiflcant in the FDI regres­
sions. Timely publication of investment laws (TIMELY_PUBL), and publication 
of important court decisions (COURTJDEC_PUBL) are also marginally signiflcant. 
Thus, only the sub-indices based on Q5 and Q6 -  on drafting and commentary of 
draft laws -  are not signiflcant.
A scatter-plot of FDI inflows against the aggregate index of legal dissemination 
(LAWJDISSEM) is given in Figure 5.1 and the regression results are shown in Table 
5.2. Figure 5.1 shows that the Czech Republic attracted by far the highest volume 
of FDI per capita from 1999 to 2002, followed by the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Croatia, Estonia and Poland. Among the top 10 destinations are the eight new E.U. 
members plus Croatia and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s relatively high FDI flows are 
very likely due to its rich natural resource base; in the case of Croatia higher FDI 
since 1999 is probably due to better prospects after the end of the Tudjman era in
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end-1999, and prospective E.U. membership.
Another important observation from Figure 5.1 (as well as Figures 5.2 to 5.4, 
which follow) is that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries have 
attracted very low levels of cumulative FDI per capita over the period 1999-2002 
despite wide differences in the measures of legal dissemination and the other enforce­
ment indices. In other words, for the CIS group of countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Uzbek­
istan), and to a lesser degree for Kazakhstan, there appears to be no correlation 
between the legal measures of contract enforcement and the flows of FDI per capita 
(FDICUM99-02). This could be due to the effects of the Russian financial crisis of 
1998, but deserves further investigation.
5.5.2 Regulation o f Court Process
We also want to establish the effects on FDI of the regulation of judicial process 
with respect to rights of appeal, superior judicial review of administrative decisions, 
requirements for written motivation of court judgments, and recognition of foreign 
judgments and arbitration decisions. As mentioned earlier, available evidence, e.g. 
Djankov et al. (2003a), suggests that written elements and access to appeals may be 
detrimental to fast delivery of judicial services. However, speedy justice may forgo a 
certain degree of fairness. There may be a trade-off between fast and fair procedures, 
and foreign investors may be more sensitive to one than the other. What do the 
data tell us?
First, upon examination of the scatter diagram of cumulative FDI flows per 
capita from 1999 through 2002 (Figure 5.2), we find that the Czech Republic is 
again somewhat of an outlier. We also note that Latvia scores rather low on this 
index, while FYR Macedonia scores the maximum points, the highest score in the 
sample. Georgia and Moldova also score in the high-end of the scale. Nevertheless,
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Figure 5.2: Cumulative FDI per capita, 1999-2002, and Index of Regulation of the 
Courts
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we observe a positive relationship between the index of REG.COURTS and FDI 
inflows. Indeed, the econometric results indicate that the index of regulation of court 
process is statistically signiflcant and has a positive coefficient in the regressions for 
both alternative dependent variables, i.e. for cumulative FDI per capita from 1999 
through 2002, and for cumulative FDI per capita from 1989 through 2002. These 
results are qualitatively the same as those for the aggregate index of LAW_DISSEM 
above. Among the control variables both GDP growth and inflation are significant, 
the logarithm of GNI in 1998 is not signiflcant.
Therefore, we find evidence which indicates that foreign investors respond to a 
well-regulated judicial process. However, it is interesting to see which ingredients 
of the REG_COURTS index actually account for its significance. A breakdown 
into its four components, and running the same regressions with each of these sub­
indices one at a time, reveals that the sub-index of judicial review of administrative 
decisions (JUD_REVIEW), i.e., whether a party can appeal an government agency 
decision before the courts, and the sub-index of a right to appeal of first-instance 
judgments (APPEAL) affect FDI positively and significantly. Surprisingly, host 
country recognition of foreign court decisions and arbitration awards does not have 
an impact upon FDI. Further, requirements for provision of written reasons for a 
judgment are also found insignificant, albeit with a positive sign.
The result for the right of judicial review of administrative decisions ( JUD JTEVIEW) 
has the highest level of significance, and is robust to alternative specifications. 
Therefore, it appears that while foreign investors are attracted to judicial systems 
with a clear right of appeal, they are more concerned about their rights of appeal 
against government decisions, which is what the JUD_REVIEW index measures.®
®This finding is consistent with recent evidence by Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) about the 
stronger influence of property rights institutions (proxied by risks against government expropria­
tion), and private contacting institutions (proxied by judicial formalism) on major economic out­
comes such as long-run growth, investment and private credit across a sample of former colonies.
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Table 5.3; Regulation of Court Process and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows, 1999- 
2002. QLS Estimations
Independent FDICUM99-02 FDICUM99-02 FDICUM99j02 FDICUM99-02 FDICUM99.02
variable
REG-COURTS 11.2569**
(4.4615)
13.3726**
(5.0867)
JUD_REVIEW 10.9489**
(4.4619)
APPEAL 11.4517*
(6.7960)
WRITTEN_JUDG 11.1491
(7.8814)
AVINFL -1.0758*** -0.9798*** -0.9254*** -0.9688*** -1.0970***
(0.3109) (0.2563) (0.2468) (0.2413) (0.3380)
GDPGR 53.7453** 46.2484** 41.6043* 47.3044** 44.0821*
(22.3289) (20.3945) (22.1412) (21.9964) (21.1338)
LGNI98 99.6113
(94.0330)
Intercept -2742.3 -591.3 -399.0 -517.5 -487.1
(2063.272) (359.3667) (274.7917) (491.8509) (582.8759)
Number of 23 23 23 23 23
observations
F test 4.41** 6.08*** 6.56*** 5.63*** 4.22**
[0.0117] [0.0044] [0.0031] [0.0062] [0.0190]
Adjusted 0.32 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.24
R-squared
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at
10%. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient
estimates. P-values shown is square brackets for the F-tests.
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A scatter-plot of FDI inflows against the index of regulation of court process is 
shown in Figure 5.2; the regression results are shown in Table 5.3.
5.5.3 Confidence in the Courts
A separate index measures lawyers’ perceptions of litigants’ confldence in the courts 
-  the index CONFID_COURTS averages perceptions that courts will recognise and 
enforce legal rights of litigants against other private parties, and against the state. 
As mentioned in the earlier section, such confldence measures can determine how 
much parties use the courts to resolve disputes. Similar indices of confidence in 
the legal system to uphold litigants’ contractual and property rights in business 
disputes have been developed by the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Surveys 1999 and 2002 (BEEPS99 and BEEPS02), which 
are firm-level surveys measuring various institutional obstacles to doing business, 
among which -  the judicial system. Keren and Ofer (2002), for example, look at 
FDI in services -  encompassing trade and financial services -  in transition economies, 
and emphasize the crucial importance the quality of law and order, including the 
quality and fairness of the justice system. They argue that total FDI and FDI 
in trade are heavily dependent on investors’ trust in law enforcement, which they 
proxy by the corruption perceptions index of Transparency International. They also 
attempt using the aggregate EBRD indices of commercial and financial law for 2000, 
but find them insignificant (these are the indices measured on a 1 to 4* scale, using 
the LIS data for 2000).
The confidence index that we use -  CONFID_COURTS -  shown against cumu­
lative FDI flows per capita from 1999 until 2002 in Figure 5.3, is highest in Slovenia, 
Estonia and Hungary, and lowest in Armenia, Albania and Uzbekistan. Latvia scores 
rather low, while the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and Croatia score sim­
ilarly to Belarus, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, even through they have recorded much
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Figure 5.3; Cumulative FDI per capita, 1999-2002, and Index of Confidence in the 
Courts
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higher FDI inflows. Despite these outliers, the confldence index and FDI inflows 
display a positive relationship.
Testing the effect of CONFID.COURTS on FDI inflows (using the three differ­
ent specifications of the dependent variable) shows that the confldence measure is 
signiflcantly and positively associated with FDI inflows. As before, inflation and 
growth are also signiflcant statistically, with the expected signs of the coefficients, 
whereas the logarithm of GNI in 1998 is not. Using both cumulative and average 
annual FDI data does not alter these results. Therefore, we find evidence that a 
higher level of trust in the court system generates higher investment from abroad.
Finally, it is worth exploring whether both ingredients of the CONFID.COURTS 
index are equally important for investment. We find some interesting results: it turns 
out that foreign investment is much more sensitive to ability of the judicial system
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Table 5.4: Confidence in the Courts and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows, 1999- 
2002. QLS Estimations_________________________________________________
Independent variable fdicum99.02
CONFID.COURTS 9.8803**
(3.5839)
CONFID_STATE
CONFID_PRIVATE
FDICUM99-02 FDICUM99-02 FDICUM89_02
12.0507***
(3.9045)
AVINFL
GDPGR
Intercept
Number
observations
-1.0451***
(0.3166)
49.2478**
(22.2903)
-64.0
(211.8136) 
of 23
-0.8567***
(0.2546)
52.4344**
(21.6319)
-136.0
(204.8186)
23
3.4408
(4.5183)
-1.1368***
(0.3826)
48.5852**
(21.7970)
296.7
(312.8981)
23
F test 5.29*** 6.71*** 3.67**
[0.0080] [0.0028] [0.0308]
Adjusted R-squared 0.26 0.31 0.21
25.1677***
(5.5847)
-1.3292***
(0.3513)
94.8005***
(27.3185)
-475.9
(308.2769)
23
19.97***
[0 .0000]
0.46
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Robust 
standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. P-values shown 
is square brackets for the F-tests.
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to protect and enforce their rights against state, i.e. government, parties rather than 
other private parties, i.e. other firms or individual litigants. This is a very intuitive 
finding: indeed, foreign investors deal with the host-country government and local 
authorities, and the risk of government expropriation probably makes them aware of 
the need for judicial protection against government decisions. Yudaeva et al. (2003), 
for instance, give as an example the high level of government -  particularly regional 
and local government -  interference with the decisions of foreign companies in their 
jurisdiction in Russia.
In this regard, the regressions we conduct -shown in Table 5.4 -  indicate that 
for all three types of FDI fiows confidence in the courts to recognise and enforce 
litigants’ rights against the state (CONFIDJSTATE) is highly significant at the 
1% level and has a positive impact on FDI infiows. The other controls behave 
as before -  only infiation and growth are significant. In contrast, confidence in the 
courts to uphold litigants’ rights against other private parties (CONFID_PRIVATE) 
is not statistically significant in any of the regression estimations. Thus, we find 
considerable evidence that the index of CONFID_STATE drives the result of the 
aggregate index, and that it is a good proxy for confidence in the judiciary.^
5.5.4 Perceptions o f Court Performance and Duration of 
Trial and Execution of Judgm ent
Trust in the courts to uphold their contractual and property rights in disputes is 
related to investors’ perceptions of court performance -  in terms of speed, costs and 
unbiasedness. The LIS respondent lawyers -  presumably themselves users of the 
courts -  were asked to evaluate court performance along these three dimensions.
^Again, this is in line with recent findings that property rights institutions, protecting from 
expropriation by the state, are more relevant for economic outcomes than private contracting 
institutions, around which economic agents can contract.
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These results are somewhat unexpected: the aggregate index of court performance 
(COURT_PERF) aflPects FDI inflows negatively and signiflcantly, i.e. countries with 
better performing courts appear to get signiflcantly less FDI. At first glance, this 
does not square with the findings on confldence in the courts above. Upon closer 
inspection, however, and taking into account the related data on duration of trial and 
execution, the results begin to make more sense. Thus, of the three component sub­
indices of COURT_PERF, only the one related to the speed of court proceedings -  
SHORT_PROC -  is significantly associated with lower FDI. The other two measures
-  on costs and impartiality towards debtors and creditors -  have no impact upon 
FDI.
Figure 5.4 depicts the negative relationship between perceptions of speediness of 
procedures and FDI -  we see that the countries that score highest on speed of the 
court, i.e. have the shortest procedures, are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Kaza­
khstan and Estonia. The countries which report that enforcement is affected because 
of lengthy court proceedings are Slovenia, Poland, Croatia, and the Czech Republic
-  essentially the transition region’s leaders in attracting FDI. These findings are 
supported also by the more quantitative questions in this section, which ask about 
duration of trial until judgment is delivered and duration of enforcement. Using 
the weighting described above in the previous section, assigning higher weights to 
shorter reported duration, we find that the aggregate index of duration of trial and 
execution (DURATION) is negatively and signiflcantly associated with FDI inflows 
(using the three different dependent variables). Since this index is an average of the 
indices of duration of trial (DUFLTRIAL) and duration of execution (DUR-EXEC), 
we test for their separate effects, and find that it is the former which drives the result 
on the aggregate index rather than the latter. Both indices have negative signs in 
our main regression, but the index of duration of trial (DUR_TRIAL) is signiflcant 
in all specifications, while DURJEXEC is never signiflcant.
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Figure 5.4: Cumulative FDI per capita, 1999-2002, and Index of Short Court Pro­
cedure
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Table 5.5: Perceptions of Duration of Trial and Court Performance and Foreign 
Direct Investment Inflows, 1999-2002. OLS Estimations
Independent variable FDICUM99-02 FDICUM99-02 FDICUM99-02 FDICUM99j02 FDICUM99-02
COURT_PERF -11.0814**
(5.2293)
SHORT_PROC -9.7793*
(5.4064)
DURATION -15.9197*
(8.1820)
DUR_TRIAL -18.1003**
(7.4067)
DURJEXEC -7.6230
(6.2065)
AVINFL -0.8459** -0.8960*** -1.1665*** -1.1827*** -1.1340**
(0.3409) (0.2472) (0.3336) (0.2709) (0.4007)
GDPGR 47.9113** 39.5852* 30.074 26.4117 40.6365*
(20.8390) (22.6570) (23.4607) (24.0772) (21.3020)
Intercept 1097.1*** 844.8** 1636.8** 2015.0** 958.5*
(359.0588) (300.8193) (680.9039) (718.04) (470.2392)
Number of 23 23 23 23 23
observations
F test 6.70*** 4.75** 6.58*** 6.66*** 5.10***
[0.0029] [0.0123] [0.0031] [0.0029] [0.0093]
Adjusted R-squared 0.25 0.32 0.37 0.43 0.27
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Robust
standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. P-values
shown is square brackets for the F-tests.
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We have also calculated the average number of days for trial and enforcement of 
the judgment based on the questions used to generate DUR-TRIAL and DUR-EXEC. 
Since respondents specified duration in ranges, we used the mid-point of the range to 
estimate the number of days. For the top range we used the minimum as the average 
number of days. The results indicate that trial times are highest in Slovenia (670 
days), Georgia (548 days), Poland (487 days), and Croatia (442 days). The shortest 
duration of trial is reported in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (105 days). In terms of 
days of execution of judgment the rankings are similar: Hungary (794 days), FYR 
Macedonia (791 days) and the Slovak Republic (731 days) have the longest duration, 
while Kazakhstan (266 days), Latvia (261 days) and Moldova (225 days) have the 
shortest duration.
We compare these duration data with available data on duration of contract en­
forcement in a standard debt collection cases, reported by the World Bank Doing 
Business database -  World Bank (2004), using the methodology of Djankov et al. 
(2003a). The Doing Business data cover all transition economies in our sample, 
with the exception of Estonia. We find that the Doing Business duration of contract 
enforcement to be shorter than the sum of the average days of trial and days of 
execution from the LIS data -  something expected since Doing Business impose a 
series of assumptions about the case, and in some countries, such as Lithuania, the 
average duration does not apply to a court process, but to an administrative process 
for debt collection. However, our measures correlate positively and significantly with 
the Doing Business measure of duration. Thus, the correlation coefficient of the Do­
ing Business (DURATION_DB), and the our measure of TOTAL JDAYS (trial and 
execution days) is 0.63, which is significant at the 1% level. The correlation between 
DURATIONJDB and DAYS_TRIAL is similar in magnitude - at 0.64, and also sig­
nificant at the 1% level, whereas the correlation coefficient between DURATION JDB 
and DAYS_ENF is lower -  at 0.46, and significant at 5% only.
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Thus, our results on duration of court procedures -  as generated by lawyers’ 
opinions in the 1999 LIS -  are very much in line with other available data measuring 
the speed of contract enforcement.®
The findings of the impact of speediness of court trials may refiect the judicial 
structure of transition economies -  many of the CIS countries have instituted special­
ized commercial courts -  the so-called arhitrazh courts -  which are purported to be 
fast in delivering justice in commercial cases. In contrast, such courts do not operate 
in Central and Eastern Europe, where civil procedures are also more burdensome -  
these countries mostly belong to the German civil law tradition, which is associated 
with a more regulated trial process. Another possible interpretation of the results 
on duration is that perhaps courts in the more advanced transition economies are 
more heavily used -  which would explain why respondents have more confidence in 
them -  but heavy use creates backlogs and delays. Clearly, more research into this 
is warranted to explain the data patterns satisfactorily.
5.5.5 Corruption and Crime
Finally, our corruption- and crime-related indices -  CORR_CHIME -  and its con­
stituent parts are not significant for FDI infiows. Similarly the index of judges’ 
qualifications and remuneration is also insignificant. Both insider trading prohi­
bitions and having judges with legal qualifications has a positive impact on FDI 
infiows, but none of the results are significant. Therefore, we do not discuss these 
further. Some of these data are suspect since questions ask about the trend in crime 
and corruption, but it is not clear how big a problem each is to begin with. In a sim­
ilar fashion, there are some doubts about the answers to the question on existence 
of legal prohibitions of insider dealing. A similar question is also asked in the secu-
®The Doing Business data are as of January 1, 2003, and based on a questionnaire of law firms 
as well.
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rities regulation section of the survey (presented in Chapter 3), and yields different 
results for some countries. This suggests that answers may be subject to question 
order effects -  for instance asking questions on insider dealing in conjunction with 
questions on crime and corruption may elicit different attitudes and answers from 
those elicited from respondents when they are merely asked a series of questions 
on the securities market laws. The divergence may also be due to different lawyers 
completing the commercial and financial sections of the LIS -  even if they are from 
the same law firm. Therefore, the results are prone to biases of this nature.
However, where possible, we have made comparisons with other available data, 
and find that the LIS data are corroborated by other existing sources, such as the 
duration of trial and execution data from this particular section of the survey.
5.6 Robustness Tests
As illustrated in Table 5.1, most of our legal variables are correlated with the distance 
and GDP per capita. We have run some robustness tests, isolating the impact of 
DIST-VIEN in a first stage regression, and then adding to the regression our main 
legal variables of interest. The results indicate that among the legal variables only 
the index of APPEAL retains significance at the 5% level, while CONFIDJSTATE 
just misses significance at 10%. The rest of the legal measures lose significance. 
These results appear in Table 5.6.
Second, repeating the same procedure for GDP per capita, leaves our main legal 
variables, together with the inflation and growth controls, insignificant.
We do not present these results, but they suggest that GDP per capita has a 
strong explanatory power over FDI inflows. Once its effect is accounted for, the 
legal and other measures lose significance.
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Table 5.6: Foreign Direct Investment Inflows, 1999-2002. OLS Estimations, Con- 
trolling for Distance to Vienna
Independent variable Residual of an OLS regression of FDICUM99_02 on
DIST_VIEN and a constant.
APPEAL 12.5613** (6.0825)
CONFID-STATE 6.0302 (3.7986)
CONFID-PRIVATE 1.4549 (4.2851)
AVINFL -0.5359** (0.2523) -0.5634** (0.2322) -0.7014** (0.2672)
GDPGR 42.9129** (19.2397) 46.9042** (19.3893) 45.0639** (19.1897)
Intercept -1169.3** (430.7755) -363.3 (223.2277) -129.9 (315.0316)
Number of 23 23 23
observations
F test 6.80*** [0.0027] 3.61** [0.0322] 3.84** [0.0265]
Adjusted R-squared 0.23 0.17 0.13
Note: *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. Robust
standard errors shown in parentheses next to coefficient estimates. P-values shown
is square brackets for the F-tests.
5.7 Conclusions
We have conducted a simple empirical analysis of the relationship between the con­
tract enforcement environment and cumulative flows of per capita FDI on a sample 
of 23 transition economies over the period 1999-2002, using legal data from the 1999 
EBRD Legal Indicator Survey. We flnd evidence that legal factors -  such as the 
degree of publication and dissemination of laws and court decisions, the protection 
of litigants’ rights of appeal and judicial review of government decisions, and in­
vestors’ confidence that the courts will uphold their property and contractual rights
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against state parties -  act as significant institutional determinants of FDI. The re­
sults suggest that court enforcement and the legal regime, as encompassed in our 
legal indices, act as significant determinants of FDI in our sample of economies.
The results indicate that foreign investment is sensitive to available information 
on laws, and transparency and quality in the legal drafting process, as well as to 
well-protected rights of appeal before a higher-level court. In particular, foreign 
investors appear to try to reduce the risk of expropriation by ensuring that host 
countries protect their right of judicial review of government decisions, and by 
investing in countries where courts are believed to respect private litigants’ rights 
in disputes with the state. This finding resonates well with recent contributions 
to the literature on institutions and comparative development, e.g. Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2003), who find that property rights institutions explain better economic 
and financial development than contracting institutions. They conjecture that this 
is due to inability of individuals to re-contract with the government.
Needless to say, these results are only initial and would benefit from confirmation 
as and when further data become available. As emphasized in earlier chapters, the 
nature of the legal variables is perception-based as of June - July 1999, and the 
use of a survey of lawyers to generate information about the legal environment may 
introduce some methodological concerns, as discussed in chapter 2. Furthermore, 
we cannot exploit the dynamic character of the FDI data since the legal survey data 
are available for one year only in a systematic manner.
Despite these caveats, the present chapter demonstrates that the legal environ­
ment and the mechanisms for creating and applying the law help to explain FDI 
flows.
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Table 5.7: Description of Variables
Variable Description
FDICUM99_02
FDICUM89_02
GDPGR
AVINFL
LGNI98
LGDPPC99
DIST_VIEN
LAW_DISSEM
LAW_DRAFT
LAW_PUBL
PRIV_PUBL
REG_COURTS
JUD_REVIEW
APPEAL
WRITTEN.JUDG
CONFID.COURTS
CONFIDJSTATE
CONFID J^RIVATE
COURT J^ERF
SHORT J>ROC
DURATION
DUR.TRIAL
DURTiXEC
Cumulative flows of FDI per capita, 1999-2002.
Cumulative flows of FDI per capita, 1989-2002.
Average growth rate of real GDP, 1996-1998.
Average annual rate of inflation, 1994-1999.
Logarithm of real Gross National Income (Atlas Method) 1998. 
Logarithm of GDP per capita, 1999.
Geographical distance of capital city to Vienna, Austria.
Index of dissemination of new commercial laws.
Index of drafting process of new laws.
Index of publicaiton of new laws across country.
Index of both private and public sector publishing new laws.
Index of regulation of court process.
Index of availability of judicial review of an administrative decision. 
Index of availability of appeal from a first-instance judgment.
Index of requirements for a written reasons for a judgment.
Index of confldence in the courts.
Index of confldence in the courts to uphold rights against the state.
Index of confidence in the courts to uphold rights against private parties.
Index of perceptions of court performance.
Index of perceptions of short judicial process.
Duration of a first-instance commercial case.
Duration until a first-instance commercial case judgment is issued. 
Duration of execution of a first-instance commercial case judgment.
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Table 5.8: Economic Variables by Country
Country FDICUM99_02 FDICUM89_02 GDPGR LGNI98 DIST.VIEN
Albania 172 303 3.7 21.7 815
Armenia 131 243 5.0 21.3 2403
Azerbaijan 248 625 4.6 22.1 2597
Belarus 109 181 6.1 23.5 1006
Bulgaria 353 560 -2.6 23.1 818
Croatia 954 1419 5.6 23.8 270
Czech Republic 2493 3554 1.3 24.7 251
Estonia 744 1846 6.8 22.3 1361
FYR Macedonia 376 467 2.4 22.0 799
Georgia 96 210 10.2 24.5 2342
Hungary 570 2253 3.4 23.8 233
Kazakhstan 527 938 1.2 21.3 4624
Kyrgyzstan 10 85 5.9 22.5 4475
Latvia 552 1304 4.6 23.0 1103
Lithuania 573 1024 4.5 22.1 950
Moldova 128 199 -1.4 21.3 946
Poland 651 1007 6.1 25.7 590
Romania 193 415 -2.6 24.3 866
Russian Federation 2 48 -2.6 26.5 1674
Slovak Republic 1523 1791 6.0 23.8 56
Slovenia 1125 1702 3.6 23.7 279
Ukraine 52 99 -4.4 24.5 1054
Uzbekistan 14 33 2.0 23.4 4171
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2003; World Development Indicators 2003, The World Bank; U.S. Bureau 
of the Census.
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Table 5.9: Main Contract Enforcement Indices by Country
Country LAW_DISSEM REG_COURTS CONFID.COURTS
Albania 58.59 81.25 37.50
Armenia 54.69 62.50 18.75
Azerbaijan 54.17 66.67 58.33
Belarus 81.25 62.50 62.50
Bulgaria 81.05 90.23 58.59
Croatia 66.84 95.14 62.50
Czech Republic 82.81 85.34 60.71
Estonia 84.75 89.29 78.57
FYR Macedonia 80.21 100.00 54.17
Georgia 65.63 93.75 62.50
Hungary 77.24 85.98 77.88
Kazakhstan 65.63 73.75 55.00
Kyrgyzstan 47.92 81.25 62.50
Latvia 73.18 64.06 40.63
Lithuania 71.88 84.38 54.17
Moldova 66.67 91.67 58.33
Poland 84.30 86.46 50.00
Romania 78.65 87.50 72.92
Russian Federation 76.49 75.89 55.95
Slovak Republic 78.13 91.25 61.67
Slovenia 81.25 91.67 83.33
Ukraine 67.97 77.08 59.38
Uzbekistan 45.57 68.75 40.63
Source: E B R D  Legal Ind icator Survey, 1999, and au th or’s com p ila tion s.
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Table 5.10: Main Contract Enforcement Indices by Country
Country COURT_PERF DURATION CORR_CRIME
Albania 47.92 68.75 16.67
Armenia 100.00 81.25 75.00
Azerbaijan 70.83 79.17 20.83
Belarus 58.33 37.50 14.58
Bulgaria 46.67 59.38 36.63
Croatia 41.09 50.00 34.90
Czech Republic 50.00 51.79 34.38
Estonia 53.77 75.00 40.48
FYR Macedonia 52.78 62.50 31.25
Georgia 66.67 50.00 37.50
Hungary 52.78 52.88 39.61
Kazakhstan 55.00 90.00 9.38
Kyrgyzstan 62.50 83.33 18.75
Latvia 41.67 84.38 32.29
Lithuania 58.33 70.83 54.17
Moldova 61.11 87.50 13.89
Poland 41.67 53.57 36.21
Romania 56.94 52.08 32.92
Russian Federation 55.83 85.12 26.28
Slovak Republic 54.38 51.25 36.04
Slovenia 41.67 45.83 37.50
Ukraine 56.25 81.25 13.80
Uzbekistan 52.08 71.88 38.54
Source: E B R D  Legal Ind icator Survey, 1999, and au th or’s com p ila tion s.
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Table 5.11: Mapping of LIS Questions Into Contract Enforcement Variables
Variable LIS Question
LAWJDISSEM (Q1-fQ2+Q3+Q4+Q5-l-Q6+Q7+Q8)/8* 100
LAW-DRAFT Ql*100
LAW-PUBL Q2*100
PRIV-PUBL Q3*100
TIMELY-PUBL Q4*100
COURT-DEC-PUBL Q7*100
REG-COURTS (Q10+Q11+Q12+Q15)/4*100
JUD-REVIEW Q12*100
APPEAL Qll*100
WRITTEN-JUDG Q10*100
CONFID-COURTS (Q13+Q14)/2*100
CONFID-STATE Q14*100
CONFID-PRIVATE Q13*100
COURT-PERF (Q17+Q18+Q19)/3*100
SHORT-PROC Q19*100
DURATION (Q16+Q20)/2*100
DUR-TRIAL Q16*100
DUR_EXEC Q20*100
CORR-CRIME (Q21+Q22+Q23+Q24)/4*100
Source: Legal Indicator Survey 1999, and author’s compilations.
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Table 5.12: Individual Question Scores on Contract Enforcement: Questions 1-12
Country Qi Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q9a QIO Qll Q12
Albania 0.50 0.69 0.88 0.88 0.81 0.38 0.31 0.25 1.00 0.17 1.00 0.81 0.81
Armenia 0.75 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.67 0.63 0.63 0.50
Azerbaijan 0.67 0.92 1.00 0.67 0.25 0.25 0.17 0.42 1.00 0.28 0.83 0.83 0.83
Belarus 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.17 1.00 0.50 0.50
Bulgaria 0.88 0.88 0.98 0.97 0.67 0.47 0.81 0.83 0.91 0.28 1.00 0.92 0.89
Croatia 0.67 0.89 0.89 0.78 0.58 0.36 0.56 0.63 0.75 0.24 0.97 0.97 0.89
Czech Republic 0.82 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.70 0.61 0.80 0.82 1.00 0.38 0.96 1.00 0.93
Estonia 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.68 0.54 0.82 0.96 0.79 0.33 0.89 0.93 0.96
FYR Macedonia 0.92 1.00 0.83 1.00 0.58 0.75 0.75 0.58 0.92 0.39 1.00 1.00 1.00
Georgia 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00
Hungary 0.83 0.83 1.00 0.81 0.73 0.54 0.71 0.73 0.87 0.30 0.90 0.92 0.90
Kazakhstan 0.75 0.80 1.00 0.90 0.60 0.50 0.30 0.40 1.00 0.17 0.95 0.95 0.70
Kyrgyzstan 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.42 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.83 0.22 1.00 1.00 0.75
Latvia 0.63 0.92 1.00 0.88 0.56 0.63 0.56 0.69 0.81 0.38 0.81 0.75 0.67
Lithuania 0.50 0.92 0.92 0.83 0.67 0.58 0.67 0.67 1.00 0.45 1.00 1.00 1.00
Moldova 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.58 0.92 0.39 0.83 1.00 1.00
Poland 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.89 0.43 0.86 0.88 0.93 0.29 0.82 0.93 1.00
Romania 0.63 0.88 1.00 0.83 0.75 0.42 0.92 0.88 1.00 0.31 0.79 1.00 0.88
Russian Federation 0.67 0.89 0.95 0.93 0.69 0.49 0.71 0.79 0.99 0.33 0.94 0.81 0.64
Slovak Republic 0.90 1.00 0.98 0.90 0.38 0.38 0.90 0.83 0.95 0.22 0.95 0.95 0.93
Slovenia 0.75 0.92 0.92 1.00 0.75 0.58 0.75 0.83 1.00 0.17 1.00 0.92 1.00
Ukraine 0.63 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.34 0.41 0.56 0.91 0.08 0.81 0.75 0.81
Uzbekistan 0.50 0.56 0.94 0.63 0.25 0.25 0.19 0.33 0.94 0.46 0.88 0.88 0.56
Source: EBR D  Legal Indicator Survey, 1999.
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Table 5.13: Individual Question Scores on Contract Enforcement: Questions 13-24
Country Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24
Albania 0.42 0.33 0.63 0.88 0.44 0.67 0.33 0.50 0.25 0.42 0.00 0.00
Armenia 0.25 0.13 0.75 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.50
Azerbaijan 0.75 0.42 0.17 1.00 0.75 0.75 0.63 0.58 0.17 0.67 0.00 0.00
Belarus 1.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 .. 0.75 -0.17 0.00 0.00
Bulgaria 0.61 0.56 0.80 0.72 0.67 0.53 0.20 0.47 0.39 0.76 0.31 0.00
Croatia 0.69 0.56 0.97 0.61 0.53 0.56 0.14 0.39 0.31 0.83 0.13 0.13
Czech Republic 0.64 0.57 0.52 0.64 0.70 0.70 0.11 0.39 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.00
Estonia 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.89 0.57 0.54 0.50 0.61 0.50 0.83 0.14 0.14
FYR Macedonia 0.58 0.50 1.00 0.92 0.75 0.58 0.25 0.33 0.58 0.67 0.00 0.00
Georgia 0.75 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.75 1.00 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00
Hungary 0.81 0.75 0.71 0.75 0.60 0.73 0.25 0.31 0.50 0.90 0.00 0.18
Kazakhstan 0.65 0.45 0.35 1.00 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.80 0.50 -0.13 0.00 0.00
Kyrgyzstan 0.83 0.42 0.50 0.92 0.88 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.33 0.42 0.00 0.00
Latvia 0.44 0.38 0.33 0.88 0.50 0.42 0.33 0.81 0.38 0.67 0.25 0.00
Lithuania 0.58 0.50 0.38 0.75 0.58 0.75 0.42 0.67 0.50 1.00 0.33 0.33
Moldova 0.67 0.50 0.83 0.92 0.58 0.75 0.50 0.83 0.33 0.22 0.00 0.00
Poland 0.54 0.46 0.71 0.57 0.75 0.46 0.04 0.50 0.50 0.81 0.14 0.00
Romania 0.75 0.71 0.83 0.67 0.75 0.58 0.38 0.38 0.42 0.57 0.17 0.17
Russian Federation 0.60 0.52 0.64 0.94 0.56 0.70 0.41 0.76 0.31 0.64 0.10 0.00
Slovak Republic 0.65 0.58 0.83 0.65 0.69 0.72 0.23 0.38 0.48 0.77 0.10 0.10
Slovenia 0.83 0.83 0.75 0.42 0.58 0.67 0.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00
Ukraine 0.66 0.53 0.71 0.91 0.84 0.47 0.38 0.72 0.47 0.08 0.00 0.00
Uzbekistan 0.50 0.31 0.44 0.88 0.75 0.38 0.44 0.56 0.50 0.71 0.33 0.00
Source: E B R D  Legal Indicator Survey, 1999. Note: m eans no answer was provided.
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Appendix 5.B Contract Enforcement Questionnaire
Q l. Do legally trained personnel generally draft commercial laws?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always 
Never gets 0 points, Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Q2. Are the full texts of laws affecting investment published and 
distributed throughout the country?
Never gets 0 points. Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always 
Q3. If so, are they published:
a) by the private sector only?
b) by the public sector (government) only?
c) by both the public and private sector?
Option a) gets 0.5, option b) gets 0.75 and option c) gets 1 point. The maximum 
score is 1.
Q4. Typically, how often are laws affecting investment published?
a) Within 1 month of being passed?
b) Between 1 and 6 months of being passed?
c) More than 6 months of being passed?
Option a) gets 1 point, option b) gets 0.5 and option c) gets zero. The maximum 
score is 1.
Q5. Are draft laws affecting investment published and accessible to  
practitioners?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always 
Never gets 0 points. Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75  
and Almost Always gets 1.
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Q6. If yes, is there an opportunity for parties to comment on draft 
laws?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points, Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Q7. Are important court decisions usually published and accessible to  
practitioners?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points. Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Q8. If yes, are they usually published within 12 months of being 
issued?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points. Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Q9. Are judges sitting on commercial or arbitration courts graduates 
in law?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points. Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Q9a. How does the annual average salary of a judge of a court of first 
instance compare w ith that of i) a private lawyer, and ii) an entry level 
primary school teacher? Using an index of 100 for such a judge, please 
complete
Judge of court of first instance 100
Private Lawyer
Entry level primary school teacher
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Not scored in previous rounds of the data. Scoring here included attaching equal 
weight of 0.50 for the judge having a salary (in % of that of a private lawyer) of 
above the median in the sample, and for having a salary (in % of that of a primary 
teacher) above the median in the sample.
QIO. Do judgements usually provide written reasons for the decision? 
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points, Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Q ll .  Is there usually a meaningful right of appeal from first instance 
court decisions?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points, Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Q12. Is there an independent right of judicial review of administrative 
action?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points. Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Q13. Do private parties generally believe that courts would recognise 
and enforce their legal rights against another private party?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points. Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Q14. Do private parties generally believe that courts would recognise 
and enforce their legal rights against state parties?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points. Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75
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and Almost Always gets 1.
Q15. Are foreign judgements (including arbitral awards) recognised, 
enforced and ultim ately decided by the courts without a re-examination 
of the merits?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points, Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Q16. How long on average can a party be expected to  wait to have a 
commercial case heard on the merits by a court in the most important 
commercial centre?
a) less than 6 months
b) between 7 months - 1 year
c) between 1 - 2  years
d) between 2 - 3  years
e) more than 3 years
Option a) gets 1 point, option b) gets 0.75, c) gets 0.5, d) gets 0.25 and e) gets 
zero. The maximum score is 1.
Q17. Does the involvement of the court affect enforcement because 
the courts tend to protect the debtor?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 1 point. Rarely gets 0.75, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.25 
and Almost Always gets 0.
Q18. Does the involvement of the court affect enforcement because 
the fees are too high?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 1 point. Rarely gets 0.75, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.25 
and Almost Always gets 0.
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Q19. Does the involvement of the court affect enforcement because 
the proceedings take too  long?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 1 point, Rarely gets 0.75, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.25 
and Almost Always gets 0.
Q20. How long on average can a party be expected to wait to have a 
final judgement for payment of a sum of money executed (through, for 
example, seizure and sale of property)?
a) Less than 6 months
b) 7 months - 1 year
c) 1 - 2 years
d) 2 - 3 years
e) More than 3 years
Option a) gets 1 point, option b) gets 0.75, c) gets 0.5, d) gets 0.25 and e) gets 
zero. The maximum score is 1.
Q21. Are cases involving corrupt practices, including bribery of public 
officials, investigated and prosecuted?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Almost Always
Never gets 0 points. Rarely gets 0.25, Sometimes gets 0.5, Frequently gets 0.75 
and Almost Always gets 1.
Q22. Do laws exist prohibiting insider share dealing of publicly listed  
companies? Y N  U__
A ’Yes’ answer gives 1, a ’N o ’ answer is worth 0, ’Unclear’ is penalised at -1/6.
Q23. Is the level of crime relating to  business in the most important 
commercial centre generally:
a) Declining?
b) Static?
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c) Increasing?
Option a) gets 1 point, option b) and c) get zero. The maximum score is 1. 
Q24. Is the level of government corruption:
a) Declining?
b) Static?
c) Increasing?
Option a) gets 1 point, option b) and c) get zero. The maximum score is 1.
Chapter 5. Legal Determinants of FDI in Transition Economies 385
Table 5.14: A Comparison of Legal Indicator Survey 
Questions on Contract Enforcement and Djankov et al. 
(2003a) Indices
LIS
Qn
No.
Belongs to Question on Relevance
to
Djankov 
et al. (2003a) 
variable
Qi Law drafting 
and
dissemination
Frequency with which legally 
trained personnel draft com­
mercial laws
effectiveness Does not cover
Q2 Law drafting 
and
dissemination
Frequency with which 
full texts of investment laws 
are published and distributed 
throughout the country
ejffectiveness Does not cover
Q3 Law drafting 
and
dissemination
Commercial laws published 
both by the public and private 
sectors
effectiveness Does not cover
Q4 Law drafting 
and
dissemination
Timeliness of publication of 
new commercial and invest­
ment laws
effectiveness Does not cover
Q5 Law drafting 
and
dissemination
Frequency with which invest­
ment laws are published and 
accessible to practitioners
effectiveness Does not cover
Q6 Law drafting 
and
dissemination
Frequency with which parties 
comment on draft commercial 
laws
effectiveness Does not cover
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QT Law drafting 
and
dissemination
Frequency with which impor­
tant court decisions are pub­
lished and accessible to legal 
practitioners
effectiveness Does not cover
Q8 Law drafting 
and
dissemination
Important court decisions are 
published within 12 months of 
their issuance
effectiveness Does not cover
Q9 Judges’
Qualifications
Frequency with which com­
mercial court judges have legal 
education
effectiveness Professional 
Ver­
sus Nonprofes­
sional judge 
sub-index
Q9a Judges’
Qualifications
Judges’ salaries are high rela­
tive to those of private lawyers 
and other public servants
effectiveness Does not cover
QIO Procedural 
Regulations of 
the Courts
Frequency with which 
court judgments provide writ­
ten reasons for the decision
effectiveness Written Versus 
Oral sub­
index; Judg­
ment Must Be 
Legally Justi­
fied sub-index
Q ll Procedural 
Regulations of 
the Courts
Frequency with which a mean­
ingful right of appeal of first- 
instance court decisions exists
effectiveness Control of Su­
perior Review 
sub-index
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Q12 Procedural 
Regulations of 
the Courts
Frequency with which an in­
dependent right of judicial re­
view of administrative actions 
exists
effectiveness close to Con­
trol
of Superior Re­
view sub-index
Q13 Confidence in 
the Courts
Frequency with which private 
parties generally believe that 
the courts would recognise 
and enforce their legal rights 
against other private parties
effectiveness Confidence 
in Legal Sys­
tem variable 
(WBES)
Q14 Confidence in 
the Courts
Frequency with which private 
parties generally believe that 
the courts would recognise 
and enforce their legal rights 
against the state
effectiveness Confidence 
in Legal Sys­
tem variable 
(WBES)
Q15 Procedural 
Regulations of 
the Courts
Frequency with which for­
eign judgments are recog­
nised, enforced and decided 
by the courts without a re­
examination of the merits
effectiveness Does not cover
Q16 Duration of 
Trial
Average duration of a com­
mercial court case in a court 
of first instance
effectiveness Duration until 
completion of 
service of pro­
cess and Du­
ration of trial 
variables
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Q17 Perceptions of 
Court
Performance
Enforcement is not af­
fected due to courts protecting 
debtors
effectiveness Legal system is 
fair and im­
partial variable 
(WBES)
Q18 Perceptions of 
Court
Performance
Enforcement is not affected 
due to high fees
effectiveness Costs of court 
enforce­
ment (attorney 
and court fees) 
variables 
(World
Bank (2004a); 
Legal system is 
affordable vari­
able (WBES)
Q19 Perceptions of 
Court
Performance
Enforcement is not affected 
due to long court proceedings
effectiveness Total Duration 
in Practice 
variable
Q20 Duration of 
Execution
Duration of execution of a 
first-instance judgment for the 
payment of a sum of money
effectiveness Duration 
of Enforcement 
variable
Q21 Corruption 
and Crime
Frequency with which corrupt 
practices, such as bribery of 
public officials, are investi­
gated and prosecuted
effectiveness close to
Legal system is 
fair honest and 
uncorrupt vari­
able (WBES)
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Q22 Corruption 
and Crime
Insider dealing is prohibited 
by law
extensiveness Does not cover
Q23 Corruption 
and Crime
Level of crime in the most im­
portant commercial centre is 
declining
effectiveness Does not cover
Q24 Corruption 
and Crime
Level of government corrup­
tion in the most important 
commercial centre is declining
effectiveness Does not cover
Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
6.1 Summary of M ain Research Questions and 
M ethodology
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the impact of legal and institu­
tional factors upon financial development in transition economies. As a separate, 
but related, theme, it also aimed to analyse the impact of legal and institutional 
factors upon flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) into transition economies. The 
main questions we sought to answer were as follows: ”Do securities laws and regula­
tions affect stock market development in transition economies?”, "Which elements 
of securities laws and regulations matter most for stock market development and 
performance?”, ”Is there any difference between the extent of the law -  albeit per­
ceived rather than actual -  and the enforcement of the law -  again as perceived by 
lawyers?” These questions were taken up in Chapters 2 and 3. Further questions 
included the following: ’’Does banking law and the regulation and supervision of 
banks affect bank performance and lending?” , ’’Which elements of banking law and 
regulation are essential for a more liquid and deeper credit market?”, ”Is there any 
difference between bank supervisory powers -  as recorded in the law -  and their
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enforcement in practice in their effect on credit market performance?” The analysis 
of these questions took place in Chapter 4. A final set of questions was related to the 
effects of the institutional and legal environment on FDI inflows. These included: 
Does the contract enforcement environment and the work of the courts attract or 
repel foreign investors? Which elements of the process of adopting economic and 
investment-related laws relate to a decision to produce in a host transition economy, 
from the vantage point of a foreign firm? Do perceptions of how courts work mat­
ter? What elements of the regulation of court process are perceived as enhancing 
the property rights of foreign investors? To the extent that FDI has been a major 
source of finance for enterprises in transition countries, this sub-theme relates well 
to the analysis of stock market and bank performance in prior chapters.
The research undertaken to do so relied on a survey of legal practitioners based 
in 23 Central and Eastern European transition economies, including the countries 
of the CIS. The survey was implemented in the summer of 1999 as a tool to gather 
information on legal developments and legal reform in the area of economic law. 
As explained in Chapter 2, the 1999 Legal Indicator Survey (LIS) was run for the 
first time in the summer of 1999 by the Office of the General Counsel of the EBRD 
as a comprehensive questionnaire, combining the previously separate sections on 
commercial law -  including pledge, bankruptcy, company law and general commer­
cial law effectiveness (what we call contract enforcement), and on financial law -  
including securities market laws and banking laws. In this dissertation, we have 
utilised the financial part of the questionnaire -  i.e. the securities and banking laws 
sections, as well as the general commercial law effectiveness section, even though we 
have subjected the other three sections to the same comprehensive and systematic 
cleaning procedure as performed on the data used in the analysis in earlier chapters.
We must stress some of the caveats associated with the use of survey data to 
proxy for the quality and enforcement of complex financial and commercial laws.
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First, lawyers’ opinions and perceptions may differ from the actual text or position 
in the law. Therefore, our extent of law measures may not quite reflect the true 
position of the law. There is not much that can be done to correct for this -  
unless we compare all the answers for a given jurisdiction to a particular survey 
question with the actual text of the law, which applies to that question. Despite 
this, opinions diverging from the law may actually be telling us more about the law 
and its functioning than a simple read of the legal text. Thus, the Czech Republic 
does not have a collateral law, which allows for non-possessory pledges in movable 
property. However, the surveyed Czech lawyers have told us of ways that this may 
be circumvented and therefore the law text only would have been a poor guide. 
Second, lawyers may not know the exact provision of the law, or may not want to 
give a correct answer -  something which we worry about less, given the profile of 
respondents from the largest and internationally active law firms in these countries. 
Third, the law itself may be unclear or new, so that it has not been used and the 
lawyers do not know much about its use. The questionnaire allows respondents to 
choose an answer option ’’Unclear”, which exists in the menus of most LIS questions. 
Next, the questionnaire itself may not be well-designed. Survey design -  for self­
administered written questionnaires, such as the LIS -  covers many issues, such as 
how to ask questions, what type of questions to ask and what answer options to give; 
how to order questions; what answer scales to use, etc. In particular, as discussed at 
some length in Chapter 2, for perception-based qualitative questions survey designers 
should introduce appropriate answer ranges, which allow quantifying the responses. 
Finally, once survey responses are gathered, the decision of how to process these 
data and what weighting procedure to adopt in aggregating the data is crucial.
As outlined in Chapter 2, we have adopted several strategies to ensure that the 
legal survey data we work with is of a good quality. First, the respondents had 
been carefully chosen from prior runs of the survey, and were well-established law
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firm based in the transition countries -  mostly local, but also some local offices of 
international law firms. The lawyers completing the questionnaire were asked to give 
their names and also to provide comments and the texts of the law in certain cases. 
Furthermore, unlike many other surveys of lawyers or other experts, which ask just 
one law firm per country to glean information about its laws, the LIS data rely on 
several law firms’ independent answers to the questionnaire for the same jurisdiction. 
Of course, conflicting views and disagreement in answers from two law firms on one 
issue are possible, but the strategy of the EBRD had been to incorporate all answers 
in the scoring, regardless of contradictions, and without subjecting the answers -  
those related to the content of the law -  to an objective test with the actual law, 
and we have retained this strategy. An alternative way to deal with contradictory 
answers from different law firms in the same country is to adopt a ’’majority” rule, 
suitably defined, and to treat the answer with the most hits as the correct one. As 
shown in Chapter 2, adopting such a rule does not change our results.
For the purposes of employing the 1999 LIS data in this dissertation, the data 
were subjected to cleaning procedures, aimed at identifying coding errors, internal 
answer inconsistencies, and data entry errors. Furthermore, the weights assigned 
to questions with the purpose of aggregating the data in legal indices, have been 
reviewed and some of the internal weights altered to correspond better to economic 
theories being tested with the data; overall question weights have also been changed 
from prior uses of the data -  with all questions scoring equally. These modifications 
in the weights, together with the cleaning and eliminations of errors, have led to 
legal indices which are not equal to ones previously published. It is my belief that 
these steps have substantially increased the quality of the data.
To the degree that I had available the raw data from the 1999 LIS and wanted 
to utilise it directly rather than rely on the generic legal indices published by the 
EBRD (1 to 4* scale), this dissertation has also involved an effort in understanding
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and applying survey questionnaires and methodologies, as Chapter 2 attests.
6.2 Overall conclusions
1. We have established that -  subject to some caveats -  better legal extensive­
ness and enforcement of securities laws tend to have a positive impact on stock 
market development; among securities laws legal factors, the enforcement of se­
curities laws with respect to disclosure of information by issuers of securities, 
and regulation of securities market intermediaries appear to be particularly 
strong in explaining the variation in market capitalisation and turnover. En­
forcement powers of the Securities Regulator display a tendency to raise the 
turnover ratio, but not capitalisation.
2. In the set of basic stock market capitalisation regressions I controlled for 
method of privatization, economic development and macroeconomic stability. 
Controlling for these variables generally leaves our main results unchanged. 
Controlling for GDP per capita alongside the legal variables or in a two-step 
procedure generally leaves the enforcement indices significant, but not the 
extent-of-law ones.
3. The regression analysis also proposed and used a set of instrumental variables 
to account for estimation problems related to endogenous dependent and legal 
variables, omitted variables and country-specific effects. These sets of instru­
mental variables are country legal origin; legal transplant status; realizations 
of the Pistor et al. (2000) index of stock market integrity for years prior to 
1999; years spent under communism; and religion practised by the majority of 
the population. The series of IV regressions -  often conducted as robustness 
tests -  generally support the findings of the OLS regressions: i.e. all three 
securities indices per theme (disclosure, intermediary regulation, enforcement
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powers and aggregate indices) tend to have a significant positive impact on 
stock market outcomes. Several different IV sets axe tested -  and some of the 
IV regressions suffer from weak instruments, so the diagnostic tests at the sec­
ond stage are not particularly useful. The IV regression results of the market 
capitalisation and market turnover regressions differ in some instances.
4. Chapter 3 looked at disaggregated indices of securities law and regulation, 
and established that the availability of information about securities issuers, 
and the strict enforcement of rules on disclosure display a tendency to raise 
market capitalisation and turnover. Alleviating information asymmetries is 
thus beneficial for securities market development.
5. We find evidence of positive effects for stock market development of effective 
legal norms on the conduct and disclosure rules for securities market inter­
mediaries -  such as brokers, dealers, investment bankers, investment funds, 
pension funds, and others. Market intermediaries provide market liquidity, 
but also vouch for the truthfulness of disclosed issuers’ information, and thus 
help resolve problems of asymmetric information in the securities market.
6. These results -  covering a small sample of transition economies, which em­
barked upon a course of legal and financial reform in the early 1990s -  are in 
line with other related research, which covers other countries and periods, e.g. 
La Porta et al. (2003). They found that mechanisms for private enforcement 
of securities laws rather than through powerful public enforcement, enhance 
securities market development.
7. Nevertheless, given the small sample size, the difficulties of measuring stock 
market development in transition economies and in disentangling the effects 
of legal development from economic development, our results should be inter­
preted with caution. Some of the estimation techniques employed -  such as
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the IV regressions -  also indicate potential problems in instrumenting for legal 
extensiveness and enforcement, thereby adding another caveat to the results.
8. Chapter 4 studied the impact of disaggregated indices of Banking Law and 
Regulation on the availability of private credit, the penetration of foreign banks 
and the liquidity of the domestic financial system. It found evidence that pri­
vate credit expansion tends to be associated with better information disclosure 
by banks, and better accounting standards. Specifically, the results appear to 
indicate that effective external auditing of banks as well as consolidated su­
pervisory examinations of banks tend to generate benefits, most likely due to 
better private monitoring of banks, and these benefits are found to result in 
more credit to the private sector, higher liquidity and more foreign banks.
9. Our results also revealed that bank accounting rules and practices tend to 
contribute toward more effective private enforcement, and to be associated 
with more developed and liquid banking markets. It is essential to note that 
despite some ambiguities in the answers to some of the accounting-related 
questions, we do find that legal provisions on who writes the accounting rules 
-  the government or the professional accounting community -  tend to affect 
our financial market outcomes in a manner such that less reliance on the 
government appears to be associated with a better banking development.
10. We find substantial evidence that banking law provisions on foreign ownership 
and licensing tend to have a significant impact upon the volume of private 
credit, and upon foreign bank entry. Fewer restrictions on foreign ownership 
of domestic banks appear to facilitate foreign entry and are significantly asso­
ciated with more private credit in the economy.
11. In contrast to Barth et al. (2004), we find that capital adequacy rules -  mea­
sured by adherence to the Basle Capital requirements -  display a tendency to
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raise the volume of private credit, most likely through reducing bank managers’ 
risk-taking incentives and promoting banking stability.
12. Importantly, our results differ from the results of Barth et al. (2004) about 
banking supervisory powers reducing the volume of credit and being associated 
with worse financial market outcomes. Both banking supervisors’ authority to 
conduct on-site examinations and the availability of professional examiners to 
conduct these are found to be related positively to private credit, albeit the 
results are not always significant. In contrast, we do find a tendency that more 
frequent examinations of banks result in less private credit, but more tests are 
needed here to determine whether these regressions suffer from selection bias 
(i.e. examinations being associated with more troubled banks).
13. All the Banking Law regressions control for past inflation, the share of state 
banks in 1998 as a proxy for soft budget constraints and the degree of compe­
tition in the banking industry, and for availability of borrower information as 
proxied by the index of Public Credit Registry, World Bank Doing Business 
database. World Bank (2004a). The control variables enter with the expected 
signs, and are generally significant at the standard levels. The Banking Law 
variables, which are found significant, are robust to the inclusion of these con­
trol variables.
14. Robustness checks are carried out employing alternative dependent variables, 
such as the share of liquid liabilities of banks and non-bank financial interme­
diaries in GDP, and the share of commercial bank assets in the total of central 
bank and commercial bank assets. Our main results continue to hold. Fur­
thermore, our main results for the effects of information disclosure by banks 
and legal restrictions on foreign bank ownership are also robust to controlling 
for GDP per capita.
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15. Further robustness checks are done, using instrumental variables estimations, 
employing the countries’ legal origin as an instrument for the banking law 
measures. Alternative instruments included main religion, number of years 
spent under communism and legal transplant status. The IV regressions sup­
port the main findings of the OLS estimations subject to some caveats related 
to the appropriateness of the instruments.
16. An important caveat associated with the comparison of our results on Banking 
Law with the results of Barth et al. (2004) is the fact that their and our 
variables, which supposedly measure the same legal or regulatory concept, 
are not well correlated in some instances. The correlation is either too low, or 
even negative. However, in the main results regarding the impact of Disclosure 
Requirements and Private Monitoring, Supervisory Powers and Foreign Entry 
Restrictions, the key variables are well correlated and comparisons of their and 
our results are therefore possible.
17. Chapter 5 examined the impact of the contract enforceability regime and the 
work of the courts on the fiows of FDI per capita in the transition economies 
over the period 1999-2002. It found substantial evidence that a better contract 
enforcement regime -  as perceived by the respondents to the 1999 LIS -  has 
a positive impact on FDI inflows. As in previous chapters, a disaggregated 
approach was adopted to assess different aspects of the contract enforcement 
regime such as the drafting and dissemination of new laws related to the econ­
omy and investment; litigants’ rights of appeal and administrative review of 
government decisions; confidence in the courts; court performance; and the 
general perceptions of crime and corruption in the country.
18. The results suggest that FDI flows seem to benefit from a more open and 
transparent process of drafting, adopting and disseminating new laws on in­
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vestment and commercial activity. In addition, well-respected rights of appeal 
before a higher-level court also tend to increase FDI flows signiflcantly.
19. Foreign investors tend to be attracted to locations with a guaranteed judicial 
review of government decisions, and where the courts are believed to respect 
private parties’ contractual and property rights in disputes with the state, 
but not in disputes with other private parties. This suggests that in this way 
foreign investors probably reduce their risks of expropriation from the host- 
country government.^
20. The results on duration of a standard court trial in the country’s largest com­
mercial centre, as well as perceptions of speediness of court procedures are 
found to affect FDI inflows signiflcantly, but negatively. The duration of trial 
and enforcement of judgment estimates, based on the LIS respondents’ an­
swers are compared with estimates of duration of contract enforcement in a 
first-instance debt collection case based on World Bank data for 2003 (Doing 
Business database). We find a high and significant positive correlation between 
the LIS and the World Bank Doing Business data -  the Central European coun­
tries, which are leaders in attracting FDI -  tend to have the longest durations 
of court enforcement, and the worst perceptions regarding speediness of court 
procedure. We conjecture that these results may be due to institutional struc­
ture -  in the sense that many CIS countries have commercial courts, which 
may allow for faster disposition of commercial cases; the differential in dura­
tion between Central Europe and the CIS may also be due to a heavier use of 
the courts in Central European countries. More research on this is needed.
21. The FDI regressions also control for macroeconomic fundamentals, such as past
^This finding is also in line with recent empirical evidence, i.e. Acemoglu and Johnson (2003), 
about the higher explanatory power of property rights institutions over contracting institutions in 
explaining growth, investment and financial development across a sample of former colonies.
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inflation and growth, as well as distance to Western Europe. Economy size is 
also controlled for, but found insigniflcant. Controlling for GDP per capita as 
a proxy for economic development, however, affects most of our results -  the 
institutional variables lose significance once GDP per capita’s effect on FDI 
inflows has been accounted for. Therefore, we interpret our main results as 
merely suggestive.
22. The contribution of all the main thematic chapters of the thesis is to assess 
empirically various existing theories and empirical evidence about the impact 
of laws and institutions on domestic capital markets, banks and flows of for­
eign investment. The novelty is in using legal survey perception-based data, 
which provides a detailed and rich set of variables, which proxy for different 
aspects of the legal environment. Despite the fairly small sample size of about 
20 or so observations, and using simple cross-section estimation techniques, 
the chapters expand on existing knowledge about securities and banking de­
velopment in transition, by going in some further detail compared to existing 
approaches, i.e. La Porta et al. (2003), Barth et al. (2004), and by expanding 
some of the existing studies’ samples to the transition economies in the late 
1990s.
6.3 Policy Im plications
The results of this dissertation indicate that, generally -  and subject to some caveats 
linked to the survey legal data, the small sample size and the robustness of the 
main regression results -  better securities and banking laws and regulations tend to 
improve financial market performance, measured by stock market capitalisation and 
turnover, and to raise the share of private credit and liquid liabilities of the banking 
system in GDP. Through improving the performance of the financial system, legal
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and institutional development can mobilise more financial resources and allocate 
them towards their most efficient use, thereby increasing economic growth.
The transition economies have already undertaken significant reforms of their 
legal and institutional systems, and these reforms are continuing. The analysis of 
the survey data utilised in the thesis has revealed that although the laws have been 
revised substantially and new legislation adopted in all the major areas of financial 
and commercial activity, there is still scope for improvement. The main policy 
recommendations which follow from the analysis in this dissertation include:
1. Benefits could be derived -  given the evidence of Chapter 3 -  from strengthen­
ing securities market regulation, and in particular, enforcement of information 
disclosure by issuers.
2. Similarly -  given the results of Chapter 3 -  strengthening the regulation of 
securities market intermediaries such as investment brokers, investment funds, 
pension funds, and others, can enhance stock market development.
3. Improving the capabilities, resources and independence of the Securities Reg­
ulator, as well as its powers of corrective action in cases of insider dealing and 
other securities law violations can also be beneficial for market capitalisation 
and turnover.
4. Based on the analysis of Chapter 4 -  including some reservations about the 
methodology and estimations -  strengthening banking regulation, and specif­
ically improving the disclosure of financial information by banks, and imple­
menting rules on consolidated accounting and examination of banks, can yield 
benefits.
5. Relaxing bank ownership restrictions for foreign banks can improve competi­
tion and help restructure domestic banks.
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6. Implementing effectively banking laws on anti-money laundering, and endow­
ing bank supervisors with sufficient powers to ensure compliance with anti­
money-laundering legislation can be beneficial for banking markets.
7. Despite that our evidence on banking supervisory powers is somewhat incon­
clusive, it may still be useful to build the institutional capacity for effective 
bank regulation and supervision. Furthermore -  based on our results -  efforts 
should be expended to insulate banking supervision and regulation from po­
litical pressures, through budgetary independence and the term of tenure of 
the head of Bank Supervisory Authority.
8. Compliance with the Basle Capital Adequacy requirements and their effective 
enforcement should be encouraged.
9. All the Banking Law and Regulation results are also subject to limitations and 
caveats. Therefore, policy implications related to banking regulation should 
necessarily be taken with caution.
10. Policymakers should consider ways to improve the climate for foreign invest­
ment, not only through appropriate foreign investment laws, but also through 
improving the general environment for contractual compliance and enforce­
ment.
11. Based on the results of Chapter 5, legislative drafting should be transparent 
and open; new business-related laws should be published and disseminated in 
a timely manner.
12. Similarly -  based on the results of Chapter 5 -  court procedures should guar­
antee litigants’ rights of appeal against both the state and other parties.
13. Court performance -  measured by the duration of a standard case of debt
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collection, the impartiality, competence and fairness of the judge, and the cost 
of contract enforcement in court -  requires improvement.
14. Court delays appear -  as given by the LIS results and alternative sources -  
particularly problematic for Central and Eastern Europe, but not the CIS 
countries. In this regard, instituting commercial procedures in the regular 
courts, or adopting simplified procedures for straightforward cases may be the 
way to go, as also suggested by other studies, e.g. Djankov et al. (2003a), 
World Bank (2004a), and Broadman et al. (2004). Out-of-court mechanisms, 
such as mediation and arbitration, can also bring benefits in terms of reducing 
court case backlogs.
15. As in the case of Chapters 3 and 4 earlier, the results of Chapter 5 are also 
subject to some qualifications. For example, controlling for GDP per capita 
leaves most contract enforcement variables insignificant.
16. Institutional reforms may be expensive and take a long time to materialise. 
In this respect, governments may be willing to undertake such reforms, only 
if given appropriate incentives, such as within the E.U. integration process.
17. Notwithstanding the above, the estimations are subject to certain caveats, and 
all recommendations are not prescriptive but rather suggestive.
In summary, this thesis has gone into detail in analysing some of the features of 
the securities and banking laws and the environment for enforcement of commercial 
contracts and protecting property rights in transition economies. Lawyers’ percep­
tions in these areas have given us proxies for the status of legal development and 
symptoms as to what the main problems are. Given the scarcity of external finance 
to firms, the evidence presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 leads us to conclude that 
these countries could gain benefits from pursuing policies which both strengthen
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their financial regulatory environment, and improve the domestic institutional envi­
ronment for contract enforcement and property rights protection. Arguably, this can 
help domestic firm-borrowers raise finance for investment, and also attract foreign 
investors in.
6.4 Directions for Future Research
The research undertaken in this thesis contributes to a growing body of both the­
oretical, e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2003), Djankov et al. (2003b), and empirical work, 
e.g. La Porta et al. (2003), Djankov et al. (2003a), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 
2003) on the role of laws and institutions in comparative development. It has been 
summed up by a new term -  ’’The New Comparative Economics”. A subset of 
this work also relates to the use of institutional and legal proxies in other related 
fields, such as corporate finance, and the empirical growth literature. The field of 
’’New Comparative Economics” is developing at a fast pace, and part of it has been 
devoted to generating comparable cross-country data -  in most cases based on the 
coding of existing laws or learning about the laws in force and their implementation 
from practising lawyers in different countries, e.g. World Bank (2004), Pistor (2000), 
Pistor et al. (2003).
As explained in Chapter 2, methodological concerns remain with the approach 
undertaken here to study the effects of banking and securities laws on financial devel­
opment in transition economies, utilising perception-based legal survey data. One 
area of improvement for future researchers in this field, particularly with respect 
to cross-country differences in legal and institutional developments in transition, 
is to attempt gathering further data on the performance of the courts, and the 
legal system. If a survey approach is undertaken to examine the institutional en­
vironment, researchers should preferably implement their own survey instrument, 
following guidelines on survey design, rigorous sample selection, and ensuring that
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data are coded correctly. Furthermore, the consistency checks performed on the 
data from the EBRD Legal Indicator Survey suggest that data entry and survey 
implementation are prone to error. Data should always be reviewed and cleaned 
carefully for this reason.
The methodology adopted here relies on a cross-section with a limited number 
of observations. Future work on legal and institutional factors -  both for financial 
development and FDI -  should attempt to use time series and panel data, where 
possible. Those methods can shed more light on the robustness of our findings. 
Indeed, some of the recent literature on determinants of FDI is already testing 
for institutional factors, employing panel estimation techniques, e.g. Campos and 
Kinoshita (2003), Bevan and Estrin (2000), among others. The same applies to the 
literature on financial market development, e.g. Beck et al. (2000), Beck and Levine 
(2004).
In studies of the interactions of institutions and economic development, re­
searchers must be aware of econometric problems associated with endogeneity, omit­
ted variables, country-specific effects and multi-collinearity. In such cases, it is im­
perative to identify appropriate instruments, and employ suitable panel estimation 
techniques for checking the robustness of the results. In fact, a lot of the recent 
literature has identified and employed different instrument sets for current legal and 
institutional development, such as early European settler mortality in colonies as in 
Acemoglu et al. (2001), legal origin as in La Porta et al. (1998), legal transplant 
status as in Berkowitz et al. (2003), main religion as in Stulz and Williamson (2003), 
geographical latitude as in Beck et al. (2003a, 2003b), ethnic fractionalization as in 
Easterly and Levine (1997), population as in Mulligan and Shleifer (2004), etc. The 
search for good instruments will continue.
It is often problematic in the comparative literature to isolate the effect of spe­
cific institutions and laws due to generally high correlation of such variables among
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themselves, but also with economic development as measured by GDP per capita. 
This will be high on the agenda of future research as economists try to ’’unbundle” 
institutions, and understand through what channels institutions affect economic 
outcomes. Some of this research is already taking shape: for instance. Beck et 
al. (2003b) examine whether legal origin influences financial market development 
through the legal adaptability channel or the political channel; in another paper 
Beck et al. (2003a) address the question of whether today’s financial development 
of former colonies is better explained by their legal origin, or by their disease envi­
ronment encountered by the first European settlers. A recent paper by Acemoglu 
and Johnson (2003) goes a step further by distinguishing between ’’property rights 
institutions” , which protect citizens from expropriation by the government and pow­
erful elites, and ’’contracting institutions”, which enable private contracts between 
citizens. They proxy contracting institutions by the measure of legal formalism in 
Djankov et al. (2003a), and property rights institutions with measures of protection 
of citizens against government expropriation and constraints on government power. 
Using multiple instrumental variables techniques in a sample of former colonies, it 
is established that property rights institutions have a major impact upon long-run 
economic growth, investment and financial development, while contracting institu­
tions appear to have an influence on the form of financial intermediation and the 
form of regulation, but have more limited effects on growth, investment and finance. 
The authors conjecture that probably individuals can structure contracts in a way 
to avoid the adverse effects of contracting institutions, but cannot do so against the 
risk of expropriation from the government.
These are exciting times for the researchers of institutional economics -  both 
theoretical and empirical. While a lot of the groundwork has aheady been laid, 
much more work is needed to understand well how different legal and institutional 
factors affect economic variables.
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